* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 1/5] domain: remove 'guest_type' field (and enum guest_type)
2019-07-30 13:18 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/5] use stashed domain create flags Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-30 13:18 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/hvm/domain: remove the 'hap_enabled' flag Paul Durrant
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-30 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan,
Julien Grall, Paul Durrant, Jan Beulich, Roger Pau Monné
The enum guest_type was introduced in commit 6c6492780ea "pvh prep:
introduce pv guest type and has_hvm_container macros" to allow a new guest
type, distinct from either PV or HVM guest types, to be added in commit
8271d6522c6 "pvh: introduce PVH guest type". Subsequently, commit
33e5c32559e "x86: remove PVHv1 code" removed this third guest type.
This patch removes the struct domain field and enumeration as the guest
type can now be trivially determined from the 'options' field.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
v3:
- Change !evaluate_nospec(cond) to evaluate_nospec(!cond)
---
xen/common/domain.c | 4 ----
xen/common/domctl.c | 10 +---------
xen/common/kernel.c | 9 ++-------
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 13 ++++---------
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 9aefc2a680..df523c9ce4 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -353,10 +353,6 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
hardware_domain = d;
}
- /* Sort out our idea of is_{pv,hvm}_domain(). All system domains are PV. */
- d->guest_type = ((d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm_guest)
- ? guest_type_hvm : guest_type_pv);
-
TRACE_1D(TRC_DOM0_DOM_ADD, d->domain_id);
/*
diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
index fa260ce5fb..3d937434af 100644
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -187,17 +187,9 @@ void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info)
(d->controller_pause_count > 0 ? XEN_DOMINF_paused : 0) |
(d->debugger_attached ? XEN_DOMINF_debugged : 0) |
(d->is_xenstore ? XEN_DOMINF_xs_domain : 0) |
+ (is_hvm_domain(d) ? XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest : 0) |
d->shutdown_code << XEN_DOMINF_shutdownshift;
- switch ( d->guest_type )
- {
- case guest_type_hvm:
- info->flags |= XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
xsm_security_domaininfo(d, info);
info->tot_pages = d->tot_pages;
diff --git a/xen/common/kernel.c b/xen/common/kernel.c
index 612575430f..f7628d73ce 100644
--- a/xen/common/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/common/kernel.c
@@ -474,19 +474,14 @@ DO(xen_version)(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_ARM_SMCCC_supported);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
- switch ( d->guest_type )
- {
- case guest_type_pv:
+ if ( is_pv_domain(d) )
fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad) |
(1U << XENFEAT_highmem_assist) |
(1U << XENFEAT_gnttab_map_avail_bits);
- break;
- case guest_type_hvm:
+ else
fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock) |
(1U << XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector) |
(has_pirq(d) ? (1U << XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs) : 0);
- break;
- }
#endif
break;
default:
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 7f4747e154..2e6e0d3488 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -302,10 +302,6 @@ struct vm_event_domain
struct evtchn_port_ops;
-enum guest_type {
- guest_type_pv, guest_type_hvm
-};
-
struct domain
{
domid_t domain_id;
@@ -356,7 +352,6 @@ struct domain
struct radix_tree_root pirq_tree;
unsigned int nr_pirqs;
- enum guest_type guest_type;
unsigned int options; /* copy of createdomain flags */
/* Is this guest dying (i.e., a zombie)? */
@@ -918,8 +913,8 @@ void watchdog_domain_destroy(struct domain *d);
static inline bool is_pv_domain(const struct domain *d)
{
- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV)
- ? evaluate_nospec(d->guest_type == guest_type_pv) : false;
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) &&
+ evaluate_nospec(!(d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm_guest));
}
static inline bool is_pv_vcpu(const struct vcpu *v)
@@ -950,8 +945,8 @@ static inline bool is_pv_64bit_vcpu(const struct vcpu *v)
#endif
static inline bool is_hvm_domain(const struct domain *d)
{
- return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM)
- ? evaluate_nospec(d->guest_type == guest_type_hvm) : false;
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) &&
+ evaluate_nospec(d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm_guest);
}
static inline bool is_hvm_vcpu(const struct vcpu *v)
--
2.20.1.2.gb21ebb671
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/hvm/domain: remove the 'hap_enabled' flag
2019-07-30 13:18 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/5] use stashed domain create flags Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 1/5] domain: remove 'guest_type' field (and enum guest_type) Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-30 13:18 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:40 ` Jan Beulich
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/domain: remove the 'oos_off' flag Paul Durrant
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-30 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan,
Julien Grall, Paul Durrant, Jan Beulich, Roger Pau Monné
The hap_enabled() macro can determine whether the feature is available
using the domain 'options'; there is no need for a separate flag.
NOTE: Furthermore, by extending sanitiziing of the domain 'options', the
macro can be transformed into an inline function and re-located to
xen/sched.h. This also makes hap_enabled() common, thus allowing
removal of an ugly ifdef CONFIG_X86 from the common iommu code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
---
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
v4:
- Add missing perentheses and move hap_enabled()
v3:
- Re-worked as suggested by Jan
- Not adding Roger's R-b as the patch has changed substantially
v2:
- Defer changes to shadow_domain_init() to patch #4
---
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 13 +++++++------
xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c | 4 ++--
xen/common/domain.c | 7 +++++++
xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c | 2 --
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h | 7 -------
xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h | 2 +-
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 5 +++++
7 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index 5933b3f51b..87b4c033d6 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -460,6 +460,12 @@ int arch_sanitise_domain_config(struct xen_domctl_createdomain *config)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( (config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap) && !hvm_hap_supported() )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "HAP enabled but not supported\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -564,12 +570,7 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d,
HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d) =
is_pv_domain(d) ? __HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START : ~0u;
- /* Need to determine if HAP is enabled before initialising paging */
- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) )
- d->arch.hvm.hap_enabled =
- hvm_hap_supported() && (config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap);
-
- if ( (rc = paging_domain_init(d, config->flags)) != 0 )
+ if ( (rc = paging_domain_init(d)) != 0 )
goto fail;
paging_initialised = true;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
index 011089368a..097a27f608 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ void paging_log_dirty_init(struct domain *d, const struct log_dirty_ops *ops)
/* CODE FOR PAGING SUPPORT */
/************************************************/
/* Domain paging struct initialization. */
-int paging_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags)
+int paging_domain_init(struct domain *d)
{
int rc;
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ int paging_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags)
if ( hap_enabled(d) )
hap_domain_init(d);
else
- rc = shadow_domain_init(d, domcr_flags);
+ rc = shadow_domain_init(d, d->options);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index df523c9ce4..36b38e1b2e 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -313,6 +313,13 @@ static int sanitise_domain_config(struct xen_domctl_createdomain *config)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( !(config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm_guest) &&
+ (config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap) )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "HAP enabled for non-HVM guest\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
return arch_sanitise_domain_config(config);
}
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
index f8c3bf53bd..37eb0f7d01 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
@@ -573,9 +573,7 @@ int iommu_do_domctl(
void iommu_share_p2m_table(struct domain* d)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
ASSERT(hap_enabled(d));
-#endif
/*
* iommu_use_hap_pt(d) cannot be used here because during domain
* construction need_iommu(d) will always return false here.
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
index 6c7c4f5aa6..bcc5621797 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
@@ -156,7 +156,6 @@ struct hvm_domain {
struct viridian_domain *viridian;
- bool_t hap_enabled;
bool_t mem_sharing_enabled;
bool_t qemu_mapcache_invalidate;
bool_t is_s3_suspended;
@@ -195,12 +194,6 @@ struct hvm_domain {
};
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
-#define hap_enabled(d) (is_hvm_domain(d) && (d)->arch.hvm.hap_enabled)
-#else
-#define hap_enabled(d) ({(void)(d); false;})
-#endif
-
#endif /* __ASM_X86_HVM_DOMAIN_H__ */
/*
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
index cf57ca708d..ab7887f23c 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/paging.h
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ void paging_vcpu_init(struct vcpu *v);
/* Set up the paging-assistance-specific parts of a domain struct at
* start of day. Called for every domain from arch_domain_create() */
-int paging_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags);
+int paging_domain_init(struct domain *d);
/* Handler for paging-control ops: operations from user-space to enable
* and disable ephemeral shadow modes (test mode and log-dirty mode) and
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 2e6e0d3488..cfe4f375e5 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -954,6 +954,11 @@ static inline bool is_hvm_vcpu(const struct vcpu *v)
return is_hvm_domain(v->domain);
}
+static inline bool hap_enabled(const struct domain *d)
+{
+ return evaluate_nospec(d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap);
+}
+
static inline bool is_hwdom_pinned_vcpu(const struct vcpu *v)
{
return (is_hardware_domain(v->domain) &&
--
2.20.1.2.gb21ebb671
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Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/hvm/domain: remove the 'hap_enabled' flag
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/hvm/domain: remove the 'hap_enabled' flag Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-30 13:40 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2019-07-30 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Durrant
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, TimDeegan,
Julien Grall, xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné
On 30.07.2019 15:18, Paul Durrant wrote:
> The hap_enabled() macro can determine whether the feature is available
> using the domain 'options'; there is no need for a separate flag.
>
> NOTE: Furthermore, by extending sanitiziing of the domain 'options', the
> macro can be transformed into an inline function and re-located to
> xen/sched.h. This also makes hap_enabled() common, thus allowing
> removal of an ugly ifdef CONFIG_X86 from the common iommu code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/domain: remove the 'oos_off' flag
2019-07-30 13:18 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/5] use stashed domain create flags Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 1/5] domain: remove 'guest_type' field (and enum guest_type) Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/hvm/domain: remove the 'hap_enabled' flag Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-30 13:18 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] domain: remove the 'is_xenstore' flag Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/domain: remove the 's3_integrity' flag Paul Durrant
4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-30 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Wei Liu, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Tim Deegan, Paul Durrant,
Jan Beulich, Roger Pau Monné
The flag is not needed since the domain 'options' can now be tested
directly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
v3:
- Force 'oos_off' to be set for PV guests (to avoid call to
is_hvm_domain() except in ASSERT)
- Dropped Tim's A-b because of the change
v2:
- Move some of the hunks from patch #3
- Also update the definition of shadow_domain_init() in none.c
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 7 ++++---
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/none.c | 2 +-
xen/common/domain.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 1 -
xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h | 2 +-
6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
index 097a27f608..69aa228e46 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/paging.c
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ int paging_domain_init(struct domain *d)
if ( hap_enabled(d) )
hap_domain_init(d);
else
- rc = shadow_domain_init(d, d->options);
+ rc = shadow_domain_init(d);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
index fa18de0bb6..1187176993 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static void sh_clean_dirty_bitmap(struct domain *);
/* Set up the shadow-specific parts of a domain struct at start of day.
* Called for every domain from arch_domain_create() */
-int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags)
+int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d)
{
static const struct log_dirty_ops sh_ops = {
.enable = sh_enable_log_dirty,
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags)
#if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC)
d->arch.paging.shadow.oos_active = 0;
- d->arch.paging.shadow.oos_off = domcr_flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_oos_off;
#endif
d->arch.paging.shadow.pagetable_dying_op = 0;
@@ -2523,11 +2522,13 @@ static void sh_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
#if (SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_OUT_OF_SYNC)
/* We need to check that all the vcpus have paging enabled to
* unsync PTs. */
- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) && !d->arch.paging.shadow.oos_off )
+ if ( !(d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_oos_off) )
{
int pe = 1;
struct vcpu *vptr;
+ ASSERT(is_hvm_domain(d));
+
for_each_vcpu(d, vptr)
{
if ( !hvm_paging_enabled(vptr) )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/none.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/none.c
index a70888bd98..2fddf4274c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/none.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/none.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static void _clean_dirty_bitmap(struct domain *d)
ASSERT(is_pv_domain(d));
}
-int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags)
+int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d)
{
static const struct log_dirty_ops sh_none_ops = {
.enable = _enable_log_dirty,
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 36b38e1b2e..2df908285b 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -313,11 +313,19 @@ static int sanitise_domain_config(struct xen_domctl_createdomain *config)
return -EINVAL;
}
- if ( !(config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm_guest) &&
- (config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap) )
+ if ( !(config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hvm_guest) )
{
- dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "HAP enabled for non-HVM guest\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ if ( config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "HAP enabled for non-HVM guest\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It is only meaningful for XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_oos_off to be clear
+ * for HVM guests.
+ */
+ config->flags |= XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_oos_off;
}
return arch_sanitise_domain_config(config);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index 933b85901f..5f9899469c 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ struct shadow_domain {
/* OOS */
bool_t oos_active;
- bool_t oos_off;
/* Has this domain ever used HVMOP_pagetable_dying? */
bool_t pagetable_dying_op;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
index f29f0f652b..8ebb89c027 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/shadow.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
/* Set up the shadow-specific parts of a domain struct at start of day.
* Called from paging_domain_init(). */
-int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags);
+int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d);
/* Setup the shadow-specific parts of a vcpu struct. It is called by
* paging_vcpu_init() in paging.c */
--
2.20.1.2.gb21ebb671
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] domain: remove the 'is_xenstore' flag
2019-07-30 13:18 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/5] use stashed domain create flags Paul Durrant
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 3/5] x86/domain: remove the 'oos_off' flag Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-30 13:18 ` Paul Durrant
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/domain: remove the 's3_integrity' flag Paul Durrant
4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-30 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan,
Julien Grall, Paul Durrant, Jan Beulich, Daniel De Graaf,
Roger Pau Monné
This patch introduces a convenience macro, is_xenstore_domain(), which
tests the domain 'options' directly and then uses that in place of
the 'is_xenstore' flag.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Cc: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
v2:
- Set 'disable_migrate' to true rather 1
---
xen/common/domain.c | 9 +++------
xen/common/domctl.c | 2 +-
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 7 +++++--
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 2 +-
4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 2df908285b..9b70626753 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
if ( hardware_domid < 0 || hardware_domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
panic("The value of hardware_dom must be a valid domain ID\n");
- d->disable_migrate = 1;
+ d->disable_migrate = true;
old_hwdom = hardware_domain;
hardware_domain = d;
}
@@ -442,11 +442,8 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
watchdog_domain_init(d);
init_status |= INIT_watchdog;
- if ( d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_xs_domain )
- {
- d->is_xenstore = 1;
- d->disable_migrate = 1;
- }
+ if ( is_xenstore_domain(d) )
+ d->disable_migrate = true;
d->iomem_caps = rangeset_new(d, "I/O Memory", RANGESETF_prettyprint_hex);
d->irq_caps = rangeset_new(d, "Interrupts", 0);
diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
index 3d937434af..6436f8b287 100644
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ void getdomaininfo(struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info)
(d->is_shut_down ? XEN_DOMINF_shutdown : 0) |
(d->controller_pause_count > 0 ? XEN_DOMINF_paused : 0) |
(d->debugger_attached ? XEN_DOMINF_debugged : 0) |
- (d->is_xenstore ? XEN_DOMINF_xs_domain : 0) |
+ (is_xenstore_domain(d) ? XEN_DOMINF_xs_domain : 0) |
(is_hvm_domain(d) ? XEN_DOMINF_hvm_guest : 0) |
d->shutdown_code << XEN_DOMINF_shutdownshift;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index cfe4f375e5..a62161cc54 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ struct domain
bool is_privileged;
/* Can this guest access the Xen console? */
bool is_console;
- /* Is this a xenstore domain (not dom0)? */
- bool is_xenstore;
/* Non-migratable and non-restoreable? */
bool disable_migrate;
/* Is this guest being debugged by dom0? */
@@ -978,6 +976,11 @@ static inline bool is_vcpu_online(const struct vcpu *v)
return !test_bit(_VPF_down, &v->pause_flags);
}
+static inline bool is_xenstore_domain(const struct domain *d)
+{
+ return d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_xs_domain;
+}
+
extern bool sched_smt_power_savings;
extern enum cpufreq_controller {
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index ef52bb1764..b8e185e6fa 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
{
return 0;
case XSM_XS_PRIV:
- if ( src->is_xenstore )
+ if ( is_xenstore_domain(src) )
return 0;
}
/* fall through */
--
2.20.1.2.gb21ebb671
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 5/5] x86/domain: remove the 's3_integrity' flag
2019-07-30 13:18 [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 0/5] use stashed domain create flags Paul Durrant
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-07-30 13:18 ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] domain: remove the 'is_xenstore' flag Paul Durrant
@ 2019-07-30 13:18 ` Paul Durrant
4 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Paul Durrant @ 2019-07-30 13:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Paul Durrant, Wei Liu, Jan Beulich, Roger Pau Monné
The flag is not needed since the domain 'options' can now be tested
directly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
v4:
- s/TBOOT/CONFIG_TBOOT/g
v3:
- Also sanitise the flag against CONFIG_TBOOT being set
---
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 9 +++++++--
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/tboot.c | 2 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 2 --
4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index 87b4c033d6..fbc70b9f94 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -466,6 +466,13 @@ int arch_sanitise_domain_config(struct xen_domctl_createdomain *config)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( (config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_s3_integrity) &&
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TBOOT) )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "S3 integrity check not valid without CONFIG_TBOOT\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -544,8 +551,6 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d,
d->domain_id);
}
- d->arch.s3_integrity = config->flags & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_s3_integrity;
-
emflags = config->arch.emulation_flags;
if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && is_pv_domain(d) )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index d2011910fa..277170f386 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
.stop_bits = 1
};
struct xen_domctl_createdomain dom0_cfg = {
- .flags = XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_s3_integrity,
+ .flags = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TBOOT) ? XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_s3_integrity : 0,
.max_evtchn_port = -1,
.max_grant_frames = opt_max_grant_frames,
.max_maptrack_frames = opt_max_maptrack_frames,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
index f3fdee4d39..3db8a8a8d8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/tboot.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void tboot_gen_domain_integrity(const uint8_t key[TB_KEY_SIZE],
vmac_set_key((uint8_t *)key, &ctx);
for_each_domain( d )
{
- if ( !d->arch.s3_integrity )
+ if ( !(d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_s3_integrity) )
continue;
printk("MACing Domain %u\n", d->domain_id);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index 5f9899469c..5c038a1065 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -295,8 +295,6 @@ struct arch_domain
uint32_t pci_cf8;
uint8_t cmos_idx;
- bool_t s3_integrity;
-
union {
struct pv_domain pv;
struct hvm_domain hvm;
--
2.20.1.2.gb21ebb671
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread