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* [PATCH v8 0/7]  crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-04 18:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
(or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
output IV.

This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.

Note to the maintainer: patches #2 .. #4 are against other subsystems, and
so it might make sense to take only the crypto patches (#1, #5, and optionally
#6 and #7) now, and allow the other subsystem maintainers to take the other
patches at their leisure during the next cycle.

This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
(generic/549 *), as well as the mode-test scripts suggested by Milan for
the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.

* due to sloppiness on my part, the fscrypt change was actually broken
  since I switched back to using full size IVs in the ESSIV template.
  This time, I fixed this, and reran the test in question and it passed.

The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.

Changes since v7:
- rebase onto cryptodev/master
- drop change to ivsize in #2
- add Milan's R-b's

Changes since v6:
- make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
  if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
- move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
  and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
- add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4

Changes since v5:
- drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
- add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
- make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
  scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
  performed, so don't optimize for it
- clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)

Changes since v4:
- make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
  cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
  complicated the code for no reason
- add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
- add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
  cipher name
- reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
  make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
  methods)
- fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
- simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
  (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)

Changes since v3:
- address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
- use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
  enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
- fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
  the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated

Changes since v2:
- fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
  testing
- some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
  to align it with the aead one
- add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
- add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
  derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine

Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)

Code can be found here
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

Ard Biesheuvel (7):
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
  md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
  crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode

 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
 crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c                | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 235 ++-----
 fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  93 +--
 14 files changed, 1435 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c

-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-04 18:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
(or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
output IV.

This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.

Note to the maintainer: patches #2 .. #4 are against other subsystems, and
so it might make sense to take only the crypto patches (#1, #5, and optionally
#6 and #7) now, and allow the other subsystem maintainers to take the other
patches at their leisure during the next cycle.

This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
(generic/549 *), as well as the mode-test scripts suggested by Milan for
the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.

* due to sloppiness on my part, the fscrypt change was actually broken
  since I switched back to using full size IVs in the ESSIV template.
  This time, I fixed this, and reran the test in question and it passed.

The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.

Changes since v7:
- rebase onto cryptodev/master
- drop change to ivsize in #2
- add Milan's R-b's

Changes since v6:
- make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
  if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
- move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
  and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
- add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4

Changes since v5:
- drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
- add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
- make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
  scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
  performed, so don't optimize for it
- clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)

Changes since v4:
- make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
  cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
  complicated the code for no reason
- add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
- add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
  cipher name
- reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
  make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
  methods)
- fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
- simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
  (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)

Changes since v3:
- address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
- use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
  enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
- fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
  the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated

Changes since v2:
- fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
  testing
- some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
  to align it with the aead one
- add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
- add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
  derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine

Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)

Code can be found here
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

Ard Biesheuvel (7):
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
  md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
  crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode

 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
 crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c                | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 235 ++-----
 fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  93 +--
 14 files changed, 1435 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c

-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-04 18:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
(or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
output IV.

This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.

Note to the maintainer: patches #2 .. #4 are against other subsystems, and
so it might make sense to take only the crypto patches (#1, #5, and optionally
#6 and #7) now, and allow the other subsystem maintainers to take the other
patches at their leisure during the next cycle.

This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
(generic/549 *), as well as the mode-test scripts suggested by Milan for
the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.

* due to sloppiness on my part, the fscrypt change was actually broken
  since I switched back to using full size IVs in the ESSIV template.
  This time, I fixed this, and reran the test in question and it passed.

The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.

Changes since v7:
- rebase onto cryptodev/master
- drop change to ivsize in #2
- add Milan's R-b's

Changes since v6:
- make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
  if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
- move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
  and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
- add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4

Changes since v5:
- drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
- add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
- make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
  scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
  performed, so don't optimize for it
- clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)

Changes since v4:
- make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
  cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
  complicated the code for no reason
- add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
- add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
  cipher name
- reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
  make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
  methods)
- fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
- simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
  (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)

Changes since v3:
- address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
- use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
  enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
- fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
  the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated

Changes since v2:
- fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
  testing
- some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
  to align it with the aead one
- add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
- add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
  derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine

Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)

Code can be found here
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

Ard Biesheuvel (7):
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
  md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
  crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode

 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
 crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c                | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 235 ++-----
 fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  93 +--
 14 files changed, 1435 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c

-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,cipher,shash) or
(aead,cipher,shash) tuple so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling
in fscrypt and dm-crypt and move it into the crypto API. This will result
in better test coverage, and will allow future changes to make the bare
cipher interface internal to the crypto subsystem, in order to increase
robustness of the API against misuse.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c  | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 669 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index e801450bcb1c..1e8390d32b6d 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -568,6 +568,34 @@ config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CRYPTO_ESSIV
+	tristate "ESSIV support for block encryption"
+	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+	help
+	  Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector (ESSIV) is an IV
+	  generation method that is used in some cases by fscrypt and/or
+	  dm-crypt. It uses the hash of the block encryption key as the
+	  symmetric key for a block encryption pass applied to the input
+	  IV, making low entropy IV sources more suitable for block
+	  encryption.
+
+	  This driver implements a crypto API template that can be
+	  instantiated either as a skcipher or as a aead (depending on the
+	  type of the first template argument), and which defers encryption
+	  and decryption requests to the encapsulated cipher after applying
+	  ESSIV to the input IV. Note that in the aead case, it is assumed
+	  that the keys are presented in the same format used by the authenc
+	  template, and that the IV appears at the end of the authenticated
+	  associated data (AAD) region (which is how dm-crypt uses it.)
+
+	  Note that the use of ESSIV is not recommended for new deployments,
+	  and so this only needs to be enabled when interoperability with
+	  existing encrypted volumes of filesystems is required, or when
+	  building for a particular system that requires it (e.g., when
+	  the SoC in question has accelerated CBC but not XTS, making CBC
+	  combined with ESSIV the only feasible mode for h/w accelerated
+	  block encryption)
+
 comment "Hash modes"
 
 config CRYPTO_CMAC
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 9479e1a45d8c..157cb0a324df 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
 
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..417d60e593dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/essiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ESSIV skcipher and aead template for block encryption
+ *
+ * This template encapsulates the ESSIV IV generation algorithm used by
+ * dm-crypt and fscrypt, which converts the initial vector for the skcipher
+ * used for block encryption, by encrypting it using the hash of the
+ * skcipher key as encryption key. Usually, the input IV is a 64-bit sector
+ * number in LE representation zero-padded to the size of the IV, but this
+ * is not assumed by this driver.
+ *
+ * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
+ * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
+ * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
+ * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
+ * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
+ * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
+ * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
+ * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
+ * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
+ * happens to use it.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
+ * Heavily based on:
+ * adiantum length-preserving encryption mode
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct essiv_instance_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher_spawn	skcipher_spawn;
+		struct crypto_aead_spawn	aead_spawn;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_spawn			essiv_cipher_spawn;
+	struct crypto_shash_spawn		hash_spawn;
+};
+
+struct essiv_tfm_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher	*skcipher;
+		struct crypto_aead	*aead;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_cipher		*essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash		*hash;
+	int				ivoffset;
+};
+
+struct essiv_aead_request_ctx {
+	struct scatterlist		sg[4];
+	u8				*assoc;
+	struct aead_request		aead_req;
+};
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+				 const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->u.skcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->u.skcipher,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->u.skcipher, key, keylen);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->u.skcipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher,
+				crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_aead_clear_flags(tctx->u.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tctx->u.aead, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tctx->u.aead, key, keylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_aead_get_flags(tctx->u.aead) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) {
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_update(desc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_finup(desc, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+						    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				  unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aead_setauthsize(tctx->u.aead, authsize);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
+
+	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.skcipher);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+				   req->iv);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req),
+				      essiv_skcipher_done, req);
+
+	return enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) :
+		     crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
+	struct scatterlist *src = req->src;
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	/*
+	 * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
+	 * we have to copy the converted IV into the right scatterlist before
+	 * we pass it on.
+	 */
+	rctx->assoc = NULL;
+	if (req->src == req->dst || !enc) {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+					 req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+					 crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
+	} else {
+		u8 *iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req) + tctx->ivoffset;
+		int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+		int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
+		struct scatterlist *sg;
+		int nents;
+
+		if (ssize < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize);
+		if (nents < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		memcpy(iv, req->iv, ivsize);
+		sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
+
+		if (unlikely(nents > 1)) {
+			/*
+			 * This is a case that rarely occurs in practice, but
+			 * for correctness, we have to deal with it nonetheless.
+			 */
+			rctx->assoc = kmalloc(ssize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!rctx->assoc)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			scatterwalk_map_and_copy(rctx->assoc, req->src, 0,
+						 ssize, 0);
+			sg_set_buf(rctx->sg, rctx->assoc, ssize);
+		} else {
+			sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize,
+				    req->src->offset);
+		}
+
+		sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
+			sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
+
+		src = rctx->sg;
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+				  essiv_aead_done, req);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, src, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+	err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
+		    crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc && err != -EINPROGRESS)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static int essiv_init_tfm(struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx,
+			  struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+	int err;
+
+	essiv_cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher);
+
+	hash = crypto_spawn_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(hash);
+		goto err_free_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+
+	tctx->essiv_cipher = essiv_cipher;
+	tctx->hash = hash;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_free_cipher(essiv_cipher);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+	int err;
+
+	skcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(skcipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(skcipher);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				         crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_skcipher(skcipher);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.skcipher = skcipher;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	unsigned int subreq_size;
+	int err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) !=
+		     sizeof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx));
+
+	aead = crypto_spawn_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+	subreq_size = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+		      crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+
+	tctx->ivoffset = offsetof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+			 subreq_size;
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, tctx->ivoffset + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_aead(aead);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.aead = aead;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->u.skcipher);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_aead(tctx->u.aead);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_free_instance(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static bool essiv_supported_algorithms(struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg,
+				       struct shash_alg *hash_alg,
+				       int ivsize)
+{
+	if (hash_alg->digestsize < essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize ||
+	    hash_alg->digestsize > essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (ivsize != essiv_cipher_alg->cra_blocksize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(hash_alg))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int essiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+	const char *inner_cipher_name;
+	const char *essiv_cipher_name;
+	const char *shash_name;
+	struct skcipher_instance *skcipher_inst = NULL;
+	struct aead_instance *aead_inst = NULL;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_alg *base, *block_base;
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx;
+	struct skcipher_alg *skcipher_alg = NULL;
+	struct aead_alg *aead_alg = NULL;
+	struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg;
+	struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg;
+	struct shash_alg *hash_alg;
+	int ivsize;
+	u32 type;
+	int err;
+
+	algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+	if (IS_ERR(algt))
+		return PTR_ERR(algt);
+
+	inner_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(inner_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(inner_cipher_name);
+
+	essiv_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher_name);
+
+	shash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[3]);
+	if (IS_ERR(shash_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(shash_name);
+
+	type = algt->type & algt->mask;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
+		skcipher_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*skcipher_inst) +
+					sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!skcipher_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = skcipher_crypto_instance(skcipher_inst);
+		base = &skcipher_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* Block cipher, e.g. "cbc(aes)" */
+		crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn,
+					   inner_cipher_name, 0,
+					   crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+								algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		skcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+		block_base = &skcipher_alg->base;
+		ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		break;
+
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
+		aead_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead_inst) +
+				    sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!aead_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead_inst);
+		base = &aead_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* AEAD cipher, e.g. "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))" */
+		crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ictx->u.aead_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn,
+				       inner_cipher_name, 0,
+				       crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							    algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		aead_alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+		block_base = &aead_alg->base;
+		ivsize = aead_alg->ivsize;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */
+	crypto_set_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, essiv_cipher_name,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_skcipher;
+	essiv_cipher_alg = ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn.alg;
+
+	/* Synchronous hash, e.g., "sha256" */
+	_hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(shash_name,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg);
+		goto out_drop_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+	hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg);
+	err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ictx->hash_spawn, hash_alg, inst);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_put_hash;
+
+	/* Check the set of algorithms */
+	if (!essiv_supported_algorithms(essiv_cipher_alg, hash_alg, ivsize)) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported essiv instantiation: essiv(%s,%s,%s)\n",
+			block_base->cra_name,
+			essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+			hash_alg->base.cra_name);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	}
+
+	/* Instance fields */
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)", block_base->cra_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+		     block_base->cra_driver_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_driver_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	base->cra_flags		= block_base->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+	base->cra_blocksize	= block_base->cra_blocksize;
+	base->cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct essiv_tfm_ctx);
+	base->cra_alignmask	= block_base->cra_alignmask;
+	base->cra_priority	= block_base->cra_priority;
+
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
+		skcipher_inst->alg.setkey	= essiv_skcipher_setkey;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.encrypt	= essiv_skcipher_encrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.decrypt	= essiv_skcipher_decrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.init		= essiv_skcipher_init_tfm;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm;
+
+		skcipher_inst->alg.min_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.max_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.ivsize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.walksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_walksize(skcipher_alg);
+
+		skcipher_inst->free		= essiv_skcipher_free_instance;
+
+		err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, skcipher_inst);
+	} else {
+		aead_inst->alg.setkey		= essiv_aead_setkey;
+		aead_inst->alg.setauthsize	= essiv_aead_setauthsize;
+		aead_inst->alg.encrypt		= essiv_aead_encrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.decrypt		= essiv_aead_decrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.init		= essiv_aead_init_tfm;
+		aead_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_aead_exit_tfm;
+
+		aead_inst->alg.ivsize		= crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.maxauthsize	= crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(aead_alg);
+
+		aead_inst->free			= essiv_aead_free_instance;
+
+		err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, aead_inst);
+	}
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+	return 0;
+
+out_drop_hash:
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+out_put_hash:
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+out_drop_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+out_drop_skcipher:
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
+		crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	else
+		crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+	kfree(skcipher_inst);
+	kfree(aead_inst);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* essiv(inner_cipher_name, essiv_cipher_name, shash_name) */
+static struct crypto_template essiv_tmpl = {
+	.name	= "essiv",
+	.create	= essiv_create,
+	.module	= THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init essiv_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit essiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(essiv_module_init);
+module_exit(essiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ESSIV skcipher/aead wrapper for block encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv");
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,cipher,shash) or
(aead,cipher,shash) tuple so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling
in fscrypt and dm-crypt and move it into the crypto API. This will result
in better test coverage, and will allow future changes to make the bare
cipher interface internal to the crypto subsystem, in order to increase
robustness of the API against misuse.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c  | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 669 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index e801450bcb1c..1e8390d32b6d 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -568,6 +568,34 @@ config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CRYPTO_ESSIV
+	tristate "ESSIV support for block encryption"
+	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+	help
+	  Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector (ESSIV) is an IV
+	  generation method that is used in some cases by fscrypt and/or
+	  dm-crypt. It uses the hash of the block encryption key as the
+	  symmetric key for a block encryption pass applied to the input
+	  IV, making low entropy IV sources more suitable for block
+	  encryption.
+
+	  This driver implements a crypto API template that can be
+	  instantiated either as a skcipher or as a aead (depending on the
+	  type of the first template argument), and which defers encryption
+	  and decryption requests to the encapsulated cipher after applying
+	  ESSIV to the input IV. Note that in the aead case, it is assumed
+	  that the keys are presented in the same format used by the authenc
+	  template, and that the IV appears at the end of the authenticated
+	  associated data (AAD) region (which is how dm-crypt uses it.)
+
+	  Note that the use of ESSIV is not recommended for new deployments,
+	  and so this only needs to be enabled when interoperability with
+	  existing encrypted volumes of filesystems is required, or when
+	  building for a particular system that requires it (e.g., when
+	  the SoC in question has accelerated CBC but not XTS, making CBC
+	  combined with ESSIV the only feasible mode for h/w accelerated
+	  block encryption)
+
 comment "Hash modes"
 
 config CRYPTO_CMAC
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 9479e1a45d8c..157cb0a324df 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
 
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..417d60e593dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/essiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ESSIV skcipher and aead template for block encryption
+ *
+ * This template encapsulates the ESSIV IV generation algorithm used by
+ * dm-crypt and fscrypt, which converts the initial vector for the skcipher
+ * used for block encryption, by encrypting it using the hash of the
+ * skcipher key as encryption key. Usually, the input IV is a 64-bit sector
+ * number in LE representation zero-padded to the size of the IV, but this
+ * is not assumed by this driver.
+ *
+ * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
+ * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
+ * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
+ * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
+ * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
+ * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
+ * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
+ * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
+ * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
+ * happens to use it.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
+ * Heavily based on:
+ * adiantum length-preserving encryption mode
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct essiv_instance_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher_spawn	skcipher_spawn;
+		struct crypto_aead_spawn	aead_spawn;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_spawn			essiv_cipher_spawn;
+	struct crypto_shash_spawn		hash_spawn;
+};
+
+struct essiv_tfm_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher	*skcipher;
+		struct crypto_aead	*aead;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_cipher		*essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash		*hash;
+	int				ivoffset;
+};
+
+struct essiv_aead_request_ctx {
+	struct scatterlist		sg[4];
+	u8				*assoc;
+	struct aead_request		aead_req;
+};
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+				 const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->u.skcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->u.skcipher,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->u.skcipher, key, keylen);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->u.skcipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher,
+				crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_aead_clear_flags(tctx->u.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tctx->u.aead, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tctx->u.aead, key, keylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_aead_get_flags(tctx->u.aead) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) {
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_update(desc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_finup(desc, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+						    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				  unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aead_setauthsize(tctx->u.aead, authsize);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
+
+	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.skcipher);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+				   req->iv);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req),
+				      essiv_skcipher_done, req);
+
+	return enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) :
+		     crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
+	struct scatterlist *src = req->src;
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	/*
+	 * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
+	 * we have to copy the converted IV into the right scatterlist before
+	 * we pass it on.
+	 */
+	rctx->assoc = NULL;
+	if (req->src == req->dst || !enc) {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+					 req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+					 crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
+	} else {
+		u8 *iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req) + tctx->ivoffset;
+		int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+		int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
+		struct scatterlist *sg;
+		int nents;
+
+		if (ssize < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize);
+		if (nents < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		memcpy(iv, req->iv, ivsize);
+		sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
+
+		if (unlikely(nents > 1)) {
+			/*
+			 * This is a case that rarely occurs in practice, but
+			 * for correctness, we have to deal with it nonetheless.
+			 */
+			rctx->assoc = kmalloc(ssize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!rctx->assoc)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			scatterwalk_map_and_copy(rctx->assoc, req->src, 0,
+						 ssize, 0);
+			sg_set_buf(rctx->sg, rctx->assoc, ssize);
+		} else {
+			sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize,
+				    req->src->offset);
+		}
+
+		sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
+			sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
+
+		src = rctx->sg;
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+				  essiv_aead_done, req);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, src, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+	err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
+		    crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc && err != -EINPROGRESS)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static int essiv_init_tfm(struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx,
+			  struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+	int err;
+
+	essiv_cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher);
+
+	hash = crypto_spawn_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(hash);
+		goto err_free_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+
+	tctx->essiv_cipher = essiv_cipher;
+	tctx->hash = hash;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_free_cipher(essiv_cipher);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+	int err;
+
+	skcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(skcipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(skcipher);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				         crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_skcipher(skcipher);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.skcipher = skcipher;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	unsigned int subreq_size;
+	int err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) !=
+		     sizeof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx));
+
+	aead = crypto_spawn_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+	subreq_size = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+		      crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+
+	tctx->ivoffset = offsetof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+			 subreq_size;
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, tctx->ivoffset + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_aead(aead);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.aead = aead;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->u.skcipher);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_aead(tctx->u.aead);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_free_instance(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static bool essiv_supported_algorithms(struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg,
+				       struct shash_alg *hash_alg,
+				       int ivsize)
+{
+	if (hash_alg->digestsize < essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize ||
+	    hash_alg->digestsize > essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (ivsize != essiv_cipher_alg->cra_blocksize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(hash_alg))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int essiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+	const char *inner_cipher_name;
+	const char *essiv_cipher_name;
+	const char *shash_name;
+	struct skcipher_instance *skcipher_inst = NULL;
+	struct aead_instance *aead_inst = NULL;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_alg *base, *block_base;
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx;
+	struct skcipher_alg *skcipher_alg = NULL;
+	struct aead_alg *aead_alg = NULL;
+	struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg;
+	struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg;
+	struct shash_alg *hash_alg;
+	int ivsize;
+	u32 type;
+	int err;
+
+	algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+	if (IS_ERR(algt))
+		return PTR_ERR(algt);
+
+	inner_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(inner_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(inner_cipher_name);
+
+	essiv_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher_name);
+
+	shash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[3]);
+	if (IS_ERR(shash_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(shash_name);
+
+	type = algt->type & algt->mask;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
+		skcipher_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*skcipher_inst) +
+					sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!skcipher_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = skcipher_crypto_instance(skcipher_inst);
+		base = &skcipher_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* Block cipher, e.g. "cbc(aes)" */
+		crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn,
+					   inner_cipher_name, 0,
+					   crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+								algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		skcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+		block_base = &skcipher_alg->base;
+		ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		break;
+
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
+		aead_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead_inst) +
+				    sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!aead_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead_inst);
+		base = &aead_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* AEAD cipher, e.g. "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))" */
+		crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ictx->u.aead_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn,
+				       inner_cipher_name, 0,
+				       crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							    algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		aead_alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+		block_base = &aead_alg->base;
+		ivsize = aead_alg->ivsize;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */
+	crypto_set_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, essiv_cipher_name,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_skcipher;
+	essiv_cipher_alg = ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn.alg;
+
+	/* Synchronous hash, e.g., "sha256" */
+	_hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(shash_name,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg);
+		goto out_drop_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+	hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg);
+	err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ictx->hash_spawn, hash_alg, inst);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_put_hash;
+
+	/* Check the set of algorithms */
+	if (!essiv_supported_algorithms(essiv_cipher_alg, hash_alg, ivsize)) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported essiv instantiation: essiv(%s,%s,%s)\n",
+			block_base->cra_name,
+			essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+			hash_alg->base.cra_name);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	}
+
+	/* Instance fields */
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)", block_base->cra_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+		     block_base->cra_driver_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_driver_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	base->cra_flags		= block_base->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+	base->cra_blocksize	= block_base->cra_blocksize;
+	base->cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct essiv_tfm_ctx);
+	base->cra_alignmask	= block_base->cra_alignmask;
+	base->cra_priority	= block_base->cra_priority;
+
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
+		skcipher_inst->alg.setkey	= essiv_skcipher_setkey;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.encrypt	= essiv_skcipher_encrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.decrypt	= essiv_skcipher_decrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.init		= essiv_skcipher_init_tfm;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm;
+
+		skcipher_inst->alg.min_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.max_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.ivsize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.walksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_walksize(skcipher_alg);
+
+		skcipher_inst->free		= essiv_skcipher_free_instance;
+
+		err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, skcipher_inst);
+	} else {
+		aead_inst->alg.setkey		= essiv_aead_setkey;
+		aead_inst->alg.setauthsize	= essiv_aead_setauthsize;
+		aead_inst->alg.encrypt		= essiv_aead_encrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.decrypt		= essiv_aead_decrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.init		= essiv_aead_init_tfm;
+		aead_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_aead_exit_tfm;
+
+		aead_inst->alg.ivsize		= crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.maxauthsize	= crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(aead_alg);
+
+		aead_inst->free			= essiv_aead_free_instance;
+
+		err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, aead_inst);
+	}
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+	return 0;
+
+out_drop_hash:
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+out_put_hash:
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+out_drop_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+out_drop_skcipher:
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
+		crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	else
+		crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+	kfree(skcipher_inst);
+	kfree(aead_inst);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* essiv(inner_cipher_name, essiv_cipher_name, shash_name) */
+static struct crypto_template essiv_tmpl = {
+	.name	= "essiv",
+	.create	= essiv_create,
+	.module	= THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init essiv_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit essiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(essiv_module_init);
+module_exit(essiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ESSIV skcipher/aead wrapper for block encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv");
-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,cipher,shash) or
(aead,cipher,shash) tuple so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling
in fscrypt and dm-crypt and move it into the crypto API. This will result
in better test coverage, and will allow future changes to make the bare
cipher interface internal to the crypto subsystem, in order to increase
robustness of the API against misuse.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c  | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 669 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index e801450bcb1c..1e8390d32b6d 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -568,6 +568,34 @@ config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CRYPTO_ESSIV
+	tristate "ESSIV support for block encryption"
+	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+	help
+	  Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector (ESSIV) is an IV
+	  generation method that is used in some cases by fscrypt and/or
+	  dm-crypt. It uses the hash of the block encryption key as the
+	  symmetric key for a block encryption pass applied to the input
+	  IV, making low entropy IV sources more suitable for block
+	  encryption.
+
+	  This driver implements a crypto API template that can be
+	  instantiated either as a skcipher or as a aead (depending on the
+	  type of the first template argument), and which defers encryption
+	  and decryption requests to the encapsulated cipher after applying
+	  ESSIV to the input IV. Note that in the aead case, it is assumed
+	  that the keys are presented in the same format used by the authenc
+	  template, and that the IV appears at the end of the authenticated
+	  associated data (AAD) region (which is how dm-crypt uses it.)
+
+	  Note that the use of ESSIV is not recommended for new deployments,
+	  and so this only needs to be enabled when interoperability with
+	  existing encrypted volumes of filesystems is required, or when
+	  building for a particular system that requires it (e.g., when
+	  the SoC in question has accelerated CBC but not XTS, making CBC
+	  combined with ESSIV the only feasible mode for h/w accelerated
+	  block encryption)
+
 comment "Hash modes"
 
 config CRYPTO_CMAC
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 9479e1a45d8c..157cb0a324df 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
 
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..417d60e593dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/essiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ESSIV skcipher and aead template for block encryption
+ *
+ * This template encapsulates the ESSIV IV generation algorithm used by
+ * dm-crypt and fscrypt, which converts the initial vector for the skcipher
+ * used for block encryption, by encrypting it using the hash of the
+ * skcipher key as encryption key. Usually, the input IV is a 64-bit sector
+ * number in LE representation zero-padded to the size of the IV, but this
+ * is not assumed by this driver.
+ *
+ * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
+ * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
+ * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
+ * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
+ * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
+ * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
+ * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
+ * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
+ * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
+ * happens to use it.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
+ * Heavily based on:
+ * adiantum length-preserving encryption mode
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct essiv_instance_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher_spawn	skcipher_spawn;
+		struct crypto_aead_spawn	aead_spawn;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_spawn			essiv_cipher_spawn;
+	struct crypto_shash_spawn		hash_spawn;
+};
+
+struct essiv_tfm_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher	*skcipher;
+		struct crypto_aead	*aead;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_cipher		*essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash		*hash;
+	int				ivoffset;
+};
+
+struct essiv_aead_request_ctx {
+	struct scatterlist		sg[4];
+	u8				*assoc;
+	struct aead_request		aead_req;
+};
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+				 const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->u.skcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->u.skcipher,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->u.skcipher, key, keylen);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->u.skcipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher,
+				crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_aead_clear_flags(tctx->u.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tctx->u.aead, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tctx->u.aead, key, keylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_aead_get_flags(tctx->u.aead) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) {
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_update(desc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_finup(desc, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+						    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				  unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aead_setauthsize(tctx->u.aead, authsize);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
+
+	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.skcipher);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+				   req->iv);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req),
+				      essiv_skcipher_done, req);
+
+	return enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) :
+		     crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
+	struct scatterlist *src = req->src;
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	/*
+	 * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
+	 * we have to copy the converted IV into the right scatterlist before
+	 * we pass it on.
+	 */
+	rctx->assoc = NULL;
+	if (req->src == req->dst || !enc) {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+					 req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+					 crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
+	} else {
+		u8 *iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req) + tctx->ivoffset;
+		int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+		int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
+		struct scatterlist *sg;
+		int nents;
+
+		if (ssize < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize);
+		if (nents < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		memcpy(iv, req->iv, ivsize);
+		sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
+
+		if (unlikely(nents > 1)) {
+			/*
+			 * This is a case that rarely occurs in practice, but
+			 * for correctness, we have to deal with it nonetheless.
+			 */
+			rctx->assoc = kmalloc(ssize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!rctx->assoc)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			scatterwalk_map_and_copy(rctx->assoc, req->src, 0,
+						 ssize, 0);
+			sg_set_buf(rctx->sg, rctx->assoc, ssize);
+		} else {
+			sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize,
+				    req->src->offset);
+		}
+
+		sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
+			sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
+
+		src = rctx->sg;
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+				  essiv_aead_done, req);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, src, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+	err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
+		    crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc && err != -EINPROGRESS)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static int essiv_init_tfm(struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx,
+			  struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+	int err;
+
+	essiv_cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher);
+
+	hash = crypto_spawn_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(hash);
+		goto err_free_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+
+	tctx->essiv_cipher = essiv_cipher;
+	tctx->hash = hash;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_free_cipher(essiv_cipher);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+	int err;
+
+	skcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(skcipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(skcipher);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				         crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_skcipher(skcipher);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.skcipher = skcipher;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	unsigned int subreq_size;
+	int err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) !=
+		     sizeof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx));
+
+	aead = crypto_spawn_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+	subreq_size = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+		      crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+
+	tctx->ivoffset = offsetof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+			 subreq_size;
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, tctx->ivoffset + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_aead(aead);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.aead = aead;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->u.skcipher);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_aead(tctx->u.aead);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_free_instance(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static bool essiv_supported_algorithms(struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg,
+				       struct shash_alg *hash_alg,
+				       int ivsize)
+{
+	if (hash_alg->digestsize < essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize ||
+	    hash_alg->digestsize > essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (ivsize != essiv_cipher_alg->cra_blocksize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(hash_alg))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int essiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+	const char *inner_cipher_name;
+	const char *essiv_cipher_name;
+	const char *shash_name;
+	struct skcipher_instance *skcipher_inst = NULL;
+	struct aead_instance *aead_inst = NULL;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_alg *base, *block_base;
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx;
+	struct skcipher_alg *skcipher_alg = NULL;
+	struct aead_alg *aead_alg = NULL;
+	struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg;
+	struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg;
+	struct shash_alg *hash_alg;
+	int ivsize;
+	u32 type;
+	int err;
+
+	algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+	if (IS_ERR(algt))
+		return PTR_ERR(algt);
+
+	inner_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(inner_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(inner_cipher_name);
+
+	essiv_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher_name);
+
+	shash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[3]);
+	if (IS_ERR(shash_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(shash_name);
+
+	type = algt->type & algt->mask;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
+		skcipher_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*skcipher_inst) +
+					sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!skcipher_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = skcipher_crypto_instance(skcipher_inst);
+		base = &skcipher_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* Block cipher, e.g. "cbc(aes)" */
+		crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn,
+					   inner_cipher_name, 0,
+					   crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+								algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		skcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+		block_base = &skcipher_alg->base;
+		ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		break;
+
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
+		aead_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead_inst) +
+				    sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!aead_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead_inst);
+		base = &aead_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* AEAD cipher, e.g. "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))" */
+		crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ictx->u.aead_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn,
+				       inner_cipher_name, 0,
+				       crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							    algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		aead_alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+		block_base = &aead_alg->base;
+		ivsize = aead_alg->ivsize;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */
+	crypto_set_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, essiv_cipher_name,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_skcipher;
+	essiv_cipher_alg = ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn.alg;
+
+	/* Synchronous hash, e.g., "sha256" */
+	_hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(shash_name,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg);
+		goto out_drop_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+	hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg);
+	err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ictx->hash_spawn, hash_alg, inst);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_put_hash;
+
+	/* Check the set of algorithms */
+	if (!essiv_supported_algorithms(essiv_cipher_alg, hash_alg, ivsize)) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported essiv instantiation: essiv(%s,%s,%s)\n",
+			block_base->cra_name,
+			essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+			hash_alg->base.cra_name);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	}
+
+	/* Instance fields */
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)", block_base->cra_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+		     block_base->cra_driver_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_driver_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	base->cra_flags		= block_base->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+	base->cra_blocksize	= block_base->cra_blocksize;
+	base->cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct essiv_tfm_ctx);
+	base->cra_alignmask	= block_base->cra_alignmask;
+	base->cra_priority	= block_base->cra_priority;
+
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
+		skcipher_inst->alg.setkey	= essiv_skcipher_setkey;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.encrypt	= essiv_skcipher_encrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.decrypt	= essiv_skcipher_decrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.init		= essiv_skcipher_init_tfm;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm;
+
+		skcipher_inst->alg.min_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.max_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.ivsize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.walksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_walksize(skcipher_alg);
+
+		skcipher_inst->free		= essiv_skcipher_free_instance;
+
+		err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, skcipher_inst);
+	} else {
+		aead_inst->alg.setkey		= essiv_aead_setkey;
+		aead_inst->alg.setauthsize	= essiv_aead_setauthsize;
+		aead_inst->alg.encrypt		= essiv_aead_encrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.decrypt		= essiv_aead_decrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.init		= essiv_aead_init_tfm;
+		aead_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_aead_exit_tfm;
+
+		aead_inst->alg.ivsize		= crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.maxauthsize	= crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(aead_alg);
+
+		aead_inst->free			= essiv_aead_free_instance;
+
+		err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, aead_inst);
+	}
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+	return 0;
+
+out_drop_hash:
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+out_put_hash:
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+out_drop_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+out_drop_skcipher:
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
+		crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	else
+		crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+	kfree(skcipher_inst);
+	kfree(aead_inst);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* essiv(inner_cipher_name, essiv_cipher_name, shash_name) */
+static struct crypto_template essiv_tmpl = {
+	.name	= "essiv",
+	.create	= essiv_create,
+	.module	= THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init essiv_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit essiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(essiv_module_init);
+module_exit(essiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ESSIV skcipher/aead wrapper for block encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv");
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Instead of open coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use a
ESSIV skcipher which does all of this under the hood.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 fs/crypto/Kconfig           |  1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c          |  5 --
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  9 --
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 93 +-------------------
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index f0de238000c0..848c064e8370 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_ECB
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	select CRYPTO_XTS
 	select CRYPTO_CTS
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 68e2ca4c4af6..6015c275590e 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -135,9 +135,6 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
-
-	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
 }
 
 int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
@@ -491,8 +488,6 @@ static void __exit fscrypt_exit(void)
 		destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
-
-	fscrypt_essiv_cleanup();
 }
 module_exit(fscrypt_exit);
 
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 7da276159593..59d0cba9cfb9 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	/* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
 
-	/*
-	 * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation.  Only set for CBC contents
-	 * encryption, otherwise is NULL.
-	 */
-	struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
-
 	/*
 	 * Encryption mode used for this inode.  It corresponds to either
 	 * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type.
@@ -166,9 +160,6 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
 	int keysize;
 	int ivsize;
 	bool logged_impl_name;
-	bool needs_essiv;
 };
 
-extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
-
 #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index dcd91a3fbe49..109ec3e5e215 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -13,14 +13,10 @@
 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
-static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
-
 /* Table of keys referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policies */
 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
@@ -144,10 +140,9 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
-		.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
+		.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
 		.keysize = 16,
 		.ivsize = 16,
-		.needs_essiv = true,
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
@@ -377,72 +372,6 @@ fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
-{
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
-
-	/* init hash transform on demand */
-	if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
-		struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
-
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			fscrypt_warn(NULL,
-				     "error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
-				     PTR_ERR(tfm));
-			return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-		}
-		prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
-		if (prev_tfm) {
-			crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-			tfm = prev_tfm;
-		}
-	}
-
-	{
-		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
-		desc->tfm = tfm;
-
-		return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
-	}
-}
-
-static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
-				int keysize)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-
-	ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
-
-	err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
-	 * used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
-	 * configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
-	 */
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-out:
-	memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
-	return err;
-}
-
-void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
-{
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
-}
-
 /*
  * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for
  * FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY mode it's the master key), set up the inode's
@@ -454,7 +383,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 {
 	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
-	int err;
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
 		mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode);
@@ -470,19 +398,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	ci->ci_master_key = mk;
 	ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
 
-	if (mode->needs_essiv) {
-		/* ESSIV implies 16-byte IVs which implies !DIRECT_KEY */
-		WARN_ON(mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		WARN_ON(ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
-
-		err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize);
-		if (err) {
-			fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
-				     "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
-				     inode->i_ino, err);
-			return err;
-		}
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -491,12 +406,10 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 	if (!ci)
 		return;
 
-	if (ci->ci_master_key) {
+	if (ci->ci_master_key)
 		put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
-	} else {
+	else
 		crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
-		crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
-	}
 	kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Instead of open coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use a
ESSIV skcipher which does all of this under the hood.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 fs/crypto/Kconfig           |  1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c          |  5 --
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  9 --
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 93 +-------------------
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index f0de238000c0..848c064e8370 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_ECB
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	select CRYPTO_XTS
 	select CRYPTO_CTS
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 68e2ca4c4af6..6015c275590e 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -135,9 +135,6 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
-
-	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
 }
 
 int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
@@ -491,8 +488,6 @@ static void __exit fscrypt_exit(void)
 		destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
-
-	fscrypt_essiv_cleanup();
 }
 module_exit(fscrypt_exit);
 
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 7da276159593..59d0cba9cfb9 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	/* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
 
-	/*
-	 * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation.  Only set for CBC contents
-	 * encryption, otherwise is NULL.
-	 */
-	struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
-
 	/*
 	 * Encryption mode used for this inode.  It corresponds to either
 	 * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type.
@@ -166,9 +160,6 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
 	int keysize;
 	int ivsize;
 	bool logged_impl_name;
-	bool needs_essiv;
 };
 
-extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
-
 #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index dcd91a3fbe49..109ec3e5e215 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -13,14 +13,10 @@
 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
-static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
-
 /* Table of keys referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policies */
 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
@@ -144,10 +140,9 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
-		.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
+		.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
 		.keysize = 16,
 		.ivsize = 16,
-		.needs_essiv = true,
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
@@ -377,72 +372,6 @@ fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
-{
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
-
-	/* init hash transform on demand */
-	if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
-		struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
-
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			fscrypt_warn(NULL,
-				     "error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
-				     PTR_ERR(tfm));
-			return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-		}
-		prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
-		if (prev_tfm) {
-			crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-			tfm = prev_tfm;
-		}
-	}
-
-	{
-		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
-		desc->tfm = tfm;
-
-		return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
-	}
-}
-
-static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
-				int keysize)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-
-	ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
-
-	err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
-	 * used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
-	 * configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
-	 */
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-out:
-	memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
-	return err;
-}
-
-void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
-{
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
-}
-
 /*
  * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for
  * FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY mode it's the master key), set up the inode's
@@ -454,7 +383,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 {
 	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
-	int err;
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
 		mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode);
@@ -470,19 +398,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	ci->ci_master_key = mk;
 	ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
 
-	if (mode->needs_essiv) {
-		/* ESSIV implies 16-byte IVs which implies !DIRECT_KEY */
-		WARN_ON(mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		WARN_ON(ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
-
-		err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize);
-		if (err) {
-			fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
-				     "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
-				     inode->i_ino, err);
-			return err;
-		}
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -491,12 +406,10 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 	if (!ci)
 		return;
 
-	if (ci->ci_master_key) {
+	if (ci->ci_master_key)
 		put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
-	} else {
+	else
 		crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
-		crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
-	}
 	kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Instead of open coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use a
ESSIV skcipher which does all of this under the hood.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 fs/crypto/Kconfig           |  1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c          |  5 --
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  9 --
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 93 +-------------------
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index f0de238000c0..848c064e8370 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_ECB
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	select CRYPTO_XTS
 	select CRYPTO_CTS
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 68e2ca4c4af6..6015c275590e 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -135,9 +135,6 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
-
-	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
 }
 
 int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
@@ -491,8 +488,6 @@ static void __exit fscrypt_exit(void)
 		destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
-
-	fscrypt_essiv_cleanup();
 }
 module_exit(fscrypt_exit);
 
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 7da276159593..59d0cba9cfb9 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	/* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
 
-	/*
-	 * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation.  Only set for CBC contents
-	 * encryption, otherwise is NULL.
-	 */
-	struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
-
 	/*
 	 * Encryption mode used for this inode.  It corresponds to either
 	 * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type.
@@ -166,9 +160,6 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
 	int keysize;
 	int ivsize;
 	bool logged_impl_name;
-	bool needs_essiv;
 };
 
-extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
-
 #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index dcd91a3fbe49..109ec3e5e215 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -13,14 +13,10 @@
 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
-static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
-
 /* Table of keys referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policies */
 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
@@ -144,10 +140,9 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
-		.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
+		.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
 		.keysize = 16,
 		.ivsize = 16,
-		.needs_essiv = true,
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
@@ -377,72 +372,6 @@ fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
-{
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
-
-	/* init hash transform on demand */
-	if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
-		struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
-
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			fscrypt_warn(NULL,
-				     "error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
-				     PTR_ERR(tfm));
-			return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-		}
-		prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
-		if (prev_tfm) {
-			crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-			tfm = prev_tfm;
-		}
-	}
-
-	{
-		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
-		desc->tfm = tfm;
-
-		return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
-	}
-}
-
-static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
-				int keysize)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-
-	ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
-
-	err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
-	 * used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
-	 * configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
-	 */
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-out:
-	memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
-	return err;
-}
-
-void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
-{
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
-}
-
 /*
  * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for
  * FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY mode it's the master key), set up the inode's
@@ -454,7 +383,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 {
 	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
-	int err;
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
 		mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode);
@@ -470,19 +398,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	ci->ci_master_key = mk;
 	ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
 
-	if (mode->needs_essiv) {
-		/* ESSIV implies 16-byte IVs which implies !DIRECT_KEY */
-		WARN_ON(mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		WARN_ON(ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
-
-		err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize);
-		if (err) {
-			fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
-				     "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
-				     inode->i_ino, err);
-			return err;
-		}
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -491,12 +406,10 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 	if (!ci)
 		return;
 
-	if (ci->ci_master_key) {
+	if (ci->ci_master_key)
 		put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
-	} else {
+	else
 		crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
-		crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
-	}
 	kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 3/7] md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Instead of allocating a crypto skcipher tfm 'foo' and attempting to
infer the encapsulated block cipher from the driver's 'name' field,
directly parse the string that we used to allocated the tfm. These
are always identical (unless the allocation failed, in which case
we bail anyway), but using the string allows us to use it in the
allocation, which is something we will need when switching to the
'essiv' crypto API template.

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 41 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 1b16d34bb785..3c17d588f6db 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2321,25 +2321,17 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
  * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
  * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
  */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
+static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *alg_name)
 {
-	const char *alg_name = NULL;
 	char *start, *end;
 
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 		if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
 			alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
 			if (!alg_name)
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		alg_name++;
-	} else {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
@@ -2434,32 +2426,35 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
 		cc->tfms_count = 64;
 
-	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
-
-	/* Allocate cipher */
-	ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
-		return ret;
-	}
-
 	/* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
 		ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
-		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
-	} else
-		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
+	       }
+	}
 
-	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
+	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
+
+	/* Allocate cipher */
+	ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
+		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
+	else
+		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 3/7] md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Instead of allocating a crypto skcipher tfm 'foo' and attempting to
infer the encapsulated block cipher from the driver's 'name' field,
directly parse the string that we used to allocated the tfm. These
are always identical (unless the allocation failed, in which case
we bail anyway), but using the string allows us to use it in the
allocation, which is something we will need when switching to the
'essiv' crypto API template.

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 41 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 1b16d34bb785..3c17d588f6db 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2321,25 +2321,17 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
  * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
  * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
  */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
+static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *alg_name)
 {
-	const char *alg_name = NULL;
 	char *start, *end;
 
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 		if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
 			alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
 			if (!alg_name)
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		alg_name++;
-	} else {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
@@ -2434,32 +2426,35 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
 		cc->tfms_count = 64;
 
-	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
-
-	/* Allocate cipher */
-	ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
-		return ret;
-	}
-
 	/* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
 		ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
-		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
-	} else
-		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
+	       }
+	}
 
-	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
+	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
+
+	/* Allocate cipher */
+	ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
+		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
+	else
+		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 3/7] md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Instead of allocating a crypto skcipher tfm 'foo' and attempting to
infer the encapsulated block cipher from the driver's 'name' field,
directly parse the string that we used to allocated the tfm. These
are always identical (unless the allocation failed, in which case
we bail anyway), but using the string allows us to use it in the
allocation, which is something we will need when switching to the
'essiv' crypto API template.

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 41 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 1b16d34bb785..3c17d588f6db 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2321,25 +2321,17 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
  * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
  * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
  */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
+static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *alg_name)
 {
-	const char *alg_name = NULL;
 	char *start, *end;
 
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 		if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
 			alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
 			if (!alg_name)
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		alg_name++;
-	} else {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
@@ -2434,32 +2426,35 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
 		cc->tfms_count = 64;
 
-	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
-
-	/* Allocate cipher */
-	ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
-		return ret;
-	}
-
 	/* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
 		ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
-		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
-	} else
-		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
+	       }
+	}
 
-	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
+	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
+
+	/* Allocate cipher */
+	ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
+		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
+	else
+		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 4/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
this processing within the crypto subsystem.

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 200 ++++----------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index db269a348b20..3c57e76969fa 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
 	depends on BLK_DEV_DM
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	---help---
 	  This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
 	  transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 3c17d588f6db..e6b49b323543 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
 		    struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
 };
 
-struct iv_essiv_private {
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-	u8 *salt;
-};
-
 struct iv_benbi_private {
 	int shift;
 };
@@ -155,7 +150,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
 	const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
 	union {
-		struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
 		struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
 		struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
 		struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
@@ -165,8 +159,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 	unsigned short int sector_size;
 	unsigned char sector_shift;
 
-	/* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
-	void *iv_private;
 	union {
 		struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
 		struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
@@ -323,157 +315,15 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
-	shash_desc_zero(desc);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
-			    crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int r, err = 0;
-
-	memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-	r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
-	if (r)
-		err = r;
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
-						struct dm_target *ti,
-						const u8 *salt,
-						unsigned int saltsize)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
-		return essiv_tfm;
-	}
-
-	if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
-		ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
-			    "not match IV size of block cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	}
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
-	if (err) {
-		ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(err);
-	}
-
-	return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
-	kzfree(essiv->salt);
-	essiv->salt = NULL;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	if (essiv_tfm)
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
-	cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
-			      const char *opts)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
-	u8 *salt = NULL;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!opts) {
-		ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Allocate hash algorithm */
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
-		err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!salt) {
-		ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
-	essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
-				       crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-	}
-	cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
-	return 0;
-
-bad:
-	if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-	kfree(salt);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 			      struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
 {
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
+	/*
+	 * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
+	 * so just pass the plain sector number here.
+	 */
 	memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
 	*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -854,10 +704,6 @@ static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
 };
 
 static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
-	.ctr       = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
-	.dtr       = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
-	.init      = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
-	.wipe      = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
 	.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
 };
 
@@ -2397,7 +2243,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 				char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
-	char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+	char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2436,9 +2282,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	}
 
 	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto bad_mem;
+
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+			       cipher_api, cc->cipher, *ivopts);
+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+			goto bad_mem;
+		cipher_api = buf;
 	}
 
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
@@ -2456,6 +2312,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
 
 	return 0;
+bad_mem:
+	ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key,
@@ -2515,9 +2374,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (!cipher_api)
 		goto bad_mem;
 
-	ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-		       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			kfree(cipher_api);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "essiv(%s(%s),%s,%s)", chainmode, cipher,
+			       cipher, *ivopts);
+	} else {
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
 		kfree(cipher_api);
 		goto bad_mem;
 	}
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 4/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
this processing within the crypto subsystem.

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 200 ++++----------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index db269a348b20..3c57e76969fa 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
 	depends on BLK_DEV_DM
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	---help---
 	  This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
 	  transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 3c17d588f6db..e6b49b323543 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
 		    struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
 };
 
-struct iv_essiv_private {
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-	u8 *salt;
-};
-
 struct iv_benbi_private {
 	int shift;
 };
@@ -155,7 +150,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
 	const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
 	union {
-		struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
 		struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
 		struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
 		struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
@@ -165,8 +159,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 	unsigned short int sector_size;
 	unsigned char sector_shift;
 
-	/* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
-	void *iv_private;
 	union {
 		struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
 		struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
@@ -323,157 +315,15 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
-	shash_desc_zero(desc);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
-			    crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int r, err = 0;
-
-	memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-	r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
-	if (r)
-		err = r;
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
-						struct dm_target *ti,
-						const u8 *salt,
-						unsigned int saltsize)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
-		return essiv_tfm;
-	}
-
-	if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
-		ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
-			    "not match IV size of block cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	}
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
-	if (err) {
-		ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(err);
-	}
-
-	return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
-	kzfree(essiv->salt);
-	essiv->salt = NULL;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	if (essiv_tfm)
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
-	cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
-			      const char *opts)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
-	u8 *salt = NULL;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!opts) {
-		ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Allocate hash algorithm */
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
-		err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!salt) {
-		ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
-	essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
-				       crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-	}
-	cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
-	return 0;
-
-bad:
-	if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-	kfree(salt);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 			      struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
 {
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
+	/*
+	 * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
+	 * so just pass the plain sector number here.
+	 */
 	memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
 	*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -854,10 +704,6 @@ static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
 };
 
 static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
-	.ctr       = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
-	.dtr       = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
-	.init      = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
-	.wipe      = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
 	.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
 };
 
@@ -2397,7 +2243,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 				char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
-	char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+	char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2436,9 +2282,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	}
 
 	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto bad_mem;
+
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+			       cipher_api, cc->cipher, *ivopts);
+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+			goto bad_mem;
+		cipher_api = buf;
 	}
 
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
@@ -2456,6 +2312,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
 
 	return 0;
+bad_mem:
+	ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key,
@@ -2515,9 +2374,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (!cipher_api)
 		goto bad_mem;
 
-	ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-		       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			kfree(cipher_api);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "essiv(%s(%s),%s,%s)", chainmode, cipher,
+			       cipher, *ivopts);
+	} else {
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
 		kfree(cipher_api);
 		goto bad_mem;
 	}
-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 4/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
this processing within the crypto subsystem.

Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 200 ++++----------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index db269a348b20..3c57e76969fa 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
 	depends on BLK_DEV_DM
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	---help---
 	  This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
 	  transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 3c17d588f6db..e6b49b323543 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
 		    struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
 };
 
-struct iv_essiv_private {
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-	u8 *salt;
-};
-
 struct iv_benbi_private {
 	int shift;
 };
@@ -155,7 +150,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
 	const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
 	union {
-		struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
 		struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
 		struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
 		struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
@@ -165,8 +159,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 	unsigned short int sector_size;
 	unsigned char sector_shift;
 
-	/* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
-	void *iv_private;
 	union {
 		struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
 		struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
@@ -323,157 +315,15 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
-	shash_desc_zero(desc);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
-			    crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int r, err = 0;
-
-	memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-	r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
-	if (r)
-		err = r;
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
-						struct dm_target *ti,
-						const u8 *salt,
-						unsigned int saltsize)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
-		return essiv_tfm;
-	}
-
-	if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
-		ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
-			    "not match IV size of block cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	}
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
-	if (err) {
-		ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(err);
-	}
-
-	return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
-	kzfree(essiv->salt);
-	essiv->salt = NULL;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	if (essiv_tfm)
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
-	cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
-			      const char *opts)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
-	u8 *salt = NULL;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!opts) {
-		ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Allocate hash algorithm */
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
-		err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!salt) {
-		ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
-	essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
-				       crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-	}
-	cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
-	return 0;
-
-bad:
-	if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-	kfree(salt);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 			      struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
 {
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
+	/*
+	 * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
+	 * so just pass the plain sector number here.
+	 */
 	memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
 	*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -854,10 +704,6 @@ static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
 };
 
 static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
-	.ctr       = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
-	.dtr       = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
-	.init      = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
-	.wipe      = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
 	.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
 };
 
@@ -2397,7 +2243,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 				char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
-	char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+	char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2436,9 +2282,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	}
 
 	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto bad_mem;
+
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+			       cipher_api, cc->cipher, *ivopts);
+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+			goto bad_mem;
+		cipher_api = buf;
 	}
 
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
@@ -2456,6 +2312,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
 
 	return 0;
+bad_mem:
+	ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key,
@@ -2515,9 +2374,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (!cipher_api)
 		goto bad_mem;
 
-	ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-		       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			kfree(cipher_api);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "essiv(%s(%s),%s,%s)", chainmode, cipher,
+			       cipher, *ivopts);
+	} else {
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
 		kfree(cipher_api);
 		goto bad_mem;
 	}
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/tcrypt.c  |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h | 497 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 520 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 798253f05203..5c8d585c2ad1 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2332,6 +2332,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
 				  0, speed_template_32);
 		break;
 
+	case 220:
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		break;
+
 	case 300:
 		if (alg) {
 			test_hash_speed(alg, sec, generic_hash_speed_template);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index d760f5cd35b2..304261a2e577 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4561,6 +4561,20 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.suite = {
 			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
 		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "gcm(aes)",
 		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 6b459a6a796b..193cf2e9badd 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -33686,4 +33686,501 @@ static const struct comp_testvec zstd_decomp_tv_template[] = {
 			  "functions.",
 	},
 };
+
+/* based on aes_cbc_tv_template */
+static const struct cipher_testvec essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.ctext	= "\xfa\x59\xe7\x5f\x41\x56\x65\xc3"
+			  "\x36\xca\x6b\x72\x10\x9f\x8c\xd4",
+		.len	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key    = "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.ctext	= "\xc8\x59\x9a\xfe\x79\xe6\x7b\x20"
+			  "\x06\x7d\x55\x0a\x5e\xc7\xb5\xa7"
+			  "\x0b\x9c\x80\xd2\x15\xa1\xb8\x6d"
+			  "\xc6\xab\x7b\x65\xd9\xfd\x88\xeb",
+		.len	= 32,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen	= 24,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x96\x6d\xa9\x7a\x42\xe6\x01\xc7"
+			  "\x17\xfc\xa7\x41\xd3\x38\x0b\xe5"
+			  "\x51\x48\xf7\x7e\x5e\x26\xa9\xfe"
+			  "\x45\x72\x1c\xd9\xde\xab\xf3\x4d"
+			  "\x39\x47\xc5\x4f\x97\x3a\x55\x63"
+			  "\x80\x29\x64\x4c\x33\xe8\x21\x8a"
+			  "\x6a\xef\x6b\x6a\x8f\x43\xc0\xcb"
+			  "\xf0\xf3\x6e\x74\x54\x44\x92\x44",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x24\x52\xf1\x48\x74\xd0\xa7\x93"
+			  "\x75\x9b\x63\x46\xc0\x1c\x1e\x17"
+			  "\x4d\xdc\x5b\x3a\x27\x93\x2a\x63"
+			  "\xf7\xf1\xc7\xb3\x54\x56\x5b\x50"
+			  "\xa3\x31\xa5\x8b\xd6\xfd\xb6\x3c"
+			  "\x8b\xf6\xf2\x45\x05\x0c\xc8\xbb"
+			  "\x32\x0b\x26\x1c\xe9\x8b\x02\xc0"
+			  "\xb2\x6f\x37\xa7\x5b\xa8\xa9\x42",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\xC9\x83\xA6\xC9\xEC\x0F\x32\x55"
+			  "\x0F\x32\x55\x78\x9B\xBE\x78\x9B"
+			  "\xBE\xE1\x04\x27\xE1\x04\x27\x4A"
+			  "\x6D\x90\x4A\x6D\x90\xB3\xD6\xF9",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\xE7\x82\x1D\xB8\x53\x11\xAC\x47"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x50\xB9\x22\xAE\x17\x80\x0C\x75"
+			  "\xDE\x47\xD3\x3C\xA5\x0E\x9A\x03"
+			  "\x6C\xF8\x61\xCA\x33\xBF\x28\x91"
+			  "\x1D\x86\xEF\x58\xE4\x4D\xB6\x1F"
+			  "\xAB\x14\x7D\x09\x72\xDB\x44\xD0"
+			  "\x39\xA2\x0B\x97\x00\x69\xF5\x5E"
+			  "\xC7\x30\xBC\x25\x8E\x1A\x83\xEC"
+			  "\x55\xE1\x4A\xB3\x1C\xA8\x11\x7A"
+			  "\x06\x6F\xD8\x41\xCD\x36\x9F\x08"
+			  "\x94\xFD\x66\xF2\x5B\xC4\x2D\xB9"
+			  "\x22\x8B\x17\x80\xE9\x52\xDE\x47"
+			  "\xB0\x19\xA5\x0E\x77\x03\x6C\xD5"
+			  "\x3E\xCA\x33\x9C\x05\x91\xFA\x63"
+			  "\xEF\x58\xC1\x2A\xB6\x1F\x88\x14"
+			  "\x7D\xE6\x4F\xDB\x44\xAD\x16\xA2"
+			  "\x0B\x74\x00\x69\xD2\x3B\xC7\x30"
+			  "\x99\x02\x8E\xF7\x60\xEC\x55\xBE"
+			  "\x27\xB3\x1C\x85\x11\x7A\xE3\x4C"
+			  "\xD8\x41\xAA\x13\x9F\x08\x71\xFD"
+			  "\x66\xCF\x38\xC4\x2D\x96\x22\x8B"
+			  "\xF4\x5D\xE9\x52\xBB\x24\xB0\x19"
+			  "\x82\x0E\x77\xE0\x49\xD5\x3E\xA7"
+			  "\x10\x9C\x05\x6E\xFA\x63\xCC\x35"
+			  "\xC1\x2A\x93\x1F\x88\xF1\x5A\xE6"
+			  "\x4F\xB8\x21\xAD\x16\x7F\x0B\x74"
+			  "\xDD\x46\xD2\x3B\xA4\x0D\x99\x02"
+			  "\x6B\xF7\x60\xC9\x32\xBE\x27\x90"
+			  "\x1C\x85\xEE\x57\xE3\x4C\xB5\x1E"
+			  "\xAA\x13\x7C\x08\x71\xDA\x43\xCF"
+			  "\x38\xA1\x0A\x96\xFF\x68\xF4\x5D"
+			  "\xC6\x2F\xBB\x24\x8D\x19\x82\xEB"
+			  "\x54\xE0\x49\xB2\x1B\xA7\x10\x79"
+			  "\x05\x6E\xD7\x40\xCC\x35\x9E\x07"
+			  "\x93\xFC\x65\xF1\x5A\xC3\x2C\xB8"
+			  "\x21\x8A\x16\x7F\xE8\x51\xDD\x46"
+			  "\xAF\x18\xA4\x0D\x76\x02\x6B\xD4"
+			  "\x3D\xC9\x32\x9B\x04\x90\xF9\x62"
+			  "\xEE\x57\xC0\x29\xB5\x1E\x87\x13"
+			  "\x7C\xE5\x4E\xDA\x43\xAC\x15\xA1"
+			  "\x0A\x73\xFF\x68\xD1\x3A\xC6\x2F"
+			  "\x98\x01\x8D\xF6\x5F\xEB\x54\xBD"
+			  "\x26\xB2\x1B\x84\x10\x79\xE2\x4B"
+			  "\xD7\x40\xA9\x12\x9E\x07\x70\xFC"
+			  "\x65\xCE\x37\xC3\x2C\x95\x21\x8A"
+			  "\xF3\x5C\xE8\x51\xBA\x23\xAF\x18"
+			  "\x81\x0D\x76\xDF\x48\xD4\x3D\xA6"
+			  "\x0F\x9B\x04\x6D\xF9\x62\xCB\x34"
+			  "\xC0\x29\x92\x1E\x87\xF0\x59\xE5"
+			  "\x4E\xB7\x20\xAC\x15\x7E\x0A\x73"
+			  "\xDC\x45\xD1\x3A\xA3\x0C\x98\x01"
+			  "\x6A\xF6\x5F\xC8\x31\xBD\x26\x8F"
+			  "\x1B\x84\xED\x56\xE2\x4B\xB4\x1D"
+			  "\xA9\x12\x7B\x07\x70\xD9\x42\xCE"
+			  "\x37\xA0\x09\x95\xFE\x67\xF3\x5C"
+			  "\xC5\x2E\xBA\x23\x8C\x18\x81\xEA"
+			  "\x53\xDF\x48\xB1\x1A\xA6\x0F\x78"
+			  "\x04\x6D\xD6\x3F\xCB\x34\x9D\x06"
+			  "\x92\xFB\x64\xF0\x59\xC2\x2B\xB7"
+			  "\x20\x89\x15\x7E\xE7\x50\xDC\x45"
+			  "\xAE\x17\xA3\x0C\x75\x01\x6A\xD3"
+			  "\x3C\xC8\x31\x9A\x03\x8F\xF8\x61"
+			  "\xED\x56\xBF\x28\xB4\x1D\x86\x12",
+		.ctext	= "\x97\x7f\x69\x0f\x0f\x34\xa6\x33"
+			  "\x66\x49\x7e\xd0\x4d\x1b\xc9\x64"
+			  "\xf9\x61\x95\x98\x11\x00\x88\xf8"
+			  "\x2e\x88\x01\x0f\x2b\xe1\xae\x3e"
+			  "\xfe\xd6\x47\x30\x11\x68\x7d\x99"
+			  "\xad\x69\x6a\xe8\x41\x5f\x1e\x16"
+			  "\x00\x3a\x47\xdf\x8e\x7d\x23\x1c"
+			  "\x19\x5b\x32\x76\x60\x03\x05\xc1"
+			  "\xa0\xff\xcf\xcc\x74\x39\x46\x63"
+			  "\xfe\x5f\xa6\x35\xa7\xb4\xc1\xf9"
+			  "\x4b\x5e\x38\xcc\x8c\xc1\xa2\xcf"
+			  "\x9a\xc3\xae\x55\x42\x46\x93\xd9"
+			  "\xbd\x22\xd3\x8a\x19\x96\xc3\xb3"
+			  "\x7d\x03\x18\xf9\x45\x09\x9c\xc8"
+			  "\x90\xf3\x22\xb3\x25\x83\x9a\x75"
+			  "\xbb\x04\x48\x97\x3a\x63\x08\x04"
+			  "\xa0\x69\xf6\x52\xd4\x89\x93\x69"
+			  "\xb4\x33\xa2\x16\x58\xec\x4b\x26"
+			  "\x76\x54\x10\x0b\x6e\x53\x1e\xbc"
+			  "\x16\x18\x42\xb1\xb1\xd3\x4b\xda"
+			  "\x06\x9f\x8b\x77\xf7\xab\xd6\xed"
+			  "\xa3\x1d\x90\xda\x49\x38\x20\xb8"
+			  "\x6c\xee\xae\x3e\xae\x6c\x03\xb8"
+			  "\x0b\xed\xc8\xaa\x0e\xc5\x1f\x90"
+			  "\x60\xe2\xec\x1b\x76\xd0\xcf\xda"
+			  "\x29\x1b\xb8\x5a\xbc\xf4\xba\x13"
+			  "\x91\xa6\xcb\x83\x3f\xeb\xe9\x7b"
+			  "\x03\xba\x40\x9e\xe6\x7a\xb2\x4a"
+			  "\x73\x49\xfc\xed\xfb\x55\xa4\x24"
+			  "\xc7\xa4\xd7\x4b\xf5\xf7\x16\x62"
+			  "\x80\xd3\x19\x31\x52\x25\xa8\x69"
+			  "\xda\x9a\x87\xf5\xf2\xee\x5d\x61"
+			  "\xc1\x12\x72\x3e\x52\x26\x45\x3a"
+			  "\xd8\x9d\x57\xfa\x14\xe2\x9b\x2f"
+			  "\xd4\xaa\x5e\x31\xf4\x84\x89\xa4"
+			  "\xe3\x0e\xb0\x58\x41\x75\x6a\xcb"
+			  "\x30\x01\x98\x90\x15\x80\xf5\x27"
+			  "\x92\x13\x81\xf0\x1c\x1e\xfc\xb1"
+			  "\x33\xf7\x63\xb0\x67\xec\x2e\x5c"
+			  "\x85\xe3\x5b\xd0\x43\x8a\xb8\x5f"
+			  "\x44\x9f\xec\x19\xc9\x8f\xde\xdf"
+			  "\x79\xef\xf8\xee\x14\x87\xb3\x34"
+			  "\x76\x00\x3a\x9b\xc7\xed\xb1\x3d"
+			  "\xef\x07\xb0\xe4\xfd\x68\x9e\xeb"
+			  "\xc2\xb4\x1a\x85\x9a\x7d\x11\x88"
+			  "\xf8\xab\x43\x55\x2b\x8a\x4f\x60"
+			  "\x85\x9a\xf4\xba\xae\x48\x81\xeb"
+			  "\x93\x07\x97\x9e\xde\x2a\xfc\x4e"
+			  "\x31\xde\xaa\x44\xf7\x2a\xc3\xee"
+			  "\x60\xa2\x98\x2c\x0a\x88\x50\xc5"
+			  "\x6d\x89\xd3\xe4\xb6\xa7\xf4\xb0"
+			  "\xcf\x0e\x89\xe3\x5e\x8f\x82\xf4"
+			  "\x9d\xd1\xa9\x51\x50\x8a\xd2\x18"
+			  "\x07\xb2\xaa\x3b\x7f\x58\x9b\xf4"
+			  "\xb7\x24\x39\xd3\x66\x2f\x1e\xc0"
+			  "\x11\xa3\x56\x56\x2a\x10\x73\xbc"
+			  "\xe1\x23\xbf\xa9\x37\x07\x9c\xc3"
+			  "\xb2\xc9\xa8\x1c\x5b\x5c\x58\xa4"
+			  "\x77\x02\x26\xad\xc3\x40\x11\x53"
+			  "\x93\x68\x72\xde\x05\x8b\x10\xbc"
+			  "\xa6\xd4\x1b\xd9\x27\xd8\x16\x12"
+			  "\x61\x2b\x31\x2a\x44\x87\x96\x58",
+		.len	= 496,
+	},
+};
+
+/* based on hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp */
+static const struct aead_testvec essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp[] = {
+	{
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xb3\x0c\x5a\x11\x41\xad\xc1\x04"
+			  "\xbc\x1e\x7e\x35\xb0\x5d\x78\x29",
+		.assoc	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\xb4\x22\xda\x80\x2c\x9f\xac\x41",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.plen	= 16,
+		.ctext	= "\xe3\x53\x77\x9c\x10\x79\xae\xb8"
+			  "\x27\x08\x94\x2d\xbe\x77\x18\x1a"
+			  "\xcc\xde\x2d\x6a\xae\xf1\x0b\xcc"
+			  "\x38\x06\x38\x51\xb4\xb8\xf3\x5b"
+			  "\x5c\x34\xa6\xa3\x6e\x0b\x05\xe5"
+			  "\x6a\x6d\x44\xaa\x26\xa8\x44\xa5",
+		.clen	= 16 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+			  "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\xe8\x14\xa5\x74\x18\x75\x13"
+			  "\x2f\x79\xe7\xc8\x65\xe3\x48\x45",
+		.assoc	= "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\xdd\xb3\xba\x69\x5a\x2e\x6f\x58",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.plen	= 32,
+		.ctext	= "\xd2\x96\xcd\x94\xc2\xcc\xcf\x8a"
+			  "\x3a\x86\x30\x28\xb5\xe1\xdc\x0a"
+			  "\x75\x86\x60\x2d\x25\x3c\xff\xf9"
+			  "\x1b\x82\x66\xbe\xa6\xd6\x1a\xb1"
+			  "\xf5\x33\x53\xf3\x68\x85\x2a\x99"
+			  "\x0e\x06\x58\x8f\xba\xf6\x06\xda"
+			  "\x49\x69\x0d\x5b\xd4\x36\x06\x62"
+			  "\x35\x5e\x54\x58\x53\x4d\xdf\xbf",
+		.clen	= 32 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x6c\x3e\xa0\x47\x76\x30\xce\x21"
+			  "\xa2\xce\x33\x4a\xa7\x46\xc2\xcd",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x1f\x6b\xfb\xd6\x6b\x72\x2f\xc9"
+			  "\xb6\x9f\x8c\x10\xa8\x96\x15\x64",
+		.assoc	= "\xc7\x82\xdc\x4c\x09\x8c\x66\xcb"
+			  "\xd9\xcd\x27\xd8\x25\x68\x2c\x81",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)",
+		.plen	= 48,
+		.ctext	= "\xd0\xa0\x2b\x38\x36\x45\x17\x53"
+			  "\xd4\x93\x66\x5d\x33\xf0\xe8\x86"
+			  "\x2d\xea\x54\xcd\xb2\x93\xab\xc7"
+			  "\x50\x69\x39\x27\x67\x72\xf8\xd5"
+			  "\x02\x1c\x19\x21\x6b\xad\x52\x5c"
+			  "\x85\x79\x69\x5d\x83\xba\x26\x84"
+			  "\x68\xb9\x3e\x90\x38\xa0\x88\x01"
+			  "\xe7\xc6\xce\x10\x31\x2f\x9b\x1d"
+			  "\x24\x78\xfb\xbe\x02\xe0\x4f\x40"
+			  "\x10\xbd\xaa\xc6\xa7\x79\xe0\x1a",
+		.clen	= 48 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x56\xe4\x7a\x38\xc5\x59\x89\x74"
+			  "\xbc\x46\x90\x3d\xba\x29\x03\x49",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x13\xe5\xf2\xef\x61\x97\x59\x35"
+			  "\x9b\x36\x84\x46\x4e\x63\xd1\x41",
+		.assoc	= "\x8c\xe8\x2e\xef\xbe\xa0\xda\x3c"
+			  "\x44\x69\x9e\xd7\xdb\x51\xb7\xd9",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7"
+			  "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"
+			  "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7"
+			  "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+			  "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7"
+			  "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+			  "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7"
+			  "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xc3\x0e\x32\xff\xed\xc0\x77\x4e"
+			  "\x6a\xff\x6a\xf0\x86\x9f\x71\xaa"
+			  "\x0f\x3a\xf0\x7a\x9a\x31\xa9\xc6"
+			  "\x84\xdb\x20\x7e\xb0\xef\x8e\x4e"
+			  "\x35\x90\x7a\xa6\x32\xc3\xff\xdf"
+			  "\x86\x8b\xb7\xb2\x9d\x3d\x46\xad"
+			  "\x83\xce\x9f\x9a\x10\x2e\xe9\x9d"
+			  "\x49\xa5\x3e\x87\xf4\xc3\xda\x55"
+			  "\x7a\x1b\xd4\x3c\xdb\x17\x95\xe2"
+			  "\xe0\x93\xec\xc9\x9f\xf7\xce\xd8"
+			  "\x3f\x54\xe2\x49\x39\xe3\x71\x25"
+			  "\x2b\x6c\xe9\x5d\xec\xec\x2b\x64",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x90\xd3\x82\xb4\x10\xee\xba\x7a"
+			  "\xd9\x38\xc4\x6c\xec\x1a\x82\xbf",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xe4\x13\xa1\x15\xe9\x6b\xb8\x23"
+			  "\x81\x7a\x94\x29\xab\xfd\xd2\x2c",
+		.assoc  = "\x00\x00\x43\x21\x00\x00\x00\x01"
+			  "\xe9\x6e\x8c\x08\xab\x46\x57\x63"
+			  "\xfd\x09\x8d\x45\xdd\x3f\xf8\x93",
+		.alen   = 24,
+		.ptext	= "\x08\x00\x0e\xbd\xa7\x0a\x00\x00"
+			  "\x8e\x9c\x08\x3d\xb9\x5b\x07\x00"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+			  "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0e\x01",
+		.plen	= 80,
+		.ctext	= "\xf6\x63\xc2\x5d\x32\x5c\x18\xc6"
+			  "\xa9\x45\x3e\x19\x4e\x12\x08\x49"
+			  "\xa4\x87\x0b\x66\xcc\x6b\x99\x65"
+			  "\x33\x00\x13\xb4\x89\x8d\xc8\x56"
+			  "\xa4\x69\x9e\x52\x3a\x55\xdb\x08"
+			  "\x0b\x59\xec\x3a\x8e\x4b\x7e\x52"
+			  "\x77\x5b\x07\xd1\xdb\x34\xed\x9c"
+			  "\x53\x8a\xb5\x0c\x55\x1b\x87\x4a"
+			  "\xa2\x69\xad\xd0\x47\xad\x2d\x59"
+			  "\x13\xac\x19\xb7\xcf\xba\xd4\xa6"
+			  "\xbb\xd4\x0f\xbe\xa3\x3b\x4c\xb8"
+			  "\x3a\xd2\xe1\x03\x86\xa5\x59\xb7"
+			  "\x73\xc3\x46\x20\x2c\xb1\xef\x68"
+			  "\xbb\x8a\x32\x7e\x12\x8c\x69\xcf",
+		.clen	= 80 + 32,
+       }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"            /* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x18"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 24,
+		.iv     = "\x49\xca\x41\xc9\x6b\xbf\x6c\x98"
+			  "\x38\x2f\xa7\x3d\x4d\x80\x49\xb0",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\x4f\x02\x1d\xb2\x43\xbc\x63\x3d"
+			  "\x71\x78\x18\x3a\x9f\xa0\x71\xe8"
+			  "\xb4\xd9\xad\xa9\xad\x7d\xed\xf4"
+			  "\xe5\xe7\x38\x76\x3f\x69\x14\x5a"
+			  "\x57\x1b\x24\x20\x12\xfb\x7a\xe0"
+			  "\x7f\xa9\xba\xac\x3d\xf1\x02\xe0"
+			  "\x08\xb0\xe2\x79\x88\x59\x88\x81"
+			  "\xd9\x20\xa9\xe6\x4f\x56\x15\xcd"
+			  "\x2f\xee\x5f\xdb\x66\xfe\x79\x09"
+			  "\x61\x81\x31\xea\x5b\x3d\x8e\xfb"
+			  "\xca\x71\x85\x93\xf7\x85\x55\x8b"
+			  "\x7a\xe4\x94\xca\x8b\xba\x19\x33",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x20"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 32,
+		.iv     = "\xdf\xab\xf2\x7c\xdc\xe0\x33\x4c"
+			  "\xf9\x75\xaf\xf9\x2f\x60\x3a\x9b",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xf5\x8c\x4c\x04\xd6\xe5\xf1\xba"
+			  "\x77\x9e\xab\xfb\x5f\x7b\xfb\xd6"
+			  "\x9c\xfc\x4e\x96\x7e\xdb\x80\x8d"
+			  "\x67\x9f\x77\x7b\xc6\x70\x2c\x7d"
+			  "\x39\xf2\x33\x69\xa9\xd9\xba\xcf"
+			  "\xa5\x30\xe2\x63\x04\x23\x14\x61"
+			  "\xb2\xeb\x05\xe2\xc3\x9b\xe9\xfc"
+			  "\xda\x6c\x19\x07\x8c\x6a\x9d\x1b"
+			  "\x24\x29\xed\xc2\x31\x49\xdb\xb1"
+			  "\x8f\x74\xbd\x17\x92\x03\xbe\x8f"
+			  "\xf3\x61\xde\x1c\xe9\xdb\xcd\xd0"
+			  "\xcc\xce\xe9\x85\x57\xcf\x6f\x5f",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	},
+};
+
 #endif	/* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes), aes, sha256)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/tcrypt.c  |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h | 497 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 520 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 798253f05203..5c8d585c2ad1 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2332,6 +2332,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
 				  0, speed_template_32);
 		break;
 
+	case 220:
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		break;
+
 	case 300:
 		if (alg) {
 			test_hash_speed(alg, sec, generic_hash_speed_template);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index d760f5cd35b2..304261a2e577 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4561,6 +4561,20 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.suite = {
 			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
 		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "gcm(aes)",
 		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 6b459a6a796b..193cf2e9badd 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -33686,4 +33686,501 @@ static const struct comp_testvec zstd_decomp_tv_template[] = {
 			  "functions.",
 	},
 };
+
+/* based on aes_cbc_tv_template */
+static const struct cipher_testvec essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.ctext	= "\xfa\x59\xe7\x5f\x41\x56\x65\xc3"
+			  "\x36\xca\x6b\x72\x10\x9f\x8c\xd4",
+		.len	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key    = "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.ctext	= "\xc8\x59\x9a\xfe\x79\xe6\x7b\x20"
+			  "\x06\x7d\x55\x0a\x5e\xc7\xb5\xa7"
+			  "\x0b\x9c\x80\xd2\x15\xa1\xb8\x6d"
+			  "\xc6\xab\x7b\x65\xd9\xfd\x88\xeb",
+		.len	= 32,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen	= 24,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x96\x6d\xa9\x7a\x42\xe6\x01\xc7"
+			  "\x17\xfc\xa7\x41\xd3\x38\x0b\xe5"
+			  "\x51\x48\xf7\x7e\x5e\x26\xa9\xfe"
+			  "\x45\x72\x1c\xd9\xde\xab\xf3\x4d"
+			  "\x39\x47\xc5\x4f\x97\x3a\x55\x63"
+			  "\x80\x29\x64\x4c\x33\xe8\x21\x8a"
+			  "\x6a\xef\x6b\x6a\x8f\x43\xc0\xcb"
+			  "\xf0\xf3\x6e\x74\x54\x44\x92\x44",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x24\x52\xf1\x48\x74\xd0\xa7\x93"
+			  "\x75\x9b\x63\x46\xc0\x1c\x1e\x17"
+			  "\x4d\xdc\x5b\x3a\x27\x93\x2a\x63"
+			  "\xf7\xf1\xc7\xb3\x54\x56\x5b\x50"
+			  "\xa3\x31\xa5\x8b\xd6\xfd\xb6\x3c"
+			  "\x8b\xf6\xf2\x45\x05\x0c\xc8\xbb"
+			  "\x32\x0b\x26\x1c\xe9\x8b\x02\xc0"
+			  "\xb2\x6f\x37\xa7\x5b\xa8\xa9\x42",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\xC9\x83\xA6\xC9\xEC\x0F\x32\x55"
+			  "\x0F\x32\x55\x78\x9B\xBE\x78\x9B"
+			  "\xBE\xE1\x04\x27\xE1\x04\x27\x4A"
+			  "\x6D\x90\x4A\x6D\x90\xB3\xD6\xF9",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\xE7\x82\x1D\xB8\x53\x11\xAC\x47"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x50\xB9\x22\xAE\x17\x80\x0C\x75"
+			  "\xDE\x47\xD3\x3C\xA5\x0E\x9A\x03"
+			  "\x6C\xF8\x61\xCA\x33\xBF\x28\x91"
+			  "\x1D\x86\xEF\x58\xE4\x4D\xB6\x1F"
+			  "\xAB\x14\x7D\x09\x72\xDB\x44\xD0"
+			  "\x39\xA2\x0B\x97\x00\x69\xF5\x5E"
+			  "\xC7\x30\xBC\x25\x8E\x1A\x83\xEC"
+			  "\x55\xE1\x4A\xB3\x1C\xA8\x11\x7A"
+			  "\x06\x6F\xD8\x41\xCD\x36\x9F\x08"
+			  "\x94\xFD\x66\xF2\x5B\xC4\x2D\xB9"
+			  "\x22\x8B\x17\x80\xE9\x52\xDE\x47"
+			  "\xB0\x19\xA5\x0E\x77\x03\x6C\xD5"
+			  "\x3E\xCA\x33\x9C\x05\x91\xFA\x63"
+			  "\xEF\x58\xC1\x2A\xB6\x1F\x88\x14"
+			  "\x7D\xE6\x4F\xDB\x44\xAD\x16\xA2"
+			  "\x0B\x74\x00\x69\xD2\x3B\xC7\x30"
+			  "\x99\x02\x8E\xF7\x60\xEC\x55\xBE"
+			  "\x27\xB3\x1C\x85\x11\x7A\xE3\x4C"
+			  "\xD8\x41\xAA\x13\x9F\x08\x71\xFD"
+			  "\x66\xCF\x38\xC4\x2D\x96\x22\x8B"
+			  "\xF4\x5D\xE9\x52\xBB\x24\xB0\x19"
+			  "\x82\x0E\x77\xE0\x49\xD5\x3E\xA7"
+			  "\x10\x9C\x05\x6E\xFA\x63\xCC\x35"
+			  "\xC1\x2A\x93\x1F\x88\xF1\x5A\xE6"
+			  "\x4F\xB8\x21\xAD\x16\x7F\x0B\x74"
+			  "\xDD\x46\xD2\x3B\xA4\x0D\x99\x02"
+			  "\x6B\xF7\x60\xC9\x32\xBE\x27\x90"
+			  "\x1C\x85\xEE\x57\xE3\x4C\xB5\x1E"
+			  "\xAA\x13\x7C\x08\x71\xDA\x43\xCF"
+			  "\x38\xA1\x0A\x96\xFF\x68\xF4\x5D"
+			  "\xC6\x2F\xBB\x24\x8D\x19\x82\xEB"
+			  "\x54\xE0\x49\xB2\x1B\xA7\x10\x79"
+			  "\x05\x6E\xD7\x40\xCC\x35\x9E\x07"
+			  "\x93\xFC\x65\xF1\x5A\xC3\x2C\xB8"
+			  "\x21\x8A\x16\x7F\xE8\x51\xDD\x46"
+			  "\xAF\x18\xA4\x0D\x76\x02\x6B\xD4"
+			  "\x3D\xC9\x32\x9B\x04\x90\xF9\x62"
+			  "\xEE\x57\xC0\x29\xB5\x1E\x87\x13"
+			  "\x7C\xE5\x4E\xDA\x43\xAC\x15\xA1"
+			  "\x0A\x73\xFF\x68\xD1\x3A\xC6\x2F"
+			  "\x98\x01\x8D\xF6\x5F\xEB\x54\xBD"
+			  "\x26\xB2\x1B\x84\x10\x79\xE2\x4B"
+			  "\xD7\x40\xA9\x12\x9E\x07\x70\xFC"
+			  "\x65\xCE\x37\xC3\x2C\x95\x21\x8A"
+			  "\xF3\x5C\xE8\x51\xBA\x23\xAF\x18"
+			  "\x81\x0D\x76\xDF\x48\xD4\x3D\xA6"
+			  "\x0F\x9B\x04\x6D\xF9\x62\xCB\x34"
+			  "\xC0\x29\x92\x1E\x87\xF0\x59\xE5"
+			  "\x4E\xB7\x20\xAC\x15\x7E\x0A\x73"
+			  "\xDC\x45\xD1\x3A\xA3\x0C\x98\x01"
+			  "\x6A\xF6\x5F\xC8\x31\xBD\x26\x8F"
+			  "\x1B\x84\xED\x56\xE2\x4B\xB4\x1D"
+			  "\xA9\x12\x7B\x07\x70\xD9\x42\xCE"
+			  "\x37\xA0\x09\x95\xFE\x67\xF3\x5C"
+			  "\xC5\x2E\xBA\x23\x8C\x18\x81\xEA"
+			  "\x53\xDF\x48\xB1\x1A\xA6\x0F\x78"
+			  "\x04\x6D\xD6\x3F\xCB\x34\x9D\x06"
+			  "\x92\xFB\x64\xF0\x59\xC2\x2B\xB7"
+			  "\x20\x89\x15\x7E\xE7\x50\xDC\x45"
+			  "\xAE\x17\xA3\x0C\x75\x01\x6A\xD3"
+			  "\x3C\xC8\x31\x9A\x03\x8F\xF8\x61"
+			  "\xED\x56\xBF\x28\xB4\x1D\x86\x12",
+		.ctext	= "\x97\x7f\x69\x0f\x0f\x34\xa6\x33"
+			  "\x66\x49\x7e\xd0\x4d\x1b\xc9\x64"
+			  "\xf9\x61\x95\x98\x11\x00\x88\xf8"
+			  "\x2e\x88\x01\x0f\x2b\xe1\xae\x3e"
+			  "\xfe\xd6\x47\x30\x11\x68\x7d\x99"
+			  "\xad\x69\x6a\xe8\x41\x5f\x1e\x16"
+			  "\x00\x3a\x47\xdf\x8e\x7d\x23\x1c"
+			  "\x19\x5b\x32\x76\x60\x03\x05\xc1"
+			  "\xa0\xff\xcf\xcc\x74\x39\x46\x63"
+			  "\xfe\x5f\xa6\x35\xa7\xb4\xc1\xf9"
+			  "\x4b\x5e\x38\xcc\x8c\xc1\xa2\xcf"
+			  "\x9a\xc3\xae\x55\x42\x46\x93\xd9"
+			  "\xbd\x22\xd3\x8a\x19\x96\xc3\xb3"
+			  "\x7d\x03\x18\xf9\x45\x09\x9c\xc8"
+			  "\x90\xf3\x22\xb3\x25\x83\x9a\x75"
+			  "\xbb\x04\x48\x97\x3a\x63\x08\x04"
+			  "\xa0\x69\xf6\x52\xd4\x89\x93\x69"
+			  "\xb4\x33\xa2\x16\x58\xec\x4b\x26"
+			  "\x76\x54\x10\x0b\x6e\x53\x1e\xbc"
+			  "\x16\x18\x42\xb1\xb1\xd3\x4b\xda"
+			  "\x06\x9f\x8b\x77\xf7\xab\xd6\xed"
+			  "\xa3\x1d\x90\xda\x49\x38\x20\xb8"
+			  "\x6c\xee\xae\x3e\xae\x6c\x03\xb8"
+			  "\x0b\xed\xc8\xaa\x0e\xc5\x1f\x90"
+			  "\x60\xe2\xec\x1b\x76\xd0\xcf\xda"
+			  "\x29\x1b\xb8\x5a\xbc\xf4\xba\x13"
+			  "\x91\xa6\xcb\x83\x3f\xeb\xe9\x7b"
+			  "\x03\xba\x40\x9e\xe6\x7a\xb2\x4a"
+			  "\x73\x49\xfc\xed\xfb\x55\xa4\x24"
+			  "\xc7\xa4\xd7\x4b\xf5\xf7\x16\x62"
+			  "\x80\xd3\x19\x31\x52\x25\xa8\x69"
+			  "\xda\x9a\x87\xf5\xf2\xee\x5d\x61"
+			  "\xc1\x12\x72\x3e\x52\x26\x45\x3a"
+			  "\xd8\x9d\x57\xfa\x14\xe2\x9b\x2f"
+			  "\xd4\xaa\x5e\x31\xf4\x84\x89\xa4"
+			  "\xe3\x0e\xb0\x58\x41\x75\x6a\xcb"
+			  "\x30\x01\x98\x90\x15\x80\xf5\x27"
+			  "\x92\x13\x81\xf0\x1c\x1e\xfc\xb1"
+			  "\x33\xf7\x63\xb0\x67\xec\x2e\x5c"
+			  "\x85\xe3\x5b\xd0\x43\x8a\xb8\x5f"
+			  "\x44\x9f\xec\x19\xc9\x8f\xde\xdf"
+			  "\x79\xef\xf8\xee\x14\x87\xb3\x34"
+			  "\x76\x00\x3a\x9b\xc7\xed\xb1\x3d"
+			  "\xef\x07\xb0\xe4\xfd\x68\x9e\xeb"
+			  "\xc2\xb4\x1a\x85\x9a\x7d\x11\x88"
+			  "\xf8\xab\x43\x55\x2b\x8a\x4f\x60"
+			  "\x85\x9a\xf4\xba\xae\x48\x81\xeb"
+			  "\x93\x07\x97\x9e\xde\x2a\xfc\x4e"
+			  "\x31\xde\xaa\x44\xf7\x2a\xc3\xee"
+			  "\x60\xa2\x98\x2c\x0a\x88\x50\xc5"
+			  "\x6d\x89\xd3\xe4\xb6\xa7\xf4\xb0"
+			  "\xcf\x0e\x89\xe3\x5e\x8f\x82\xf4"
+			  "\x9d\xd1\xa9\x51\x50\x8a\xd2\x18"
+			  "\x07\xb2\xaa\x3b\x7f\x58\x9b\xf4"
+			  "\xb7\x24\x39\xd3\x66\x2f\x1e\xc0"
+			  "\x11\xa3\x56\x56\x2a\x10\x73\xbc"
+			  "\xe1\x23\xbf\xa9\x37\x07\x9c\xc3"
+			  "\xb2\xc9\xa8\x1c\x5b\x5c\x58\xa4"
+			  "\x77\x02\x26\xad\xc3\x40\x11\x53"
+			  "\x93\x68\x72\xde\x05\x8b\x10\xbc"
+			  "\xa6\xd4\x1b\xd9\x27\xd8\x16\x12"
+			  "\x61\x2b\x31\x2a\x44\x87\x96\x58",
+		.len	= 496,
+	},
+};
+
+/* based on hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp */
+static const struct aead_testvec essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp[] = {
+	{
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xb3\x0c\x5a\x11\x41\xad\xc1\x04"
+			  "\xbc\x1e\x7e\x35\xb0\x5d\x78\x29",
+		.assoc	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\xb4\x22\xda\x80\x2c\x9f\xac\x41",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.plen	= 16,
+		.ctext	= "\xe3\x53\x77\x9c\x10\x79\xae\xb8"
+			  "\x27\x08\x94\x2d\xbe\x77\x18\x1a"
+			  "\xcc\xde\x2d\x6a\xae\xf1\x0b\xcc"
+			  "\x38\x06\x38\x51\xb4\xb8\xf3\x5b"
+			  "\x5c\x34\xa6\xa3\x6e\x0b\x05\xe5"
+			  "\x6a\x6d\x44\xaa\x26\xa8\x44\xa5",
+		.clen	= 16 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+			  "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\xe8\x14\xa5\x74\x18\x75\x13"
+			  "\x2f\x79\xe7\xc8\x65\xe3\x48\x45",
+		.assoc	= "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\xdd\xb3\xba\x69\x5a\x2e\x6f\x58",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.plen	= 32,
+		.ctext	= "\xd2\x96\xcd\x94\xc2\xcc\xcf\x8a"
+			  "\x3a\x86\x30\x28\xb5\xe1\xdc\x0a"
+			  "\x75\x86\x60\x2d\x25\x3c\xff\xf9"
+			  "\x1b\x82\x66\xbe\xa6\xd6\x1a\xb1"
+			  "\xf5\x33\x53\xf3\x68\x85\x2a\x99"
+			  "\x0e\x06\x58\x8f\xba\xf6\x06\xda"
+			  "\x49\x69\x0d\x5b\xd4\x36\x06\x62"
+			  "\x35\x5e\x54\x58\x53\x4d\xdf\xbf",
+		.clen	= 32 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x6c\x3e\xa0\x47\x76\x30\xce\x21"
+			  "\xa2\xce\x33\x4a\xa7\x46\xc2\xcd",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x1f\x6b\xfb\xd6\x6b\x72\x2f\xc9"
+			  "\xb6\x9f\x8c\x10\xa8\x96\x15\x64",
+		.assoc	= "\xc7\x82\xdc\x4c\x09\x8c\x66\xcb"
+			  "\xd9\xcd\x27\xd8\x25\x68\x2c\x81",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)",
+		.plen	= 48,
+		.ctext	= "\xd0\xa0\x2b\x38\x36\x45\x17\x53"
+			  "\xd4\x93\x66\x5d\x33\xf0\xe8\x86"
+			  "\x2d\xea\x54\xcd\xb2\x93\xab\xc7"
+			  "\x50\x69\x39\x27\x67\x72\xf8\xd5"
+			  "\x02\x1c\x19\x21\x6b\xad\x52\x5c"
+			  "\x85\x79\x69\x5d\x83\xba\x26\x84"
+			  "\x68\xb9\x3e\x90\x38\xa0\x88\x01"
+			  "\xe7\xc6\xce\x10\x31\x2f\x9b\x1d"
+			  "\x24\x78\xfb\xbe\x02\xe0\x4f\x40"
+			  "\x10\xbd\xaa\xc6\xa7\x79\xe0\x1a",
+		.clen	= 48 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x56\xe4\x7a\x38\xc5\x59\x89\x74"
+			  "\xbc\x46\x90\x3d\xba\x29\x03\x49",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x13\xe5\xf2\xef\x61\x97\x59\x35"
+			  "\x9b\x36\x84\x46\x4e\x63\xd1\x41",
+		.assoc	= "\x8c\xe8\x2e\xef\xbe\xa0\xda\x3c"
+			  "\x44\x69\x9e\xd7\xdb\x51\xb7\xd9",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7"
+			  "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"
+			  "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7"
+			  "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+			  "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7"
+			  "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+			  "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7"
+			  "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xc3\x0e\x32\xff\xed\xc0\x77\x4e"
+			  "\x6a\xff\x6a\xf0\x86\x9f\x71\xaa"
+			  "\x0f\x3a\xf0\x7a\x9a\x31\xa9\xc6"
+			  "\x84\xdb\x20\x7e\xb0\xef\x8e\x4e"
+			  "\x35\x90\x7a\xa6\x32\xc3\xff\xdf"
+			  "\x86\x8b\xb7\xb2\x9d\x3d\x46\xad"
+			  "\x83\xce\x9f\x9a\x10\x2e\xe9\x9d"
+			  "\x49\xa5\x3e\x87\xf4\xc3\xda\x55"
+			  "\x7a\x1b\xd4\x3c\xdb\x17\x95\xe2"
+			  "\xe0\x93\xec\xc9\x9f\xf7\xce\xd8"
+			  "\x3f\x54\xe2\x49\x39\xe3\x71\x25"
+			  "\x2b\x6c\xe9\x5d\xec\xec\x2b\x64",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x90\xd3\x82\xb4\x10\xee\xba\x7a"
+			  "\xd9\x38\xc4\x6c\xec\x1a\x82\xbf",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xe4\x13\xa1\x15\xe9\x6b\xb8\x23"
+			  "\x81\x7a\x94\x29\xab\xfd\xd2\x2c",
+		.assoc  = "\x00\x00\x43\x21\x00\x00\x00\x01"
+			  "\xe9\x6e\x8c\x08\xab\x46\x57\x63"
+			  "\xfd\x09\x8d\x45\xdd\x3f\xf8\x93",
+		.alen   = 24,
+		.ptext	= "\x08\x00\x0e\xbd\xa7\x0a\x00\x00"
+			  "\x8e\x9c\x08\x3d\xb9\x5b\x07\x00"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+			  "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0e\x01",
+		.plen	= 80,
+		.ctext	= "\xf6\x63\xc2\x5d\x32\x5c\x18\xc6"
+			  "\xa9\x45\x3e\x19\x4e\x12\x08\x49"
+			  "\xa4\x87\x0b\x66\xcc\x6b\x99\x65"
+			  "\x33\x00\x13\xb4\x89\x8d\xc8\x56"
+			  "\xa4\x69\x9e\x52\x3a\x55\xdb\x08"
+			  "\x0b\x59\xec\x3a\x8e\x4b\x7e\x52"
+			  "\x77\x5b\x07\xd1\xdb\x34\xed\x9c"
+			  "\x53\x8a\xb5\x0c\x55\x1b\x87\x4a"
+			  "\xa2\x69\xad\xd0\x47\xad\x2d\x59"
+			  "\x13\xac\x19\xb7\xcf\xba\xd4\xa6"
+			  "\xbb\xd4\x0f\xbe\xa3\x3b\x4c\xb8"
+			  "\x3a\xd2\xe1\x03\x86\xa5\x59\xb7"
+			  "\x73\xc3\x46\x20\x2c\xb1\xef\x68"
+			  "\xbb\x8a\x32\x7e\x12\x8c\x69\xcf",
+		.clen	= 80 + 32,
+       }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"            /* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x18"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 24,
+		.iv     = "\x49\xca\x41\xc9\x6b\xbf\x6c\x98"
+			  "\x38\x2f\xa7\x3d\x4d\x80\x49\xb0",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\x4f\x02\x1d\xb2\x43\xbc\x63\x3d"
+			  "\x71\x78\x18\x3a\x9f\xa0\x71\xe8"
+			  "\xb4\xd9\xad\xa9\xad\x7d\xed\xf4"
+			  "\xe5\xe7\x38\x76\x3f\x69\x14\x5a"
+			  "\x57\x1b\x24\x20\x12\xfb\x7a\xe0"
+			  "\x7f\xa9\xba\xac\x3d\xf1\x02\xe0"
+			  "\x08\xb0\xe2\x79\x88\x59\x88\x81"
+			  "\xd9\x20\xa9\xe6\x4f\x56\x15\xcd"
+			  "\x2f\xee\x5f\xdb\x66\xfe\x79\x09"
+			  "\x61\x81\x31\xea\x5b\x3d\x8e\xfb"
+			  "\xca\x71\x85\x93\xf7\x85\x55\x8b"
+			  "\x7a\xe4\x94\xca\x8b\xba\x19\x33",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x20"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 32,
+		.iv     = "\xdf\xab\xf2\x7c\xdc\xe0\x33\x4c"
+			  "\xf9\x75\xaf\xf9\x2f\x60\x3a\x9b",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xf5\x8c\x4c\x04\xd6\xe5\xf1\xba"
+			  "\x77\x9e\xab\xfb\x5f\x7b\xfb\xd6"
+			  "\x9c\xfc\x4e\x96\x7e\xdb\x80\x8d"
+			  "\x67\x9f\x77\x7b\xc6\x70\x2c\x7d"
+			  "\x39\xf2\x33\x69\xa9\xd9\xba\xcf"
+			  "\xa5\x30\xe2\x63\x04\x23\x14\x61"
+			  "\xb2\xeb\x05\xe2\xc3\x9b\xe9\xfc"
+			  "\xda\x6c\x19\x07\x8c\x6a\x9d\x1b"
+			  "\x24\x29\xed\xc2\x31\x49\xdb\xb1"
+			  "\x8f\x74\xbd\x17\x92\x03\xbe\x8f"
+			  "\xf3\x61\xde\x1c\xe9\xdb\xcd\xd0"
+			  "\xcc\xce\xe9\x85\x57\xcf\x6f\x5f",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	},
+};
+
 #endif	/* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */
-- 
2.17.1

--
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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes), aes, sha256)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/tcrypt.c  |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h | 497 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 520 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 798253f05203..5c8d585c2ad1 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2332,6 +2332,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
 				  0, speed_template_32);
 		break;
 
+	case 220:
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		break;
+
 	case 300:
 		if (alg) {
 			test_hash_speed(alg, sec, generic_hash_speed_template);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index d760f5cd35b2..304261a2e577 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4561,6 +4561,20 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.suite = {
 			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
 		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "gcm(aes)",
 		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 6b459a6a796b..193cf2e9badd 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -33686,4 +33686,501 @@ static const struct comp_testvec zstd_decomp_tv_template[] = {
 			  "functions.",
 	},
 };
+
+/* based on aes_cbc_tv_template */
+static const struct cipher_testvec essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.ctext	= "\xfa\x59\xe7\x5f\x41\x56\x65\xc3"
+			  "\x36\xca\x6b\x72\x10\x9f\x8c\xd4",
+		.len	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key    = "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.ctext	= "\xc8\x59\x9a\xfe\x79\xe6\x7b\x20"
+			  "\x06\x7d\x55\x0a\x5e\xc7\xb5\xa7"
+			  "\x0b\x9c\x80\xd2\x15\xa1\xb8\x6d"
+			  "\xc6\xab\x7b\x65\xd9\xfd\x88\xeb",
+		.len	= 32,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen	= 24,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x96\x6d\xa9\x7a\x42\xe6\x01\xc7"
+			  "\x17\xfc\xa7\x41\xd3\x38\x0b\xe5"
+			  "\x51\x48\xf7\x7e\x5e\x26\xa9\xfe"
+			  "\x45\x72\x1c\xd9\xde\xab\xf3\x4d"
+			  "\x39\x47\xc5\x4f\x97\x3a\x55\x63"
+			  "\x80\x29\x64\x4c\x33\xe8\x21\x8a"
+			  "\x6a\xef\x6b\x6a\x8f\x43\xc0\xcb"
+			  "\xf0\xf3\x6e\x74\x54\x44\x92\x44",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x24\x52\xf1\x48\x74\xd0\xa7\x93"
+			  "\x75\x9b\x63\x46\xc0\x1c\x1e\x17"
+			  "\x4d\xdc\x5b\x3a\x27\x93\x2a\x63"
+			  "\xf7\xf1\xc7\xb3\x54\x56\x5b\x50"
+			  "\xa3\x31\xa5\x8b\xd6\xfd\xb6\x3c"
+			  "\x8b\xf6\xf2\x45\x05\x0c\xc8\xbb"
+			  "\x32\x0b\x26\x1c\xe9\x8b\x02\xc0"
+			  "\xb2\x6f\x37\xa7\x5b\xa8\xa9\x42",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\xC9\x83\xA6\xC9\xEC\x0F\x32\x55"
+			  "\x0F\x32\x55\x78\x9B\xBE\x78\x9B"
+			  "\xBE\xE1\x04\x27\xE1\x04\x27\x4A"
+			  "\x6D\x90\x4A\x6D\x90\xB3\xD6\xF9",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\xE7\x82\x1D\xB8\x53\x11\xAC\x47"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x50\xB9\x22\xAE\x17\x80\x0C\x75"
+			  "\xDE\x47\xD3\x3C\xA5\x0E\x9A\x03"
+			  "\x6C\xF8\x61\xCA\x33\xBF\x28\x91"
+			  "\x1D\x86\xEF\x58\xE4\x4D\xB6\x1F"
+			  "\xAB\x14\x7D\x09\x72\xDB\x44\xD0"
+			  "\x39\xA2\x0B\x97\x00\x69\xF5\x5E"
+			  "\xC7\x30\xBC\x25\x8E\x1A\x83\xEC"
+			  "\x55\xE1\x4A\xB3\x1C\xA8\x11\x7A"
+			  "\x06\x6F\xD8\x41\xCD\x36\x9F\x08"
+			  "\x94\xFD\x66\xF2\x5B\xC4\x2D\xB9"
+			  "\x22\x8B\x17\x80\xE9\x52\xDE\x47"
+			  "\xB0\x19\xA5\x0E\x77\x03\x6C\xD5"
+			  "\x3E\xCA\x33\x9C\x05\x91\xFA\x63"
+			  "\xEF\x58\xC1\x2A\xB6\x1F\x88\x14"
+			  "\x7D\xE6\x4F\xDB\x44\xAD\x16\xA2"
+			  "\x0B\x74\x00\x69\xD2\x3B\xC7\x30"
+			  "\x99\x02\x8E\xF7\x60\xEC\x55\xBE"
+			  "\x27\xB3\x1C\x85\x11\x7A\xE3\x4C"
+			  "\xD8\x41\xAA\x13\x9F\x08\x71\xFD"
+			  "\x66\xCF\x38\xC4\x2D\x96\x22\x8B"
+			  "\xF4\x5D\xE9\x52\xBB\x24\xB0\x19"
+			  "\x82\x0E\x77\xE0\x49\xD5\x3E\xA7"
+			  "\x10\x9C\x05\x6E\xFA\x63\xCC\x35"
+			  "\xC1\x2A\x93\x1F\x88\xF1\x5A\xE6"
+			  "\x4F\xB8\x21\xAD\x16\x7F\x0B\x74"
+			  "\xDD\x46\xD2\x3B\xA4\x0D\x99\x02"
+			  "\x6B\xF7\x60\xC9\x32\xBE\x27\x90"
+			  "\x1C\x85\xEE\x57\xE3\x4C\xB5\x1E"
+			  "\xAA\x13\x7C\x08\x71\xDA\x43\xCF"
+			  "\x38\xA1\x0A\x96\xFF\x68\xF4\x5D"
+			  "\xC6\x2F\xBB\x24\x8D\x19\x82\xEB"
+			  "\x54\xE0\x49\xB2\x1B\xA7\x10\x79"
+			  "\x05\x6E\xD7\x40\xCC\x35\x9E\x07"
+			  "\x93\xFC\x65\xF1\x5A\xC3\x2C\xB8"
+			  "\x21\x8A\x16\x7F\xE8\x51\xDD\x46"
+			  "\xAF\x18\xA4\x0D\x76\x02\x6B\xD4"
+			  "\x3D\xC9\x32\x9B\x04\x90\xF9\x62"
+			  "\xEE\x57\xC0\x29\xB5\x1E\x87\x13"
+			  "\x7C\xE5\x4E\xDA\x43\xAC\x15\xA1"
+			  "\x0A\x73\xFF\x68\xD1\x3A\xC6\x2F"
+			  "\x98\x01\x8D\xF6\x5F\xEB\x54\xBD"
+			  "\x26\xB2\x1B\x84\x10\x79\xE2\x4B"
+			  "\xD7\x40\xA9\x12\x9E\x07\x70\xFC"
+			  "\x65\xCE\x37\xC3\x2C\x95\x21\x8A"
+			  "\xF3\x5C\xE8\x51\xBA\x23\xAF\x18"
+			  "\x81\x0D\x76\xDF\x48\xD4\x3D\xA6"
+			  "\x0F\x9B\x04\x6D\xF9\x62\xCB\x34"
+			  "\xC0\x29\x92\x1E\x87\xF0\x59\xE5"
+			  "\x4E\xB7\x20\xAC\x15\x7E\x0A\x73"
+			  "\xDC\x45\xD1\x3A\xA3\x0C\x98\x01"
+			  "\x6A\xF6\x5F\xC8\x31\xBD\x26\x8F"
+			  "\x1B\x84\xED\x56\xE2\x4B\xB4\x1D"
+			  "\xA9\x12\x7B\x07\x70\xD9\x42\xCE"
+			  "\x37\xA0\x09\x95\xFE\x67\xF3\x5C"
+			  "\xC5\x2E\xBA\x23\x8C\x18\x81\xEA"
+			  "\x53\xDF\x48\xB1\x1A\xA6\x0F\x78"
+			  "\x04\x6D\xD6\x3F\xCB\x34\x9D\x06"
+			  "\x92\xFB\x64\xF0\x59\xC2\x2B\xB7"
+			  "\x20\x89\x15\x7E\xE7\x50\xDC\x45"
+			  "\xAE\x17\xA3\x0C\x75\x01\x6A\xD3"
+			  "\x3C\xC8\x31\x9A\x03\x8F\xF8\x61"
+			  "\xED\x56\xBF\x28\xB4\x1D\x86\x12",
+		.ctext	= "\x97\x7f\x69\x0f\x0f\x34\xa6\x33"
+			  "\x66\x49\x7e\xd0\x4d\x1b\xc9\x64"
+			  "\xf9\x61\x95\x98\x11\x00\x88\xf8"
+			  "\x2e\x88\x01\x0f\x2b\xe1\xae\x3e"
+			  "\xfe\xd6\x47\x30\x11\x68\x7d\x99"
+			  "\xad\x69\x6a\xe8\x41\x5f\x1e\x16"
+			  "\x00\x3a\x47\xdf\x8e\x7d\x23\x1c"
+			  "\x19\x5b\x32\x76\x60\x03\x05\xc1"
+			  "\xa0\xff\xcf\xcc\x74\x39\x46\x63"
+			  "\xfe\x5f\xa6\x35\xa7\xb4\xc1\xf9"
+			  "\x4b\x5e\x38\xcc\x8c\xc1\xa2\xcf"
+			  "\x9a\xc3\xae\x55\x42\x46\x93\xd9"
+			  "\xbd\x22\xd3\x8a\x19\x96\xc3\xb3"
+			  "\x7d\x03\x18\xf9\x45\x09\x9c\xc8"
+			  "\x90\xf3\x22\xb3\x25\x83\x9a\x75"
+			  "\xbb\x04\x48\x97\x3a\x63\x08\x04"
+			  "\xa0\x69\xf6\x52\xd4\x89\x93\x69"
+			  "\xb4\x33\xa2\x16\x58\xec\x4b\x26"
+			  "\x76\x54\x10\x0b\x6e\x53\x1e\xbc"
+			  "\x16\x18\x42\xb1\xb1\xd3\x4b\xda"
+			  "\x06\x9f\x8b\x77\xf7\xab\xd6\xed"
+			  "\xa3\x1d\x90\xda\x49\x38\x20\xb8"
+			  "\x6c\xee\xae\x3e\xae\x6c\x03\xb8"
+			  "\x0b\xed\xc8\xaa\x0e\xc5\x1f\x90"
+			  "\x60\xe2\xec\x1b\x76\xd0\xcf\xda"
+			  "\x29\x1b\xb8\x5a\xbc\xf4\xba\x13"
+			  "\x91\xa6\xcb\x83\x3f\xeb\xe9\x7b"
+			  "\x03\xba\x40\x9e\xe6\x7a\xb2\x4a"
+			  "\x73\x49\xfc\xed\xfb\x55\xa4\x24"
+			  "\xc7\xa4\xd7\x4b\xf5\xf7\x16\x62"
+			  "\x80\xd3\x19\x31\x52\x25\xa8\x69"
+			  "\xda\x9a\x87\xf5\xf2\xee\x5d\x61"
+			  "\xc1\x12\x72\x3e\x52\x26\x45\x3a"
+			  "\xd8\x9d\x57\xfa\x14\xe2\x9b\x2f"
+			  "\xd4\xaa\x5e\x31\xf4\x84\x89\xa4"
+			  "\xe3\x0e\xb0\x58\x41\x75\x6a\xcb"
+			  "\x30\x01\x98\x90\x15\x80\xf5\x27"
+			  "\x92\x13\x81\xf0\x1c\x1e\xfc\xb1"
+			  "\x33\xf7\x63\xb0\x67\xec\x2e\x5c"
+			  "\x85\xe3\x5b\xd0\x43\x8a\xb8\x5f"
+			  "\x44\x9f\xec\x19\xc9\x8f\xde\xdf"
+			  "\x79\xef\xf8\xee\x14\x87\xb3\x34"
+			  "\x76\x00\x3a\x9b\xc7\xed\xb1\x3d"
+			  "\xef\x07\xb0\xe4\xfd\x68\x9e\xeb"
+			  "\xc2\xb4\x1a\x85\x9a\x7d\x11\x88"
+			  "\xf8\xab\x43\x55\x2b\x8a\x4f\x60"
+			  "\x85\x9a\xf4\xba\xae\x48\x81\xeb"
+			  "\x93\x07\x97\x9e\xde\x2a\xfc\x4e"
+			  "\x31\xde\xaa\x44\xf7\x2a\xc3\xee"
+			  "\x60\xa2\x98\x2c\x0a\x88\x50\xc5"
+			  "\x6d\x89\xd3\xe4\xb6\xa7\xf4\xb0"
+			  "\xcf\x0e\x89\xe3\x5e\x8f\x82\xf4"
+			  "\x9d\xd1\xa9\x51\x50\x8a\xd2\x18"
+			  "\x07\xb2\xaa\x3b\x7f\x58\x9b\xf4"
+			  "\xb7\x24\x39\xd3\x66\x2f\x1e\xc0"
+			  "\x11\xa3\x56\x56\x2a\x10\x73\xbc"
+			  "\xe1\x23\xbf\xa9\x37\x07\x9c\xc3"
+			  "\xb2\xc9\xa8\x1c\x5b\x5c\x58\xa4"
+			  "\x77\x02\x26\xad\xc3\x40\x11\x53"
+			  "\x93\x68\x72\xde\x05\x8b\x10\xbc"
+			  "\xa6\xd4\x1b\xd9\x27\xd8\x16\x12"
+			  "\x61\x2b\x31\x2a\x44\x87\x96\x58",
+		.len	= 496,
+	},
+};
+
+/* based on hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp */
+static const struct aead_testvec essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp[] = {
+	{
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xb3\x0c\x5a\x11\x41\xad\xc1\x04"
+			  "\xbc\x1e\x7e\x35\xb0\x5d\x78\x29",
+		.assoc	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\xb4\x22\xda\x80\x2c\x9f\xac\x41",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.plen	= 16,
+		.ctext	= "\xe3\x53\x77\x9c\x10\x79\xae\xb8"
+			  "\x27\x08\x94\x2d\xbe\x77\x18\x1a"
+			  "\xcc\xde\x2d\x6a\xae\xf1\x0b\xcc"
+			  "\x38\x06\x38\x51\xb4\xb8\xf3\x5b"
+			  "\x5c\x34\xa6\xa3\x6e\x0b\x05\xe5"
+			  "\x6a\x6d\x44\xaa\x26\xa8\x44\xa5",
+		.clen	= 16 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+			  "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\xe8\x14\xa5\x74\x18\x75\x13"
+			  "\x2f\x79\xe7\xc8\x65\xe3\x48\x45",
+		.assoc	= "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\xdd\xb3\xba\x69\x5a\x2e\x6f\x58",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.plen	= 32,
+		.ctext	= "\xd2\x96\xcd\x94\xc2\xcc\xcf\x8a"
+			  "\x3a\x86\x30\x28\xb5\xe1\xdc\x0a"
+			  "\x75\x86\x60\x2d\x25\x3c\xff\xf9"
+			  "\x1b\x82\x66\xbe\xa6\xd6\x1a\xb1"
+			  "\xf5\x33\x53\xf3\x68\x85\x2a\x99"
+			  "\x0e\x06\x58\x8f\xba\xf6\x06\xda"
+			  "\x49\x69\x0d\x5b\xd4\x36\x06\x62"
+			  "\x35\x5e\x54\x58\x53\x4d\xdf\xbf",
+		.clen	= 32 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x6c\x3e\xa0\x47\x76\x30\xce\x21"
+			  "\xa2\xce\x33\x4a\xa7\x46\xc2\xcd",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x1f\x6b\xfb\xd6\x6b\x72\x2f\xc9"
+			  "\xb6\x9f\x8c\x10\xa8\x96\x15\x64",
+		.assoc	= "\xc7\x82\xdc\x4c\x09\x8c\x66\xcb"
+			  "\xd9\xcd\x27\xd8\x25\x68\x2c\x81",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)",
+		.plen	= 48,
+		.ctext	= "\xd0\xa0\x2b\x38\x36\x45\x17\x53"
+			  "\xd4\x93\x66\x5d\x33\xf0\xe8\x86"
+			  "\x2d\xea\x54\xcd\xb2\x93\xab\xc7"
+			  "\x50\x69\x39\x27\x67\x72\xf8\xd5"
+			  "\x02\x1c\x19\x21\x6b\xad\x52\x5c"
+			  "\x85\x79\x69\x5d\x83\xba\x26\x84"
+			  "\x68\xb9\x3e\x90\x38\xa0\x88\x01"
+			  "\xe7\xc6\xce\x10\x31\x2f\x9b\x1d"
+			  "\x24\x78\xfb\xbe\x02\xe0\x4f\x40"
+			  "\x10\xbd\xaa\xc6\xa7\x79\xe0\x1a",
+		.clen	= 48 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x56\xe4\x7a\x38\xc5\x59\x89\x74"
+			  "\xbc\x46\x90\x3d\xba\x29\x03\x49",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x13\xe5\xf2\xef\x61\x97\x59\x35"
+			  "\x9b\x36\x84\x46\x4e\x63\xd1\x41",
+		.assoc	= "\x8c\xe8\x2e\xef\xbe\xa0\xda\x3c"
+			  "\x44\x69\x9e\xd7\xdb\x51\xb7\xd9",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7"
+			  "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"
+			  "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7"
+			  "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+			  "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7"
+			  "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+			  "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7"
+			  "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xc3\x0e\x32\xff\xed\xc0\x77\x4e"
+			  "\x6a\xff\x6a\xf0\x86\x9f\x71\xaa"
+			  "\x0f\x3a\xf0\x7a\x9a\x31\xa9\xc6"
+			  "\x84\xdb\x20\x7e\xb0\xef\x8e\x4e"
+			  "\x35\x90\x7a\xa6\x32\xc3\xff\xdf"
+			  "\x86\x8b\xb7\xb2\x9d\x3d\x46\xad"
+			  "\x83\xce\x9f\x9a\x10\x2e\xe9\x9d"
+			  "\x49\xa5\x3e\x87\xf4\xc3\xda\x55"
+			  "\x7a\x1b\xd4\x3c\xdb\x17\x95\xe2"
+			  "\xe0\x93\xec\xc9\x9f\xf7\xce\xd8"
+			  "\x3f\x54\xe2\x49\x39\xe3\x71\x25"
+			  "\x2b\x6c\xe9\x5d\xec\xec\x2b\x64",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x90\xd3\x82\xb4\x10\xee\xba\x7a"
+			  "\xd9\x38\xc4\x6c\xec\x1a\x82\xbf",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xe4\x13\xa1\x15\xe9\x6b\xb8\x23"
+			  "\x81\x7a\x94\x29\xab\xfd\xd2\x2c",
+		.assoc  = "\x00\x00\x43\x21\x00\x00\x00\x01"
+			  "\xe9\x6e\x8c\x08\xab\x46\x57\x63"
+			  "\xfd\x09\x8d\x45\xdd\x3f\xf8\x93",
+		.alen   = 24,
+		.ptext	= "\x08\x00\x0e\xbd\xa7\x0a\x00\x00"
+			  "\x8e\x9c\x08\x3d\xb9\x5b\x07\x00"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+			  "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0e\x01",
+		.plen	= 80,
+		.ctext	= "\xf6\x63\xc2\x5d\x32\x5c\x18\xc6"
+			  "\xa9\x45\x3e\x19\x4e\x12\x08\x49"
+			  "\xa4\x87\x0b\x66\xcc\x6b\x99\x65"
+			  "\x33\x00\x13\xb4\x89\x8d\xc8\x56"
+			  "\xa4\x69\x9e\x52\x3a\x55\xdb\x08"
+			  "\x0b\x59\xec\x3a\x8e\x4b\x7e\x52"
+			  "\x77\x5b\x07\xd1\xdb\x34\xed\x9c"
+			  "\x53\x8a\xb5\x0c\x55\x1b\x87\x4a"
+			  "\xa2\x69\xad\xd0\x47\xad\x2d\x59"
+			  "\x13\xac\x19\xb7\xcf\xba\xd4\xa6"
+			  "\xbb\xd4\x0f\xbe\xa3\x3b\x4c\xb8"
+			  "\x3a\xd2\xe1\x03\x86\xa5\x59\xb7"
+			  "\x73\xc3\x46\x20\x2c\xb1\xef\x68"
+			  "\xbb\x8a\x32\x7e\x12\x8c\x69\xcf",
+		.clen	= 80 + 32,
+       }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"            /* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x18"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 24,
+		.iv     = "\x49\xca\x41\xc9\x6b\xbf\x6c\x98"
+			  "\x38\x2f\xa7\x3d\x4d\x80\x49\xb0",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\x4f\x02\x1d\xb2\x43\xbc\x63\x3d"
+			  "\x71\x78\x18\x3a\x9f\xa0\x71\xe8"
+			  "\xb4\xd9\xad\xa9\xad\x7d\xed\xf4"
+			  "\xe5\xe7\x38\x76\x3f\x69\x14\x5a"
+			  "\x57\x1b\x24\x20\x12\xfb\x7a\xe0"
+			  "\x7f\xa9\xba\xac\x3d\xf1\x02\xe0"
+			  "\x08\xb0\xe2\x79\x88\x59\x88\x81"
+			  "\xd9\x20\xa9\xe6\x4f\x56\x15\xcd"
+			  "\x2f\xee\x5f\xdb\x66\xfe\x79\x09"
+			  "\x61\x81\x31\xea\x5b\x3d\x8e\xfb"
+			  "\xca\x71\x85\x93\xf7\x85\x55\x8b"
+			  "\x7a\xe4\x94\xca\x8b\xba\x19\x33",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x20"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 32,
+		.iv     = "\xdf\xab\xf2\x7c\xdc\xe0\x33\x4c"
+			  "\xf9\x75\xaf\xf9\x2f\x60\x3a\x9b",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xf5\x8c\x4c\x04\xd6\xe5\xf1\xba"
+			  "\x77\x9e\xab\xfb\x5f\x7b\xfb\xd6"
+			  "\x9c\xfc\x4e\x96\x7e\xdb\x80\x8d"
+			  "\x67\x9f\x77\x7b\xc6\x70\x2c\x7d"
+			  "\x39\xf2\x33\x69\xa9\xd9\xba\xcf"
+			  "\xa5\x30\xe2\x63\x04\x23\x14\x61"
+			  "\xb2\xeb\x05\xe2\xc3\x9b\xe9\xfc"
+			  "\xda\x6c\x19\x07\x8c\x6a\x9d\x1b"
+			  "\x24\x29\xed\xc2\x31\x49\xdb\xb1"
+			  "\x8f\x74\xbd\x17\x92\x03\xbe\x8f"
+			  "\xf3\x61\xde\x1c\xe9\xdb\xcd\xd0"
+			  "\xcc\xce\xe9\x85\x57\xcf\x6f\x5f",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	},
+};
+
 #endif	/* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 82 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index f0ceb545bd1e..11b85ce02d7a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -185,46 +185,64 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
-	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	unsigned int blocks;
 
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	struct skcipher_walk walk;
-	unsigned int blocks;
+	int err;
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
 
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+static int cbc_decrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int cts_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
 {
 	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct cts_cbc_req_ctx));
@@ -250,22 +268,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_encrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
@@ -315,22 +323,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_decrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 82 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index f0ceb545bd1e..11b85ce02d7a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -185,46 +185,64 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
-	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	unsigned int blocks;
 
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	struct skcipher_walk walk;
-	unsigned int blocks;
+	int err;
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
 
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+static int cbc_decrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int cts_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
 {
 	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct cts_cbc_req_ctx));
@@ -250,22 +268,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_encrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
@@ -315,22 +323,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_decrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 82 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index f0ceb545bd1e..11b85ce02d7a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -185,46 +185,64 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
-	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	unsigned int blocks;
 
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	struct skcipher_walk walk;
-	unsigned int blocks;
+	int err;
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
 
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+static int cbc_decrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int cts_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
 {
 	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct cts_cbc_req_ctx));
@@ -250,22 +268,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_encrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
@@ -315,22 +323,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_decrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256'
skcipher, which is used by fscrypt or dm-crypt on systems where
CBC mode is signficantly more performant than XTS mode (e.g., when
using a h/w accelerator which supports the former but not the latter)
This avoids a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 ++++-
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 11b85ce02d7a..7097739e7cd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		ce_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		ce_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		ce_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		ce_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -50,6 +53,8 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		neon_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		neon_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		neon_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		neon_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -93,6 +98,13 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
 				int rounds, int blocks, u32 const rk2[], u8 iv[],
 				int first);
 
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+
 asmlinkage void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
 			       int blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
 			       int enc_after);
@@ -108,6 +120,12 @@ struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
 };
 
+struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx {
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx key1;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+};
+
 struct mac_tfm_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx key;
 	u8 __aligned(8) consts[];
@@ -145,6 +163,31 @@ static int xts_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx->hash);
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key1, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	desc->tfm = ctx->hash;
+	crypto_shash_digest(desc, in_key, key_len, digest);
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key2, digest, sizeof(digest));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -359,6 +402,68 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->hash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctx->hash))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctx->hash);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_cbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(ctx->hash);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_enc, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_dec, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -502,6 +607,24 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt	= cts_cbc_encrypt,
 	.decrypt	= cts_cbc_decrypt,
 	.init		= cts_cbc_init_tfm,
+}, {
+	.base = {
+		.cra_name		= "__essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+		.cra_priority		= PRIO + 1,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey		= essiv_cbc_set_key,
+	.encrypt	= essiv_cbc_encrypt,
+	.decrypt	= essiv_cbc_decrypt,
+	.init		= essiv_cbc_init_tfm,
+	.exit		= essiv_cbc_exit_tfm,
 }, {
 	.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
index 3f60f7b152bf..c33a050c694c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
@@ -121,10 +121,25 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_ecb_decrypt)
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
 	 * aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
 	 */
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v4, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcencstart
+
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcencstart:
 	enc_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .Lcbcencloop4x:
@@ -156,13 +171,25 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	st1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* return iv */
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_encrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
+	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+	mov		x29, sp
+
+	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v7, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcdecstart
 
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
 	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov		x29, sp
 
 	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcdecstart:
 	dec_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .LcbcdecloopNx:
@@ -215,6 +242,7 @@ ST5(	st1		{v4.16b}, [x0], #16		)
 	ldp		x29, x30, [sp], #16
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_decrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
 
 
 	/*
@@ -294,7 +322,6 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_cts_decrypt)
 	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 	.previous
 
-
 	/*
 	 * aes_ctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 ctr[])
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256'
skcipher, which is used by fscrypt or dm-crypt on systems where
CBC mode is signficantly more performant than XTS mode (e.g., when
using a h/w accelerator which supports the former but not the latter)
This avoids a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 ++++-
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 11b85ce02d7a..7097739e7cd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		ce_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		ce_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		ce_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		ce_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -50,6 +53,8 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		neon_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		neon_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		neon_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		neon_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -93,6 +98,13 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
 				int rounds, int blocks, u32 const rk2[], u8 iv[],
 				int first);
 
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+
 asmlinkage void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
 			       int blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
 			       int enc_after);
@@ -108,6 +120,12 @@ struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
 };
 
+struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx {
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx key1;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+};
+
 struct mac_tfm_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx key;
 	u8 __aligned(8) consts[];
@@ -145,6 +163,31 @@ static int xts_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx->hash);
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key1, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	desc->tfm = ctx->hash;
+	crypto_shash_digest(desc, in_key, key_len, digest);
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key2, digest, sizeof(digest));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -359,6 +402,68 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->hash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctx->hash))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctx->hash);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_cbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(ctx->hash);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_enc, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_dec, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -502,6 +607,24 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt	= cts_cbc_encrypt,
 	.decrypt	= cts_cbc_decrypt,
 	.init		= cts_cbc_init_tfm,
+}, {
+	.base = {
+		.cra_name		= "__essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+		.cra_priority		= PRIO + 1,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey		= essiv_cbc_set_key,
+	.encrypt	= essiv_cbc_encrypt,
+	.decrypt	= essiv_cbc_decrypt,
+	.init		= essiv_cbc_init_tfm,
+	.exit		= essiv_cbc_exit_tfm,
 }, {
 	.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
index 3f60f7b152bf..c33a050c694c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
@@ -121,10 +121,25 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_ecb_decrypt)
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
 	 * aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
 	 */
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v4, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcencstart
+
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcencstart:
 	enc_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .Lcbcencloop4x:
@@ -156,13 +171,25 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	st1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* return iv */
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_encrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
+	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+	mov		x29, sp
+
+	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v7, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcdecstart
 
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
 	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov		x29, sp
 
 	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcdecstart:
 	dec_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .LcbcdecloopNx:
@@ -215,6 +242,7 @@ ST5(	st1		{v4.16b}, [x0], #16		)
 	ldp		x29, x30, [sp], #16
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_decrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
 
 
 	/*
@@ -294,7 +322,6 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_cts_decrypt)
 	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 	.previous
 
-
 	/*
 	 * aes_ctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 ctr[])
-- 
2.17.1

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v8 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
@ 2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-04 18:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, Ard Biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef, dm-devel, Milan Broz

Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256'
skcipher, which is used by fscrypt or dm-crypt on systems where
CBC mode is signficantly more performant than XTS mode (e.g., when
using a h/w accelerator which supports the former but not the latter)
This avoids a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 ++++-
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 11b85ce02d7a..7097739e7cd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		ce_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		ce_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		ce_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		ce_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -50,6 +53,8 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		neon_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		neon_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		neon_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		neon_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -93,6 +98,13 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
 				int rounds, int blocks, u32 const rk2[], u8 iv[],
 				int first);
 
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+
 asmlinkage void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
 			       int blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
 			       int enc_after);
@@ -108,6 +120,12 @@ struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
 };
 
+struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx {
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx key1;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+};
+
 struct mac_tfm_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx key;
 	u8 __aligned(8) consts[];
@@ -145,6 +163,31 @@ static int xts_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx->hash);
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key1, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	desc->tfm = ctx->hash;
+	crypto_shash_digest(desc, in_key, key_len, digest);
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key2, digest, sizeof(digest));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -359,6 +402,68 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->hash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctx->hash))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctx->hash);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_cbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(ctx->hash);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_enc, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_dec, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -502,6 +607,24 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt	= cts_cbc_encrypt,
 	.decrypt	= cts_cbc_decrypt,
 	.init		= cts_cbc_init_tfm,
+}, {
+	.base = {
+		.cra_name		= "__essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+		.cra_priority		= PRIO + 1,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey		= essiv_cbc_set_key,
+	.encrypt	= essiv_cbc_encrypt,
+	.decrypt	= essiv_cbc_decrypt,
+	.init		= essiv_cbc_init_tfm,
+	.exit		= essiv_cbc_exit_tfm,
 }, {
 	.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
index 3f60f7b152bf..c33a050c694c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
@@ -121,10 +121,25 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_ecb_decrypt)
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
 	 * aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
 	 */
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v4, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcencstart
+
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcencstart:
 	enc_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .Lcbcencloop4x:
@@ -156,13 +171,25 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	st1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* return iv */
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_encrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
+	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+	mov		x29, sp
+
+	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v7, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcdecstart
 
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
 	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov		x29, sp
 
 	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcdecstart:
 	dec_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .LcbcdecloopNx:
@@ -215,6 +242,7 @@ ST5(	st1		{v4.16b}, [x0], #16		)
 	ldp		x29, x30, [sp], #16
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_decrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
 
 
 	/*
@@ -294,7 +322,6 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_cts_decrypt)
 	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 	.previous
 
-
 	/*
 	 * aes_ctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 ctr[])
-- 
2.17.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
  2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-05  6:35   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-05  6:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, device-mapper development,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

On Thu, 4 Jul 2019 at 20:30, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
> transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
> (or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
> encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
> while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
> output IV.
>
> This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
> as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.
>
> Note to the maintainer: patches #2 .. #4 are against other subsystems, and
> so it might make sense to take only the crypto patches (#1, #5, and optionally
> #6 and #7) now, and allow the other subsystem maintainers to take the other
> patches at their leisure during the next cycle.
>

Please disregard #6 and #7 for now - the IV handling is busted after
the rebase to cryptodev/master. #1 and #5 should be fine though

Since I am obviously unsuccessful in cranking out these patches
without bugs in time before my leave, I am going to stop trying, and I
will get back to this work when I return from my leave, around the end
of September.


> This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
> (generic/549 *), as well as the mode-test scripts suggested by Milan for
> the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
> but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.
>
> * due to sloppiness on my part, the fscrypt change was actually broken
>   since I switched back to using full size IVs in the ESSIV template.
>   This time, I fixed this, and reran the test in question and it passed.
>
> The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
> encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
> encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
> the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
> equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
> this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.
>
> Changes since v7:
> - rebase onto cryptodev/master
> - drop change to ivsize in #2
> - add Milan's R-b's
>
> Changes since v6:
> - make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
>   if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
> - move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
>   and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
> - add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4
>
> Changes since v5:
> - drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
> - add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
> - make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
>   scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
>   performed, so don't optimize for it
> - clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)
>
> Changes since v4:
> - make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
>   cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
>   complicated the code for no reason
> - add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
> - add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
>   cipher name
> - reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
>   make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
>   methods)
> - fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
> - simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
>   (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)
>
> Changes since v3:
> - address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
> - use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
>   enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
> - fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
>   the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated
>
> Changes since v2:
> - fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
>   testing
> - some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
>   to align it with the aead one
> - add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
> - add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
>   derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine
>
> Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
> with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
> as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)
>
> Code can be found here
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8
>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
> Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
> Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
>
> Ard Biesheuvel (7):
>   crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
>   fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
>   md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
>   md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
>   crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
>   crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
>   crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
>
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
>  crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
>  crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
>  crypto/essiv.c                | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
>  crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
>  crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
>  drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 235 ++-----
>  fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
>  fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
>  fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
>  fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  93 +--
>  14 files changed, 1435 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-05  6:35   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-05  6:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development, Milan Broz

On Thu, 4 Jul 2019 at 20:30, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
> transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
> (or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
> encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
> while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
> output IV.
>
> This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
> as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.
>
> Note to the maintainer: patches #2 .. #4 are against other subsystems, and
> so it might make sense to take only the crypto patches (#1, #5, and optionally
> #6 and #7) now, and allow the other subsystem maintainers to take the other
> patches at their leisure during the next cycle.
>

Please disregard #6 and #7 for now - the IV handling is busted after
the rebase to cryptodev/master. #1 and #5 should be fine though

Since I am obviously unsuccessful in cranking out these patches
without bugs in time before my leave, I am going to stop trying, and I
will get back to this work when I return from my leave, around the end
of September.


> This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
> (generic/549 *), as well as the mode-test scripts suggested by Milan for
> the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
> but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.
>
> * due to sloppiness on my part, the fscrypt change was actually broken
>   since I switched back to using full size IVs in the ESSIV template.
>   This time, I fixed this, and reran the test in question and it passed.
>
> The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
> encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
> encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
> the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
> equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
> this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.
>
> Changes since v7:
> - rebase onto cryptodev/master
> - drop change to ivsize in #2
> - add Milan's R-b's
>
> Changes since v6:
> - make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
>   if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
> - move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
>   and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
> - add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4
>
> Changes since v5:
> - drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
> - add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
> - make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
>   scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
>   performed, so don't optimize for it
> - clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)
>
> Changes since v4:
> - make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
>   cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
>   complicated the code for no reason
> - add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
> - add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
>   cipher name
> - reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
>   make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
>   methods)
> - fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
> - simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
>   (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)
>
> Changes since v3:
> - address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
> - use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
>   enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
> - fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
>   the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated
>
> Changes since v2:
> - fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
>   testing
> - some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
>   to align it with the aead one
> - add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
> - add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
>   derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine
>
> Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
> with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
> as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)
>
> Code can be found here
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8
>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
> Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
> Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
>
> Ard Biesheuvel (7):
>   crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
>   fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
>   md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
>   md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
>   crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
>   crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
>   crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
>
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
>  crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
>  crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
>  crypto/essiv.c                | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
>  crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
>  crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
>  drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 235 ++-----
>  fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
>  fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
>  fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
>  fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  93 +--
>  14 files changed, 1435 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-05  6:35   ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-05  6:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development, Milan Broz

On Thu, 4 Jul 2019 at 20:30, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
> transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
> (or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
> encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
> while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
> output IV.
>
> This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
> as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.
>
> Note to the maintainer: patches #2 .. #4 are against other subsystems, and
> so it might make sense to take only the crypto patches (#1, #5, and optionally
> #6 and #7) now, and allow the other subsystem maintainers to take the other
> patches at their leisure during the next cycle.
>

Please disregard #6 and #7 for now - the IV handling is busted after
the rebase to cryptodev/master. #1 and #5 should be fine though

Since I am obviously unsuccessful in cranking out these patches
without bugs in time before my leave, I am going to stop trying, and I
will get back to this work when I return from my leave, around the end
of September.


> This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
> (generic/549 *), as well as the mode-test scripts suggested by Milan for
> the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
> but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.
>
> * due to sloppiness on my part, the fscrypt change was actually broken
>   since I switched back to using full size IVs in the ESSIV template.
>   This time, I fixed this, and reran the test in question and it passed.
>
> The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
> encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
> encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
> the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
> equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
> this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.
>
> Changes since v7:
> - rebase onto cryptodev/master
> - drop change to ivsize in #2
> - add Milan's R-b's
>
> Changes since v6:
> - make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
>   if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
> - move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
>   and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
> - add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4
>
> Changes since v5:
> - drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
> - add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
> - make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
>   scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
>   performed, so don't optimize for it
> - clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)
>
> Changes since v4:
> - make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
>   cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
>   complicated the code for no reason
> - add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
> - add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
>   cipher name
> - reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
>   make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
>   methods)
> - fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
> - simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
>   (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)
>
> Changes since v3:
> - address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
> - use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
>   enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
> - fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
>   the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated
>
> Changes since v2:
> - fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
>   testing
> - some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
>   to align it with the aead one
> - add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
> - add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
>   derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine
>
> Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
> with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
> as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)
>
> Code can be found here
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8
>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
> Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
> Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
>
> Ard Biesheuvel (7):
>   crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
>   fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
>   md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
>   md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
>   crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
>   crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
>   crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
>
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
>  crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
>  crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
>  crypto/essiv.c                | 640 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
>  crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
>  crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
>  drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 235 ++-----
>  fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
>  fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
>  fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
>  fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  93 +--
>  14 files changed, 1435 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-07-26  4:31     ` Herbert Xu
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-07-26  4:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: linux-crypto, ard.biesheuvel, ebiggers, dm-devel, linux-fscrypt,
	gilad, gmazyland

Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> + * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
> + * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
> + * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
> + * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
> + * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
> + * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
> + * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
> + * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
> + * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
> + * happens to use it.

IIRC only authenc is allowed in dm-crypt currently in conjunction
with ESSIV.  Does it ever allow a different hash algorithm in
authenc compared to the one used for ESSIV? IOW given

	essiv(authenc(hmac(X),cbc(Y)),Z,U)

is it currently possible for X != U or Y != Z? If not then let's
just make the algorithm name be essiv(Y,X).

Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.

Similary for the skcipher case, given

	essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)

is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
algorithm name essiv(X,Z).

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-26  4:31     ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-07-26  4:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: ebiggers, linux-fscrypt, gilad, dm-devel, linux-crypto, gmazyland

Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> + * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
> + * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
> + * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
> + * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
> + * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
> + * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
> + * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
> + * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
> + * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
> + * happens to use it.

IIRC only authenc is allowed in dm-crypt currently in conjunction
with ESSIV.  Does it ever allow a different hash algorithm in
authenc compared to the one used for ESSIV? IOW given

	essiv(authenc(hmac(X),cbc(Y)),Z,U)

is it currently possible for X != U or Y != Z? If not then let's
just make the algorithm name be essiv(Y,X).

Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.

Similary for the skcipher case, given

	essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)

is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
algorithm name essiv(X,Z).

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-26  4:31     ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-07-26  4:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: ebiggers, ard.biesheuvel, linux-fscrypt, gilad, dm-devel,
	linux-crypto, gmazyland

Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> + * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
> + * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
> + * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
> + * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
> + * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
> + * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
> + * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
> + * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
> + * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
> + * happens to use it.

IIRC only authenc is allowed in dm-crypt currently in conjunction
with ESSIV.  Does it ever allow a different hash algorithm in
authenc compared to the one used for ESSIV? IOW given

	essiv(authenc(hmac(X),cbc(Y)),Z,U)

is it currently possible for X != U or Y != Z? If not then let's
just make the algorithm name be essiv(Y,X).

Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.

Similary for the skcipher case, given

	essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)

is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
algorithm name essiv(X,Z).

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-07-26  4:31     ` [dm-devel] " Herbert Xu
  (?)
@ 2019-07-26  9:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-26  9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
	device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	Milan Broz

On Fri, 26 Jul 2019 at 07:31, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > + * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
> > + * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
> > + * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
> > + * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
> > + * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
> > + * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
> > + * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
> > + * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
> > + * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
> > + * happens to use it.
>
> IIRC only authenc is allowed in dm-crypt currently in conjunction
> with ESSIV.  Does it ever allow a different hash algorithm in
> authenc compared to the one used for ESSIV? IOW given
>
>         essiv(authenc(hmac(X),cbc(Y)),Z,U)
>
> is it currently possible for X != U or Y != Z? If not then let's
> just make the algorithm name be essiv(Y,X).
>

X and U are independent, since the dm-crypt userland API permits you
to specify both, and the only requirement is that the digest size of U
is a valid jey size for Z.

For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
used.

E.g., this could be

authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-chcr
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-iproc
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-caam-qi
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-ccree
safexcel-authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-picoxcell
qat_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-talitos

but also

authenc(..., cbc-ppc-spe))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-s390))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-ppc4xx))
authenc(..., artpec6-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-iproc))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam-qi))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam-qi2))
authenc(..., cavium-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., n5_cbc(aes)))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-geode))
authenc(..., hisi_sec_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., safexcel-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., mv-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-nx))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-padlock))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-picoxcell))
authenc(..., qat_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-sun4i-ss))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-talitos))
authenc(..., cbc-des-talitos))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-ux500))
authenc(..., virtio_crypto_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., p8_aes_cbc))

where the first one does not even have the cipher in its name.

So the only way to deal with this is to instantiate the AEAD and then
parse the name.

Unfortunately, this means that patch #3 in this series is broken,
since it assumes that we can infer authenc'ness from the user
specified cipher string.

> Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
>
> Similary for the skcipher case, given
>
>         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
>
> is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
>

Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.

Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
from a cra_driver_name?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-26  9:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-26  9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
	device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	Milan Broz

On Fri, 26 Jul 2019 at 07:31, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > + * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
> > + * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
> > + * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
> > + * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
> > + * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
> > + * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
> > + * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
> > + * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
> > + * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
> > + * happens to use it.
>
> IIRC only authenc is allowed in dm-crypt currently in conjunction
> with ESSIV.  Does it ever allow a different hash algorithm in
> authenc compared to the one used for ESSIV? IOW given
>
>         essiv(authenc(hmac(X),cbc(Y)),Z,U)
>
> is it currently possible for X != U or Y != Z? If not then let's
> just make the algorithm name be essiv(Y,X).
>

X and U are independent, since the dm-crypt userland API permits you
to specify both, and the only requirement is that the digest size of U
is a valid jey size for Z.

For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
used.

E.g., this could be

authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-chcr
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-iproc
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-caam-qi
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-ccree
safexcel-authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-picoxcell
qat_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-talitos

but also

authenc(..., cbc-ppc-spe))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-s390))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-ppc4xx))
authenc(..., artpec6-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-iproc))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam-qi))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam-qi2))
authenc(..., cavium-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., n5_cbc(aes)))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-geode))
authenc(..., hisi_sec_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., safexcel-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., mv-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-nx))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-padlock))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-picoxcell))
authenc(..., qat_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-sun4i-ss))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-talitos))
authenc(..., cbc-des-talitos))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-ux500))
authenc(..., virtio_crypto_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., p8_aes_cbc))

where the first one does not even have the cipher in its name.

So the only way to deal with this is to instantiate the AEAD and then
parse the name.

Unfortunately, this means that patch #3 in this series is broken,
since it assumes that we can infer authenc'ness from the user
specified cipher string.

> Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
>
> Similary for the skcipher case, given
>
>         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
>
> is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
>

Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.

Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
from a cra_driver_name?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-07-26  9:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-07-26  9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development,
	open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Milan Broz

On Fri, 26 Jul 2019 at 07:31, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > + * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
> > + * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
> > + * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
> > + * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
> > + * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
> > + * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
> > + * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
> > + * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
> > + * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
> > + * happens to use it.
>
> IIRC only authenc is allowed in dm-crypt currently in conjunction
> with ESSIV.  Does it ever allow a different hash algorithm in
> authenc compared to the one used for ESSIV? IOW given
>
>         essiv(authenc(hmac(X),cbc(Y)),Z,U)
>
> is it currently possible for X != U or Y != Z? If not then let's
> just make the algorithm name be essiv(Y,X).
>

X and U are independent, since the dm-crypt userland API permits you
to specify both, and the only requirement is that the digest size of U
is a valid jey size for Z.

For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
used.

E.g., this could be

authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-chcr
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-iproc
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-caam-qi
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-ccree
safexcel-authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-picoxcell
qat_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1
authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-talitos

but also

authenc(..., cbc-ppc-spe))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-s390))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-ppc4xx))
authenc(..., artpec6-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-iproc))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam-qi))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-caam-qi2))
authenc(..., cavium-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., n5_cbc(aes)))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-geode))
authenc(..., hisi_sec_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., safexcel-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., mv-cbc-aes))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-nx))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-padlock))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-picoxcell))
authenc(..., qat_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-sun4i-ss))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-talitos))
authenc(..., cbc-des-talitos))
authenc(..., cbc-aes-ux500))
authenc(..., virtio_crypto_aes_cbc))
authenc(..., p8_aes_cbc))

where the first one does not even have the cipher in its name.

So the only way to deal with this is to instantiate the AEAD and then
parse the name.

Unfortunately, this means that patch #3 in this series is broken,
since it assumes that we can infer authenc'ness from the user
specified cipher string.

> Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
>
> Similary for the skcipher case, given
>
>         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
>
> is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
>

Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.

Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
from a cra_driver_name?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-07-26  9:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-08-02  3:55         ` Herbert Xu
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-02  3:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
	device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	Milan Broz

On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:00:20PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
> permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
> we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
> used.

We don't really permit that.  It might work but it is certainly not
guaranteed to work.  The only thing we guarantee is that the
algorithm name and the canonical driver name will work.  For example,
with gcm you can either say gcm(aes) or gcm_base(drv_name1, drv_name2).

Anything else is not supported.

So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.

Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
for it in the template creation function.

What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
currently supported and no more.

> > Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> > than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
> >
> > Similary for the skcipher case, given
> >
> >         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
> >
> > is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> > algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
> >
> 
> Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.
> 
> Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
> from a cra_driver_name?

You don't need to do that.  Just copy whatever gcm does in its
creation function when you invoke it as gcm_base.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-02  3:55         ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-02  3:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development,
	open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Milan Broz

On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:00:20PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
> permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
> we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
> used.

We don't really permit that.  It might work but it is certainly not
guaranteed to work.  The only thing we guarantee is that the
algorithm name and the canonical driver name will work.  For example,
with gcm you can either say gcm(aes) or gcm_base(drv_name1, drv_name2).

Anything else is not supported.

So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.

Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
for it in the template creation function.

What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
currently supported and no more.

> > Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> > than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
> >
> > Similary for the skcipher case, given
> >
> >         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
> >
> > is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> > algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
> >
> 
> Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.
> 
> Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
> from a cra_driver_name?

You don't need to do that.  Just copy whatever gcm does in its
creation function when you invoke it as gcm_base.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-02  3:55         ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-02  3:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development,
	open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Milan Broz

On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:00:20PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
> For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
> permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
> we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
> used.

We don't really permit that.  It might work but it is certainly not
guaranteed to work.  The only thing we guarantee is that the
algorithm name and the canonical driver name will work.  For example,
with gcm you can either say gcm(aes) or gcm_base(drv_name1, drv_name2).

Anything else is not supported.

So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.

Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
for it in the template creation function.

What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
currently supported and no more.

> > Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> > than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
> >
> > Similary for the skcipher case, given
> >
> >         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
> >
> > is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> > algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
> >
> 
> Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.
> 
> Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
> from a cra_driver_name?

You don't need to do that.  Just copy whatever gcm does in its
creation function when you invoke it as gcm_base.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-08-02  3:55         ` [dm-devel] " Herbert Xu
  (?)
@ 2019-08-03  7:36           ` Ard Biesheuvel
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-03  7:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
	device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	Milan Broz

On Fri, 2 Aug 2019 at 06:55, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:00:20PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >
> > For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
> > permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
> > we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
> > used.
>
> We don't really permit that.  It might work but it is certainly not
> guaranteed to work.  The only thing we guarantee is that the
> algorithm name and the canonical driver name will work.  For example,
> with gcm you can either say gcm(aes) or gcm_base(drv_name1, drv_name2).
>
> Anything else is not supported.
>

Understood. But that is not the problem.

The problem is that we want to instantiate a cipher based on the
cipher algorithm that is encapsulated by the skcipher, and how that is
encoded in the name is not straightforward.

To use your GCM analogy: gcm_base(ctr-ppc-spe, ghash-generic) is a
supported aead identifier, but  there is nothing in the name that
identifies the skcipher as one that encapsulates AES.

> So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
> U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
> then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.
>

That might be a useful enhancement by itself, but it does not fix the
issue above. The only way to instantiate the same cipher as the one
encapsulated by "cbc-ppc-spe" is to instantiate the latter, parse the
cipher name and pass it to crypto_alloc_cipher()

> Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
> should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
> algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
> for it in the template creation function.
>
> What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
> currently supported and no more.
>

Yeah, that makes sense. But we have h/w drivers that instantiate
authenc(X,Y) in its entirety, and passing those driver names is
something that is supported today, so we can't just remove that.

> > > Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> > > than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
> > >
> > > Similary for the skcipher case, given
> > >
> > >         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
> > >
> > > is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> > > algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
> > >
> >
> > Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.
> >
> > Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
> > from a cra_driver_name?
>
> You don't need to do that.  Just copy whatever gcm does in its
> creation function when you invoke it as gcm_base.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-03  7:36           ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-03  7:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development,
	open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Milan Broz

On Fri, 2 Aug 2019 at 06:55, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:00:20PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >
> > For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
> > permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
> > we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
> > used.
>
> We don't really permit that.  It might work but it is certainly not
> guaranteed to work.  The only thing we guarantee is that the
> algorithm name and the canonical driver name will work.  For example,
> with gcm you can either say gcm(aes) or gcm_base(drv_name1, drv_name2).
>
> Anything else is not supported.
>

Understood. But that is not the problem.

The problem is that we want to instantiate a cipher based on the
cipher algorithm that is encapsulated by the skcipher, and how that is
encoded in the name is not straightforward.

To use your GCM analogy: gcm_base(ctr-ppc-spe, ghash-generic) is a
supported aead identifier, but  there is nothing in the name that
identifies the skcipher as one that encapsulates AES.

> So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
> U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
> then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.
>

That might be a useful enhancement by itself, but it does not fix the
issue above. The only way to instantiate the same cipher as the one
encapsulated by "cbc-ppc-spe" is to instantiate the latter, parse the
cipher name and pass it to crypto_alloc_cipher()

> Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
> should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
> algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
> for it in the template creation function.
>
> What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
> currently supported and no more.
>

Yeah, that makes sense. But we have h/w drivers that instantiate
authenc(X,Y) in its entirety, and passing those driver names is
something that is supported today, so we can't just remove that.

> > > Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> > > than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
> > >
> > > Similary for the skcipher case, given
> > >
> > >         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
> > >
> > > is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> > > algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
> > >
> >
> > Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.
> >
> > Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
> > from a cra_driver_name?
>
> You don't need to do that.  Just copy whatever gcm does in its
> creation function when you invoke it as gcm_base.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-03  7:36           ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-03  7:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Herbert Xu
  Cc: Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development,
	open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Milan Broz

On Fri, 2 Aug 2019 at 06:55, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:00:20PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >
> > For Y and Z, it is not straightforward either: since the crypto API
> > permits the use of driver names in addition to the plain CRA names,
> > we'd have to infer from the first parameter which cipher is being
> > used.
>
> We don't really permit that.  It might work but it is certainly not
> guaranteed to work.  The only thing we guarantee is that the
> algorithm name and the canonical driver name will work.  For example,
> with gcm you can either say gcm(aes) or gcm_base(drv_name1, drv_name2).
>
> Anything else is not supported.
>

Understood. But that is not the problem.

The problem is that we want to instantiate a cipher based on the
cipher algorithm that is encapsulated by the skcipher, and how that is
encoded in the name is not straightforward.

To use your GCM analogy: gcm_base(ctr-ppc-spe, ghash-generic) is a
supported aead identifier, but  there is nothing in the name that
identifies the skcipher as one that encapsulates AES.

> So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
> U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
> then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.
>

That might be a useful enhancement by itself, but it does not fix the
issue above. The only way to instantiate the same cipher as the one
encapsulated by "cbc-ppc-spe" is to instantiate the latter, parse the
cipher name and pass it to crypto_alloc_cipher()

> Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
> should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
> algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
> for it in the template creation function.
>
> What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
> currently supported and no more.
>

Yeah, that makes sense. But we have h/w drivers that instantiate
authenc(X,Y) in its entirety, and passing those driver names is
something that is supported today, so we can't just remove that.

> > > Because this is legacy stuff, I don't want it to support any more
> > > than what is currently being supported by dm-crypt.
> > >
> > > Similary for the skcipher case, given
> > >
> > >         essiv(cbc(X),Y,Z)
> > >
> > > is it ever possible for X != Y? If not then we should just make the
> > > algorithm name essiv(X,Z).
> > >
> >
> > Same problem. We'd need to instantiate the skcipher and parse the cra_name.
> >
> > Perhaps we should introduce a crypto API call that infers the cra_name
> > from a cra_driver_name?
>
> You don't need to do that.  Just copy whatever gcm does in its
> creation function when you invoke it as gcm_base.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-08-03  7:36           ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
  (?)
@ 2019-08-15  2:30             ` Herbert Xu
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-15  2:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
	device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	Milan Broz

On Sat, Aug 03, 2019 at 10:36:44AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> 
> To use your GCM analogy: gcm_base(ctr-ppc-spe, ghash-generic) is a
> supported aead identifier, but  there is nothing in the name that
> identifies the skcipher as one that encapsulates AES.

I would've thought that you would first grab (literally :) ahold
of ctr-ppc-spe, at which point you could query its cra_name and then
derive AES from that.  Is that going to be a problem?

> > So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
> > U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
> > then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.
> >
> 
> That might be a useful enhancement by itself, but it does not fix the
> issue above. The only way to instantiate the same cipher as the one
> encapsulated by "cbc-ppc-spe" is to instantiate the latter, parse the
> cipher name and pass it to crypto_alloc_cipher()

That's pretty much what I'm suggesting.  Except that I would point
out that you don't need to instantiate it (i.e., allocate a tfm),
you just need to grab ahold of the algorithm object.

The actual allocation of the AES cipher can be done in the cra_init
function.

We only need to grab algorithms that form a core part of the
resultant instance.  IOW, if the underlying algorithm is replaced,
you would always recreate the instance on top of it.  This is not
the case with AES here, since it's just used for a very small part
in the instance and we don't really care about recreating the essiv
intance when the block AES algorithm changes.

> > Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
> > should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
> > algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
> > for it in the template creation function.
> >
> > What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
> > currently supported and no more.
> >
> 
> Yeah, that makes sense. But we have h/w drivers that instantiate
> authenc(X,Y) in its entirety, and passing those driver names is
> something that is supported today, so we can't just remove that.

Sure, we only need to impose a restriction on the cra_name, not
on the driver name.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-15  2:30             ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-15  2:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Eric Biggers,
	device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	Milan Broz

On Sat, Aug 03, 2019 at 10:36:44AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> 
> To use your GCM analogy: gcm_base(ctr-ppc-spe, ghash-generic) is a
> supported aead identifier, but  there is nothing in the name that
> identifies the skcipher as one that encapsulates AES.

I would've thought that you would first grab (literally :) ahold
of ctr-ppc-spe, at which point you could query its cra_name and then
derive AES from that.  Is that going to be a problem?

> > So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
> > U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
> > then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.
> >
> 
> That might be a useful enhancement by itself, but it does not fix the
> issue above. The only way to instantiate the same cipher as the one
> encapsulated by "cbc-ppc-spe" is to instantiate the latter, parse the
> cipher name and pass it to crypto_alloc_cipher()

That's pretty much what I'm suggesting.  Except that I would point
out that you don't need to instantiate it (i.e., allocate a tfm),
you just need to grab ahold of the algorithm object.

The actual allocation of the AES cipher can be done in the cra_init
function.

We only need to grab algorithms that form a core part of the
resultant instance.  IOW, if the underlying algorithm is replaced,
you would always recreate the instance on top of it.  This is not
the case with AES here, since it's just used for a very small part
in the instance and we don't really care about recreating the essiv
intance when the block AES algorithm changes.

> > Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
> > should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
> > algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
> > for it in the template creation function.
> >
> > What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
> > currently supported and no more.
> >
> 
> Yeah, that makes sense. But we have h/w drivers that instantiate
> authenc(X,Y) in its entirety, and passing those driver names is
> something that is supported today, so we can't just remove that.

Sure, we only need to impose a restriction on the cra_name, not
on the driver name.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-15  2:30             ` Herbert Xu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 42+ messages in thread
From: Herbert Xu @ 2019-08-15  2:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: Eric Biggers, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef,
	device-mapper development,
	open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Milan Broz

On Sat, Aug 03, 2019 at 10:36:44AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> 
> To use your GCM analogy: gcm_base(ctr-ppc-spe, ghash-generic) is a
> supported aead identifier, but  there is nothing in the name that
> identifies the skcipher as one that encapsulates AES.

I would've thought that you would first grab (literally :) ahold
of ctr-ppc-spe, at which point you could query its cra_name and then
derive AES from that.  Is that going to be a problem?

> > So I would envisage something similar for essiv where essiv just has
> > U, X and Y (as you said that U and X are independent) while you can
> > then have an essiv_base that spells everything out in detail.
> >
> 
> That might be a useful enhancement by itself, but it does not fix the
> issue above. The only way to instantiate the same cipher as the one
> encapsulated by "cbc-ppc-spe" is to instantiate the latter, parse the
> cipher name and pass it to crypto_alloc_cipher()

That's pretty much what I'm suggesting.  Except that I would point
out that you don't need to instantiate it (i.e., allocate a tfm),
you just need to grab ahold of the algorithm object.

The actual allocation of the AES cipher can be done in the cra_init
function.

We only need to grab algorithms that form a core part of the
resultant instance.  IOW, if the underlying algorithm is replaced,
you would always recreate the instance on top of it.  This is not
the case with AES here, since it's just used for a very small part
in the instance and we don't really care about recreating the essiv
intance when the block AES algorithm changes.

> > Also, do we allow anything other than HMAC for X? If not then that
> > should be encoded either into the name by dropping the hmac in the
> > algorithm name and adding it through the driver name, or by checking
> > for it in the template creation function.
> >
> > What I'd like to achieve is a state where we support only what is
> > currently supported and no more.
> >
> 
> Yeah, that makes sense. But we have h/w drivers that instantiate
> authenc(X,Y) in its entirety, and passing those driver names is
> something that is supported today, so we can't just remove that.

Sure, we only need to impose a restriction on the cra_name, not
on the driver name.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 42+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-08-15  2:31 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-07-04 18:30 [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-26  4:31   ` Herbert Xu
2019-07-26  4:31     ` Herbert Xu
2019-07-26  4:31     ` [dm-devel] " Herbert Xu
2019-07-26  9:00     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-26  9:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-26  9:00       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-02  3:55       ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-02  3:55         ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-02  3:55         ` [dm-devel] " Herbert Xu
2019-08-03  7:36         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-03  7:36           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-03  7:36           ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-15  2:30           ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-15  2:30             ` Herbert Xu
2019-08-15  2:30             ` Herbert Xu
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 3/7] md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 4/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256) Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [PATCH v8 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes), aes, sha256) Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30 ` [PATCH v8 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-04 18:30   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-05  6:35 ` [PATCH v8 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-05  6:35   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-07-05  6:35   ` [dm-devel] " Ard Biesheuvel

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