From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>, "Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jann Horn" <jann@thejh.net>, "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@chromium.org>, "Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>, "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, "Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>, "Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, "Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>, "Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>, bpf@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v13 4/7] landlock: Add ptrace LSM hooks Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 11:34:47 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20191105193446.s4pswwwhrmgk6hcx@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <23acf523-dbc4-855b-ca49-2bbfa5e7117e@digikod.net> On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 07:01:41PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 05/11/2019 18:18, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 06:21:43PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > >> Add a first Landlock hook that can be used to enforce a security policy > >> or to audit some process activities. For a sandboxing use-case, it is > >> needed to inform the kernel if a task can legitimately debug another. > >> ptrace(2) can also be used by an attacker to impersonate another task > >> and remain undetected while performing malicious activities. > >> > >> Using ptrace(2) and related features on a target process can lead to a > >> privilege escalation. A sandboxed task must then be able to tell the > >> kernel if another task is more privileged, via ptrace_may_access(). > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > > ... > >> +static int check_ptrace(struct landlock_domain *domain, > >> + struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) > >> +{ > >> + struct landlock_hook_ctx_ptrace ctx_ptrace = { > >> + .prog_ctx = { > >> + .tracer = (uintptr_t)tracer, > >> + .tracee = (uintptr_t)tracee, > >> + }, > >> + }; > > > > So you're passing two kernel pointers obfuscated as u64 into bpf program > > yet claiming that the end goal is to make landlock unprivileged?! > > The most basic security hole in the tool that is aiming to provide security. > > How could you used these pointers without dedicated BPF helpers? This > context items are typed as PTR_TO_TASK and can't be used without a > dedicated helper able to deal with ARG_PTR_TO_TASK. Moreover, pointer > arithmetic is explicitly forbidden (and I added tests for that). Did I > miss something? It's a pointer leak. > > > > > I think the only way bpf-based LSM can land is both landlock and KRSI > > developers work together on a design that solves all use cases. > > As I said in a previous cover letter [1], that would be great. I think > that the current Landlock bases (almost everything from this series > except the seccomp interface) should meet both needs, but I would like > to have the point of view of the KRSI developers. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191029171505.6650-1-mic@digikod.net/ > > > BPF is capable > > to be a superset of all existing LSMs whereas landlock and KRSI propsals today > > are custom solutions to specific security concerns. BPF subsystem was extended > > with custom things in the past. In networking we have lwt, skb, tc, xdp, sk > > program types with a lot of overlapping functionality. We couldn't figure out > > how to generalize them into single 'networking' program. Now we can and we > > should. Accepting two partially overlapping bpf-based LSMs would be repeating > > the same mistake again. > > I'll let the LSM maintainers comment on whether BPF could be a superset > of all LSM, but given the complexity of an access-control system, I have > some doubts though. Anyway, we need to start somewhere and then iterate. > This patch series is a first step. I would like KRSI folks to speak up. So far I don't see any sharing happening between landlock and KRSI. You're claiming this set is a first step. They're claiming the same about their patches. I'd like to set a patchset that was jointly developed.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>, "Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jann Horn" <jann@thejh.net>, "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@chromium.org>, "Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>, "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, "Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v13 4/7] landlock: Add ptrace LSM hooks Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 11:34:47 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20191105193446.s4pswwwhrmgk6hcx@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <23acf523-dbc4-855b-ca49-2bbfa5e7117e@digikod.net> On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 07:01:41PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 05/11/2019 18:18, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 06:21:43PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > >> Add a first Landlock hook that can be used to enforce a security policy > >> or to audit some process activities. For a sandboxing use-case, it is > >> needed to inform the kernel if a task can legitimately debug another. > >> ptrace(2) can also be used by an attacker to impersonate another task > >> and remain undetected while performing malicious activities. > >> > >> Using ptrace(2) and related features on a target process can lead to a > >> privilege escalation. A sandboxed task must then be able to tell the > >> kernel if another task is more privileged, via ptrace_may_access(). > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > > ... > >> +static int check_ptrace(struct landlock_domain *domain, > >> + struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) > >> +{ > >> + struct landlock_hook_ctx_ptrace ctx_ptrace = { > >> + .prog_ctx = { > >> + .tracer = (uintptr_t)tracer, > >> + .tracee = (uintptr_t)tracee, > >> + }, > >> + }; > > > > So you're passing two kernel pointers obfuscated as u64 into bpf program > > yet claiming that the end goal is to make landlock unprivileged?! > > The most basic security hole in the tool that is aiming to provide security. > > How could you used these pointers without dedicated BPF helpers? This > context items are typed as PTR_TO_TASK and can't be used without a > dedicated helper able to deal with ARG_PTR_TO_TASK. Moreover, pointer > arithmetic is explicitly forbidden (and I added tests for that). Did I > miss something? It's a pointer leak. > > > > > I think the only way bpf-based LSM can land is both landlock and KRSI > > developers work together on a design that solves all use cases. > > As I said in a previous cover letter [1], that would be great. I think > that the current Landlock bases (almost everything from this series > except the seccomp interface) should meet both needs, but I would like > to have the point of view of the KRSI developers. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191029171505.6650-1-mic@digikod.net/ > > > BPF is capable > > to be a superset of all existing LSMs whereas landlock and KRSI propsals today > > are custom solutions to specific security concerns. BPF subsystem was extended > > with custom things in the past. In networking we have lwt, skb, tc, xdp, sk > > program types with a lot of overlapping functionality. We couldn't figure out > > how to generalize them into single 'networking' program. Now we can and we > > should. Accepting two partially overlapping bpf-based LSMs would be repeating > > the same mistake again. > > I'll let the LSM maintainers comment on whether BPF could be a superset > of all LSM, but given the complexity of an access-control system, I have > some doubts though. Anyway, we need to start somewhere and then iterate. > This patch series is a first step. I would like KRSI folks to speak up. So far I don't see any sharing happening between landlock and KRSI. You're claiming this set is a first step. They're claiming the same about their patches. I'd like to set a patchset that was jointly developed.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-05 19:34 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-11-04 17:21 [PATCH bpf-next v13 0/7] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 1/7] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 2/7] landlock: Add the management of domains Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 3/7] landlock,seccomp: Apply Landlock programs to process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 4/7] landlock: Add ptrace LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-05 17:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 17:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 17:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 17:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 19:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 19:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 19:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 19:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 21:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 21:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 22:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 22:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 18:01 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-05 18:01 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-05 19:34 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message] 2019-11-05 19:34 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-05 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-06 10:06 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 10:06 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-06 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-06 21:45 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 21:45 ` KP Singh 2019-11-08 14:08 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-08 14:08 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-08 14:34 ` Daniel Borkmann 2019-11-08 14:34 ` Daniel Borkmann 2019-11-08 15:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-08 15:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-08 15:27 ` KP Singh 2019-11-08 15:27 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 10:15 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 10:15 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-06 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 5/7] bpf,landlock: Add task_landlock_ptrace_ancestor() helper Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 6/7] bpf,landlock: Add tests for the Landlock ptrace program type Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 7/7] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
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