* [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
@ 2019-07-23 6:50 Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-07-23 22:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Ondrej Mosnacek @ 2019-07-23 6:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: selinux, Paul Moore
Cc: NitinGote, kernel-hardening, Kees Cook, William Roberts
We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
happens.
Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
++count;
}
+ /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
+ rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+ if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
/* insert context into new entry */
rc = -ENOMEM;
dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
2019-07-23 6:50 [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry Ondrej Mosnacek
@ 2019-07-23 22:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2019-07-23 22:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ondrej Mosnacek
Cc: selinux, Paul Moore, NitinGote, kernel-hardening, William Roberts
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 08:50:59AM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
> sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
> happens.
>
> Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
> ++count;
> }
>
> + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
> + rc = -EOVERFLOW;
> + if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> /* insert context into new entry */
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
> --
> 2.21.0
>
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
2019-07-23 6:50 [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry Ondrej Mosnacek
@ 2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2019-07-24 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ondrej Mosnacek
Cc: selinux, NitinGote, kernel-hardening, Kees Cook, William Roberts
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:51 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
> sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
> happens.
>
> Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Thanks. This looks like -stable material to me so I've marked it as
such and merged it into selinux/stable-5.3; assuming it passes
testing, and as long as I don't hear any objections, I'll send it up
to Linus later this week.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
> ++count;
> }
>
> + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
> + rc = -EOVERFLOW;
> + if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> /* insert context into new entry */
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
> --
> 2.21.0
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
@ 2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2019-07-24 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ondrej Mosnacek
Cc: selinux, NitinGote, kernel-hardening, Kees Cook, William Roberts
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:51 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
> sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
> happens.
>
> Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Thanks. This looks like -stable material to me so I've marked it as
such and merged it into selinux/stable-5.3; assuming it passes
testing, and as long as I don't hear any objections, I'll send it up
to Linus later this week.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
> ++count;
> }
>
> + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
> + rc = -EOVERFLOW;
> + if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> /* insert context into new entry */
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
> --
> 2.21.0
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-07-24 15:19 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2019-07-23 6:50 [PATCH v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-07-23 22:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
2019-07-24 15:18 ` Paul Moore
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