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* [PATCH] KVM: x86: nVMX: allow RSM to restore VMXE CR4 flag
@ 2019-03-26 13:07 Vitaly Kuznetsov
  2019-03-26 13:11 ` Liran Alon
       [not found] ` <20190327192946.19128-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov @ 2019-03-26 13:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: kvm
  Cc: Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
	Jon Doron, Sean Christopherson, Liran Alon, linux-kernel

Commit 5bea5123cbf0 ("KVM: VMX: check nested state and CR4.VMXE against
SMM") introduced a check to vmx_set_cr4() forbidding to set VMXE from SMM.
The check is correct, however, there is a special case when RSM is called
to leave SMM: rsm_enter_protected_mode() is called with HF_SMM_MASK still
set and in case VMXE was set before entering SMM we're failing to return.

Resolve the issue by temporary dropping HF_SMM_MASK around set_cr4() calls
when ops->set_cr() is called from RSM.

Reported-by: Jon Doron <arilou@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Fixes: 5bea5123cbf0 ("KVM: VMX: check nested state and CR4.VMXE against SMM")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
---
- Instread of putting the temporary HF_SMM_MASK drop to
  rsm_enter_protected_mode() (as was suggested by Liran), move it to
  emulator_set_cr() modifying its interface. emulate.c seems to be
  vcpu-specifics-free at this moment, we may want to keep it this way.
- It seems that Hyper-V+UEFI on KVM is still broken, I'm observing sporadic
  hangs even with this patch. These hangs, however, seem to be unrelated to
  rsm.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c             | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 | 12 +++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
index 93c4bf598fb0..6c33caa82fa5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -203,7 +203,8 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
 	void (*set_gdt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt);
 	void (*set_idt)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt);
 	ulong (*get_cr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr);
-	int (*set_cr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val);
+	int (*set_cr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val,
+		      bool from_rsm);
 	int (*cpl)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
 	int (*get_dr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr, ulong *dest);
 	int (*set_dr)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int dr, ulong value);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index c338984c850d..a6204105d4d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2413,7 +2413,7 @@ static int rsm_enter_protected_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 		cr3 &= ~0xfff;
 	}
 
-	bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, cr3);
+	bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, cr3, true);
 	if (bad)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
@@ -2422,20 +2422,20 @@ static int rsm_enter_protected_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 	 * Then enable protected mode.	However, PCID cannot be enabled
 	 * if EFER.LMA=0, so set it separately.
 	 */
-	bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+	bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE, true);
 	if (bad)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
-	bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0);
+	bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0, true);
 	if (bad)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 
 	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) {
-		bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4);
+		bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4, true);
 		if (bad)
 			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 		if (pcid) {
-			bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, cr3 | pcid);
+			bad = ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, cr3 | pcid, true);
 			if (bad)
 				return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
 		}
@@ -2581,7 +2581,7 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 		/* Zero CR4.PCIDE before CR0.PG.  */
 		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) {
-			ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+			ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PCIDE, true);
 			cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PCIDE;
 		}
 
@@ -2595,11 +2595,12 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	/* For the 64-bit case, this will clear EFER.LMA.  */
 	cr0 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0);
 	if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
-		ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE));
+		ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0 & ~(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE),
+				  true);
 
 	/* Now clear CR4.PAE (which must be done before clearing EFER.LME).  */
 	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
-		ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE);
+		ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 4, cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PAE, true);
 
 	/* And finally go back to 32-bit mode.  */
 	efer = 0;
@@ -3131,7 +3132,7 @@ static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 	int ret;
 	u8 cpl;
 
-	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3, false))
 		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
 	ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
 	ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
@@ -3331,7 +3332,7 @@ static int emulator_do_task_switch(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 		write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc);
 	}
 
-	ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0,  ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) | X86_CR0_TS);
+	ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0,  ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) | X86_CR0_TS, false);
 	ops->set_segment(ctxt, tss_selector, &next_tss_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_TR);
 
 	if (has_error_code) {
@@ -3633,7 +3634,7 @@ static int em_movbe(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 static int em_cr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
-	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, ctxt->src.val))
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, ctxt->src.val, false))
 		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
 
 	/* Disable writeback. */
@@ -3766,7 +3767,7 @@ static int em_clts(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 	cr0 = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0);
 	cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_TS;
-	ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0);
+	ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, cr0, false);
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
@@ -3866,7 +3867,7 @@ static int em_smsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 static int em_lmsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
 	ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 0, (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & ~0x0eul)
-			  | (ctxt->src.val & 0x0f));
+			  | (ctxt->src.val & 0x0f), false);
 	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a419656521b6..f2745e3170b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -5739,7 +5739,8 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
 	return value;
 }
 
-static int emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val)
+static int emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val,
+			   bool from_rsm)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
 	int res = 0;
@@ -5755,7 +5756,16 @@ static int emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val)
 		res = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
 		break;
 	case 4:
+		/*
+		 * set_cr4() may forbid to set certain flags (e.g. VMXE) from
+		 * SMM but we're actually leaving it; temporary drop HF_SMM_MASK
+		 * when setting CR4.
+		 */
+		if (from_rsm)
+			vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK;
 		res = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr4(vcpu), val));
+		if (from_rsm)
+			vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_SMM_MASK;
 		break;
 	case 8:
 		res = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val);
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-04-10 10:32 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-03-26 13:07 [PATCH] KVM: x86: nVMX: allow RSM to restore VMXE CR4 flag Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-03-26 13:11 ` Liran Alon
2019-03-26 13:48   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-03-26 15:02     ` Liran Alon
2019-03-27 10:08       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
     [not found] ` <20190327192946.19128-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
     [not found]   ` <87va03ml7n.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>
     [not found]     ` <CALMp9eQPwFy5GvjDbE9wQQYEDdYfHzEwm6n1XZgQ_hCuk9vp+Q@mail.gmail.com>
2019-04-09  8:21       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-04-09 16:31         ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-04-10  9:38           ` [RFC] selftests: kvm: add a selftest for SMM Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-04-10 10:10             ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-04-10 10:32               ` Vitaly Kuznetsov

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