* [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
` (51 more replies)
0 siblings, 52 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module
information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
/proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
will be called for this information. The first security
module providing the hooks will be used by default.
The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
for each of the security modules that export information
outside the LSM layer.
The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
"void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
many of the interfaces cleaner.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
` (50 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++-------------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++--------------
7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a240a3fc5fc4..f9222a04968d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..550988a0f024 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -300,12 +301,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
prepare_lsm(*lsm);
- init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
- init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
- init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
- init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
- init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
- init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+ init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
+ init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
/*
* Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -603,6 +605,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sb->s_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Hook list operation macros.
*
@@ -776,12 +799,21 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
- return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sb_free(sb);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+ kfree(sb->s_security);
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
}
void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..7478d8eda00a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
if (!isec)
return;
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
/*
* As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
* empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
@@ -366,11 +366,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-
- sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sbsec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
@@ -379,18 +375,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sb->s_security = sbsec;
return 0;
}
-static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
- sb->s_security = NULL;
- kfree(sbsec);
-}
-
struct selinux_mnt_opts {
const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
};
@@ -507,7 +495,7 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
/*
* IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
@@ -535,7 +523,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
int rc = 0;
@@ -648,7 +636,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
@@ -881,8 +869,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
const struct super_block *newsb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
@@ -914,8 +902,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
int rc = 0;
- const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
- struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(oldsb);
+ struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
@@ -1085,7 +1074,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
int rc;
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
@@ -1377,7 +1366,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -1767,7 +1756,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
u32 *_new_isid)
{
- const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1798,7 +1788,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
int rc;
dsec = inode_security(dir);
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -1947,7 +1937,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
- sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
}
@@ -2578,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
}
-static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- superblock_free_security(sb);
-}
-
static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
{
bool open_quote = false;
@@ -2653,7 +2638,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
{
struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
u32 sid;
int rc;
@@ -2877,7 +2862,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
int rc;
char *context;
- sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
@@ -3115,7 +3100,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
- sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3296,13 +3281,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 newsid;
int rc;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -6647,6 +6633,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6675,7 +6662,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 231262d8eac9..d08d7e5d2f93 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ec62918521b1..e3f5d6aece66 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
struct sidtab *sidtab;
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
- struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index cf52af77d15e..caecbcba9942 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
+ const struct super_block *superblock)
+{
+ return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
+}
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5c1613519d5a..807eff2ccce9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
*/
static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
-
- sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (sbsp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
/*
* SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
*/
- sb->s_security = sbsp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
- * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
- *
- */
-static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- kfree(sb->s_security);
- sb->s_security = NULL;
-}
-
struct smack_mnt_opts {
const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
};
@@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
{
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
- struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
struct inode_smack *isp;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
@@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
*/
static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
return 0;
- sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
return 0;
@@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*/
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
int rc;
@@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
- struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
@@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
- sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
return -EACCES;
@@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
goto unlockandout;
sbp = inode->i_sb;
- sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
/*
* We're going to use the superblock default label
* if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:17 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
` (49 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f9222a04968d..b353482ea348 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_cred;
int lbs_file;
int lbs_inode;
+ int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
int lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 7334ac966d01..adac04e3b3cc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *peer;
};
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 49d664ddff44..2716e7731279 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
return error;
}
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
- if (!ctx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
- SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
- kfree(ctx);
}
/**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
- struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!skb->secmark)
return 0;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
};
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ ctx = aa_sock(sk);
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
skb->secmark, sk))
return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 550988a0f024..e32b7180282e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
}
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
}
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+ sock->sk_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+ if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sk_free(sk);
+ return rc;
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7478d8eda00a..f38a6f484613 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4376,7 +4376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
if (sock->sk) {
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
sksec->sclass = sclass;
sksec->sid = sid;
/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4392,8 +4392,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4408,7 +4408,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family;
int err;
@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4711,9 +4711,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
@@ -4745,8 +4745,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4788,7 +4788,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
int err = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4889,13 +4889,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ __user char *optval,
+ __user int *optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -4955,34 +4957,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
- sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
- if (!sksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
- sk->sk_security = sksec;
return 0;
}
static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
- sk->sk_security = NULL;
selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
- kfree(sksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -4996,7 +4991,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
if (!sk)
*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
else {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
*secid = sksec->sid;
}
@@ -5006,7 +5001,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec =
inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5021,7 +5016,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5172,8 +5167,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
* the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5190,7 +5185,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
int err;
u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
u32 connsid;
@@ -5211,7 +5206,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->sid = req->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5228,7 +5223,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5312,7 +5307,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
* isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5353,7 +5348,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int err = 0;
u32 perm;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -5494,7 +5489,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5533,7 +5528,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5625,7 +5620,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 skb_sid;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
return NF_DROP;
/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5654,7 +5649,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
} else {
/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
* associated socket. */
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
@@ -6633,6 +6628,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d08d7e5d2f93..29f02b8f8f31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
const struct sock *sk,
u32 sid)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk != NULL) {
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
return 0;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
{
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (family == PF_INET)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
}
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
{
int rc = 0;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addr)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index caecbcba9942..4ac4bf3310d7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
}
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+ return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
const struct super_block *superblock)
{
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 807eff2ccce9..fd69e1bd841b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
/*
* If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2231,11 +2231,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
- ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
- if (ssp == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
/*
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2249,11 +2245,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
}
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
- sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
return 0;
}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
@@ -2262,7 +2257,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
*/
static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
struct smk_port_label *spp;
if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2275,9 +2269,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-#endif
- kfree(sk->sk_security);
}
+#endif
/**
* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2395,7 +2388,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -2440,7 +2433,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
struct smack_known *hkp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smk_port_label *spp;
unsigned short port = 0;
@@ -2603,7 +2596,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
int act)
{
struct smk_port_label *spp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
unsigned short port;
struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2697,7 +2690,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2745,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
*/
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
}
@@ -2770,8 +2763,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
struct socket *sockb)
{
- struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2825,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
return 0;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
#endif
switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
@@ -3566,9 +3559,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_known *okp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3614,8 +3607,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
*/
static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3652,7 +3645,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
#endif
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
struct smack_known *rsp;
#endif
int rc = 0;
@@ -3817,7 +3810,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3934,7 +3927,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
int slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -3984,7 +3977,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
break;
case PF_INET:
@@ -3997,7 +3990,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
- ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4035,7 +4028,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
ssp->smk_in = skp;
ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4055,7 +4048,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
struct smack_known *skp;
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4154,7 +4147,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
struct smack_known *skp;
if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4558,6 +4551,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+ .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
};
@@ -4667,7 +4661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct smack_known *skp;
- if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
- ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+ ssp = smack_sock(sk);
skp = ssp->smk_out;
skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:18 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
` (48 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Move management of the key->security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++-------------
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++
security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++-------------
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b353482ea348..3fe39abccc8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
int lbs_sock;
int lbs_superblock;
int lbs_ipc;
+ int lbs_key;
int lbs_msg_msg;
int lbs_task;
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e32b7180282e..d05f00a40e82 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ init_debug("key blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+/**
+ * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
+ * @key: the key that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_key == 0) {
+ key->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ key->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (key->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/**
* lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
* @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_key_free(key);
+ return rc;
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
{
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+ kfree(key->security);
+ key->security = NULL;
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f38a6f484613..ee840fecfebb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct key_security_struct *ksec;
-
- ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ksec)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
else
ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
- k->security = ksec;
return 0;
}
-static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
-{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
-
- k->security = NULL;
- kfree(ksec);
-}
-
static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred,
unsigned perm)
@@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
sid = cred_sid(cred);
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- ksec = key->security;
+ ksec = selinux_key(key);
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
@@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+ struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
char *context = NULL;
unsigned len;
int rc;
@@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 29f02b8f8f31..3b78aa4ee98f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
{
return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 4ac4bf3310d7..7cc3a3382fee 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
/*
* Is the directory transmuting?
*/
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fd69e1bd841b..e9560b078efe 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- key->security = skp;
+ *blob = skp;
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
- * @key: the object
- *
- * Clear the blob pointer
- */
-static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
- key->security = NULL;
-}
-
/**
* smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
* @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
+ struct smack_known **blob;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
@@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
* it may do so.
*/
- if (keyp->security == NULL)
+ blob = smack_key(keyp);
+ skp = *blob;
+ if (skp == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* This should not occur
@@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
request |= MAY_READ;
if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
request |= MAY_WRITE;
- rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+ rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
*/
static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+ struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
+ struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
size_t length;
char *copy;
- if (key->security == NULL) {
+ if (skp == NULL) {
*_buffer = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (47 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
When more than one security module is exporting data to
audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
structure to be used instead.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..81f9f79f9a1e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -76,6 +76,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
};
+/* Data exported by the security modules */
+struct lsm_export {
+ u32 selinux;
+ u32 smack;
+ u32 apparmor;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
+#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 1:57 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (46 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 13 +++++++++++--
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3fe39abccc8f..09573c55e535 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@
* @inode_getsecid:
* Get the secid associated with the node.
* @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * @data contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
* @inode_copy_up:
* A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer_size);
- void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *data);
int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 81f9f79f9a1e..fb19f41d630b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ struct lsm_export {
#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d05f00a40e82..a1f28a5e582b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -712,6 +712,36 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1389,7 +1419,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ee840fecfebb..0e31be22d9bb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -213,6 +213,15 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
+/*
+ * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->selinux = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3316,15 +3325,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
return len;
}
-static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+
+ selinux_export_secid(l, isec->sid);
}
static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
{
- u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export l;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct cred *new_creds = *new;
@@ -3336,8 +3346,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
- selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
- tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ lsm_export_init(&l);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &l);
+ tsec->create_sid = l.selinux;
*new = new_creds;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e9560b078efe..5e345122ccb1 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -466,6 +466,15 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * Set the Smack secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->smack = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1481,11 +1490,11 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
* @inode: inode to extract the info from
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
}
/*
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (45 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the cred_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_cred_getsecid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 6 ++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 09573c55e535..0f9d4174bb6e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -572,7 +572,8 @@
* Transfer data from original creds to new creds
* @cred_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c
- * @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid.
+ * @c contains the credentials
+ * @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
@@ -1596,7 +1597,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
- void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+ void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a1f28a5e582b..ca485a777ca1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1638,8 +1638,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0e31be22d9bb..f97dd414ac8d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3764,9 +3764,9 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*tsec = *old_tsec;
}
-static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = cred_sid(c);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, cred_sid(c));
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5e345122ccb1..15579bdd7244 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1980,13 +1980,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
rcu_read_lock();
skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
` (44 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the cred_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks to use the
lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some
scaffolding involved that will be removed when
security_ipc_getsecid() and security_task_getsecid() are
updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++++----
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++++++++++--
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++++++----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0f9d4174bb6e..62783a923136 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @l.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* @task_setnice:
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@
* @ipc_getsecid:
* Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
@@ -1610,7 +1610,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
- void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+ void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
- void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 2716e7731279..706e5ae09170 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ int apparmor_initialized;
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
+/*
+ * Set the AppArmor secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void apparmor_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->apparmor = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
/*
* LSM hook functions
@@ -710,10 +718,10 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return;
}
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
- *secid = label->secid;
+ apparmor_export_secid(l, label->secid);
aa_put_label(label);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ca485a777ca1..802557ff6f60 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1722,8 +1722,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
@@ -1805,8 +1807,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f97dd414ac8d..c82108793fb5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3911,9 +3911,9 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}
-static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = task_sid(p);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, task_sid(p));
}
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -6094,10 +6094,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
-static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
- *secid = isec->sid;
+
+ selinux_export_secid(l, isec->sid);
}
static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 15579bdd7244..13ac3045a388 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2087,11 +2087,11 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*
* Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
*/
-static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
}
/**
@@ -3231,12 +3231,12 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
* @ipp: the object permissions
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
-static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
- *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, iskp->smk_secid);
}
/**
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
` (43 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 62783a923136..800040050032 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@
* @kernel_act_as:
* Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
* @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @l specifies the security data to be set
* The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
* Return 0 if successful.
* @kernel_create_files_as:
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ union security_list_options {
gfp_t gfp);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 802557ff6f60..3a766755b722 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -742,6 +742,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
}
}
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1647,7 +1656,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82108793fb5..b88a51b6ca41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
}
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
@@ -3773,19 +3781,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
*/
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
+ u32 nsid;
u32 sid = current_sid();
int ret;
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &nsid);
+
ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, secid,
+ sid, nsid,
SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
- tsec->sid = secid;
+ tsec->sid = nsid;
tsec->create_sid = 0;
tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 13ac3045a388..3b77a0324c3d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -475,6 +475,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
}
+static inline void smack_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK)
+ *secid = l->smack;
+ else
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -1997,10 +2005,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ u32 secid;
struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
` (42 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the getpeersec_dgram hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_getpeersec_dgram()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++--
5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 800040050032..bcc628cffe6a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@
* ancillary message type.
* @sock contains the peer socket. May be NULL.
* @skb is the sk_buff for the packet being queried. May be NULL.
- * @secid pointer to store the secid of the packet.
+ * @l is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
* Return 0 on success, error on failure.
* @sk_alloc_security:
* Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
@@ -1702,7 +1702,8 @@ union security_list_options {
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 706e5ae09170..24b638bd4305 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1096,7 +1096,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
/* TODO: requires secid support */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3a766755b722..2f1355d10e0d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2145,10 +2145,17 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
optval, optlen, len);
}
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 *secid)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- skb, secid);
+ int rc;
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ &data);
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b88a51b6ca41..9db12f6b1221 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4949,7 +4949,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
u16 family;
@@ -4971,7 +4973,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
out:
- *secid = peer_secid;
+ selinux_export_secid(l, peer_secid);
if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3b77a0324c3d..3e3724bbd6ea 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3973,7 +3973,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -4024,7 +4025,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
#endif
break;
}
- *secid = s;
+ smack_export_secid(l, s);
if (s == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (41 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the audit_rule_match hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is quite a bit of scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_audit_rule_match()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
security/security.c | 7 ++++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 -----------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +++--
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +++++--
11 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index bcc628cffe6a..01296e4ce474 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@
* @audit_rule_match:
* Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
* by @audit_rule_known.
- * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @l points to the security data in question.
* @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
* @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
* @lrule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
@@ -1778,7 +1778,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule);
int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 5a8b9cded4f2..bea59bfad332 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
struct aa_label *label;
int found = 0;
- label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
if (!label)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index ee559bc2acb8..372ba4fada9c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,6 +192,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index fa2062711b63..c283c620efe3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct aa_label;
/* secid value that matches any other secid */
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
-struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 05373d9a3d6a..1546c45a2a18 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -61,9 +61,12 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label)
*
* see label for inverse aa_label_to_secid
*/
-struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
+struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
+ u32 secid;
+
+ secid = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) ? l->apparmor : 0;
rcu_read_lock();
label = idr_find(&aa_secids, secid);
@@ -72,12 +75,22 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
return label;
}
+static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->flags = LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+ l->apparmor = secid;
+}
+
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
- struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+ struct lsm_export data;
+ struct aa_label *label;
int len;
+ aa_import_secid(&data, secid);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(&data);
+
AA_BUG(!seclen);
if (!label)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2f1355d10e0d..60dd064c0531 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2477,7 +2477,12 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ int rc;
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
+ return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9db12f6b1221..bfd0f1f5979f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -213,23 +213,6 @@ static void cred_init_security(void)
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
}
-/*
- * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
- */
-static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
-{
- l->selinux = secid;
- l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
-{
- if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
- *secid = l->selinux;
- else
- *secid = SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
/*
* get the security ID of a set of credentials
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 682e2b5de2a4..92dd5ab15fb2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @l: points to the context ID to check
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3b78aa4ee98f..59a3b1cd5ba9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -50,6 +50,23 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
return tsec->sid;
}
+/*
+ * Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure
+ */
+static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+{
+ l->selinux = secid;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 *secid)
+{
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX)
+ *secid = l->selinux;
+ else
+ *secid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
enum label_initialized {
LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e3f5d6aece66..626b877363fb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3395,13 +3395,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
+ u32 sid;
if (unlikely(!rule)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
@@ -3415,6 +3417,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
goto out;
}
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &sid);
+
ctxt = sidtab_search(state->ss->sidtab, sid);
if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3e3724bbd6ea..a3776501965d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4369,7 +4369,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
/**
* smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
- * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @l: security id for identifying the object to test
* @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
* @op: required testing operator
* @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
@@ -4377,10 +4377,12 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
* whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
*/
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *vrule)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;
+ u32 secid;
if (unlikely(!rule)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
@@ -4390,6 +4392,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return 0;
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
/*
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (40 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the secid_to_secctx hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_secid_to_secctx()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 6 ++----
security/security.c | 5 ++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 +++++++--
6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 01296e4ce474..433d98dcb928 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@
* This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
* secdata.
- * @secid contains the security ID.
+ * @l points to the security information.
* @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
* context.
* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index c283c620efe3..03369183f512 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 1546c45a2a18..ab4dc165e43e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,15 +81,13 @@ static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
- struct lsm_export data;
struct aa_label *label;
int len;
- aa_import_secid(&data, secid);
- label = aa_secid_to_label(&data);
+ label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
AA_BUG(!seclen);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 60dd064c0531..adf4cb768665 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2002,7 +2002,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+ struct lsm_export data;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index bfd0f1f5979f..16d902158e8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6301,8 +6301,12 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
+ u32 secid;
+
+ selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
secdata, seclen);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a3776501965d..809af981f14c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4433,9 +4433,14 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ u32 secid;
+
+ smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
if (secdata)
*secdata = skp->smk_known;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
` (39 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert the secctx_to_secid hooks to use the lsm_export
structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
involved that will be removed when security_secctx_to_secid()
is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++++---
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 3 ++-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 9 +++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++++++++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++---
6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 433d98dcb928..0837c214cc17 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1324,8 +1324,8 @@
* context.
* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
- * Convert security context to secid.
- * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ * Convert security context to exported lsm data.
+ * @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
* @secdata contains the security context.
*
* @release_secctx:
@@ -1666,7 +1666,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
u32 *seclen);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 03369183f512..5381eff03d4f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ struct aa_label;
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index ab4dc165e43e..69d98a89db75 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)
return label;
}
-static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
+static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
{
- l->flags = LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+ l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
l->apparmor = secid;
}
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
return 0;
}
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
- *secid = label->secid;
+ aa_export_secid(l, label->secid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index adf4cb768665..1645ebe06715 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2012,8 +2012,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = 0;
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+ struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &data);
+ lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 16d902158e8a..7dd333f133db 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6311,10 +6311,16 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
secdata, seclen);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
- secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ u32 secid;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+ &secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ selinux_export_secid(l, secid);
+ return rc;
}
static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 809af981f14c..ecd636e5c75c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4456,14 +4456,15 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
if (skp)
- *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
else
- *secid = 0;
+ smack_export_secid(l, 0);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
` (38 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that
will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++--
security/security.c | 48 ++---------------------------
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fb19f41d630b..ea2c6c4e88db 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 63f8b3f26fab..15771102919d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d1eab1d4a930..822ba35e4e64 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
}
@@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..090ef8ceb116 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1645ebe06715..1e819ecf26ff 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -712,45 +712,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -2482,14 +2443,11 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
` (37 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_kernel_act_as to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index efb6edf32de7..9305298eca17 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsm_export;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsm_export *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ea2c6c4e88db..7369cdc3a681 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 45d77284aed0..40a3fde22667 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @l: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1e819ecf26ff..edaaaef54239 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1615,13 +1615,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
-
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &data);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, l);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
` (36 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_socket_getpeersec_dgram to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
In particular, the le entry in scm_cookie includes the secid
data. The secid will go away.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +++-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 13 ++++---------
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7369cdc3a681..e3f5c61b9b2c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1270,7 +1270,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1408,7 +1409,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 1ce365f4c256..13b8a369fd89 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
+ struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -46,7 +47,8 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
+ security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 82f341e84fae..b8ef7677a7e5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -130,14 +130,16 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
u32 seclen, secid;
int err;
- err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &secid);
+ err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index edaaaef54239..d8300a6400c3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2110,16 +2110,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
- &data);
-
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb,
+ l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (35 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 4 +---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 8 ++++++--
security/security.c | 11 ++++-------
6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e3f5c61b9b2c..991d2d2e290e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1220,7 +1221,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *secle
static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
u32 seclen,
- u32 *secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 40a3fde22667..7792538b1ca6 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
struct lsm_export le;
- u32 secid;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &le);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
return set_security_override(new, &le);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 987d2d6ce624..598bea8e4799 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -576,13 +576,15 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &tmp_secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
if (err)
return err;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &tmp_secid);
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index f16202d26c20..2def8d8898e6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
- &info->secid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &info->secid);
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c92894c3e40a..fc38934ccb35 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -919,10 +920,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
&audit_info);
@@ -947,6 +949,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -968,10 +971,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &secid);
+ &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
&audit_info);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d8300a6400c3..868e9ae6b48c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1967,14 +1967,11 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
- return rc;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 18/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (34 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++-
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +---
kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 ++++++---
security/security.c | 8 ++------
13 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8685882da64c..9119333f794b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 991d2d2e290e..5cea6260bbd9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
*secid = data->apparmor;
break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ /* For scaffolding only */
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
default:
pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
data->flags);
@@ -436,7 +440,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1214,7 +1218,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 13b8a369fd89..b5d1c24318e3 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c89ea48c70a6..b5d96a0320fb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 822ba35e4e64..83aba0336eac 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -946,6 +946,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -955,7 +956,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1197,7 +1199,9 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_export le;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1348,9 +1352,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index b8ef7677a7e5..a4f37ba6dbe2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,15 +132,14 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 66c596d287a5..b069277450c5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index c2ae14c720b4..12318026d8d4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0dcc3592d053..4c74c383e26b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index fc38934ccb35..00922f55dd9e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1092,6 +1100,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1146,7 +1155,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 4676f5bb16ae..1079cdea872c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ddb838a1b74c..4d4107927ba2 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -143,17 +143,20 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ u32 best_secid;
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
+ return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 868e9ae6b48c..b6a096be95ac 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1957,13 +1957,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- struct lsm_export data;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
- seclen);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 18/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 19/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (33 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_ipc_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5cea6260bbd9..6ac48c7c4a41 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1096,9 +1096,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 83aba0336eac..eabbf78fee96 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2266,11 +2266,13 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_export le;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->ipc.osid);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b6a096be95ac..6ba1187c9655 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1775,12 +1775,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, l);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 19/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 18/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (32 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_task_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/audit.c | 4 ++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +---
kernel/auditsc.c | 18 +++++++++++-------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 4 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
10 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 9119333f794b..0eeb5b75da5b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->priority = task_nice(current);
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &le);
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6ac48c7c4a41..ae4c058abc5e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1023,9 +1023,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index b5d96a0320fb..fa4c5544eb37 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2078,11 +2078,11 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 15771102919d..468dac2bdce5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
@@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index eabbf78fee96..b06ffcf9bb9f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->lsm_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &le);
need_sid = 0;
}
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
@@ -2362,12 +2360,14 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+ struct lsm_export le;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->target_sid);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2384,6 +2384,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2394,7 +2395,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
@@ -2407,7 +2409,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &ctx->target_sid);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2428,7 +2431,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 00922f55dd9e..7f245d593c8f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1554,11 +1554,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct lsm_export le;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info.secid);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 4a397cde1a48..2dbc4276bdcc 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,10 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info->secid);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 5fb7127bbe68..be714afc9fd2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 357edd140c09..1e3cfaf0ee5c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -336,9 +336,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -363,8 +365,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
@@ -388,8 +392,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
@@ -500,6 +506,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -521,7 +528,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
}
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6ba1187c9655..22ea709593f3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1690,12 +1690,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
-void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 19/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 21/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
` (31 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_inode_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +---
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ae4c058abc5e..2d04687c3fa9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
@@ -852,9 +852,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
- *secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(l);
}
static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b06ffcf9bb9f..71daead619e5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1908,13 +1908,16 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &name->osid);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 090ef8ceb116..280f2410e551 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
- u32 osid;
struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 22ea709593f3..e12ce930dfd9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1387,12 +1387,10 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, l);
}
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 21/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
` (30 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_cred_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 8 +++-----
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2d04687c3fa9..40aa7b9f3c83 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsm_export *l);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1e3cfaf0ee5c..f5efa9ef270d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (ret)
return ret;
- security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
+ security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
+ lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e12ce930dfd9..69983ad68233 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1604,12 +1604,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
-void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
-
- call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &data);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, secid);
+ lsm_export_init(l);
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 21/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 2:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 23/58] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
` (29 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Remove lsm_export scaffolding around audit_sig_sid by
changing the u32 secid into an lsm_export structure named
audit_sig_lsm.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
kernel/audit.c | 18 ++++++++----------
kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +--
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 40aa7b9f3c83..e76d7a9dbe50 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
+{
+ return (((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX) && l->selinux) ||
+ ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK) && l->smack) ||
+ ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
+}
+
/**
* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
* @data: the containing data structure
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index fa4c5544eb37..5226e2af9498 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_limit = 64;
static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
-kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
-pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
-u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
+pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
+struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;
/* Records can be lost in several ways:
0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
- struct lsm_export le;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+ &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- if (audit_sig_sid)
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm))
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
- if (audit_sig_sid) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 958d5b8fc1b3..64498850c52b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid;
-extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
+extern struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;
extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 71daead619e5..41f540037a93 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2398,8 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = auid;
else
audit_sig_uid = uid;
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_lsm);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 23/58] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 24/58] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
` (28 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert target_sid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to target_lsm to be
descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 30 ++++++++++++------------------
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 64498850c52b..e2e6fa911f9c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t target_auid;
kuid_t target_uid;
unsigned int target_sessionid;
- u32 target_sid;
+ struct lsm_export target_lsm;
char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 41f540037a93..75d181029d40 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
- u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+ struct lsm_export target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
int pid_count;
};
@@ -937,14 +937,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
}
static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
- kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
- u32 sid, char *comm)
+ kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+ unsigned int sessionid,
+ struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
- struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -953,9 +953,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1525,7 +1524,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
- axs->target_sid[i],
+ &axs->target_lsm[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
@@ -1534,7 +1533,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
- context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+ &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1711,7 +1710,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->aux = NULL;
context->aux_pids = NULL;
context->target_pid = 0;
- context->target_sid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(&context->target_lsm);
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -2363,14 +2362,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsm_export le;
context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_lsm);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2387,7 +2384,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t);
- struct lsm_export le;
if (auditd_test_task(t) &&
(sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2411,8 +2407,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_lsm);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2433,8 +2428,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- security_task_getsecid(t, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 24/58] Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 23/58] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
` (27 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert osid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to olsm to be
descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 4 +---
kernel/audit.h | 4 ++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 36 ++++++++++++------------------------
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5226e2af9498..d83d1f05c95d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2073,12 +2073,10 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
char *ctx = NULL;
unsigned len;
int error;
- u32 sid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &sid);
- if (!sid)
+ if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index e2e6fa911f9c..7d2fcdf0bc94 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export olsm;
struct audit_cap_data fcap;
unsigned int fcap_ver;
unsigned char type; /* record type */
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
umode_t mode;
- u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export olsm;
int has_perm;
uid_t perm_uid;
gid_t perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 75d181029d40..d64775f4bb1b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -645,17 +645,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- &le,
+ &name->olsm,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- &le,
+ &n->olsm,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -667,8 +665,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
- if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.olsm,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule))
++result;
@@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
context->socketcall.args[i]);
break; }
case AUDIT_IPC: {
- u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
+ struct lsm_export *l = &context->ipc.olsm;
audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
- if (osid) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
@@ -1346,14 +1341,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
- if (n->osid != 0) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
@@ -1907,16 +1900,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
{
- struct lsm_export le;
-
name->ino = inode->i_ino;
name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
name->mode = inode->i_mode;
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- security_inode_getsecid(inode, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->olsm);
if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
name->fcap_ver = -1;
return;
@@ -2266,13 +2256,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
- struct lsm_export le;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
- security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &context->ipc.osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 24/58] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 2:06 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 26/58] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (26 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Clean out the scaffolding used in the lsm_export transition.
This requires changing some of the IMA internal interfaces
from u32 to struct lsm_export pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +++++----
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++-----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++++-------
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..8b109ad0de2e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks {
};
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c7505fb122d4..7e493af96134 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @l: LAM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, int mask, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int *pcr)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, l, func, mask, flags, pcr);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index be714afc9fd2..ba64b0b61383 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
*/
int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &le, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f5efa9ef270d..22b973e743fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsm_export *l, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr);
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, l, mask, func, &pcr);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -335,13 +335,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
*/
int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -364,19 +362,16 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &le, NULL, 0,
MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
@@ -392,12 +387,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -506,7 +499,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
@@ -530,8 +522,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &le, buf, size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 280f2410e551..fae4718d24f9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
* Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
*/
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l,
enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
{
int i;
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(l,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @l: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
- enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsm_export *l, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags, int *pcr)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask))
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, l, func, mask))
continue;
action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 26/58] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 27/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
` (25 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Store a lsm_export structure in the UDS control information
instead of a single secid.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 +++------
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e76d7a9dbe50..9d8115b3d679 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -100,6 +100,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
}
+static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
+{
+ if (l->flags != m->flags || l->flags == LSM_EXPORT_NONE)
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX &&
+ (l->selinux != m->selinux || l->selinux == 0))
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK &&
+ (l->smack != m->smack || l->smack == 0))
+ return false;
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR &&
+ (l->apparmor != m->apparmor || l->apparmor == 0))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
/**
* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
* @data: the containing data structure
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
index 3426d6dacc45..c1612d4b191c 100644
--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
kgid_t gid;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Security ID */
+ struct lsm_export le; /* LSM data */
#endif
u32 consumed;
} __randomize_layout;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 4d4107927ba2..222929693867 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -143,20 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
+ UNIXCB(skb).le = scm->le;
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ scm->le = UNIXCB(skb).le;
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- u32 best_secid;
-
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
- return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ return lsm_export_equal(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).le));
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 27/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 26/58] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 28/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
` (24 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Replace the lsm_export scaffolding in xt_SECMARK.c
This raises an issue, in that Smack users have been
using SECMARK_MODE_SEL, which is suppoed to be exclusively
for SELinux. This is worked around in the code, but not
fully addressed.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 2def8d8898e6..9a2a97c200a2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
@@ -63,7 +64,12 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
return err;
}
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &info->secid);
+ /* Smack is cheating, using SECMARK_MODE_SEL */
+ if (le.selinux)
+ info->secid = le.selinux;
+ else
+ info->secid = le.smack;
+
if (!info->secid) {
pr_info_ratelimited("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n",
info->secctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 28/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 27/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 29/58] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (23 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Replace the lsm_export scaffolding in nft_meta.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index 598bea8e4799..a1d3dab5bc25 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -580,11 +580,17 @@ static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
if (err)
return err;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &tmp_secid);
+ /* Use the "best" secid */
+ if (le.selinux)
+ tmp_secid = le.selinux;
+ else
+ tmp_secid = le.smack;
+
if (!tmp_secid)
return -ENOENT;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 29/58] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 28/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 30/58] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (22 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Remove scaffolding functions from the netfilter code.
Replace with direct access to lsm_export fields so as
to be explicit about how the secmarks are being
handled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 12 ++++++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++++++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 6 +++++-
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index b069277450c5..d10cc1924e46 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -332,7 +332,11 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -619,7 +623,11 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
int len, ret;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 12318026d8d4..d353f3efc5a5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -177,7 +177,12 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ /* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = ct->secmark;
+ le.smack = ct->secmark;
+
ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 4c74c383e26b..a0670137477b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -317,7 +317,11 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
if (skb->secmark) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
+ /* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.selinux = skb->secmark;
+ le.smack = skb->secmark;
security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 30/58] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 29/58] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 31/58] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
` (21 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert to lsm_export structures instead of u32 secids.
Clean out the associated scaffolding. This requires changes
to several internal interfaces, but no change in behavior.
Change the LOC tag type to pass an lsm_export instead of
a single u32. As this tag is only used locally there is
no change to externally exposed interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 ++---
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 ++++---
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 65 ++++++++++++-------------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 +--
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 9 +++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 ++++--
11 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 72d6435fc16c..546c75f27d05 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;
/* NetLabel audit information */
struct netlbl_audit {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
kuid_t loginuid;
unsigned int sessionid;
};
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {
* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label
* @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap
* @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level
- * @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token
+ * @attr.le: LSM specific data
*
* Description:
* This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
u32 lvl;
} mls;
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
} attr;
};
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index f0165c5f376b..1defea2488b3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -122,13 +122,16 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;
*
* 0 8 16 24 32
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value |
+ * | 10000000 | 00000110 | SELinux secid |
* +----------+----------+----------+----------+
- * | in (host byte order)|
+ * | Smack secid | AppArmor secid |
+ * +----------+----------+----------+----------+
+ * | LSM export flags |
* +----------+----------+
*
+ * All secid and flag fields are in host byte order.
*/
-#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6
+#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsm_export))
/*
* Helper Functions
@@ -1481,7 +1484,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
- *(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+ memcpy(&buffer[2], &secattr->attr.le, sizeof(secattr->attr.le));
return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
}
@@ -1501,7 +1504,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *tag,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
- secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+ memcpy(&secattr->attr.le, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.le));
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index ee3e5b6471a6..849064422e0b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u16 family,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
u32 addr_len;
@@ -243,8 +243,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
}
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
- secid, audit_info);
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, l, audit_info);
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 7f245d593c8f..f79ab91bf25e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_af4list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
- u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_af6list list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in_addr *addr,
const struct in_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->le = *l;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
const struct in6_addr *addr,
const struct in6_addr *mask,
- u32 secid)
+ struct lsm_export *l)
{
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
entry->list.mask = *mask;
entry->list.valid = 1;
- entry->secid = secid;
+ entry->le = *l;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -422,7 +421,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, l);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
- ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+ ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, l);
if (audit_buf != NULL)
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
dev_name,
@@ -452,10 +451,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
@@ -490,7 +486,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -510,10 +505,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -555,7 +548,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -574,10 +566,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
- if (entry != NULL)
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -903,7 +893,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -932,9 +921,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &le,
&audit_info);
}
@@ -956,7 +944,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *addr;
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
- u32 secid;
struct lsm_export le;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -983,10 +970,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
return netlbl_unlhsh_add(&init_net,
- NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, secid,
- &audit_info);
+ NULL, addr, mask, addr_len, &le, &audit_info);
}
/**
@@ -1097,10 +1082,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
void *data;
- u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1138,7 +1122,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr4->secid;
+ lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr4->le;
} else {
ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1152,11 +1136,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
- secid = addr6->secid;
+ lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr6->le;
}
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1501,26 +1484,30 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
case PF_INET: {
struct iphdr *hdr4;
struct netlbl_af4list *addr4;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
hdr4 = ip_hdr(skb);
addr4 = netlbl_af4list_search(hdr4->saddr,
&iface->addr4_list);
if (addr4 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->secid;
+ lep = &netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(addr4)->le;
+ secattr->attr.le = *lep;
break;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6: {
struct ipv6hdr *hdr6;
struct netlbl_af6list *addr6;
+ struct lsm_export *lep;
hdr6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
addr6 = netlbl_af6list_search(&hdr6->saddr,
&iface->addr6_list);
if (addr6 == NULL)
goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel;
- secattr->attr.secid = netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->secid;
+ lep = &netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(addr6)->le;
+ secattr->attr.le = *lep;
break;
}
#endif /* IPv6 */
@@ -1554,13 +1541,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
int ret_val;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
- struct lsm_export le;
/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
* it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
* messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info.secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.le);
audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
audit_info.sessionid = 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 3a9e5dc9511b..0803f1e6e3c1 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
const void *addr,
const void *mask,
u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
+ struct lsm_export *l,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
const char *dev_name,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 1079cdea872c..2cc96305c841 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
- struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -113,9 +112,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
- lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
- if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &secctx,
+ &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 2dbc4276bdcc..ee73711e0756 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,10 +48,7 @@
static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- struct lsm_export le;
-
- security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &audit_info->secid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->le);
audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index c40914a157b7..4bbd50237a8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
return NULL;
if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
- (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+ (secattr->attr.le.selinux == sid))
return secattr;
return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 626b877363fb..8a197b387056 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3596,8 +3596,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
- else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
- *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID &&
+ (secattr->attr.le.flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX))
+ *sid = secattr->attr.le.selinux;
else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
rc = -EIDRM;
ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3670,7 +3671,9 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
if (secattr->domain == NULL)
goto out;
- secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ lsm_export_init(&secattr->attr.le);
+ secattr->attr.le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
+ secattr->attr.le.selinux = sid;
secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ecd636e5c75c..38ea48d22547 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3756,11 +3756,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
return &smack_known_web;
return &smack_known_star;
}
- if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0 &&
+ (sap->attr.le.flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK))
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.le.smack);
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index faf2ea3968b3..28c567465f6c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ nap->le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ nap->le.smack = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
@@ -1150,6 +1151,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct lsm_export le;
struct smk_net4addr *snp;
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char *smack;
@@ -1281,10 +1283,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
* this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
* but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
*/
- if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+ lsm_export_init(&le);
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.smack = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
- snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+ &le, &audit_info);
+ }
if (rc == 0)
rc = count;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 31/58] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 30/58] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 32/58] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
` (20 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
The scaffolding functions lsm_export_secid and lsm_export_to_all
are no longer required. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 43 ----------------------------------------
1 file changed, 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9d8115b3d679..dde36e850cf0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -116,49 +116,6 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
return true;
}
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- /* For scaffolding only */
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 32/58] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 31/58] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 33/58] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
` (19 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Fix the prototype on a function stub
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 8b109ad0de2e..7ae41218eb07 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 33/58] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 32/58] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 34/58] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
` (18 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
The secid_to_secctx() hook has to be balanced with a release_secctx
hook for stacking. This hook does nothing.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 38ea48d22547..a837af153ed9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4470,10 +4470,11 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
}
/*
- * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
- * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
- * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
+ * There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
*/
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
@@ -4713,6 +4714,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 34/58] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 33/58] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
` (17 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Remove the getpeersec_dgram hook stub. It's unnecessary
and disrupts stacking.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 24b638bd4305..76c409737370 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1094,15 +1094,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ *
+ * The TODO stub interfered with stacking and was removed - Casey
*/
-static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct lsm_export *l)
-
-{
- /* TODO: requires secid support */
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
@@ -1202,8 +1196,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 34/58] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 36/58] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
` (16 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
LSM hooks dealing with security context strings should
only be called for one security module. Add call macros
that invoke a single module hook and us in for those cases.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 69983ad68233..365970f2501d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -698,6 +698,16 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
} while (0)
+#define call_one_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
int RC = IRC; \
do { \
@@ -712,6 +722,19 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
+#define call_one_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
+ int RC = IRC; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ RC; \
+})
+
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1951,7 +1974,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata,
+ seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
@@ -1959,13 +1983,13 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
@@ -2090,7 +2114,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ return call_one_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
optval, optlen, len);
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 36/58] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 37/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (15 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
A "security context" is the text representation of
the information used by LSMs. This provides a structure
so that the use can be made consistant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dde36e850cf0..e12b169deed6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
return true;
}
+/* Text representation of LSM specific security information - a "context" */
+struct lsm_context {
+ char *context;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+static inline void lsm_context_init(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp));
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 37/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 36/58] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 38/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
` (14 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++----
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 +++++------
security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0837c214cc17..229899452678 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1320,9 +1320,8 @@
* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
* secdata.
* @l points to the security information.
- * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
+ * @cp contains the pointer that stores the converted security
* context.
- * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to exported lsm data.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
@@ -1664,8 +1663,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 5381eff03d4f..964d3dc92635 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;
#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 69d98a89db75..4e11434605d6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
struct aa_label *label;
@@ -89,13 +89,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
label = aa_secid_to_label(l);
- AA_BUG(!seclen);
-
if (!label)
return -EINVAL;
- if (secdata)
- len = aa_label_asxprint(secdata, root_ns, label,
+ /* scaffolding check - Casey */
+ if (cp)
+ len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
if (len < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
- *seclen = len;
+ cp->len = len;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 365970f2501d..ac0498daa49e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1974,8 +1974,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata,
- seclen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, &lc);
+ if (secdata)
+ *secdata = lc.context;
+ else
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ *seclen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7dd333f133db..6a2a82dcd948 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6301,14 +6301,13 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
- secdata, seclen);
+ &cp->context, &cp->len);
}
static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a837af153ed9..10d6c6a1a001 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4434,8 +4434,7 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
*
* Exists for networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
- u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
u32 secid;
@@ -4443,9 +4442,8 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,
smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- if (secdata)
- *secdata = skp->smk_known;
- *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 38/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 37/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 39/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (13 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 229899452678..c983d573a005 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1324,8 +1324,8 @@
* context.
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to exported lsm data.
+ * @cp contains the security context.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
*
* @release_secctx:
* Release the security context.
@@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
- int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index 964d3dc92635..acfcf99bff0e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct aa_label;
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 4e11434605d6..35df38592b6e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -110,13 +110,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
return 0;
}
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
struct aa_label *label;
- label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, secdata,
- seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
+ label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, cp->context,
+ cp->len, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
if (IS_ERR(label))
return PTR_ERR(label);
aa_export_secid(l, label->secid);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index ac0498daa49e..84f27428b62d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1990,8 +1990,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = secdata;
+ lc.len = seclen;
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, &lc, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6a2a82dcd948..a2257ccaee5c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6310,13 +6310,13 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
u32 secid;
int rc;
- rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, cp->context, cp->len,
&secid, GFP_KERNEL);
selinux_export_secid(l, secid);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 10d6c6a1a001..78c01ef707eb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4455,10 +4455,10 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
*
* Exists for audit and networking code.
*/
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(cp->context);
if (skp)
smack_export_secid(l, skp->smk_secid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 39/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 38/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 40/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (12 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 11 +++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index c983d573a005..20e59e0b775f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1394,11 +1394,10 @@
* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
*
* @inode_getsecctx:
- * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security
* context for the given @inode.
* @inode we wish to get the security context of.
- * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
- * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ * @cp is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
*
* Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through
* eBPF syscalls.
@@ -1671,7 +1670,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
- int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 84f27428b62d..0c23ffdd92c9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1992,7 +1992,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
{
struct lsm_context lc;
- lc.context = secdata;
+ lc.context = (char *)secdata;
lc.len = seclen;
lsm_export_init(l);
return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, &lc, l);
@@ -2025,7 +2025,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, &lc);
+
+ *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
+ *ctxlen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a2257ccaee5c..e881f42d3ff8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6355,14 +6355,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
int len = 0;
len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
- ctx, true);
+ (void **)&cp->context, true);
if (len < 0)
return len;
- *ctxlen = len;
+ cp->len = len;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 78c01ef707eb..46eead699e1d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4484,12 +4484,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
}
-static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
- *ctx = skp->smk_known;
- *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 40/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 39/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 41/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
` (11 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++---
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 20e59e0b775f..eda0a1bcdf07 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1377,8 +1377,7 @@
* file's attributes to the client.
* Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
* @inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ * @cp contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
*
* @inode_setsecctx:
* Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
@@ -1668,7 +1667,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
- int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0c23ffdd92c9..4f443dd481bd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2013,7 +2013,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = ctx;
+ lc.len = ctxlen;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, &lc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e881f42d3ff8..633d62b97e90 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6339,10 +6339,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
/*
* called with inode->i_mutex locked
*/
-static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
- ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ cp->context, cp->len, 0);
/* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 46eead699e1d..3d24503029e5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4474,9 +4474,10 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
-static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+ return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, cp->context,
+ cp->len, 0);
}
static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 41/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 40/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 42/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
` (10 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert SELinux to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index eda0a1bcdf07..d4ace7af4950 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -165,8 +165,7 @@
* @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
* @mode mode used to determine resource type.
* @name name of the last path component used to create file
- * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
- * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ * @cp pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
* @dentry_create_files_as:
* Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
* and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are
@@ -1492,8 +1491,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*sb_add_mnt_opt)(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
void **mnt_opts);
int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen);
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct qstr *name,
const struct cred *old,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4f443dd481bd..c04b334370a5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1017,8 +1017,14 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
- name, ctx, ctxlen);
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+ name, &lc);
+ *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
+ *ctxlen = lc.len;
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 633d62b97e90..fe09905d013c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2813,8 +2813,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
u32 newsid;
int rc;
@@ -2826,8 +2826,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
if (rc)
return rc;
- return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
- ctxlen);
+ return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &cp->context,
+ &cp->len);
}
static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 42/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 41/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 43/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
` (9 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_dentry_init_security to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 5 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++----------
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 4dbb0ee23432..de000649f9f3 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int err;
if (label == NULL)
@@ -122,7 +123,9 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
return NULL;
err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
- &dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len);
+ &dentry->d_name, &lc);
+ label->label = lc.context;
+ label->len = lc.len;
if (err == 0)
return label;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e12b169deed6..6c3a74a44a59 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val,
int len, void **mnt_opts);
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen);
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct qstr *name,
const struct cred *old,
@@ -674,8 +674,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
int mode,
const struct qstr *name,
- void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c04b334370a5..628287180ce7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1014,17 +1014,11 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
}
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
- name, &lc);
- *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
- *ctxlen = lc.len;
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+ name, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 43/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 42/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 44/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
` (8 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_inode_notifysecctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 6 ++++--
fs/nfs/inode.c | 6 ++++--
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 8 ++------
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 0c1fd945ce42..460e611b1938 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
{
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr;
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
inode->i_mode = kn->mode;
if (attrs) {
@@ -192,8 +193,9 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
* persistent copy in kernfs_node.
*/
set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
- security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
- attrs->ia_secdata_len);
+ lc.context = attrs->ia_secdata;
+ lc.len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
+ security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
}
if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c
index 414a90d48493..8d0be9767b14 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c
@@ -340,14 +340,16 @@ static void nfs_clear_label_invalid(struct inode *inode)
void nfs_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr,
struct nfs4_label *label)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int error;
if (label == NULL)
return;
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL) && inode->i_security) {
- error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, label->label,
- label->len);
+ lc.context = label->label;
+ lc.len = label->len;
+ error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
if (error)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() %s %d "
"security_inode_notifysecctx() %d\n",
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6c3a74a44a59..6b2fcca08a43 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
-int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1232,7 +1232,8 @@ static inline void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
}
-static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 628287180ce7..74f211d58e5f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2011,13 +2011,9 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
-int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
-
- lc.context = ctx;
- lc.len = ctxlen;
- return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, &lc);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 44/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 43/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 45/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
` (7 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_inode_getsecctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 11 +++++------
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 ++++++--------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
security/security.c | 11 ++---------
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 460e611b1938..41c5afc698fc 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -351,8 +351,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
{
struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
- void *secdata;
- u32 secdata_len = 0;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
int error;
attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
@@ -362,16 +361,16 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
if (error)
return error;
- error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
+ error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &lc);
if (error)
return error;
mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
- error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
+ error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, (void **)&lc.context, &lc.len);
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
- if (secdata)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 3de42a729093..1bf34730d054 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2420,8 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
__be32 status;
int err;
struct nfs4_acl *acl = NULL;
- void *context = NULL;
- int contextlen;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
bool contextsupport = false;
struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
@@ -2477,8 +2476,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
if ((bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) ||
bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {
if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL)
- err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry),
- &context, &contextlen);
+ err = security_inode_getsecctx(d_inode(dentry), &lc);
else
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
contextsupport = (err == 0);
@@ -2907,8 +2905,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
}
if (bmval2 & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
- status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, context,
- contextlen);
+ status = nfsd4_encode_security_label(xdr, rqstp, lc.context,
+ lc.len);
if (status)
goto out;
}
@@ -2919,8 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
- if (context)
- security_release_secctx(context, contextlen);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6b2fcca08a43..90d1ff7a2fe6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1241,7 +1241,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode,
+ struct lsm_context *cp);
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 74f211d58e5f..4f999cfcf949 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2023,16 +2023,9 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
-int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, &lc);
-
- *ctx = (void *)lc.context;
- *ctxlen = lc.len;
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 45/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 44/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
` (6 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++----
kernel/cred.c | 5 ++++-
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 5 ++++-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++++++++--------
security/security.c | 9 ++-------
6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 90d1ff7a2fe6..3f757b2d8275 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -432,8 +432,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l);
+int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1217,8 +1216,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
- u32 seclen,
+static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 7792538b1ca6..ebae67fdd4d0 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -724,10 +724,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct lsm_export le;
int ret;
- ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &le);
+ lc.context = secctx;
+ lc.len = strlen(secctx);
+ ret = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
index a1d3dab5bc25..f25b26318d72 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_meta.c
@@ -577,11 +577,14 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {
static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)
{
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
u32 tmp_secid = 0;
int err;
lsm_export_init(&le);
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(priv->ctx, strlen(priv->ctx), &le);
+ lc.context = priv->ctx;
+ lc.len = strlen(priv->ctx);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 9a2a97c200a2..a06e50535194 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -50,13 +50,16 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
int err;
info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
info->secid = 0;
lsm_export_init(&le);
- err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx), &le);
+ lc.context = info->secctx;
+ lc.len = strlen(info->secctx);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index f79ab91bf25e..707ea5a364b0 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -914,10 +915,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
dev_name = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE]);
- ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
- nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &le);
+ lc.context = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ lc.len = nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
@@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
void *mask;
u32 addr_len;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -963,10 +964,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,
ret_val = netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
- ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(
- nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]),
- &le);
+ lc.context = nla_data(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ lc.len = nla_len(info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX]);
+ ret_val = security_secctx_to_secid(&lc, &le);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4f999cfcf949..44a4402073d7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1987,15 +1987,10 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
-int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
- struct lsm_export *l)
+int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
-
- lc.context = (char *)secdata;
- lc.len = seclen;
lsm_export_init(l);
- return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, &lc, l);
+ return call_one_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, cp, l);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 45/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 2:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 47/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (5 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert SELinux, Smack and AppAror to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +--
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/secid.c | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index d4ace7af4950..3a779a0f9e15 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1329,7 +1329,6 @@
* @release_secctx:
* Release the security context.
* @secdata contains the security context.
- * @seclen contains the length of the security context.
*
* Security hooks for Audit
*
@@ -1663,7 +1662,7 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
- void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+ void (*release_secctx)(struct lsm_context *cp);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index acfcf99bff0e..a780e56d4f5b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
-void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
int aa_alloc_secid(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 35df38592b6e..46c8b9a67ac7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
return 0;
}
-void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- kfree(secdata);
+ kfree(cp->context);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 44a4402073d7..029d2f4fe48c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1996,7 +1996,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+
+ lc.context = secdata;
+ lc.len = seclen;
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, &lc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fe09905d013c..332296f69f76 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6322,9 +6322,9 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
return rc;
}
-static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- kfree(secdata);
+ kfree(cp->context);
}
static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3d24503029e5..cf27905ccaa5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4468,9 +4468,9 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
}
/*
- * There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
+ * The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
*/
-static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static void smack_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 47/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 48/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
` (4 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_release_secctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 21 +++++++--------
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 ++++---
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 2 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 9 +++++--
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 +--
include/net/scm.h | 10 +++----
kernel/audit.c | 27 +++++++++----------
kernel/auditsc.c | 27 +++++++++----------
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 9 +++----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 10 +++----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 9 +++----
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 28 ++++++++++---------
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 36 ++++++++++++-------------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 11 ++++----
security/security.c | 10 +++----
16 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 0eeb5b75da5b..c2cfef13257c 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2874,8 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off = 0;
struct binder_context *context = proc->context;
int t_debug_id = atomic_inc_return(&binder_last_id);
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_sz = 0;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .len = 0, .context = NULL, };
e = binder_transaction_log_add(&binder_transaction_log);
e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3122,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &le);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_get_secctx_failed;
}
- extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ extra_buffers_size += ALIGN(lc.len, sizeof(u64));
}
trace_binder_transaction(reply, t, target_node);
@@ -3148,18 +3147,18 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer = NULL;
goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed;
}
- if (secctx) {
+ if (lc.context) {
size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) +
ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) -
- ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64));
+ ALIGN(lc.len, sizeof(u64));
t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;
binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc,
t->buffer, buf_offset,
- secctx, secctx_sz);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
- secctx = NULL;
+ lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ lc.context = NULL;
}
t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3479,8 +3478,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
err_binder_alloc_buf_failed:
- if (secctx)
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
err_get_secctx_failed:
kfree(tcomplete);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index b84d635567d3..11672c075a8b 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,9 +532,12 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
kfree_const(kn->name);
if (kn->iattr) {
- if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
- security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
- kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
+ if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
+ lc.context = kn->iattr->ia_secdata;
+ lc.len = kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len;
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ }
simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
}
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 41c5afc698fc..45781f0da80f 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
if (lc.context)
- security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index de000649f9f3..8dee01eda643 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -134,8 +134,13 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- if (label)
- security_release_secctx(label->label, label->len);
+ struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
+
+ if (label) {
+ lc.context = label->label;
+ lc.len = label->len;
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
+ }
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
index 1bf34730d054..3d1251bd588f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL
if (lc.context)
- security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */
kfree(acl);
if (tempfh) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3f757b2d8275..57ce9b824eef 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+static inline void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
{
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index b5d1c24318e3..7e242ebdd258 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -92,16 +92,16 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (!err) {
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
+ lc.len, lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d83d1f05c95d..269c76fefe40 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1191,8 +1191,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
struct audit_buffer *ab;
u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type);
if (err)
@@ -1428,27 +1427,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- len = 0;
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
- &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
+ &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (err)
return err;
}
- sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + lc.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm))
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ memcpy(sig_data->ctx, lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0,
- sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
+ sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + lc.len);
kfree(sig_data);
break;
case AUDIT_TTY_GET: {
@@ -2070,24 +2068,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
- char *ctx = NULL;
- unsigned len;
int error;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
security_task_getsecid(current, &le);
if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
return 0;
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return 0;
error_path:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d64775f4bb1b..4dab81c7aca0 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -938,9 +938,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
unsigned int sessionid,
struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
int rc = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
@@ -951,12 +950,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
@@ -1191,14 +1190,13 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1342,16 +1340,15 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
MAJOR(n->rdev),
MINOR(n->rdev));
if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
} else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index a4f37ba6dbe2..18a7fab8b2d3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -131,20 +131,19 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsm_export le;
- char *secdata;
- u32 seclen;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (err)
return;
- put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, SCM_SECURITY, lc.len, lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index d10cc1924e46..49bce1b085ce 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -328,16 +328,16 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
- int len, ret;
- char *secctx;
+ int ret;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
lsm_export_init(&le);
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -346,13 +346,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
if (!nest_secctx)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx))
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, lc.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return ret;
}
#else
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index d353f3efc5a5..97d16a51504b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -173,9 +173,8 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
int ret;
- u32 len;
- char *secctx;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
/* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */
lsm_export_init(&le);
@@ -183,13 +182,13 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+ seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", lc.context);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
#else
static inline void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index a0670137477b..b70871693368 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
- u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
@@ -322,12 +322,15 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = skb->secmark;
le.smack = skb->secmark;
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ *secdata = lc.context;
}
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ return lc.len;
+#else
+ return 0;
#endif
- return seclen;
}
static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -403,8 +406,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var(ctinfo);
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
- char *secdata = NULL;
- u32 seclen = 0;
+ struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
size = nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(struct nfgenmsg))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr))
@@ -470,9 +472,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
if ((queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX) && entskb->sk) {
- seclen = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &secdata);
- if (seclen)
- size += nla_total_size(seclen);
+ lc.len = nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(entskb, &lc.context);
+ if (lc.len)
+ size += nla_total_size(lc.len);
}
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -605,7 +607,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
- if (seclen && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, seclen, secdata))
+ if (lc.len && nla_put(skb, NFQA_SECCTX, lc.len, lc.context))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (ct && nfnl_ct->build(skb, ct, ctinfo, NFQA_CT, NFQA_CT_INFO) < 0)
@@ -633,8 +635,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
}
nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len;
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return skb;
nla_put_failure:
@@ -642,8 +644,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,
kfree_skb(skb);
net_err_ratelimited("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n");
nlmsg_failure:
- if (seclen)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ if (lc.context)
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 707ea5a364b0..4c4a8f6df261 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -387,8 +387,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
- char *secctx = NULL;
- u32 secctx_len;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,9 +449,10 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -484,8 +483,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -499,6 +496,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL,
audit_info);
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+ struct lsm_context lc;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, iface->ifindex);
netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
@@ -507,9 +505,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -560,6 +558,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL,
audit_info);
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+ struct lsm_context lc;
dev = dev_get_by_index(net, iface->ifindex);
netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
(dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
@@ -568,9 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", entry != NULL ? 1 : 0);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
@@ -1082,9 +1081,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
void *data;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
struct lsm_export *lep;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1139,14 +1137,14 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr6->le;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &lc.context, &lc.len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX,
- secctx_len,
- secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ lc.len,
+ lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 2cc96305c841..0418f0935199 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -113,10 +112,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
audit_info->sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
- security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &lc.context,
+ &lc.len) == 0) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", lc.context);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
return audit_buf;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 029d2f4fe48c..3da7302d20ec 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
if (secdata)
*secdata = lc.context;
else
- security_release_secctx(lc.context, lc.len);
+ security_release_secctx(&lc);
*seclen = lc.len;
return rc;
}
@@ -1994,13 +1994,9 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
-void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc;
-
- lc.context = secdata;
- lc.len = seclen;
- call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, &lc);
+ call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 48/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 47/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 49/58] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
` (3 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
Convert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Add a flag for lsm_export to indicate that the caller of
security_secid_to_secctx() is only interested in the length
of the context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++------
include/net/scm.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 5 ++---
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++++-----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 11 ++++++-----
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 12 ++++--------
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 3 +--
security/apparmor/secid.c | 3 +--
security/security.c | 13 ++-----------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
15 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index c2cfef13257c..58033c003cc2 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &le);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 57ce9b824eef..9a9de2bafa55 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct lsm_export {
u32 apparmor;
u32 flags;
};
-#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
-#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
-#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
-#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
+#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00000000
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x00000001
+#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x00000002
+#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x00000004
+#define LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH 0x80000000 /* Only the length required */
static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
{
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1211,7 +1212,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
- char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+ struct lsm_seccontext *cp)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 7e242ebdd258..b25ca3b6a514 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &lc);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 269c76fefe40..203e5b14bea4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1428,8 +1428,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm,
- &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &lc);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2076,7 +2075,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
if (!lsm_export_any(&le))
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4dab81c7aca0..ceefd17467f9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
unsigned int sessionid,
struct lsm_export *l, char *comm)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
+ struct lsm_context lc;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
int rc = 0;
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1190,8 +1190,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
context->ipc.mode);
if (lsm_export_any(l)) {
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
+ struct lsm_context lc;
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (lsm_export_any(&n->olsm)) {
struct lsm_context lc;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&n->olsm, &lc)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=(unknown)");
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 18a7fab8b2d3..56035b53952d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (err)
return;
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 49bce1b085ce..ea83909af6db 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -620,20 +620,21 @@ static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- int len, ret;
+ int ret;
struct lsm_export le;
+ struct lsm_context lc;
lsm_export_init(&le);
- le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
+ le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH;
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret)
return 0;
return nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
- + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
+ + nla_total_size(sizeof(char) * lc.len); /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#else
return 0;
#endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 97d16a51504b..797abf443a34 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
le.selinux = ct->secmark;
le.smack = ct->secmark;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index b70871693368..4a3d4b52caef 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
le.flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK;
le.selinux = skb->secmark;
le.smack = skb->secmark;
- security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &lc);
*secdata = lc.context;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 4c4a8f6df261..336d315ee8eb 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
struct lsm_context lc;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(l, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
@@ -504,8 +504,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
@@ -544,8 +543,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct net_device *dev;
- char *secctx;
- u32 secctx_len;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -566,8 +563,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le,
- &lc.context, &lc.len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&entry->le, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
@@ -1137,7 +1133,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr6->le;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &lc.context, &lc.len);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(lep, &lc);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 0418f0935199..11ea98525c4e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -112,8 +112,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
audit_info->sessionid);
if (lsm_export_any(&audit_info->le) &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &lc.context,
- &lc.len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_info->le, &lc) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", lc.context);
security_release_secctx(&lc);
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 46c8b9a67ac7..9dc17903a936 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
if (!label)
return -EINVAL;
- /* scaffolding check - Casey */
- if (cp)
+ if (!(l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH))
len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3da7302d20ec..6588172b3ec8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1972,18 +1972,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, };
- int rc;
-
- rc = call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, &lc);
- if (secdata)
- *secdata = lc.context;
- else
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
- *seclen = lc.len;
- return rc;
+ return call_one_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 332296f69f76..7bf73493d10d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6306,6 +6306,9 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH)
+ return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+ NULL, &cp->len);
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
&cp->context, &cp->len);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index cf27905ccaa5..1b5b3e421bff 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4442,7 +4442,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
smack_import_secid(l, &secid);
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- cp->context = skp->smk_known;
+ cp->context = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH) ? NULL : skp->smk_known;
cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 49/58] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (47 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 48/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 50/58] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
` (2 subsequent siblings)
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
The conversion from secctx/seclen pairs to the lsm_context
structure used scaffolding in kernfs and nfs. Replace the
secctx/seclen pairs in the filesystem local datastructures
with a lsm_context.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 +++------
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 13 +++++--------
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +--
fs/nfs/inode.c | 15 ++++++---------
fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 ++++----
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 27 +++++++++++----------------
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +++++++++-------
include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 ++++----
8 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index 11672c075a8b..48506e856573 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,12 +532,9 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
kfree_const(kn->name);
if (kn->iattr) {
- if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) {
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
- lc.context = kn->iattr->ia_secdata;
- lc.len = kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len;
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
- }
+ if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context)
+ security_release_secctx(
+ &kn->iattr->ia_context);
simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
}
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 45781f0da80f..4c7da446d210 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
void *old_secdata;
size_t old_secdata_len;
- old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
- old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
+ old_secdata = attrs->ia_context.context;
+ old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_context.len;
- attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
- attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
+ attrs->ia_context.context = *secdata;
+ attrs->ia_context.len = *secdata_len;
*secdata = old_secdata;
*secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
@@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
{
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr;
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
inode->i_mode = kn->mode;
if (attrs) {
@@ -193,9 +192,7 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
* persistent copy in kernfs_node.
*/
set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
- lc.context = attrs->ia_secdata;
- lc.len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
- security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
+ security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &attrs->ia_context);
}
if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
index 0b7d197a904c..2a870795bb3e 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
+++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@
struct kernfs_iattrs {
struct iattr ia_iattr;
- void *ia_secdata;
- u32 ia_secdata_len;
+ struct lsm_context ia_context;
struct simple_xattrs xattrs;
};
diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c
index 8d0be9767b14..a9a3ec40a90c 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c
@@ -340,22 +340,19 @@ static void nfs_clear_label_invalid(struct inode *inode)
void nfs_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_fattr *fattr,
struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int error;
if (label == NULL)
return;
if ((fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL) && inode->i_security) {
- lc.context = label->label;
- lc.len = label->len;
- error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &lc);
+ error = security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, &label->context);
if (error)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s() %s %d "
"security_inode_notifysecctx() %d\n",
__func__,
- (char *)label->label,
- label->len, error);
+ label->context.context,
+ label->context.len, error);
nfs_clear_label_invalid(inode);
}
}
@@ -375,12 +372,12 @@ struct nfs4_label *nfs4_label_alloc(struct nfs_server *server, gfp_t flags)
if (label == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- label->label = kzalloc(NFS4_MAXLABELLEN, flags);
- if (label->label == NULL) {
+ label->context.context = kzalloc(NFS4_MAXLABELLEN, flags);
+ if (label->context.context == NULL) {
kfree(label);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
- label->len = NFS4_MAXLABELLEN;
+ label->context.len = NFS4_MAXLABELLEN;
return label;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/internal.h b/fs/nfs/internal.h
index c7cf23ae6597..63de73024b5f 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h
@@ -307,20 +307,20 @@ nfs4_label_copy(struct nfs4_label *dst, struct nfs4_label *src)
if (!dst || !src)
return NULL;
- if (src->len > NFS4_MAXLABELLEN)
+ if (src->context.len > NFS4_MAXLABELLEN)
return NULL;
dst->lfs = src->lfs;
dst->pi = src->pi;
- dst->len = src->len;
- memcpy(dst->label, src->label, src->len);
+ dst->context.len = src->context.len;
+ memcpy(dst->context.context, src->context.context, src->context.len);
return dst;
}
static inline void nfs4_label_free(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
if (label) {
- kfree(label->label);
+ kfree(label->context.context);
kfree(label);
}
return;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 8dee01eda643..b2480d0341f1 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label *
nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
int err;
if (label == NULL)
@@ -123,9 +122,7 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
return NULL;
err = security_dentry_init_security(dentry, sattr->ia_mode,
- &dentry->d_name, &lc);
- label->label = lc.context;
- label->len = lc.len;
+ &dentry->d_name, &label->context);
if (err == 0)
return label;
@@ -134,13 +131,8 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
static inline void
nfs4_label_release_security(struct nfs4_label *label)
{
- struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */
-
- if (label) {
- lc.context = label->label;
- lc.len = label->len;
- security_release_secctx(&lc);
- }
+ if (label)
+ security_release_secctx(&label->context);
}
static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
@@ -3556,7 +3548,9 @@ nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct nfs_open_context *ctx,
int open_flags, struct iattr *attr, int *opened)
{
struct nfs4_state *state;
- struct nfs4_label l = {0, 0, 0, NULL}, *label = NULL;
+ struct nfs4_label *label = NULL;
+ struct nfs4_label l = {0, 0,
+ .context = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, }, };
label = nfs4_label_init_security(dir, ctx->dentry, attr, &l);
@@ -5595,7 +5589,8 @@ static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
struct nfs_fattr fattr;
- struct nfs4_label label = {0, 0, buflen, buf};
+ struct nfs4_label label = {0, 0,
+ .context = { .context = buf, .len = buflen, }, };
u32 bitmask[3] = { 0, 0, FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL };
struct nfs4_getattr_arg arg = {
@@ -5621,7 +5616,7 @@ static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
return ret;
if (!(fattr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL))
return -ENOENT;
- if (buflen < label.len)
+ if (buflen < label.context.len)
return -ERANGE;
return 0;
}
@@ -5713,8 +5708,8 @@ nfs4_set_security_label(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t buflen)
ilabel.pi = 0;
ilabel.lfs = 0;
- ilabel.label = (char *)buf;
- ilabel.len = buflen;
+ ilabel.context.context = (char *)buf;
+ ilabel.context.len = buflen;
olabel = nfs4_label_alloc(NFS_SERVER(inode), GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(olabel)) {
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
index cfcabc33e24d..85a527ccd6d7 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap,
}
if (label && (attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL)) {
- len += 4 + 4 + 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(label->len) << 2);
+ len += 4 + 4 + 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(label->context.len) << 2);
bmval[2] |= FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL;
}
@@ -1175,8 +1175,9 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap,
if (bmval[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) {
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi);
- *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len);
- p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->label, label->len);
+ *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->context.len);
+ p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->context.context,
+ label->context.len);
}
if (bmval[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_MODE_UMASK) {
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_mode & S_IALLUGO);
@@ -4163,8 +4164,8 @@ static int decode_attr_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
return -EIO;
if (len < NFS4_MAXLABELLEN) {
if (label) {
- memcpy(label->label, p, len);
- label->len = len;
+ memcpy(label->context.context, p, len);
+ label->context.len = len;
label->pi = pi;
label->lfs = lfs;
status = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL;
@@ -4174,9 +4175,10 @@ static int decode_attr_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: label too long (%u)!\n",
__func__, len);
}
- if (label && label->label)
+ if (label && label->context.context)
dprintk("%s: label=%s, len=%d, PI=%d, LFS=%d\n", __func__,
- (char *)label->label, label->len, label->pi, label->lfs);
+ (char *)label->context.context, label->context.len,
+ label->pi, label->lfs);
return status;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs4.h b/include/linux/nfs4.h
index 22494d170619..1189aad71592 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs4.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs4.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/nfs4.h>
enum nfs4_acl_whotype {
@@ -43,10 +44,9 @@ struct nfs4_acl {
#define NFS4_MAXLABELLEN 2048
struct nfs4_label {
- uint32_t lfs;
- uint32_t pi;
- u32 len;
- char *label;
+ uint32_t lfs;
+ uint32_t pi;
+ struct lsm_context context;
};
typedef struct { char data[NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE]; } nfs4_verifier;
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 50/58] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 49/58] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-05-31 23:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:13 ` [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-02 2:56 ` Kees Cook
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
In order to ensure that the release function for a
lsm_context matches the LSM that allocated it an element
is added to the lsm_context structure to contain a
pointer to it. This function is called in security_release_secctx
instead of relying on a value in a hook list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ------
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 -
security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 ++++++-----
security/security.c | 5 ++++-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 ++++++++------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++--------
7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 3a779a0f9e15..d1235a3cd8e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1326,10 +1326,6 @@
* @cp contains the security context.
* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
*
- * @release_secctx:
- * Release the security context.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
- *
* Security hooks for Audit
*
* @audit_rule_init:
@@ -1662,7 +1658,6 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,
struct lsm_export *l);
- void (*release_secctx)(struct lsm_context *cp);
void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1939,7 +1934,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head ismaclabel;
struct hlist_head secid_to_secctx;
struct hlist_head secctx_to_secid;
- struct hlist_head release_secctx;
struct hlist_head inode_invalidate_secctx;
struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 9a9de2bafa55..94c714310ab7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)
struct lsm_context {
char *context;
u32 len;
+ void (*release)(struct lsm_context *cp); /* frees .context */
};
static inline void lsm_context_init(struct lsm_context *cp)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 76c409737370..771b0ae24a5f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1225,7 +1225,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
};
/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 9dc17903a936..30fd4ad80948 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
l->apparmor = secid;
}
+void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ kfree(cp->context);
+}
+
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
@@ -105,6 +110,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
return -ENOMEM;
cp->len = len;
+ cp->release = apparmor_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
@@ -122,11 +128,6 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)
return 0;
}
-void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
-{
- kfree(cp->context);
-}
-
/**
* aa_alloc_secid - allocate a new secid for a profile
* @label: the label to allocate a secid for
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6588172b3ec8..c8ce190dcdda 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1987,7 +1987,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
- call_one_void_hook(release_secctx, cp);
+ if (WARN_ON(cp->release == NULL))
+ return;
+ cp->release(cp);
+ lsm_context_init(cp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7bf73493d10d..0e347a26c3d8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2812,6 +2812,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
inode_free_security(inode);
}
+static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+ kfree(cp->context);
+}
+
static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name,
struct lsm_context *cp)
@@ -2826,6 +2831,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &cp->context,
&cp->len);
}
@@ -6306,6 +6312,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
u32 secid;
selinux_import_secid(l, &secid);
+ cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;
if (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH)
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
NULL, &cp->len);
@@ -6325,11 +6332,6 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
return rc;
}
-static void selinux_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
-{
- kfree(cp->context);
-}
-
static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
@@ -6367,6 +6369,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
if (len < 0)
return len;
cp->len = len;
+ cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
@@ -6781,7 +6784,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1b5b3e421bff..e00346799cdf 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4425,6 +4425,12 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
}
+/*
+ * The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
+ */
+static void smack_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
+{
+}
/**
* smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
@@ -4444,6 +4450,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)
cp->context = (l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH) ? NULL : skp->smk_known;
cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->release = smack_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
@@ -4467,13 +4474,6 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,
return 0;
}
-/*
- * The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing
- */
-static void smack_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
-{
-}
-
static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
{
return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, cp->context,
@@ -4491,6 +4491,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)
cp->context = skp->smk_known;
cp->len = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ cp->release = smack_release_secctx;
return 0;
}
@@ -4713,7 +4714,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
--
2.19.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 50/58] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-01 15:13 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-02 2:56 ` Kees Cook
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-01 15:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:22PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> [...]
> 58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
58 files and 58 patches! :)
I (and the mailing list) appear to be missing patches 51-58...
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-01 15:15 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-01 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:23PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out
> of the individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++-------------------
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +-
> security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++--------------
> 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index a240a3fc5fc4..f9222a04968d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
> int lbs_cred;
> int lbs_file;
> int lbs_inode;
> + int lbs_superblock;
> int lbs_ipc;
> int lbs_msg_msg;
> int lbs_task;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 23cbb1a295a3..550988a0f024 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> }
>
> @@ -300,12 +301,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
> prepare_lsm(*lsm);
>
> - init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
> - init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> - init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> - init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> - init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> - init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> + init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
> + init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> + init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> + init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> + init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> + init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>
> /*
> * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
> @@ -603,6 +605,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
> + * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
> + *
> + * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
> + *
> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
> + */
> +int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
> +{
> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
> + sb->s_security = NULL;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (sb->s_security == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Hook list operation macros.
> *
> @@ -776,12 +799,21 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *
>
> int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
> + int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
> +
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + return rc;
> + rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + security_sb_free(sb);
> + return rc;
> }
>
> void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
> + kfree(sb->s_security);
> + sb->s_security = NULL;
> }
>
> void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 1d0b37af2444..7478d8eda00a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
>
> if (!isec)
> return;
> - sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
> /*
> * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
> * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
> @@ -366,11 +366,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
>
> static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
> -
> - sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!sbsec)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
>
> mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
> @@ -379,18 +375,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
> sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
> sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> - sb->s_security = sbsec;
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
> -{
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> - sb->s_security = NULL;
> - kfree(sbsec);
> -}
> -
> struct selinux_mnt_opts {
> const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
> };
> @@ -507,7 +495,7 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
>
> static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
>
> /*
> * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
> @@ -535,7 +523,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
>
> static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
> struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
> struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
> int rc = 0;
> @@ -648,7 +636,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
> {
> const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
> struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
> struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
> struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
> @@ -881,8 +869,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> const struct super_block *newsb)
> {
> - struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
> - struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
> + struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
> char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
> char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
>
> @@ -914,8 +902,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
> {
> int rc = 0;
> - const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
> - struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
> + const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
> + selinux_superblock(oldsb);
> + struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
>
> int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
> int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
> @@ -1085,7 +1074,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
>
> static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
> {
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
> int rc;
>
> if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
> @@ -1377,7 +1366,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
> if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
> isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
>
> - sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
> if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
> /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
> after the initial policy is loaded and the security
> @@ -1767,7 +1756,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
> const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
> u32 *_new_isid)
> {
> - const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
> + const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
> + selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
>
> if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
> (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
> @@ -1798,7 +1788,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
> int rc;
>
> dsec = inode_security(dir);
> - sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
>
> sid = tsec->sid;
>
> @@ -1947,7 +1937,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
> u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
>
> - sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
> return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
> }
> @@ -2578,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
> return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
> }
>
> -static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
> -{
> - superblock_free_security(sb);
> -}
> -
> static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
> {
> bool open_quote = false;
> @@ -2653,7 +2638,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
> static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
> {
> struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
> u32 sid;
> int rc;
>
> @@ -2877,7 +2862,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> int rc;
> char *context;
>
> - sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
>
> newsid = tsec->create_sid;
>
> @@ -3115,7 +3100,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
> }
>
> - sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
> if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> @@ -3296,13 +3281,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> {
> struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
> u32 newsid;
> int rc;
>
> if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
> if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> @@ -6647,6 +6633,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
> + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -6675,7 +6662,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
>
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 231262d8eac9..d08d7e5d2f93 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc(
> return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
> }
>
> +static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
> + const struct super_block *superblock)
> +{
> + return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index ec62918521b1..e3f5d6aece66 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> #include <linux/mutex.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <net/netlabel.h>
>
> #include "flask.h"
> @@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
> struct sidtab *sidtab;
> int rc = 0;
> struct ocontext *c;
> - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
> const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
>
> read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index cf52af77d15e..caecbcba9942 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
> return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
> }
>
> +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
> + const struct super_block *superblock)
> +{
> + return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Is the directory transmuting?
> */
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 5c1613519d5a..807eff2ccce9 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
> */
> static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> - struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> -
> - sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
> -
> - if (sbsp == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
>
> sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
> sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
> @@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
> /*
> * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
> */
> - sb->s_security = sbsp;
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
> - * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
> - *
> - */
> -static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
> -{
> - kfree(sb->s_security);
> - sb->s_security = NULL;
> -}
> -
> struct smack_mnt_opts {
> const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
> };
> @@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> {
> struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
> struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
> - struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
> struct inode_smack *isp;
> struct smack_known *skp;
> struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
> @@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
> */
> static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> - struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
> int rc;
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
>
> @@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
> return 0;
>
> - sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
> if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
> isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
> return 0;
> @@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
> */
> static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
> {
> - struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
> int rc;
> @@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> */
> if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
> struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
> - struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
>
> isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
> } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
> @@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
> isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
> if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
> return 0;
> - sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
> + sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
> if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
> isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
> return -EACCES;
> @@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> goto unlockandout;
>
> sbp = inode->i_sb;
> - sbsp = sbp->s_security;
> + sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
> /*
> * We're going to use the superblock default label
> * if there's no label on the file.
> @@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
>
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
> --
> 2.19.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-01 15:17 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-01 15:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:24PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
> of the individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++-----------
> security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++
> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++-----
> security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--
> 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index f9222a04968d..b353482ea348 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
> int lbs_cred;
> int lbs_file;
> int lbs_inode;
> + int lbs_sock;
> int lbs_superblock;
> int lbs_ipc;
> int lbs_msg_msg;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> index 7334ac966d01..adac04e3b3cc 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
> @@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
> struct aa_label *peer;
> };
>
> -#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
> +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
> +{
> + return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> +}
> +
> #define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
> #define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
> struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 49d664ddff44..2716e7731279 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
> return error;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
> - */
> -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
> -{
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
> -
> - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
> - if (!ctx)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> -
> - SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> /**
> * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
> */
> static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> - SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
> aa_put_label(ctx->label);
> aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
> - kfree(ctx);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
> struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
>
> new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
> new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
> @@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> label = aa_get_current_label();
>
> if (sock->sk) {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
>
> aa_put_label(ctx->label);
> ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
> @@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
> */
> static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (!skb->secmark)
> return 0;
> @@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (ctx->peer)
> return ctx->peer;
> @@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> */
> static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (!ctx->label)
> ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
> @@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
>
> if (!skb->secmark)
> return 0;
> @@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
> .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
> + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
> };
>
> static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
>
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
>
> @@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
> if (sk == NULL)
> return NF_ACCEPT;
>
> - ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
> + ctx = aa_sock(sk);
> if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
> skb->secmark, sk))
> return NF_ACCEPT;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 550988a0f024..e32b7180282e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/msg.h>
> #include <net/flow.h>
> +#include <net/sock.h>
>
> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
>
> @@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> }
> @@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> + init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
>
> @@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
> panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
> + * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
> + * @priority: allocation mode
> + *
> + * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
> + *
> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
> + */
> +int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
> +{
> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
> + sock->sk_security = NULL;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
> + if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
> * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
> @@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
>
> int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
> + int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
> +
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + return rc;
> + rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + security_sk_free(sk);
> + return rc;
> }
>
> void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
> {
> call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
> + kfree(sk->sk_security);
> + sk->sk_security = NULL;
> }
>
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7478d8eda00a..f38a6f484613 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
>
> static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
>
> @@ -4376,7 +4376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
>
> if (sock->sk) {
> - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
> sksec->sclass = sclass;
> sksec->sid = sid;
> /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
> @@ -4392,8 +4392,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
> struct socket *sockb)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
>
> sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
> sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
> @@ -4408,7 +4408,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
> static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> {
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> u16 family;
> int err;
>
> @@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
> struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
> {
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> int err;
>
> err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
> @@ -4711,9 +4711,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> struct sock *other,
> struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> int err;
> @@ -4745,8 +4745,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
> struct socket *other)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
>
> @@ -4788,7 +4788,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> u16 family)
> {
> int err = 0;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> @@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> int err;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> u16 family = sk->sk_family;
> u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> @@ -4889,13 +4889,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> return err;
> }
>
> -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
> - int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
> +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> + __user char *optval,
> + __user int *optlen,
> + unsigned int len)
> {
> int err = 0;
> char *scontext;
> u32 scontext_len;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
> u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
>
> if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
> @@ -4955,34 +4957,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
>
> static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
> -
> - sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
> - if (!sksec)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
> sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
> selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
> - sk->sk_security = sksec;
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> - sk->sk_security = NULL;
> selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
> - kfree(sksec);
> }
>
> static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
> newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
> @@ -4996,7 +4991,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
> if (!sk)
> *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
> else {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> *secid = sksec->sid;
> }
> @@ -5006,7 +5001,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> {
> struct inode_security_struct *isec =
> inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
> sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
> @@ -5021,7 +5016,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
> u8 peerlbl_active;
> @@ -5172,8 +5167,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
> static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
> struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
> * the non-sctp clone version.
> @@ -5190,7 +5185,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
> static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> int err;
> u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
> u32 connsid;
> @@ -5211,7 +5206,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
> const struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> newsksec->sid = req->secid;
> newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
> @@ -5228,7 +5223,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
> static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> u16 family = sk->sk_family;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
> if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
> @@ -5312,7 +5307,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
> static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
> {
> struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
> * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
> @@ -5353,7 +5348,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> int err = 0;
> u32 perm;
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> @@ -5494,7 +5489,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
> return NF_ACCEPT;
>
> /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
> - sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> sid = sksec->sid;
> } else
> sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
> @@ -5533,7 +5528,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> if (sk == NULL)
> return NF_ACCEPT;
> - sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
> ad.u.net = &net;
> @@ -5625,7 +5620,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
> u32 skb_sid;
> struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
>
> - sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
> return NF_DROP;
> /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
> @@ -5654,7 +5649,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
> } else {
> /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
> * associated socket. */
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> peer_sid = sksec->sid;
> secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
> }
> @@ -6633,6 +6628,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
> + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index d08d7e5d2f93..29f02b8f8f31 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
> return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
> }
>
> +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
> +{
> + return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> +}
> +
> #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> #include <linux/gfp.h>
> #include <linux/ip.h>
> #include <linux/ipv6.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <net/sock.h>
> #include <net/netlabel.h>
> #include <net/ip.h>
> @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
> static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
> @@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
> const struct sock *sk,
> u32 sid)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
>
> if (secattr == NULL)
> @@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
> * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
> sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
> if (sk != NULL) {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
> return 0;
> @@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
> {
> int rc;
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
> struct sockaddr *addr;
> struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> @@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
> */
> void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (family == PF_INET)
> sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
> @@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
> */
> void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
>
> newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
> }
> @@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
> @@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
> {
> int rc = 0;
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
>
> if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
> @@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
> struct sockaddr *addr)
> {
> int rc;
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
>
> /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
> @@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
> int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
> struct sockaddr *addr)
> {
> - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
>
> if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
> sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index caecbcba9942..4ac4bf3310d7 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
> return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
> }
>
> +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
> +{
> + return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> +}
> +
> static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
> const struct super_block *superblock)
> {
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 807eff2ccce9..fd69e1bd841b 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
> if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
>
> if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
> isp = ssp->smk_in;
> @@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
>
> if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
> sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
> /*
> * If the receiving process can't write to the
> @@ -2231,11 +2231,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
> static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> {
> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
> - struct socket_smack *ssp;
> -
> - ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
> - if (ssp == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
>
> /*
> * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
> @@ -2249,11 +2245,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> }
> ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
>
> - sk->sk_security = ssp;
> -
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
> /**
> * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
> * @sk: the socket
> @@ -2262,7 +2257,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
> */
> static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> {
> -#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
> struct smk_port_label *spp;
>
> if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
> @@ -2275,9 +2269,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
> }
> rcu_read_unlock();
> }
> -#endif
> - kfree(sk->sk_security);
> }
> +#endif
>
> /**
> * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
> @@ -2395,7 +2388,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
> static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
> {
> struct smack_known *skp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> int rc = 0;
>
> /*
> @@ -2440,7 +2433,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
> int rc;
> int sk_lbl;
> struct smack_known *hkp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> @@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
> {
> struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> struct smk_port_label *spp;
> unsigned short port = 0;
>
> @@ -2603,7 +2596,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
> int act)
> {
> struct smk_port_label *spp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
> unsigned short port;
> struct smack_known *object;
> @@ -2697,7 +2690,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
>
> if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
> ssp->smk_in = skp;
> @@ -2745,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
> */
> if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
> ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
> }
> @@ -2770,8 +2763,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
> static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
> struct socket *sockb)
> {
> - struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
> + struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
>
> asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
> bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
> @@ -2825,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
> return 0;
>
> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> #endif
>
> switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
> @@ -3566,9 +3559,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> {
> struct smack_known *skp;
> struct smack_known *okp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
> + struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
> + struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> int rc = 0;
> #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> @@ -3614,8 +3607,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
> */
> static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
> {
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> - struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> + struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> int rc;
>
> @@ -3652,7 +3645,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
> #endif
> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> struct smack_known *rsp;
> #endif
> int rc = 0;
> @@ -3817,7 +3810,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
> static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
> int rc = 0;
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> @@ -3934,7 +3927,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
> int slen = 1;
> int rc = 0;
>
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
> rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
> slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
> @@ -3984,7 +3977,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
>
> switch (family) {
> case PF_UNIX:
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
> break;
> case PF_INET:
> @@ -3997,7 +3990,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
> * Translate what netlabel gave us.
> */
> if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
> - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
> netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
> rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
> if (rc == 0) {
> @@ -4035,7 +4028,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
> return;
>
> - ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> ssp->smk_in = skp;
> ssp->smk_out = skp;
> /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
> @@ -4055,7 +4048,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> {
> u16 family = sk->sk_family;
> struct smack_known *skp;
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
> struct sockaddr_in addr;
> struct iphdr *hdr;
> @@ -4154,7 +4147,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
> const struct request_sock *req)
> {
> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
> @@ -4558,6 +4551,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> };
>
> @@ -4667,7 +4661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
> +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
> +#endif
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
> index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
> @@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
> struct socket_smack *ssp;
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> - if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
> - ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
> + ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> skp = ssp->smk_out;
> skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
> }
> @@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
> struct socket_smack *ssp;
> struct smack_known *skp;
>
> - if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
> - ssp = sk->sk_security;
> + if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
> + ssp = smack_sock(sk);
> skp = ssp->smk_out;
> skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
> }
> --
> 2.19.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-01 15:18 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-01 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:25PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> Move management of the key->security blob out of the
> individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++-------------
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++
> security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++-------------
> 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index b353482ea348..3fe39abccc8f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
> int lbs_sock;
> int lbs_superblock;
> int lbs_ipc;
> + int lbs_key;
> int lbs_msg_msg;
> int lbs_task;
> };
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index e32b7180282e..d05f00a40e82 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
> blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);
> +#endif
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> @@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
> init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
> init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> + init_debug("key blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
> init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
> init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
> @@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> +/**
> + * lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob
> + * @key: the key that needs a blob
> + *
> + * Allocate the key blob for all the modules
> + *
> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
> + */
> +int lsm_key_alloc(struct key *key)
> +{
> + if (blob_sizes.lbs_key == 0) {
> + key->security = NULL;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + key->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_key, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (key->security == NULL)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> +
> /**
> * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
> * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
> @@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
> int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
> + int rc = lsm_key_alloc(key);
> +
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + return rc;
> + rc = call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + security_key_free(key);
> + return rc;
> }
>
> void security_key_free(struct key *key)
> {
> call_void_hook(key_free, key);
> + kfree(key->security);
> + key->security = NULL;
> }
>
> int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f38a6f484613..ee840fecfebb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
> - struct key_security_struct *ksec;
> -
> - ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!ksec)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k);
>
> tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
> if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
> @@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
> else
> ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
>
> - k->security = ksec;
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
> -{
> - struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
> -
> - k->security = NULL;
> - kfree(ksec);
> -}
> -
> static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> const struct cred *cred,
> unsigned perm)
> @@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> sid = cred_sid(cred);
>
> key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
> - ksec = key->security;
> + ksec = selinux_key(key);
>
> return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
> @@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
>
> static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> {
> - struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
> + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key);
> char *context = NULL;
> unsigned len;
> int rc;
> @@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
> @@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
> #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 29f02b8f8f31..3b78aa4ee98f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
> return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> +static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key)
> +{
> + return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> +
> static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
> {
> return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
> index 4ac4bf3310d7..7cc3a3382fee 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack.h
> +++ b/security/smack/smack.h
> @@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
> return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> +static inline struct smack_known **smack_key(const struct key *key)
> +{
> + return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> +
> /*
> * Is the directory transmuting?
> */
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index fd69e1bd841b..e9560b078efe 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
> static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> + struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
>
> - key->security = skp;
> + *blob = skp;
> return 0;
> }
>
> -/**
> - * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
> - * @key: the object
> - *
> - * Clear the blob pointer
> - */
> -static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
> -{
> - key->security = NULL;
> -}
> -
> /**
> * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
> * @key_ref: gets to the object
> @@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
> static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
> {
> + struct smack_known **blob;
> + struct smack_known *skp;
> struct key *keyp;
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
> @@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
> * it may do so.
> */
> - if (keyp->security == NULL)
> + blob = smack_key(keyp);
> + skp = *blob;
> + if (skp == NULL)
> return 0;
> /*
> * This should not occur
> @@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> request |= MAY_READ;
> if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
> request |= MAY_WRITE;
> - rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
> - rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
> + rc = smk_access(tkp, skp, request, &ad);
> + rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, skp, request, rc);
> return rc;
> }
>
> @@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> */
> static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
> {
> - struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
> + struct smack_known **blob = smack_key(key);
> + struct smack_known *skp = *blob;
> size_t length;
> char *copy;
>
> - if (key->security == NULL) {
> + if (skp == NULL) {
> *_buffer = NULL;
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
> .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
> .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
> @@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> /* key management security hooks */
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> --
> 2.19.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-01 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-01 15:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:26PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> When more than one security module is exporting data to
> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
> structure to be used instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Thoughts below...
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 49f2685324b0..81f9f79f9a1e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
> LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
> };
>
> +/* Data exported by the security modules */
> +struct lsm_export {
> + u32 selinux;
> + u32 smack;
> + u32 apparmor;
> + u32 flags;
> +};
I think it might make more logical sent to leave flags at the start.
While I don't expect to add more fields, I find it surprising that
it is at the end. :)
-Kees
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
> +#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
> +
> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> int cap, unsigned int opts);
> --
> 2.19.1
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-02 1:57 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-04 0:29 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-02 1:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:27PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Convert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
> structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
> involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid()
> is updated.
So, there are like 20 patches that all have basically identical subject
and changelog, but some evolve the API in subtle ways. For example,
in this patch, there is no mention of adding lsm_export_init(). I would
expect all the lsm_export infrastructure and support functions to be
introduced in patch 4 where struct lsm_export is initially introduced.
Instead, various helper functions are scattered through these patches
and I'm left struggling to figure out where things are actually
changing.
Also, I find the helper naming to be not easy to follow but this is
mainly due to me repeatedly trying to parse the helpers as
noun-verb-noun, so lsm_export_secid() kind of makes sense ("write to
secid, based on the flags") but then I see smack_export_secid() and this
is "write to the internal lsm_export storage, the value of this secid".
The direction here is what ends up confusing me. Which direction is the
data moving?
lsm_export_to_secid() <- from lsm_export to secid
smack_secid_to_lsm_export() <- from secid to smack's lsm_export record
> +static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
> +{
> + l->selinux = secid;
> + l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
> +}
Which brings me to another thing I find awkward here: I feel like an LSM
shouldn't need to do anything with this object: it should be opaque to
the LSM. The LSM infrastructure knows which LSM it has called into. Why
isn't this just like the other blobs?
Anyway, I'll keep reading maybe I just haven't gotten far enough, but
I'd love some help in the 0/NN cover letter describing what the
evolution actually does through the series so I can follow along and you
can set my expectations about what I'll be looking for in each patch.
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-02 2:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 22:23 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-02 2:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:44PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Remove lsm_export scaffolding around audit_sig_sid by
> changing the u32 secid into an lsm_export structure named
> audit_sig_lsm.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
> kernel/audit.c | 18 ++++++++----------
> kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +--
> 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 40aa7b9f3c83..e76d7a9dbe50 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
> memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
> }
>
> +static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
> +{
> + return (((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX) && l->selinux) ||
> + ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK) && l->smack) ||
> + ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
> +}
All of these helpers need kerndoc.
Bikeshed on naming:
- struct lsm_export renamed to lsm_secid
- lsm_export_any renamed to lsm_secid_defined() or ..._is_set() or
..._non_zero() ?
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-02 2:06 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 21:40 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-02 2:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:47PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
> * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
> * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
> - * @secid: secid of the task being validated
> + * @l: LAM data of the task being validated
> * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
> * MAY_APPEND)
> * @func: caller identifier
Call this "l" just hurts me. Why shouldn't it still be secid?
Also typo: LAM -> LSM.
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-02 2:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 21:57 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-02 2:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:10:08PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> -void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
> +void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
> {
> - kfree(secdata);
> + kfree(cp->context);
> }
Maybe better to have common helper?
void lsm_context_clear(struct lsm_context *cp)
{
kfree(cp->context);
cp->context = NULL;
cp->len = 0;
}
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2019-06-01 15:13 ` [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-02 2:56 ` Kees Cook
51 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-02 2:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:22PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
I will go read 51-58 from here :)
I'd really love to see summaries of the series broken down because I
think there are some separable parts:
First several patch: more blobs -- send this part again separately,
let's get some more review and land it. It's distinct from the other
changes.
rest until 35: secids work (is this actually separable from secctx?)
36-?: security context
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
2019-06-01 15:23 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-03 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-03 20:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On 6/1/2019 8:23 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:26PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> When more than one security module is exporting data to
>> audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer
>> is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a
>> structure to be used instead.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> Thoughts below...
>
>> ---
>> include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 49f2685324b0..81f9f79f9a1e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -76,6 +76,18 @@ enum lsm_event {
>> LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
>> };
>>
>> +/* Data exported by the security modules */
>> +struct lsm_export {
>> + u32 selinux;
>> + u32 smack;
>> + u32 apparmor;
>> + u32 flags;
>> +};
> I think it might make more logical sent to leave flags at the start.
> While I don't expect to add more fields, I find it surprising that
> it is at the end. :)
Data structure randomization notwithstanding, it
doesn't matter to me, so I'll put the flags first.
This came about because I initially didn't think I'd
need flags, and they were add to the end when I determined
I did.
>
> -Kees
>
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02
>> +#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04
>> +
>> /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
>> extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
>> int cap, unsigned int opts);
>> --
>> 2.19.1
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
2019-06-02 2:06 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-03 21:40 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-03 21:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey
On 6/1/2019 7:06 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:47PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
>> @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
>> * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
>> * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
>> * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
>> - * @secid: secid of the task being validated
>> + * @l: LAM data of the task being validated
>> * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
>> * MAY_APPEND)
>> * @func: caller identifier
> Call this "l" just hurts me. Why shouldn't it still be secid?
Changing the type while leaving the name alone, or
changed slightly (e.g. secids instead of secid) makes
tracking down unchanged uses much harder. How about
lsme, or export?
> Also typo: LAM -> LSM.
That too.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
2019-06-02 2:27 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-03 21:57 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-03 21:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey
On 6/1/2019 7:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:10:08PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> -void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
>> +void apparmor_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp)
>> {
>> - kfree(secdata);
>> + kfree(cp->context);
>> }
> Maybe better to have common helper?
>
> void lsm_context_clear(struct lsm_context *cp)
> {
> kfree(cp->context);
> cp->context = NULL;
> cp->len = 0;
> }
The caller, security_release_secctx(), does a
lsm_context_init after the module specific code.
The helper wouldn't be generic, since Smack does
not do a kfree() on cp->context.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-06-02 2:03 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-03 22:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 18:41 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-03 22:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On 6/1/2019 7:03 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:44PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Remove lsm_export scaffolding around audit_sig_sid by
>> changing the u32 secid into an lsm_export structure named
>> audit_sig_lsm.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
>> kernel/audit.c | 18 ++++++++----------
>> kernel/audit.h | 2 +-
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +--
>> 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 40aa7b9f3c83..e76d7a9dbe50 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
>> memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
>> }
>>
>> +static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l)
>> +{
>> + return (((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX) && l->selinux) ||
>> + ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_SMACK) && l->smack) ||
>> + ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor));
>> +}
> All of these helpers need kerndoc.
Point.
> Bikeshed on naming:
> - struct lsm_export renamed to lsm_secid
I want to get away from the expectation that what an
LSM exports has to be a u32 secid. It's not in any patchset
yet, but I plan to replace the Smack u32 with a struct smack_known *
at some point in the future. That will require a little work
in the secmark code, but will have significant performance
improvement in audit and UDS.
> - lsm_export_any renamed to lsm_secid_defined() or ..._is_set() or
> ..._non_zero() ?
I'll admit lsm_export_any() isn't a great name. The state it has
to convey is "some LSM has set a value, and it isn't an error value."
Like "secid != 0", except that it matters whether the 0 came from
secid having never been set, as opposed to it was set because something
went wrong. At the same time, I don't want it to imply that the value
is set for all LSMs, because it may not be. That's why I used "any".
Some LSM *has* set a value. That value may not be the one you're hoping
for, but you may need to call the subsystem (e.g.audit) that's going to
look.
Maybe lsm_export_is_interesting()?
I'd love to discover there's a convention I could adhere to.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
2019-06-02 1:57 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-04 0:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 19:11 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-04 0:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, Stephen Smalley, casey
On 6/1/2019 6:57 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:27PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Convert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
>> structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
>> involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid()
>> is updated.
> So, there are like 20 patches that all have basically identical subject
> and changelog, but some evolve the API in subtle ways. For example,
> in this patch, there is no mention of adding lsm_export_init(). I would
> expect all the lsm_export infrastructure and support functions to be
> introduced in patch 4 where struct lsm_export is initially introduced.
Fair enough. I didn't introduce helpers until they were used.
I hoped to avoid the "what is this for?" question that can
come up when you add functions that aren't used.
> Instead, various helper functions are scattered through these patches
> and I'm left struggling to figure out where things are actually
> changing.
I think it's possible that the patches may be too small
to contain enough context for them to be sensible. It may
make things more obvious if I combined
[PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
[PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid
into a single patch. That would reduce the amount of scaffolding
that has to get set up and torn down.
> Also, I find the helper naming to be not easy to follow but this is
> mainly due to me repeatedly trying to parse the helpers as
> noun-verb-noun, so lsm_export_secid() kind of makes sense ("write to
> secid, based on the flags") but then I see smack_export_secid() and this
> is "write to the internal lsm_export storage, the value of this secid".
> The direction here is what ends up confusing me. Which direction is the
> data moving?
>
> lsm_export_to_secid() <- from lsm_export to secid
> smack_secid_to_lsm_export() <- from secid to smack's lsm_export record
The inconsistency is comes from my use of "lsm_export" for
the name of the LSM data structure. This is something you've
commented on elsewhere. The underscore makes the function name
look like it has an lsm_ prefix, rather than just being the
name of the structure. If I changed "struct lsm_export" to
"struct lsmdata" the names:
lsm_lsmdata_to_secid() and smack_secid_to_lsmdata()
would be more consistent.
>> +static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)
>> +{
>> + l->selinux = secid;
>> + l->flags |= LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX;
>> +}
> Which brings me to another thing I find awkward here: I feel like an LSM
> shouldn't need to do anything with this object: it should be opaque to
> the LSM. The LSM infrastructure knows which LSM it has called into. Why
> isn't this just like the other blobs?
There's a lot more rework required if the lsm_export has to be
life-cycle managed. The audit code, for example, passes them about,
copying, storing and dropping them without a care. I'm not completely
opposed to taking that on, but it's essentially a rewrite of the
audit LSM handling. The SO_PEERSEC handling probably has issues as
well. I think netlabel would be OK, but there's stuff going on elsewhere
in the networking stack that isn't going to like anything it has to
worry about allocating and/or freeing.
> Anyway, I'll keep reading maybe I just haven't gotten far enough, but
> I'd love some help in the 0/NN cover letter describing what the
> evolution actually does through the series so I can follow along and you
> can set my expectations about what I'll be looking for in each patch.
OK. Good feedback. The next batch will be better.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-06-03 22:23 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-06 18:41 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-06 19:17 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-06 18:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 03:23:07PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Maybe lsm_export_is_interesting()?
> I'd love to discover there's a convention I could adhere to.
I'd agree "lsm_data" seems meaningless. lsm_export does seem a better
name, though it has the "export is also a verb" issue. Would "lsm_context"
or "lsm_ctx"?
be better?
then we get lsm_ctx_is_interesting() and lsm_ctx_to_secid() ?
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
2019-06-04 0:29 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-06 19:11 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-06 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, Stephen Smalley
On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 05:29:45PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/1/2019 6:57 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:09:27PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> Convert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export
> >> structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding
> >> involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid()
> >> is updated.
> > So, there are like 20 patches that all have basically identical subject
> > and changelog, but some evolve the API in subtle ways. For example,
> > in this patch, there is no mention of adding lsm_export_init(). I would
> > expect all the lsm_export infrastructure and support functions to be
> > introduced in patch 4 where struct lsm_export is initially introduced.
>
> Fair enough. I didn't introduce helpers until they were used.
> I hoped to avoid the "what is this for?" question that can
> come up when you add functions that aren't used.
True, but since we know a giant set of changes is coming, I think it's
okay. As long there's kerndoc on the helpers, it should be clear what
they're for. And the commit log can include the context for why the
helpers exist. "In later patches, we'll replace secids with lsm_context,
so we need to use foo to do bar etc"
> > Instead, various helper functions are scattered through these patches
> > and I'm left struggling to figure out where things are actually
> > changing.
>
> I think it's possible that the patches may be too small
> to contain enough context for them to be sensible. It may
> make things more obvious if I combined
>
> [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
> [PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid
>
> into a single patch. That would reduce the amount of scaffolding
> that has to get set up and torn down.
Yeah, that's fine. If you have to do a lot of work to split up a pair of
patches, I think that's fine to combine them. What I usually want to see
is a split of separable changes. Like, adding all the helpers: I can
look at those individually as I read the patch. Then the next patch
might swap a whole logical set of things like putting lsm_context into
the LSMs, but leaving all the interfaces alone. Then fixing the high
level things that use secids, etc.
But, really, the cover letter should cover the evolutionary steps the
series takes: that should serve as a guide for everything trying to
follow your thinking.
> The inconsistency is comes from my use of "lsm_export" for
> the name of the LSM data structure. This is something you've
> commented on elsewhere. The underscore makes the function name
> look like it has an lsm_ prefix, rather than just being the
> name of the structure. If I changed "struct lsm_export" to
> "struct lsmdata" the names:
>
> lsm_lsmdata_to_secid() and smack_secid_to_lsmdata()
> would be more consistent.
Right. Having a distinct verb in the helper name should solve all my
confusion. :)
lsm_context_to_secid() secid_to_lsm_context() smack_secid_to_lsm_export()
etc
> > Which brings me to another thing I find awkward here: I feel like an LSM
> > shouldn't need to do anything with this object: it should be opaque to
> > the LSM. The LSM infrastructure knows which LSM it has called into. Why
> > isn't this just like the other blobs?
>
> There's a lot more rework required if the lsm_export has to be
> life-cycle managed. The audit code, for example, passes them about,
> copying, storing and dropping them without a care. I'm not completely
> opposed to taking that on, but it's essentially a rewrite of the
> audit LSM handling. The SO_PEERSEC handling probably has issues as
> well. I think netlabel would be OK, but there's stuff going on elsewhere
> in the networking stack that isn't going to like anything it has to
> worry about allocating and/or freeing.
I didn't mean life-cycle managed, but rather "opaque" to LSM. I just now
tried to construct an example, and have decided it's too crazy. :) The
benefits of your current system are that they are trivially able to be
put on the stack since they're a fixed size. The down side is that each
LSM must manage its own flags, etc. I will ponder alternatives after I
see the next version of your series.
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-06-06 18:41 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-06 19:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 20:53 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-06 19:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey
On 6/6/2019 11:41 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 03:23:07PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Maybe lsm_export_is_interesting()?
>> I'd love to discover there's a convention I could adhere to.
> I'd agree "lsm_data" seems meaningless. lsm_export does seem a better
> name, though it has the "export is also a verb" issue. Would "lsm_context"
> or "lsm_ctx"?
> be better?
>
> then we get lsm_ctx_is_interesting() and lsm_ctx_to_secid() ?
Fiddling around with this led me to think "struct lsmdata"
would work, although maybe "struct lsmblob", in keeping with
the notion it is opaque. Leaving out the "_" helps with the
verb issue, I think. I think ctx or context is right out, as
secctx is the string representation, and it would really confuse
things.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-06-06 19:17 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-06 20:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-06 21:06 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-06 20:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 12:17:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/6/2019 11:41 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 03:23:07PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> Maybe lsm_export_is_interesting()?
> >> I'd love to discover there's a convention I could adhere to.
> > I'd agree "lsm_data" seems meaningless. lsm_export does seem a better
> > name, though it has the "export is also a verb" issue. Would "lsm_context"
> > or "lsm_ctx"?
> > be better?
> >
> > then we get lsm_ctx_is_interesting() and lsm_ctx_to_secid() ?
>
> Fiddling around with this led me to think "struct lsmdata"
> would work, although maybe "struct lsmblob", in keeping with
> the notion it is opaque. Leaving out the "_" helps with the
> verb issue, I think. I think ctx or context is right out, as
> secctx is the string representation, and it would really confuse
> things.
Ah yeah, good point on "context". Does "blob" conflict with the existing
"blob" stuff? If it's always going to be u32 data, do we want it to be
lsm_u32 ? Or, since it's a multiplexor, lsmmux ?
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-06-06 20:53 ` Kees Cook
@ 2019-06-06 21:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 22:53 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-06 21:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds, casey
On 6/6/2019 1:53 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 12:17:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 6/6/2019 11:41 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 03:23:07PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> Maybe lsm_export_is_interesting()?
>>>> I'd love to discover there's a convention I could adhere to.
>>> I'd agree "lsm_data" seems meaningless. lsm_export does seem a better
>>> name, though it has the "export is also a verb" issue. Would "lsm_context"
>>> or "lsm_ctx"?
>>> be better?
>>>
>>> then we get lsm_ctx_is_interesting() and lsm_ctx_to_secid() ?
>> Fiddling around with this led me to think "struct lsmdata"
>> would work, although maybe "struct lsmblob", in keeping with
>> the notion it is opaque. Leaving out the "_" helps with the
>> verb issue, I think. I think ctx or context is right out, as
>> secctx is the string representation, and it would really confuse
>> things.
> Ah yeah, good point on "context". Does "blob" conflict with the existing
> "blob" stuff?
I don't think so. Some people might think it a bit too cute,
but I kind of like it.
> If it's always going to be u32 data, do we want it to be
> lsm_u32 ?
At some point I would love to have the Smack data be a
struct smack_known pointer, but that's a future thing.
> Or, since it's a multiplexor, lsmmux ?
I'd rather describe what's in it than how it's used.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
2019-06-06 21:06 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-06 22:53 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-06-06 22:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux,
john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 02:06:44PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> I'd rather describe what's in it than how it's used.
Yeah, good point. :)
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 16:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 17:11 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-06-07 13:03 ` José Bollo
1 sibling, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: José Bollo @ 2019-06-07 13:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On Tue, 4 Jun 2019 09:14:42 -0700
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 6/4/2019 5:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> This patchset provides the changes required for
> >> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
> >
> > Please explain the motivation
>
> I'll add some explanation for the next revision.
> It won't be anything that I haven't posted many times
> before, but you're right that it belongs in the log.
>
> > - why do we want to allow AppArmor to stack with other modules,
>
> First, is there a reason not to? Sure, you can confuse
> administrators by implementing complex security policies,
> but there are lots of ways to do that already.
>
> AppArmor provides a different security model than SELinux,
> TOMOYO or Smack. Smack is better at system component
> separation, while AppArmor is better at application isolation.
> It's a win to use each to its strength rather than trying to
> stretch either to the edge of what it can do.
>
> > who would use it,
Hi all,
I would like to expose a potential use of interest for me: being able
to have containers running Smack on Ubuntu or Fedora platforms.
But it could also be interesting for running a container having fedora
on ubuntu or suse or the opposite.
How it will work? Will it work? Ask Casey.
just my 2 pennies
José Bollo
> Can't name names, but there have been multiple requests.
>
> > how would it be used,
>
> As mentioned above, Smack for system separation, AppArmor for
> application isolation.
>
> > what does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of
> > it.
>
> It's not necessary that something be impossible to do any
> other way. The question should be whether this provides for
> a better way to achieve the goals, and this does that.
> If I tried the come up with something that's impossible I
> would expect the usual "you can do that with SELinux policy"
> argument. We know we can do things. We want to have the tools
> to do them better.
>
> > Also, Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor,
> > would this still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they
> > rely on hooks that are not handled here?
>
> Some amount of merging will likely be required. But that's
> always going to be true with parallel development tracks.
> That's why we have git!
>
> > Please explain the cost of the change - what do we pay in terms of
> > memory, runtime, or other overheads in order to support this
> > change?
>
> Do you have particular benchmarks you want to see?
> When I've supplied numbers in the past they have not
> been remarked on.
>
> >
> >>
> >> A new process attribute identifies which security module
> >> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
> >> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
> >> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
> >> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
> >> will be called for this information. The first security
> >> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
> >
> > Doesn't this effectively undo making the hooks read-only after
> > init, at least for the subset involved? What are the security
> > implications thereof?
>
> Any mechanism, be it a separate set of hooks, a name used to
> do list look ups, or an sophisticated hash scheme will have that
> impact for the processes that use it. This scheme has the best
> performance profile of the mechanisms I experimented with and
> avoids all sorts of special cases.
>
> >
> >> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
> >> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
> >> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
> >> for each of the security modules that export information
> >> outside the LSM layer.
> >>
> >> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
> >> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
> >> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
> >> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
> >> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
> >> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
> >> many of the interfaces cleaner.
> >>
> >> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> >> ---
> >> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
> >> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
> >> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
> >> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
> >> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
> >> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
> >> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
> >> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
> >> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
> >> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
> >> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
> >> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> >> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
> >> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
> >> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
> >> include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
> >> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
> >> include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
> >> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
> >> kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
> >> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
> >> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
> >> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
> >> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
> >> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
> >> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
> >> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
> >> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
> >> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
> >> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
> >> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
> >> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
> >> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
> >> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
> >> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
> >> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
> >> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
> >> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
> >> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
> >> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
> >> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
> >> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
> >> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
> >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
> >> security/security.c | 338
> >> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> >> security/selinux/hooks.c | 259
> >> ++++++++++++------------ security/selinux/include/audit.h
> >> | 5 +- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
> >> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
> >> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
> >> security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
> >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238
> >> +++++++++++----------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c |
> >> 8 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +- 58 files
> >> changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-05 21:43 ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-05 22:28 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-05 22:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, selinux, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul
On Wed, 5 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:
> This does rely on apparmor doing its own namespacing and bounding. LSM
> stacking just allows us to start doing this with apparmor containers
> on smack and selinux based systems.
Ahh, ok, I thought you were using an LSM stack for each container.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-05 20:53 ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-05 21:43 ` John Johansen
2019-06-05 22:28 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-05 21:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris
Cc: Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, selinux, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul
On 6/5/19 1:53 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:
>
>> Yes, on Ubuntu & suse you can lauch lxd system containers with the
>> container having a system policy bounding the container, and the container
>> having its own apparmor policy namespace. So it loads and has its own
>> policy that is enforced.
>>
>> This allows for us to run older versions of ubuntu (say 16.04) on an
>> 18.04 host, and have the 16.04 policy behave just as if it was the host.
>
> How well does the LSM stacking scale to 100s or more containers?
>
Actually really well,
The cost isn't really based on how many containers but how many LSMs
are registered and how nested we are.
How we are currently handling it is apparmor is registered once, and
it is responsible for looping on its bounding. So for tasks that are
not in the container there is no additional cost.
For tasks in the first container, there is an extra cost of enforcing
the extra layer of apparmor policy loaded in the container. If you do
container in container there are two extra levels of apparmor policy.
This does rely on apparmor doing its own namespacing and bounding. LSM
stacking just allows us to start doing this with apparmor containers
on smack and selinux based systems.
>> This approach won't be an option for the 19.10 release and we will be
>> needing the full patchset. I should be able to provide some benchmark
>> and testing data soon.
>
> Great.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-05 5:03 ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-05 20:53 ` James Morris
2019-06-05 21:43 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-05 20:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, selinux, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul
On Tue, 4 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:
> Yes, on Ubuntu & suse you can lauch lxd system containers with the
> container having a system policy bounding the container, and the container
> having its own apparmor policy namespace. So it loads and has its own
> policy that is enforced.
>
> This allows for us to run older versions of ubuntu (say 16.04) on an
> 18.04 host, and have the 16.04 policy behave just as if it was the host.
How well does the LSM stacking scale to 100s or more containers?
> This approach won't be an option for the 19.10 release and we will be
> needing the full patchset. I should be able to provide some benchmark
> and testing data soon.
Great.
--
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-05 3:08 ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-05 5:03 ` John Johansen
2019-06-05 20:53 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-05 5:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris
Cc: Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, selinux, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul
On 6/4/19 8:08 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:
>
>> system as a whole is still being protected by selinux. Similar requests
>> have been made for lxd doing system containers. lxd currently supports
>> nested apparmor, so on an ubuntu system you can run suse container,
>> where the ubuntu host is enforcing policy and the suse container is
>> loading and enforcing its policy as well. In this case the policy of the
>> container is bounded by the policy of the host. The goal is to be able
>> to the same with selinux and smack based systems, LSM stacking is of
>> course only part of what is required to make this work.
>
> Interesting. So you're stacking apparmor with itself, and one is the
> container instance? And you add another stacked apparmor for a 2nd
> container etc. ?
Yes, on Ubuntu & suse you can lauch lxd system containers with the
container having a system policy bounding the container, and the container
having its own apparmor policy namespace. So it loads and has its own
policy that is enforced.
This allows for us to run older versions of ubuntu (say 16.04) on an
18.04 host, and have the 16.04 policy behave just as if it was the host.
>
>> Ubuntu actually has a very small apparmor delta these days, and we are
>> working on eliminating it entirely. There are no patches in Ubuntu that
>> require new hooks. As for the delta wrt to the stacking work, Ubuntu has
>> pulled in a subset of this delta and has been shipping kernels with
>> stacking enabled for 4 releases now and apparmor development is done
>> with LSM stacking in mind.
>
> A subset of these patches from Casey?
>
Yes, we have been testing the and using Casey's patches. The set has
changed from release to release, and we don't usually take all of them.
As we are trying to find the right balance.
For 19.04 we did test the full stack and the decision was to hold off
and give it more testing. The big concern was around the secid changes
which needed more review and testing before we could commit to them.
Instead we cherry-picked the stacking patches from 5.2 and a subset of
the set under review, and reverted the upstream apparmor changes that
require secids.
This approach won't be an option for the 19.10 release and we will be
needing the full patchset. I should be able to provide some benchmark
and testing data soon.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-05 1:50 ` John Johansen
@ 2019-06-05 3:08 ` James Morris
2019-06-05 5:03 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-05 3:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Johansen
Cc: Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler,
linux-security-module, selinux, keescook, penguin-kernel, paul
On Tue, 4 Jun 2019, John Johansen wrote:
> system as a whole is still being protected by selinux. Similar requests
> have been made for lxd doing system containers. lxd currently supports
> nested apparmor, so on an ubuntu system you can run suse container,
> where the ubuntu host is enforcing policy and the suse container is
> loading and enforcing its policy as well. In this case the policy of the
> container is bounded by the policy of the host. The goal is to be able
> to the same with selinux and smack based systems, LSM stacking is of
> course only part of what is required to make this work.
Interesting. So you're stacking apparmor with itself, and one is the
container instance? And you add another stacked apparmor for a 2nd
container etc. ?
> Ubuntu actually has a very small apparmor delta these days, and we are
> working on eliminating it entirely. There are no patches in Ubuntu that
> require new hooks. As for the delta wrt to the stacking work, Ubuntu has
> pulled in a subset of this delta and has been shipping kernels with
> stacking enabled for 4 releases now and apparmor development is done
> with LSM stacking in mind.
A subset of these patches from Casey?
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 16:14 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-05 1:50 ` John Johansen
2019-06-05 3:08 ` James Morris
1 sibling, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: John Johansen @ 2019-06-05 1:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley, Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris,
linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: keescook, penguin-kernel, paul
On 6/4/19 5:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>
> Please explain the motivation - why do we want to allow AppArmor to stack with other modules, who would use it, how would it be used, what does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of it.
>
Its another step towards making stacking generic. The current stacking in 5.2 only allows for a subset of blobs and limits what can be done by new security modules. This is another step towards achieving generic stacking. Whether it makes sense to stacking a given set of security modules is a different discussion. I am fairly sure if landlock/sara get in upstream they will at some point want access to parts of the LSM that are currently limited to a major LSM.
On the apparmor front stacking with other modules has been asked for in the context of containers, both application and system. For example snapd would like to be able to stack apparmor on an selinux system so the snap container can enforce its apparmor set of policy while the system as a whole is still being protected by selinux. Similar requests have been made for lxd doing system containers. lxd currently supports nested apparmor, so on an ubuntu system you can run suse container, where the ubuntu host is enforcing policy and the suse container is loading and enforcing its policy as well. In this case the policy of the container is bounded by the policy of the host. The goal is to be able to the same with selinux and smack based systems, LSM stacking is of course only part of what is required to make this work.
Currently with the stacking patches we can boot a fedora system, and run an ubuntu container with apparmor enforcing its policy inside the container and selinux enforcing its policy on the host.
> Also, Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor, would this still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they rely on hooks that are not handled here?
Ubuntu actually has a very small apparmor delta these days, and we are working on eliminating it entirely. There are no patches in Ubuntu that require new hooks. As for the delta wrt to the stacking work, Ubuntu has pulled in a subset of this delta and has been shipping kernels with stacking enabled for 4 releases now and apparmor development is done with LSM stacking in mind.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 20:42 ` James Morris
@ 2019-06-04 21:19 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-04 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris
Cc: Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, casey
On 6/4/2019 1:42 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
>>> It isn't free so there should be a cost/benefit analysis.
>> Some benchmarking is definitely in order, but most
>> of what's you're calling out as downside is hypothetical
>> or based on assumption.
> When you're proposing changes such as these, which make fundamental and
> far-reaching changes, the burden is on you to present the cost/benefit
> analysis.
Granted. There has been substantial conversation about it
over the years, but I have not done well including it in
this discussion.
> You can't just say "Here are some changes and here are the benefits, and
> any possible costs are merely hypothetical".
Of course. Nonetheless, no evidence for performance impact has
been provided, while it has been asserted.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 19:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-06-04 20:42 ` James Morris
2019-06-04 21:19 ` Casey Schaufler
1 sibling, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2019-06-04 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, linux-security-module, selinux,
keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On Tue, 4 Jun 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > It isn't free so there should be a cost/benefit analysis.
>
> Some benchmarking is definitely in order, but most
> of what's you're calling out as downside is hypothetical
> or based on assumption.
When you're proposing changes such as these, which make fundamental and
far-reaching changes, the burden is on you to present the cost/benefit
analysis.
You can't just say "Here are some changes and here are the benefits, and
any possible costs are merely hypothetical".
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 19:58 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-04 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 20:42 ` James Morris
1 sibling, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-06-04 20:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 6/4/19 3:58 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/4/2019 10:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 6/4/19 12:14 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 6/4/2019 5:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>> On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>>>>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>>>
>>>> Please explain the motivation
>>>
>>> I'll add some explanation for the next revision.
>>> It won't be anything that I haven't posted many times
>>> before, but you're right that it belongs in the log.
>>>
>>>> - why do we want to allow AppArmor to stack with other modules,
>>>
>>> First, is there a reason not to? Sure, you can confuse
>>> administrators by implementing complex security policies,
>>> but there are lots of ways to do that already.
>>
>> There are costs to doing so, e.g.
>> - greater complexity in the security framework,
>
> Taking blob management out of the modules and
> into the framework makes simplifies the modules.
>
>> - possibly greater memory and runtime overheads,
>
> Possibly reduced memory and runtime overheads, as well.
>
>> - potential user confusion (which security module(s) caused a given failure?)
>
> That's not new. I've seen countless cases where users blame
> SELinux or Smack when the problem is with mode bits and/or
> capabilities. Not to mention that a good 50% of current Linux
> users don't understand any of the security mechanisms to
> begin with.
>
>> - potential distro maintainer burden
>
> Selection of security modules and how they are configured
> has always been a burden for distro developers and maintainers.
> Nothing new here.
> And, they knew the job was dangerous when they took it.
>
>
>> (similar to above, but performing triage when any given permission denial can have multiple causes beyond just DAC + one module, weird interactions among modules, etc)
>
> Yama has been widely accepted by distros, and civilization
> has yet to have officially been declared ended.
>
>> It isn't free so there should be a cost/benefit analysis.
>
> Some benchmarking is definitely in order, but most
> of what's you're calling out as downside is hypothetical
> or based on assumption.
>
>>
>>>
>>> AppArmor provides a different security model than SELinux,
>>> TOMOYO or Smack. Smack is better at system component
>>> separation, while AppArmor is better at application isolation.
>>> It's a win to use each to its strength rather than trying to
>>> stretch either to the edge of what it can do.
>>>
>>>> who would use it,
>>>
>>> Can't name names, but there have been multiple requests.
>>>
>>>> how would it be used,
>>>
>>> As mentioned above, Smack for system separation, AppArmor for
>>> application isolation.
>>
>> Can you provide a concrete example of how combining the two yields a smaller, simpler configuration overall than using them individually?
>
> Smack + AppArmor is a simpler, smaller model than the Smack policy
> used in Tizen 2.
Not very compelling given that not even Tizen is using that policy
anymore. But even taking that as an example, have you actually done the
work to craft a working configuration of Smack + AppArmor that meets the
same security goals as the Tizen 2 policy and confirmed that it is in
fact smaller and simpler? Won't it just move the size/complexity from
Smack rules to AppArmor profiles? And those might be larger...
>
>>
>>>
>>>> what does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of it.
>>>
>>> It's not necessary that something be impossible to do any
>>> other way. The question should be whether this provides for
>>> a better way to achieve the goals, and this does that.
>>> If I tried the come up with something that's impossible I
>>> would expect the usual "you can do that with SELinux policy"
>>> argument. We know we can do things. We want to have the tools
>>> to do them better.
>>>
>>>> Also, Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor, would this still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they rely on hooks that are not handled here?
>>>
>>> Some amount of merging will likely be required. But that's
>>> always going to be true with parallel development tracks.
>>> That's why we have git!
>>>
>>>> Please explain the cost of the change - what do we pay in terms of memory, runtime, or other overheads in order to support this change?
>>>
>>> Do you have particular benchmarks you want to see?
>>> When I've supplied numbers in the past they have not
>>> been remarked on.
>>
>> A combination of micro and macro benchmarks exercising multiple kernel subsystems would be good. Kernel build time isn't sufficient.
>
> Do you have preferences, or better yet, facilities
> for running them? I am, alas, running on finite resources
> and benchmark contributions, especially in areas where you
> have specific concerns, would be most welcome.
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A new process attribute identifies which security module
>>>>> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
>>>>> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
>>>>> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
>>>>> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
>>>>> will be called for this information. The first security
>>>>> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
>>>>
>>>> Doesn't this effectively undo making the hooks read-only after init, at least for the subset involved? What are the security implications thereof?
>>>
>>> Any mechanism, be it a separate set of hooks, a name used to
>>> do list look ups, or an sophisticated hash scheme will have that
>>> impact for the processes that use it. This scheme has the best
>>> performance profile of the mechanisms I experimented with and
>>> avoids all sorts of special cases.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
>>>>> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
>>>>> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
>>>>> for each of the security modules that export information
>>>>> outside the LSM layer.
>>>>>
>>>>> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
>>>>> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
>>>>> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
>>>>> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
>>>>> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
>>>>> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
>>>>> many of the interfaces cleaner.
>>>>>
>>>>> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
>>>>> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
>>>>> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
>>>>> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
>>>>> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
>>>>> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
>>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
>>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
>>>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
>>>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
>>>>> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
>>>>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>>>>> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
>>>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
>>>>> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
>>>>> include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
>>>>> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
>>>>> include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
>>>>> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
>>>>> kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
>>>>> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
>>>>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
>>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
>>>>> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
>>>>> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
>>>>> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
>>>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
>>>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
>>>>> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
>>>>> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
>>>>> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
>>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
>>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
>>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
>>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
>>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
>>>>> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
>>>>> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
>>>>> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
>>>>> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
>>>>> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
>>>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
>>>>> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
>>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
>>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
>>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
>>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
>>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
>>>>> security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
>>>>> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
>>>>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
>>>>> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
>>>>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
>>>>> security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
>>>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
>>>>> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
>>>>> security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
>>>>> 58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 17:11 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-06-04 19:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 20:42 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 2 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-04 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, casey
On 6/4/2019 10:11 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 6/4/19 12:14 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 6/4/2019 5:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>>>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>>
>>> Please explain the motivation
>>
>> I'll add some explanation for the next revision.
>> It won't be anything that I haven't posted many times
>> before, but you're right that it belongs in the log.
>>
>>> - why do we want to allow AppArmor to stack with other modules,
>>
>> First, is there a reason not to? Sure, you can confuse
>> administrators by implementing complex security policies,
>> but there are lots of ways to do that already.
>
> There are costs to doing so, e.g.
> - greater complexity in the security framework,
Taking blob management out of the modules and
into the framework makes simplifies the modules.
> - possibly greater memory and runtime overheads,
Possibly reduced memory and runtime overheads, as well.
> - potential user confusion (which security module(s) caused a given failure?)
That's not new. I've seen countless cases where users blame
SELinux or Smack when the problem is with mode bits and/or
capabilities. Not to mention that a good 50% of current Linux
users don't understand any of the security mechanisms to
begin with.
> - potential distro maintainer burden
Selection of security modules and how they are configured
has always been a burden for distro developers and maintainers.
Nothing new here.
And, they knew the job was dangerous when they took it.
> (similar to above, but performing triage when any given permission denial can have multiple causes beyond just DAC + one module, weird interactions among modules, etc)
Yama has been widely accepted by distros, and civilization
has yet to have officially been declared ended.
> It isn't free so there should be a cost/benefit analysis.
Some benchmarking is definitely in order, but most
of what's you're calling out as downside is hypothetical
or based on assumption.
>
>>
>> AppArmor provides a different security model than SELinux,
>> TOMOYO or Smack. Smack is better at system component
>> separation, while AppArmor is better at application isolation.
>> It's a win to use each to its strength rather than trying to
>> stretch either to the edge of what it can do.
>>
>>> who would use it,
>>
>> Can't name names, but there have been multiple requests.
>>
>>> how would it be used,
>>
>> As mentioned above, Smack for system separation, AppArmor for
>> application isolation.
>
> Can you provide a concrete example of how combining the two yields a smaller, simpler configuration overall than using them individually?
Smack + AppArmor is a simpler, smaller model than the Smack policy
used in Tizen 2.
>
>>
>>> what does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of it.
>>
>> It's not necessary that something be impossible to do any
>> other way. The question should be whether this provides for
>> a better way to achieve the goals, and this does that.
>> If I tried the come up with something that's impossible I
>> would expect the usual "you can do that with SELinux policy"
>> argument. We know we can do things. We want to have the tools
>> to do them better.
>>
>>> Also, Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor, would this still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they rely on hooks that are not handled here?
>>
>> Some amount of merging will likely be required. But that's
>> always going to be true with parallel development tracks.
>> That's why we have git!
>>
>>> Please explain the cost of the change - what do we pay in terms of memory, runtime, or other overheads in order to support this change?
>>
>> Do you have particular benchmarks you want to see?
>> When I've supplied numbers in the past they have not
>> been remarked on.
>
> A combination of micro and macro benchmarks exercising multiple kernel subsystems would be good. Kernel build time isn't sufficient.
Do you have preferences, or better yet, facilities
for running them? I am, alas, running on finite resources
and benchmark contributions, especially in areas where you
have specific concerns, would be most welcome.
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> A new process attribute identifies which security module
>>>> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
>>>> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
>>>> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
>>>> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
>>>> will be called for this information. The first security
>>>> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
>>>
>>> Doesn't this effectively undo making the hooks read-only after init, at least for the subset involved? What are the security implications thereof?
>>
>> Any mechanism, be it a separate set of hooks, a name used to
>> do list look ups, or an sophisticated hash scheme will have that
>> impact for the processes that use it. This scheme has the best
>> performance profile of the mechanisms I experimented with and
>> avoids all sorts of special cases.
>>
>>>
>>>> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
>>>> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
>>>> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
>>>> for each of the security modules that export information
>>>> outside the LSM layer.
>>>>
>>>> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
>>>> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
>>>> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
>>>> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
>>>> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
>>>> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
>>>> many of the interfaces cleaner.
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
>>>> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
>>>> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
>>>> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
>>>> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
>>>> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
>>>> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
>>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
>>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
>>>> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
>>>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>>>> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
>>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
>>>> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
>>>> include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
>>>> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
>>>> include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
>>>> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
>>>> kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
>>>> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
>>>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
>>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
>>>> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
>>>> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
>>>> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
>>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
>>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
>>>> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
>>>> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
>>>> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
>>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
>>>> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
>>>> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
>>>> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
>>>> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
>>>> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
>>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
>>>> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
>>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
>>>> security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
>>>> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
>>>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
>>>> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
>>>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
>>>> security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
>>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
>>>> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
>>>> security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
>>>> 58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 16:14 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-04 17:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 19:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-07 13:03 ` José Bollo
1 sibling, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-06-04 17:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 6/4/19 12:14 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/4/2019 5:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>
>> Please explain the motivation
>
> I'll add some explanation for the next revision.
> It won't be anything that I haven't posted many times
> before, but you're right that it belongs in the log.
>
>> - why do we want to allow AppArmor to stack with other modules,
>
> First, is there a reason not to? Sure, you can confuse
> administrators by implementing complex security policies,
> but there are lots of ways to do that already.
There are costs to doing so, e.g.
- greater complexity in the security framework,
- possibly greater memory and runtime overheads,
- potential user confusion (which security module(s) caused a given
failure?)
- potential distro maintainer burden (similar to above, but performing
triage when any given permission denial can have multiple causes beyond
just DAC + one module, weird interactions among modules, etc)
It isn't free so there should be a cost/benefit analysis.
>
> AppArmor provides a different security model than SELinux,
> TOMOYO or Smack. Smack is better at system component
> separation, while AppArmor is better at application isolation.
> It's a win to use each to its strength rather than trying to
> stretch either to the edge of what it can do.
>
>> who would use it,
>
> Can't name names, but there have been multiple requests.
>
>> how would it be used,
>
> As mentioned above, Smack for system separation, AppArmor for
> application isolation.
Can you provide a concrete example of how combining the two yields a
smaller, simpler configuration overall than using them individually?
>
>> what does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of it.
>
> It's not necessary that something be impossible to do any
> other way. The question should be whether this provides for
> a better way to achieve the goals, and this does that.
> If I tried the come up with something that's impossible I
> would expect the usual "you can do that with SELinux policy"
> argument. We know we can do things. We want to have the tools
> to do them better.
>
>> Also, Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor, would this still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they rely on hooks that are not handled here?
>
> Some amount of merging will likely be required. But that's
> always going to be true with parallel development tracks.
> That's why we have git!
>
>> Please explain the cost of the change - what do we pay in terms of memory, runtime, or other overheads in order to support this change?
>
> Do you have particular benchmarks you want to see?
> When I've supplied numbers in the past they have not
> been remarked on.
A combination of micro and macro benchmarks exercising multiple kernel
subsystems would be good. Kernel build time isn't sufficient.
>
>>
>>>
>>> A new process attribute identifies which security module
>>> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
>>> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
>>> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
>>> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
>>> will be called for this information. The first security
>>> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
>>
>> Doesn't this effectively undo making the hooks read-only after init, at least for the subset involved? What are the security implications thereof?
>
> Any mechanism, be it a separate set of hooks, a name used to
> do list look ups, or an sophisticated hash scheme will have that
> impact for the processes that use it. This scheme has the best
> performance profile of the mechanisms I experimented with and
> avoids all sorts of special cases.
>
>>
>>> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
>>> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
>>> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
>>> for each of the security modules that export information
>>> outside the LSM layer.
>>>
>>> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
>>> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
>>> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
>>> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
>>> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
>>> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
>>> many of the interfaces cleaner.
>>>
>>> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
>>> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
>>> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
>>> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
>>> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
>>> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
>>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
>>> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
>>> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
>>> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
>>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>>> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
>>> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
>>> include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
>>> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
>>> include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
>>> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
>>> kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
>>> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
>>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
>>> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
>>> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
>>> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
>>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
>>> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
>>> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
>>> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
>>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
>>> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
>>> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
>>> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
>>> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
>>> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
>>> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
>>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
>>> security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
>>> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
>>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
>>> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
>>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
>>> security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
>>> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
>>> security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
>>> 58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-04 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2019-06-04 16:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 17:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-07 13:03 ` José Bollo
2019-06-05 1:50 ` John Johansen
1 sibling, 2 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-04 16:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, casey
On 6/4/2019 5:29 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>
> Please explain the motivation
I'll add some explanation for the next revision.
It won't be anything that I haven't posted many times
before, but you're right that it belongs in the log.
> - why do we want to allow AppArmor to stack with other modules,
First, is there a reason not to? Sure, you can confuse
administrators by implementing complex security policies,
but there are lots of ways to do that already.
AppArmor provides a different security model than SELinux,
TOMOYO or Smack. Smack is better at system component
separation, while AppArmor is better at application isolation.
It's a win to use each to its strength rather than trying to
stretch either to the edge of what it can do.
> who would use it,
Can't name names, but there have been multiple requests.
> how would it be used,
As mentioned above, Smack for system separation, AppArmor for
application isolation.
> what does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of it.
It's not necessary that something be impossible to do any
other way. The question should be whether this provides for
a better way to achieve the goals, and this does that.
If I tried the come up with something that's impossible I
would expect the usual "you can do that with SELinux policy"
argument. We know we can do things. We want to have the tools
to do them better.
> Also, Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor, would this still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they rely on hooks that are not handled here?
Some amount of merging will likely be required. But that's
always going to be true with parallel development tracks.
That's why we have git!
> Please explain the cost of the change - what do we pay in terms of memory, runtime, or other overheads in order to support this change?
Do you have particular benchmarks you want to see?
When I've supplied numbers in the past they have not
been remarked on.
>
>>
>> A new process attribute identifies which security module
>> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
>> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
>> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
>> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
>> will be called for this information. The first security
>> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
>
> Doesn't this effectively undo making the hooks read-only after init, at least for the subset involved? What are the security implications thereof?
Any mechanism, be it a separate set of hooks, a name used to
do list look ups, or an sophisticated hash scheme will have that
impact for the processes that use it. This scheme has the best
performance profile of the mechanisms I experimented with and
avoids all sorts of special cases.
>
>> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
>> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
>> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
>> for each of the security modules that export information
>> outside the LSM layer.
>>
>> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
>> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
>> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
>> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
>> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
>> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
>> many of the interfaces cleaner.
>>
>> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
>> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
>> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
>> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
>> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
>> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
>> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
>> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
>> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
>> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
>> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
>> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
>> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
>> include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
>> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
>> include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
>> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
>> kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
>> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
>> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
>> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
>> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
>> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
>> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
>> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
>> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
>> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
>> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
>> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
>> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
>> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
>> security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
>> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
>> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
>> security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
>> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
>> security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
>> 58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
>>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
2019-06-02 16:50 Casey Schaufler
@ 2019-06-04 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 16:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-05 1:50 ` John Johansen
0 siblings, 2 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2019-06-04 12:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Casey Schaufler, casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module,
selinux
Cc: keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul
On 6/2/19 12:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> This patchset provides the changes required for
> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
Please explain the motivation - why do we want to allow AppArmor to
stack with other modules, who would use it, how would it be used, what
does it provide that isn't already possible in the absence of it. Also,
Ubuntu fully upstreamed all of their changes to AppArmor, would this
still suffice to enable stacking of AppArmor or do they rely on hooks
that are not handled here?
Please explain the cost of the change - what do we pay in terms of
memory, runtime, or other overheads in order to support this change?
>
> A new process attribute identifies which security module
> information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
> /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
> /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
> module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
> will be called for this information. The first security
> module providing the hooks will be used by default.
Doesn't this effectively undo making the hooks read-only after init, at
least for the subset involved? What are the security implications thereof?
> The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
> generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
> lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
> for each of the security modules that export information
> outside the LSM layer.
>
> The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
> have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
> instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
> interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
> "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
> release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
> many of the interfaces cleaner.
>
> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
> fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
> fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
> fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
> fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
> fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
> include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
> include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
> include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
> kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
> kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
> security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
> security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
> security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
> security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
> security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
> security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
> security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
> 58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2019-06-02 16:50 Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
0 siblings, 1 reply; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-06-02 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module
information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
/proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
will be called for this information. The first security
module providing the hooks will be used by default.
The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
for each of the security modules that export information
outside the LSM layer.
The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
"void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
many of the interfaces cleaner.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
@ 2019-05-31 23:30 Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 0 replies; 88+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2019-05-31 23:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: casey.schaufler, jmorris, linux-security-module, selinux
Cc: casey, keescook, john.johansen, penguin-kernel, paul, sds
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module
information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the
/proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by
/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security
module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks
will be called for this information. The first security
module providing the hooks will be used by default.
The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is
generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information
for each of the security modules that export information
outside the LSM layer.
The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings
have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context"
instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the
interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a
"void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct
release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes
many of the interfaces cleaner.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v1-apparmor
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 25 ++-
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +-
fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 ++-
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +-
fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +-
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +-
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 91 +++++----
include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +-
include/linux/security.h | 133 +++++++++----
include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
include/net/netlabel.h | 10 +-
include/net/scm.h | 14 +-
kernel/audit.c | 43 ++--
kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++++----
kernel/cred.c | 15 +-
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +-
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 ++-
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 38 ++--
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 14 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++++-----
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +-
net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +-
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 +++---
security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
security/security.c | 338 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 259 ++++++++++++------------
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +-
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 42 +++-
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +-
security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 238 +++++++++++-----------
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 +-
58 files changed, 1217 insertions(+), 779 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 88+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-06-07 13:09 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-05-31 23:09 [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 01/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 02/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:17 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 03/58] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:18 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 1:57 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-04 0:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 19:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 06/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 07/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 08/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 09/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 10/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 11/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 12/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 13/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 14/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 15/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 16/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 17/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 18/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 19/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 20/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 21/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 2:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 22:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 18:41 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-06 19:17 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 20:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-06 21:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 23/58] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 24/58] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 2:06 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 21:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 26/58] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 27/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 28/58] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 29/58] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 30/58] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 31/58] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 32/58] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 33/58] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 34/58] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 36/58] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:09 ` [PATCH 37/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 38/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 39/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 40/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 41/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 42/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 43/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 44/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 45/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 2:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 21:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 47/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 48/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 49/58] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-05-31 23:10 ` [PATCH 50/58] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-06-01 15:13 ` [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Kees Cook
2019-06-02 2:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-05-31 23:30 Casey Schaufler
2019-06-02 16:50 Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 12:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 16:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 17:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 19:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-04 20:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 20:42 ` James Morris
2019-06-04 21:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-07 13:03 ` José Bollo
2019-06-05 1:50 ` John Johansen
2019-06-05 3:08 ` James Morris
2019-06-05 5:03 ` John Johansen
2019-06-05 20:53 ` James Morris
2019-06-05 21:43 ` John Johansen
2019-06-05 22:28 ` James Morris
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