* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification AKASHI Takahiro
` (5 more replies)
0 siblings, 6 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
# This patch set is a prerequisite for UEFI secure boot.
The current rsa_verify() requires five parameters for a RSA public key
for efficiency while RSA, in theory, requires only two. In addition,
those parameters are expected to come from FIT image.
So this function won't fit very well when we want to use it for the purpose
of implementing UEFI secure boot, in particular, image authentication
as well as variable authentication, where the essential two parameters
are set to be retrieved from one of X509 certificates in signature
database.
So, in this patch, additional three parameters will be calculated
on the fly when rsa_verify() is called without fdt which should contain
parameters above.
This calculation heavily relies on "big-number (or multi-precision)
library." Therefore some routines from BearSSL[1] under MIT license are
imported in this implementation. See Patch#4.
# Please let me know if this is not appropriate.
# Checkpatch will complain with lots of warnings/errors, but
# I intentionally don't fix them for maximum maintainability.
[1] https://bearssl.org/
[2] https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-October/388263.html
Changes in v3 (Nov 13, 2019)
* remove RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY, which is to be added in patch#2 (patch#1)
* modify unit test Kconfg due to removal of test/lib/Kconfig (patch#6)
Changes in v2 (Oct 29, 2019)
* fix build errors at Travis CI
* not include linux/kconfig.h (patch#1)
* add a separate patch for adding CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY (patch#2)
* take a prerequisite patch from my "secure boot patch" (patch#3)
* add a dependency on RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER (patch#4)
* remove "inline" directives (patch#4)
* add function descriptions, which mostly come from BearSSL's src/inner.h
(patch#4)
* improve Kconfig help text after Simon's comment (patch#5)
* add function description of rsa_verify_with_pkey() (patch#5)
* modify rsa_verify() to use "if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(...) " style
rather than "#ifdef CONFIG_..." (patch#5)
* add function tests (patch#6)
Changes in v1 (Oct 9, 2019)
* fix a build error on pine64-lts_defconfig (reported by Heinrich)
by defining FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY flag and adding
SPL_RSA_VERIFY config (patch#1)
* remove FIT-specific code from image-sig.c and put them to new
image-fit-sig.c to allow us to disable CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE (patch#1)
* compile rsa-keyprop.c only if necessary (i.e. if
CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) (patch#2)
* add SPDX license identifier in rsa-keyprop.c (patch#2)
* include <common.h> instead of <stdio.h> (patch#2)
* use U-Boot's byteorder helper functions instead of BearSSL's (patch#2)
AKASHI Takahiro (6):
lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification
rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config
include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info
lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key
lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey()
test: add rsa_verify() unit test
Kconfig | 1 +
common/Makefile | 3 +-
common/image-fit-sig.c | 417 ++++++++++++++++++++
common/image-fit.c | 6 +-
common/image-sig.c | 396 -------------------
include/image.h | 23 +-
include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h | 21 +
lib/rsa/Kconfig | 27 ++
lib/rsa/Makefile | 3 +-
lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c | 717 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 129 +++++--
test/Kconfig | 12 +
test/lib/Makefile | 1 +
test/lib/rsa.c | 207 ++++++++++
tools/Makefile | 2 +-
15 files changed, 1530 insertions(+), 435 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 common/image-fit-sig.c
create mode 100644 lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
create mode 100644 test/lib/rsa.c
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/6] rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config AKASHI Takahiro
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Introduce new configuration, CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY which will decouple building
RSA functions from FIT verification and allow for adding a RSA-based
signature verification for other file formats, in particular PE file
for UEFI secure boot.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
Kconfig | 1 +
common/Makefile | 3 +-
common/image-fit-sig.c | 417 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
common/image-fit.c | 6 +-
common/image-sig.c | 396 --------------------------------------
include/image.h | 13 +-
lib/rsa/Kconfig | 12 ++
lib/rsa/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 78 +++++---
tools/Makefile | 2 +-
10 files changed, 493 insertions(+), 437 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 common/image-fit-sig.c
diff --git a/Kconfig b/Kconfig
index 66b059f749a7..63690514b261 100644
--- a/Kconfig
+++ b/Kconfig
@@ -417,6 +417,7 @@ config SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE
depends on SPL_DM
select SPL_FIT
select SPL_RSA
+ select SPL_RSA_VERIFY
config SPL_LOAD_FIT
bool "Enable SPL loading U-Boot as a FIT (basic fitImage features)"
diff --git a/common/Makefile b/common/Makefile
index 302d8beaf356..d66c0068bb88 100644
--- a/common/Makefile
+++ b/common/Makefile
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ANDROID_BOOT_IMAGE) += image-android.o
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_TPL_)OF_LIBFDT) += image-fdt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_TPL_)FIT) += image-fit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MULTI_DTB_FIT) += boot_fit.o common_fit.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_TPL_)FIT_SIGNATURE) += image-sig.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA_VERIFY) += image-sig.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_TPL_)FIT_SIGNATURE) += image-fit-sig.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IO_TRACE) += iotrace.o
obj-y += memsize.o
obj-y += stdio.o
diff --git a/common/image-fit-sig.c b/common/image-fit-sig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f6caeb0c5901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/image-fit-sig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
+#include "mkimage.h"
+#include <time.h>
+#else
+#include <common.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
+#endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/
+#include <image.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa-checksum.h>
+
+#define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100
+
+#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
+void *host_blob;
+
+void image_set_host_blob(void *blob)
+{
+ host_blob = blob;
+}
+
+void *image_get_host_blob(void)
+{
+ return host_blob;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions
+ *
+ * Given a list of fdt_regions, create a list of image_regions. This is a
+ * simple conversion routine since the FDT and image code use different
+ * structures.
+ *
+ * @fit: FIT image
+ * @fdt_regions: Pointer to FDT regions
+ * @count: Number of FDT regions
+ * @region: Pointer to image regions, which must hold @count records. If
+ * region is NULL, then (except for an SPL build) the array will be
+ * allocated.
+ * @return: Pointer to image regions
+ */
+struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
+ struct fdt_region *fdt_regions,
+ int count,
+ struct image_region *region)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ debug("Hash regions:\n");
+ debug("%10s %10s\n", "Offset", "Size");
+
+ /*
+ * Use malloc() except in SPL (to save code size). In SPL the caller
+ * must allocate the array.
+ */
+#ifndef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
+ if (!region)
+ region = calloc(sizeof(*region), count);
+#endif
+ if (!region)
+ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ debug("%10x %10x\n", fdt_regions[i].offset,
+ fdt_regions[i].size);
+ region[i].data = fit + fdt_regions[i].offset;
+ region[i].size = fdt_regions[i].size;
+ }
+
+ return region;
+}
+
+static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
+ const void *fit, int noffset,
+ int required_keynode, char **err_msgp)
+{
+ char *algo_name;
+ const char *padding_name;
+
+ if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
+ *err_msgp = "Total size too large";
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
+ *err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ padding_name = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "padding", NULL);
+ if (!padding_name)
+ padding_name = RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME;
+
+ memset(info, '\0', sizeof(*info));
+ info->keyname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "key-name-hint", NULL);
+ info->fit = (void *)fit;
+ info->node_offset = noffset;
+ info->name = algo_name;
+ info->checksum = image_get_checksum_algo(algo_name);
+ info->crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(algo_name);
+ info->padding = image_get_padding_algo(padding_name);
+ info->fdt_blob = gd_fdt_blob();
+ info->required_keynode = required_keynode;
+ printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname);
+
+ if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto || !info->padding) {
+ *err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int fit_image_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, const void *data,
+ size_t size, int required_keynode, char **err_msgp)
+{
+ struct image_sign_info info;
+ struct image_region region;
+ uint8_t *fit_value;
+ int fit_value_len;
+
+ *err_msgp = NULL;
+ if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, required_keynode,
+ err_msgp))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
+ &fit_value_len)) {
+ *err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ region.data = data;
+ region.size = size;
+
+ if (info.crypto->verify(&info, ®ion, 1, fit_value, fit_value_len)) {
+ *err_msgp = "Verification failed";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int fit_image_verify_sig(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
+ const char *data, size_t size,
+ const void *sig_blob, int sig_offset)
+{
+ int noffset;
+ char *err_msg = "";
+ int verified = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Process all hash subnodes of the component image node */
+ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, image_noffset) {
+ const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
+
+ if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
+ strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
+ ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data,
+ size, -1, &err_msg);
+ if (ret) {
+ puts("- ");
+ } else {
+ puts("+ ");
+ verified = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
+ err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
+
+error:
+ printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' image node\n",
+ err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
+ fit_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
+ const char *data, size_t size,
+ const void *sig_blob, int *no_sigsp)
+{
+ int verify_count = 0;
+ int noffset;
+ int sig_node;
+
+ /* Work out what we need to verify */
+ *no_sigsp = 1;
+ sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
+ if (sig_node < 0) {
+ debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
+ fdt_strerror(sig_node));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
+ const char *required;
+ int ret;
+
+ required = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, noffset, "required", NULL);
+ if (!required || strcmp(required, "image"))
+ continue;
+ ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
+ sig_blob, noffset);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
+ fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
+ return ret;
+ }
+ verify_count++;
+ }
+
+ if (verify_count)
+ *no_sigsp = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,
+ char **err_msgp)
+{
+ char * const exc_prop[] = {"data"};
+ const char *prop, *end, *name;
+ struct image_sign_info info;
+ const uint32_t *strings;
+ uint8_t *fit_value;
+ int fit_value_len;
+ int max_regions;
+ int i, prop_len;
+ char path[200];
+ int count;
+
+ debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, gd_fdt_blob(),
+ fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
+ fit_get_name(gd_fdt_blob(), required_keynode, NULL));
+ *err_msgp = NULL;
+ if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, required_keynode,
+ err_msgp))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
+ &fit_value_len)) {
+ *err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Count the number of strings in the property */
+ prop = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-nodes", &prop_len);
+ end = prop ? prop + prop_len : prop;
+ for (name = prop, count = 0; name < end; name++)
+ if (!*name)
+ count++;
+ if (!count) {
+ *err_msgp = "Can't get hashed-nodes property";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (prop && prop_len > 0 && prop[prop_len - 1] != '\0') {
+ *err_msgp = "hashed-nodes property must be null-terminated";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Add a sanity check here since we are using the stack */
+ if (count > IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES) {
+ *err_msgp = "Number of hashed nodes exceeds maximum";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Create a list of node names from those strings */
+ char *node_inc[count];
+
+ debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count);
+ for (name = prop, i = 0; name < end; name += strlen(name) + 1, i++) {
+ debug(" '%s'\n", name);
+ node_inc[i] = (char *)name;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Each node can generate one region for each sub-node. Allow for
+ * 7 sub-nodes (hash-1, signature-1, etc.) and some extra.
+ */
+ max_regions = 20 + count * 7;
+ struct fdt_region fdt_regions[max_regions];
+
+ /* Get a list of regions to hash */
+ count = fdt_find_regions(fit, node_inc, count,
+ exc_prop, ARRAY_SIZE(exc_prop),
+ fdt_regions, max_regions - 1,
+ path, sizeof(path), 0);
+ if (count < 0) {
+ *err_msgp = "Failed to hash configuration";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (count == 0) {
+ *err_msgp = "No data to hash";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (count >= max_regions - 1) {
+ *err_msgp = "Too many hash regions";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Add the strings */
+ strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL);
+ if (strings) {
+ /*
+ * The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
+ * This is set in tool/image-host.c
+ */
+ fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
+ fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
+ count++;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate the region list on the stack */
+ struct image_region region[count];
+
+ fit_region_make_list(fit, fdt_regions, count, region);
+ if (info.crypto->verify(&info, region, count, fit_value,
+ fit_value_len)) {
+ *err_msgp = "Verification failed";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int fit_config_verify_sig(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+ const void *sig_blob, int sig_offset)
+{
+ int noffset;
+ char *err_msg = "";
+ int verified = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Process all hash subnodes of the component conf node */
+ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, conf_noffset) {
+ const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
+
+ if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
+ strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
+ ret = fit_config_check_sig(fit, noffset, sig_offset,
+ &err_msg);
+ if (ret) {
+ puts("- ");
+ } else {
+ puts("+ ");
+ verified = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
+ err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
+
+error:
+ printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' config node\n",
+ err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
+ fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL));
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+ const void *sig_blob)
+{
+ int noffset;
+ int sig_node;
+
+ /* Work out what we need to verify */
+ sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
+ if (sig_node < 0) {
+ debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
+ fdt_strerror(sig_node));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
+ const char *required;
+ int ret;
+
+ required = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, noffset, "required", NULL);
+ if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
+ continue;
+ ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit, conf_noffset, sig_blob,
+ noffset);
+ if (ret) {
+ printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
+ fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int fit_config_verify(const void *fit, int conf_noffset)
+{
+ return fit_config_verify_required_sigs(fit, conf_noffset,
+ gd_fdt_blob());
+}
diff --git a/common/image-fit.c b/common/image-fit.c
index 5c63c769de27..2d78f0b47da2 100644
--- a/common/image-fit.c
+++ b/common/image-fit.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ int fit_image_verify_with_data(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
int ret;
/* Verify all required signatures */
- if (IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY &&
+ if (FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY &&
fit_image_verify_required_sigs(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
gd_fdt_blob(), &verify_all)) {
err_msg = "Unable to verify required signature";
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ int fit_image_verify_with_data(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
&err_msg))
goto error;
puts("+ ");
- } else if (IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY && verify_all &&
+ } else if (FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY && verify_all &&
!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data,
@@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ int fit_image_load(bootm_headers_t *images, ulong addr,
if (image_type == IH_TYPE_KERNEL)
images->fit_uname_cfg = fit_base_uname_config;
- if (IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY && images->verify) {
+ if (FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY && images->verify) {
puts(" Verifying Hash Integrity ... ");
if (fit_config_verify(fit, cfg_noffset)) {
puts("Bad Data Hash\n");
diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
index 639a1124504f..84b2c0439cf8 100644
--- a/common/image-sig.c
+++ b/common/image-sig.c
@@ -17,18 +17,6 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
#define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100
-#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
-void *host_blob;
-void image_set_host_blob(void *blob)
-{
- host_blob = blob;
-}
-void *image_get_host_blob(void)
-{
- return host_blob;
-}
-#endif
-
struct checksum_algo checksum_algos[] = {
{
.name = "sha1",
@@ -162,387 +150,3 @@ struct padding_algo *image_get_padding_algo(const char *name)
return NULL;
}
-
-/**
- * fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions
- *
- * Given a list of fdt_regions, create a list of image_regions. This is a
- * simple conversion routine since the FDT and image code use different
- * structures.
- *
- * @fit: FIT image
- * @fdt_regions: Pointer to FDT regions
- * @count: Number of FDT regions
- * @region: Pointer to image regions, which must hold @count records. If
- * region is NULL, then (except for an SPL build) the array will be
- * allocated.
- * @return: Pointer to image regions
- */
-struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
- struct fdt_region *fdt_regions, int count,
- struct image_region *region)
-{
- int i;
-
- debug("Hash regions:\n");
- debug("%10s %10s\n", "Offset", "Size");
-
- /*
- * Use malloc() except in SPL (to save code size). In SPL the caller
- * must allocate the array.
- */
-#ifndef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD
- if (!region)
- region = calloc(sizeof(*region), count);
-#endif
- if (!region)
- return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- debug("%10x %10x\n", fdt_regions[i].offset,
- fdt_regions[i].size);
- region[i].data = fit + fdt_regions[i].offset;
- region[i].size = fdt_regions[i].size;
- }
-
- return region;
-}
-
-static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
- const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,
- char **err_msgp)
-{
- char *algo_name;
- const char *padding_name;
-
- if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
- *err_msgp = "Total size too large";
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
- *err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
- return -1;
- }
-
- padding_name = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "padding", NULL);
- if (!padding_name)
- padding_name = RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME;
-
- memset(info, '\0', sizeof(*info));
- info->keyname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "key-name-hint", NULL);
- info->fit = (void *)fit;
- info->node_offset = noffset;
- info->name = algo_name;
- info->checksum = image_get_checksum_algo(algo_name);
- info->crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(algo_name);
- info->padding = image_get_padding_algo(padding_name);
- info->fdt_blob = gd_fdt_blob();
- info->required_keynode = required_keynode;
- printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname);
-
- if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto || !info->padding) {
- *err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm";
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int fit_image_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, const void *data,
- size_t size, int required_keynode, char **err_msgp)
-{
- struct image_sign_info info;
- struct image_region region;
- uint8_t *fit_value;
- int fit_value_len;
-
- *err_msgp = NULL;
- if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, required_keynode,
- err_msgp))
- return -1;
-
- if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
- &fit_value_len)) {
- *err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
- return -1;
- }
-
- region.data = data;
- region.size = size;
-
- if (info.crypto->verify(&info, ®ion, 1, fit_value, fit_value_len)) {
- *err_msgp = "Verification failed";
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int fit_image_verify_sig(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
- const char *data, size_t size, const void *sig_blob,
- int sig_offset)
-{
- int noffset;
- char *err_msg = "";
- int verified = 0;
- int ret;
-
- /* Process all hash subnodes of the component image node */
- fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, image_noffset) {
- const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
-
- if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
- strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
- ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data,
- size, -1, &err_msg);
- if (ret) {
- puts("- ");
- } else {
- puts("+ ");
- verified = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
- err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
- goto error;
- }
-
- return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
-
-error:
- printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' image node\n",
- err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
- fit_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL));
- return -1;
-}
-
-int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
- const char *data, size_t size, const void *sig_blob,
- int *no_sigsp)
-{
- int verify_count = 0;
- int noffset;
- int sig_node;
-
- /* Work out what we need to verify */
- *no_sigsp = 1;
- sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
- if (sig_node < 0) {
- debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
- fdt_strerror(sig_node));
- return 0;
- }
-
- fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
- const char *required;
- int ret;
-
- required = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, noffset, "required", NULL);
- if (!required || strcmp(required, "image"))
- continue;
- ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size,
- sig_blob, noffset);
- if (ret) {
- printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
- fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
- return ret;
- }
- verify_count++;
- }
-
- if (verify_count)
- *no_sigsp = 0;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,
- char **err_msgp)
-{
- char * const exc_prop[] = {"data"};
- const char *prop, *end, *name;
- struct image_sign_info info;
- const uint32_t *strings;
- uint8_t *fit_value;
- int fit_value_len;
- int max_regions;
- int i, prop_len;
- char path[200];
- int count;
-
- debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, gd_fdt_blob(),
- fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
- fit_get_name(gd_fdt_blob(), required_keynode, NULL));
- *err_msgp = NULL;
- if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, required_keynode,
- err_msgp))
- return -1;
-
- if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value,
- &fit_value_len)) {
- *err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property";
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Count the number of strings in the property */
- prop = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-nodes", &prop_len);
- end = prop ? prop + prop_len : prop;
- for (name = prop, count = 0; name < end; name++)
- if (!*name)
- count++;
- if (!count) {
- *err_msgp = "Can't get hashed-nodes property";
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (prop && prop_len > 0 && prop[prop_len - 1] != '\0') {
- *err_msgp = "hashed-nodes property must be null-terminated";
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Add a sanity check here since we are using the stack */
- if (count > IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES) {
- *err_msgp = "Number of hashed nodes exceeds maximum";
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Create a list of node names from those strings */
- char *node_inc[count];
-
- debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count);
- for (name = prop, i = 0; name < end; name += strlen(name) + 1, i++) {
- debug(" '%s'\n", name);
- node_inc[i] = (char *)name;
- }
-
- /*
- * Each node can generate one region for each sub-node. Allow for
- * 7 sub-nodes (hash-1, signature-1, etc.) and some extra.
- */
- max_regions = 20 + count * 7;
- struct fdt_region fdt_regions[max_regions];
-
- /* Get a list of regions to hash */
- count = fdt_find_regions(fit, node_inc, count,
- exc_prop, ARRAY_SIZE(exc_prop),
- fdt_regions, max_regions - 1,
- path, sizeof(path), 0);
- if (count < 0) {
- *err_msgp = "Failed to hash configuration";
- return -1;
- }
- if (count == 0) {
- *err_msgp = "No data to hash";
- return -1;
- }
- if (count >= max_regions - 1) {
- *err_msgp = "Too many hash regions";
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Add the strings */
- strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL);
- if (strings) {
- /*
- * The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
- * This is set in tool/image-host.c
- */
- fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
- fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
- count++;
- }
-
- /* Allocate the region list on the stack */
- struct image_region region[count];
-
- fit_region_make_list(fit, fdt_regions, count, region);
- if (info.crypto->verify(&info, region, count, fit_value,
- fit_value_len)) {
- *err_msgp = "Verification failed";
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int fit_config_verify_sig(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
- const void *sig_blob, int sig_offset)
-{
- int noffset;
- char *err_msg = "";
- int verified = 0;
- int ret;
-
- /* Process all hash subnodes of the component conf node */
- fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, conf_noffset) {
- const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL);
-
- if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME,
- strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) {
- ret = fit_config_check_sig(fit, noffset, sig_offset,
- &err_msg);
- if (ret) {
- puts("- ");
- } else {
- puts("+ ");
- verified = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) {
- err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree";
- goto error;
- }
-
- return verified ? 0 : -EPERM;
-
-error:
- printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' config node\n",
- err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL),
- fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL));
- return -1;
-}
-
-int fit_config_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
- const void *sig_blob)
-{
- int noffset;
- int sig_node;
-
- /* Work out what we need to verify */
- sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(sig_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
- if (sig_node < 0) {
- debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
- fdt_strerror(sig_node));
- return 0;
- }
-
- fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, sig_blob, sig_node) {
- const char *required;
- int ret;
-
- required = fdt_getprop(sig_blob, noffset, "required", NULL);
- if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf"))
- continue;
- ret = fit_config_verify_sig(fit, conf_noffset, sig_blob,
- noffset);
- if (ret) {
- printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n",
- fit_get_name(sig_blob, noffset, NULL));
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int fit_config_verify(const void *fit, int conf_noffset)
-{
- return fit_config_verify_required_sigs(fit, conf_noffset,
- gd_fdt_blob());
-}
diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
index f4d2aaf53e87..7eb0b4b53184 100644
--- a/include/image.h
+++ b/include/image.h
@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ int fit_conf_get_prop_node(const void *fit, int noffset,
int fit_check_ramdisk(const void *fit, int os_noffset,
uint8_t arch, int verify);
+#endif /* IMAGE_ENABLE_FIT */
int calculate_hash(const void *data, int data_len, const char *algo,
uint8_t *value, int *value_len);
@@ -1098,16 +1099,20 @@ int calculate_hash(const void *data, int data_len, const char *algo,
# if defined(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)
# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN 1
# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 1
+# define FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 1
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# else
# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN 0
# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 0
+# define FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 0
# endif
#else
# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN 0
-# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
+# define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(RSA_VERIFY)
+# define FIT_IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
#endif
+#if IMAGE_ENABLE_FIT
#ifdef USE_HOSTCC
void *image_get_host_blob(void);
void image_set_host_blob(void *host_blob);
@@ -1121,6 +1126,7 @@ void image_set_host_blob(void *host_blob);
#else
#define IMAGE_ENABLE_BEST_MATCH 0
#endif
+#endif /* IMAGE_ENABLE_FIT */
/* Information passed to the signing routines */
struct image_sign_info {
@@ -1137,7 +1143,6 @@ struct image_sign_info {
const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */
const char *engine_id; /* Engine to use for signing */
};
-#endif /* Allow struct image_region to always be defined for rsa.h */
/* A part of an image, used for hashing */
struct image_region {
@@ -1145,8 +1150,6 @@ struct image_region {
int size;
};
-#if IMAGE_ENABLE_FIT
-
#if IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY
# include <u-boot/rsa-checksum.h>
#endif
@@ -1247,6 +1250,8 @@ struct crypto_algo *image_get_crypto_algo(const char *full_name);
*/
struct padding_algo *image_get_padding_algo(const char *name);
+#if IMAGE_ENABLE_FIT
+
/**
* fit_image_verify_required_sigs() - Verify signatures marked as 'required'
*
diff --git a/lib/rsa/Kconfig b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
index 2b33f323bccc..03ffa2969048 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
config RSA
bool "Use RSA Library"
+ select RSA_VERIFY
select RSA_FREESCALE_EXP if FSL_CAAM && !ARCH_MX7 && !ARCH_MX6 && !ARCH_MX5
select RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP if !RSA_FREESCALE_EXP
help
@@ -17,6 +18,17 @@ if RSA
config SPL_RSA
bool "Use RSA Library within SPL"
+ select SPL_RSA_VERIFY
+
+config SPL_RSA_VERIFY
+ bool
+ help
+ Add RSA signature verification support in SPL.
+
+config RSA_VERIFY
+ bool
+ help
+ Add RSA signature verification support.
config RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP
bool "Enable driver for RSA Modular Exponentiation in software"
diff --git a/lib/rsa/Makefile b/lib/rsa/Makefile
index a51c6e1685fb..c07305188e0c 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/Makefile
+++ b/lib/rsa/Makefile
@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@
# (C) Copyright 2000-2007
# Wolfgang Denk, DENX Software Engineering, wd at denx.de.
-obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)FIT_SIGNATURE) += rsa-verify.o rsa-checksum.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA_VERIFY) += rsa-verify.o rsa-checksum.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP) += rsa-mod-exp.o
diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
index 82dc513260e2..d2fd0692fa13 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
+++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ out:
}
#endif
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
/**
* rsa_verify_key() - Verify a signature against some data using RSA Key
*
@@ -341,7 +342,9 @@ static int rsa_verify_key(struct image_sign_info *info,
return 0;
}
+#endif
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
/**
* rsa_verify_with_keynode() - Verify a signature against some data using
* information in node with prperties of RSA Key like modulus, exponent etc.
@@ -395,18 +398,22 @@ static int rsa_verify_with_keynode(struct image_sign_info *info,
return ret;
}
+#else
+static int rsa_verify_with_keynode(struct image_sign_info *info,
+ const void *hash, uint8_t *sig,
+ uint sig_len, int node)
+{
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+#endif
int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
const struct image_region region[], int region_count,
uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
{
- const void *blob = info->fdt_blob;
/* Reserve memory for maximum checksum-length */
uint8_t hash[info->crypto->key_len];
- int ndepth, noffset;
- int sig_node, node;
- char name[100];
- int ret;
+ int ret = -EACCES;
/*
* Verify that the checksum-length does not exceed the
@@ -419,12 +426,6 @@ int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
return -EINVAL;
}
- sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
- if (sig_node < 0) {
- debug("%s: No signature node found\n", __func__);
- return -ENOENT;
- }
-
/* Calculate checksum with checksum-algorithm */
ret = info->checksum->calculate(info->checksum->name,
region, region_count, hash);
@@ -433,29 +434,44 @@ int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* See if we must use a particular key */
- if (info->required_keynode != -1) {
- ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash, sig, sig_len,
- info->required_keynode);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)) {
+ const void *blob = info->fdt_blob;
+ int ndepth, noffset;
+ int sig_node, node;
+ char name[100];
- /* Look for a key that matches our hint */
- snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "key-%s", info->keyname);
- node = fdt_subnode_offset(blob, sig_node, name);
- ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash, sig, sig_len, node);
- if (!ret)
- return ret;
+ sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
+ if (sig_node < 0) {
+ debug("%s: No signature node found\n", __func__);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
- /* No luck, so try each of the keys in turn */
- for (ndepth = 0, noffset = fdt_next_node(info->fit, sig_node, &ndepth);
- (noffset >= 0) && (ndepth > 0);
- noffset = fdt_next_node(info->fit, noffset, &ndepth)) {
- if (ndepth == 1 && noffset != node) {
+ /* See if we must use a particular key */
+ if (info->required_keynode != -1) {
ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash, sig, sig_len,
- noffset);
- if (!ret)
- break;
+ info->required_keynode);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a key that matches our hint */
+ snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "key-%s", info->keyname);
+ node = fdt_subnode_offset(blob, sig_node, name);
+ ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash, sig, sig_len, node);
+ if (!ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* No luck, so try each of the keys in turn */
+ for (ndepth = 0, noffset = fdt_next_node(info->fit, sig_node,
+ &ndepth);
+ (noffset >= 0) && (ndepth > 0);
+ noffset = fdt_next_node(info->fit, noffset, &ndepth)) {
+ if (ndepth == 1 && noffset != node) {
+ ret = rsa_verify_with_keynode(info, hash,
+ sig, sig_len,
+ noffset);
+ if (!ret)
+ break;
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
index 345bc84e48db..1f885cca7034 100644
--- a/tools/Makefile
+++ b/tools/Makefile
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += fit_info fit_check_sign
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_CMD_BOOTEFI_SELFTEST) += file2include
FIT_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT) := fit_common.o fit_image.o image-host.o common/image-fit.o
-FIT_SIG_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) := common/image-sig.o
+FIT_SIG_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) := common/image-sig.o common/image-fit-sig.o
# The following files are synced with upstream DTC.
# Use synced versions from scripts/dtc/libfdt/.
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/6] rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info AKASHI Takahiro
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
In the next couple of commits, under new CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY,
rsa_verify() will be extended to be able to perform RSA decryption without
additional RSA key properties from FIT image, i.e. rr and n0inv.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
lib/rsa/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/rsa/Kconfig b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
index 03ffa2969048..71e4c06bf883 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
@@ -30,6 +30,20 @@ config RSA_VERIFY
help
Add RSA signature verification support.
+config RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
+ bool "Execute RSA verification without key parameters from FDT"
+ depends on RSA
+ help
+ The standard RSA-signature verification code (FIT_SIGNATURE) uses
+ pre-calculated key properties, that are stored in fdt blob, in
+ decrypting a signature.
+ This does not suit the use case where there is no way defined to
+ provide such additional key properties in standardized form,
+ particularly UEFI secure boot.
+ This options enables RSA signature verification with a public key
+ directly specified in image_sign_info, where all the necessary
+ key properties will be calculated on the fly in verification code.
+
config RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP
bool "Enable driver for RSA Modular Exponentiation in software"
depends on DM
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/6] rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key AKASHI Takahiro
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
For FIT verification, all the properties of a public key come from
"control fdt" pointed to by fdt_blob. In UEFI secure boot, on the other
hand, a public key is located and retrieved from dedicated signature
database stored as UEFI variables.
Added two fields may hold values of a public key if fdt_blob is NULL, and
will be used in rsa_verify_with_pkey() to verify a signature in UEFI
sub-system.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
include/image.h | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
index 7eb0b4b53184..bff87f51f01b 100644
--- a/include/image.h
+++ b/include/image.h
@@ -1142,6 +1142,16 @@ struct image_sign_info {
int required_keynode; /* Node offset of key to use: -1=any */
const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */
const char *engine_id; /* Engine to use for signing */
+ /*
+ * Note: the following two fields
+ * are always valid even w/o
+ * RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY in order
+ * to make sure this structure is
+ * the same on target and host.
+ * Otherwise, vboot test may fail.
+ */
+ const void *key; /* Pointer to public key in DER */
+ int keylen; /* Length of public key */
};
/* A part of an image, used for hashing */
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey() AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test AKASHI Takahiro
5 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
In the current implementation of FIT_SIGNATURE, five parameters for
a RSA public key are required while only two of them are essential.
(See rsa-mod-exp.h and uImage.FIT/signature.txt)
This is a result of considering relatively limited computer power
and resources on embedded systems, while such a assumption may not
be quite practical for other use cases.
In this patch, added is a function, rsa_gen_key_prop(), which will
generate additional parameters for other uses, in particular
UEFI secure boot, on the fly.
Note: the current code uses some "big number" routines from BearSSL
for the calculation.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h | 21 +
lib/rsa/Kconfig | 1 +
lib/rsa/Makefile | 1 +
lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c | 717 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 740 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
diff --git a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
index 8a428c4b6a1a..374169b8304e 100644
--- a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
+++ b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct key_prop {
uint32_t exp_len; /* Exponent length in number of uint8_t */
};
+/**
+ * rsa_gen_key_prop() - Generate key properties of RSA public key
+ * @key: Specifies key data in DER format
+ * @keylen: Length of @key
+ *
+ * This function takes a blob of encoded RSA public key data in DER
+ * format, parse it and generate all the relevant properties
+ * in key_prop structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Pointer to struct key_prop on success, NULL on error
+ */
+struct key_prop *rsa_gen_key_prop(const void *key, uint32_t keylen);
+
+/**
+ * rsa_free_key_prop() - Free key properties
+ * @prop: Pointer to struct key_prop
+ *
+ * This function frees all the memories allocated by rsa_gen_key_prop().
+ */
+void rsa_free_key_prop(struct key_prop *prop);
+
/**
* rsa_mod_exp_sw() - Perform RSA Modular Exponentiation in sw
*
diff --git a/lib/rsa/Kconfig b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
index 71e4c06bf883..d1d6f6cf64a3 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ config RSA_VERIFY
config RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
bool "Execute RSA verification without key parameters from FDT"
depends on RSA
+ imply RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER
help
The standard RSA-signature verification code (FIT_SIGNATURE) uses
pre-calculated key properties, that are stored in fdt blob, in
diff --git a/lib/rsa/Makefile b/lib/rsa/Makefile
index c07305188e0c..14ed3cb4012b 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/Makefile
+++ b/lib/rsa/Makefile
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
# Wolfgang Denk, DENX Software Engineering, wd at denx.de.
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA_VERIFY) += rsa-verify.o rsa-checksum.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) += rsa-keyprop.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP) += rsa-mod-exp.o
diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9458337cc608
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,717 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ and MIT
+/*
+ * RSA library - generate parameters for a public key
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro Limited
+ * Author: AKASHI Takahiro
+ *
+ * Big number routines in this file come from BearSSL:
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <image.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
+
+/**
+ * br_dec16be() - Convert 16-bit big-endian integer to native
+ * @src: Pointer to data
+ * Return: Native-endian integer
+ */
+static unsigned br_dec16be(const void *src)
+{
+ return be16_to_cpup(src);
+}
+
+/**
+ * br_dec32be() - Convert 32-bit big-endian integer to native
+ * @src: Pointer to data
+ * Return: Native-endian integer
+ */
+static uint32_t br_dec32be(const void *src)
+{
+ return be32_to_cpup(src);
+}
+
+/**
+ * br_enc32be() - Convert native 32-bit integer to big-endian
+ * @dst: Pointer to buffer to store big-endian integer in
+ * @x: Native 32-bit integer
+ */
+static void br_enc32be(void *dst, uint32_t x)
+{
+ __be32 tmp;
+
+ tmp = cpu_to_be32(x);
+ memcpy(dst, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/inner.h */
+
+/*
+ * Negate a boolean.
+ */
+static uint32_t NOT(uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ return ctl ^ 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplexer: returns x if ctl == 1, y if ctl == 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t MUX(uint32_t ctl, uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ return y ^ (-ctl & (x ^ y));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Equality check: returns 1 if x == y, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t EQ(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = x ^ y;
+ return NOT((q | -q) >> 31);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inequality check: returns 1 if x != y, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t NEQ(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = x ^ y;
+ return (q | -q) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Comparison: returns 1 if x > y, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t GT(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ /*
+ * If both x < 2^31 and y < 2^31, then y-x will have its high
+ * bit set if x > y, cleared otherwise.
+ *
+ * If either x >= 2^31 or y >= 2^31 (but not both), then the
+ * result is the high bit of x.
+ *
+ * If both x >= 2^31 and y >= 2^31, then we can virtually
+ * subtract 2^31 from both, and we are back to the first case.
+ * Since (y-2^31)-(x-2^31) = y-x, the subtraction is already
+ * fine.
+ */
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = y - x;
+ return (z ^ ((x ^ y) & (x ^ z))) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the bit length of a 32-bit integer. Returned value is between 0
+ * and 32 (inclusive).
+ */
+static uint32_t BIT_LENGTH(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t k, c;
+
+ k = NEQ(x, 0);
+ c = GT(x, 0xFFFF); x = MUX(c, x >> 16, x); k += c << 4;
+ c = GT(x, 0x00FF); x = MUX(c, x >> 8, x); k += c << 3;
+ c = GT(x, 0x000F); x = MUX(c, x >> 4, x); k += c << 2;
+ c = GT(x, 0x0003); x = MUX(c, x >> 2, x); k += c << 1;
+ k += GT(x, 0x0001);
+ return k;
+}
+
+#define GE(x, y) NOT(GT(y, x))
+#define LT(x, y) GT(y, x)
+#define MUL(x, y) ((uint64_t)(x) * (uint64_t)(y))
+
+/*
+ * Integers 'i32'
+ * --------------
+ *
+ * The 'i32' functions implement computations on big integers using
+ * an internal representation as an array of 32-bit integers. For
+ * an array x[]:
+ * -- x[0] contains the "announced bit length" of the integer
+ * -- x[1], x[2]... contain the value in little-endian order (x[1]
+ * contains the least significant 32 bits)
+ *
+ * Multiplications rely on the elementary 32x32->64 multiplication.
+ *
+ * The announced bit length specifies the number of bits that are
+ * significant in the subsequent 32-bit words. Unused bits in the
+ * last (most significant) word are set to 0; subsequent words are
+ * uninitialized and need not exist at all.
+ *
+ * The execution time and memory access patterns of all computations
+ * depend on the announced bit length, but not on the actual word
+ * values. For modular integers, the announced bit length of any integer
+ * modulo n is equal to the actual bit length of n; thus, computations
+ * on modular integers are "constant-time" (only the modulus length may
+ * leak).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Extract one word from an integer. The offset is counted in bits.
+ * The word MUST entirely fit within the word elements corresponding
+ * to the announced bit length of a[].
+ */
+static uint32_t br_i32_word(const uint32_t *a, uint32_t off)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned j;
+
+ u = (size_t)(off >> 5) + 1;
+ j = (unsigned)off & 31;
+ if (j == 0) {
+ return a[u];
+ } else {
+ return (a[u] >> j) | (a[u + 1] << (32 - j));
+ }
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_bitlen.c */
+
+/*
+ * Compute the actual bit length of an integer. The argument x should
+ * point to the first (least significant) value word of the integer.
+ * The len 'xlen' contains the number of 32-bit words to access.
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_i32_bit_length(uint32_t *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ uint32_t tw, twk;
+
+ tw = 0;
+ twk = 0;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t w, c;
+
+ c = EQ(tw, 0);
+ w = x[xlen];
+ tw = MUX(c, w, tw);
+ twk = MUX(c, (uint32_t)xlen, twk);
+ }
+ return (twk << 5) + BIT_LENGTH(tw);
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_decode.c */
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * "true" bit length of the integer is computed, but all words of x[]
+ * corresponding to the full 'len' bytes of the source are set.
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak.
+ */
+static void br_i32_decode(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, v;
+
+ buf = src;
+ u = len;
+ v = 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (u < 4) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ if (u < 2) {
+ if (u == 0) {
+ break;
+ } else {
+ w = buf[0];
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (u == 2) {
+ w = br_dec16be(buf);
+ } else {
+ w = ((uint32_t)buf[0] << 16)
+ | br_dec16be(buf + 1);
+ }
+ }
+ x[v ++] = w;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ u -= 4;
+ x[v ++] = br_dec32be(buf + u);
+ }
+ }
+ x[0] = br_i32_bit_length(x + 1, v - 1);
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_encode.c */
+
+/*
+ * Encode an integer into its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * output length in bytes is provided (parameter 'len'); if the length
+ * is too short then the integer is appropriately truncated; if it is
+ * too long then the extra bytes are set to 0.
+ */
+static void br_i32_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t k;
+
+ buf = dst;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the announced size of x in bytes; extra bytes are
+ * filled with zeros.
+ */
+ k = (x[0] + 7) >> 3;
+ while (len > k) {
+ *buf ++ = 0;
+ len --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we use k as index within x[]. That index starts at 1;
+ * we initialize it to the topmost complete word, and process
+ * any remaining incomplete word.
+ */
+ k = (len + 3) >> 2;
+ switch (len & 3) {
+ case 3:
+ *buf ++ = x[k] >> 16;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 2:
+ *buf ++ = x[k] >> 8;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 1:
+ *buf ++ = x[k];
+ k --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode all complete words.
+ */
+ while (k > 0) {
+ br_enc32be(buf, x[k]);
+ k --;
+ buf += 4;
+ }
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_ninv32.c */
+
+/*
+ * Compute -(1/x) mod 2^32. If x is even, then this function returns 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_i32_ninv32(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t y;
+
+ y = 2 - x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ return MUX(x & 1, -y, 0);
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_add.c */
+
+/*
+ * Add b[] to a[] and return the carry (0 or 1). If ctl is 0, then a[]
+ * is unmodified, but the carry is still computed and returned. The
+ * arrays a[] and b[] MUST have the same announced bit length.
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] MAY be the same array, but partial overlap is not allowed.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_i32_add(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw + bw + cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Carry is 1 if naw < aw. Carry is also 1 if naw == aw
+ * AND the carry was already 1.
+ */
+ cc = (cc & EQ(naw, aw)) | LT(naw, aw);
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_sub.c */
+
+/*
+ * Subtract b[] from a[] and return the carry (0 or 1). If ctl is 0,
+ * then a[] is unmodified, but the carry is still computed and returned.
+ * The arrays a[] and b[] MUST have the same announced bit length.
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] MAY be the same array, but partial overlap is not allowed.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_i32_sub(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw - bw - cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Carry is 1 if naw > aw. Carry is 1 also if naw == aw
+ * AND the carry was already 1.
+ */
+ cc = (cc & EQ(naw, aw)) | GT(naw, aw);
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_div32.c */
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time division. The dividend hi:lo is divided by the
+ * divisor d; the quotient is returned and the remainder is written
+ * in *r. If hi == d, then the quotient does not fit on 32 bits;
+ * returned value is thus truncated. If hi > d, returned values are
+ * indeterminate.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_divrem(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d, uint32_t *r)
+{
+ /* TODO: optimize this */
+ uint32_t q;
+ uint32_t ch, cf;
+ int k;
+
+ q = 0;
+ ch = EQ(hi, d);
+ hi = MUX(ch, 0, hi);
+ for (k = 31; k > 0; k --) {
+ int j;
+ uint32_t w, ctl, hi2, lo2;
+
+ j = 32 - k;
+ w = (hi << j) | (lo >> k);
+ ctl = GE(w, d) | (hi >> k);
+ hi2 = (w - d) >> j;
+ lo2 = lo - (d << k);
+ hi = MUX(ctl, hi2, hi);
+ lo = MUX(ctl, lo2, lo);
+ q |= ctl << k;
+ }
+ cf = GE(lo, d) | hi;
+ q |= cf;
+ *r = MUX(cf, lo - d, lo);
+ return q;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for br_divrem(); the remainder is returned, and the quotient
+ * is discarded.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_rem(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ br_divrem(hi, lo, d, &r);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for br_divrem(); the quotient is returned, and the remainder
+ * is discarded.
+ */
+static uint32_t br_div(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ return br_divrem(hi, lo, d, &r);
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_muladd.c */
+
+/*
+ * Multiply x[] by 2^32 and then add integer z, modulo m[]. This
+ * function assumes that x[] and m[] have the same announced bit
+ * length, and the announced bit length of m[] matches its true
+ * bit length.
+ *
+ * x[] and m[] MUST be distinct arrays.
+ *
+ * CT: only the common announced bit length of x and m leaks, not
+ * the values of x, z or m.
+ */
+static void br_i32_muladd_small(uint32_t *x, uint32_t z, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen;
+ size_t u, mlen;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, b0, hi, g, q, tb;
+ uint32_t chf, clow, under, over;
+ uint64_t cc;
+
+ /*
+ * We can test on the modulus bit length since we accept to
+ * leak that length.
+ */
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (m_bitlen <= 32) {
+ x[1] = br_rem(x[1], z, m[1]);
+ return;
+ }
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+
+ /*
+ * Principle: we estimate the quotient (x*2^32+z)/m by
+ * doing a 64/32 division with the high words.
+ *
+ * Let:
+ * w = 2^32
+ * a = (w*a0 + a1) * w^N + a2
+ * b = b0 * w^N + b2
+ * such that:
+ * 0 <= a0 < w
+ * 0 <= a1 < w
+ * 0 <= a2 < w^N
+ * w/2 <= b0 < w
+ * 0 <= b2 < w^N
+ * a < w*b
+ * I.e. the two top words of a are a0:a1, the top word of b is
+ * b0, we ensured that b0 is "full" (high bit set), and a is
+ * such that the quotient q = a/b fits on one word (0 <= q < w).
+ *
+ * If a = b*q + r (with 0 <= r < q), we can estimate q by
+ * doing an Euclidean division on the top words:
+ * a0*w+a1 = b0*u + v (with 0 <= v < w)
+ * Then the following holds:
+ * 0 <= u <= w
+ * u-2 <= q <= u
+ */
+ a0 = br_i32_word(x, m_bitlen - 32);
+ hi = x[mlen];
+ memmove(x + 2, x + 1, (mlen - 1) * sizeof *x);
+ x[1] = z;
+ a1 = br_i32_word(x, m_bitlen - 32);
+ b0 = br_i32_word(m, m_bitlen - 32);
+
+ /*
+ * We estimate a divisor q. If the quotient returned by br_div()
+ * is g:
+ * -- If a0 == b0 then g == 0; we want q = 0xFFFFFFFF.
+ * -- Otherwise:
+ * -- if g == 0 then we set q = 0;
+ * -- otherwise, we set q = g - 1.
+ * The properties described above then ensure that the true
+ * quotient is q-1, q or q+1.
+ */
+ g = br_div(a0, a1, b0);
+ q = MUX(EQ(a0, b0), 0xFFFFFFFF, MUX(EQ(g, 0), 0, g - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * We subtract q*m from x (with the extra high word of value 'hi').
+ * Since q may be off by 1 (in either direction), we may have to
+ * add or subtract m afterwards.
+ *
+ * The 'tb' flag will be true (1)@the end of the loop if the
+ * result is greater than or equal to the modulus (not counting
+ * 'hi' or the carry).
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ tb = 1;
+ for (u = 1; u <= mlen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t mw, zw, xw, nxw;
+ uint64_t zl;
+
+ mw = m[u];
+ zl = MUL(mw, q) + cc;
+ cc = (uint32_t)(zl >> 32);
+ zw = (uint32_t)zl;
+ xw = x[u];
+ nxw = xw - zw;
+ cc += (uint64_t)GT(nxw, xw);
+ x[u] = nxw;
+ tb = MUX(EQ(nxw, mw), tb, GT(nxw, mw));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we underestimated q, then either cc < hi (one extra bit
+ * beyond the top array word), or cc == hi and tb is true (no
+ * extra bit, but the result is not lower than the modulus). In
+ * these cases we must subtract m once.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, we may have overestimated, which will show as
+ * cc > hi (thus a negative result). Correction is adding m once.
+ */
+ chf = (uint32_t)(cc >> 32);
+ clow = (uint32_t)cc;
+ over = chf | GT(clow, hi);
+ under = ~over & (tb | (~chf & LT(clow, hi)));
+ br_i32_add(x, m, over);
+ br_i32_sub(x, m, under);
+}
+
+/* from BearSSL's src/int/i32_reduce.c */
+
+/*
+ * Reduce an integer (a[]) modulo another (m[]). The result is written
+ * in x[] and its announced bit length is set to be equal to that of m[].
+ *
+ * x[] MUST be distinct from a[] and m[].
+ *
+ * CT: only announced bit lengths leak, not values of x, a or m.
+ */
+static void br_i32_reduce(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen, a_bitlen;
+ size_t mlen, alen, u;
+
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+
+ x[0] = m_bitlen;
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the source is shorter, then simply copy all words from a[]
+ * and zero out the upper words.
+ */
+ a_bitlen = a[0];
+ alen = (a_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+ if (a_bitlen < m_bitlen) {
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 1, alen * sizeof *a);
+ for (u = alen; u < mlen; u ++) {
+ x[u + 1] = 0;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The source length is@least equal to that of the modulus.
+ * We must thus copy N-1 words, and input the remaining words
+ * one by one.
+ */
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 2 + (alen - mlen), (mlen - 1) * sizeof *a);
+ x[mlen] = 0;
+ for (u = 1 + alen - mlen; u > 0; u --) {
+ br_i32_muladd_small(x, a[u], m);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * rsa_free_key_prop() - Free key properties
+ * @prop: Pointer to struct key_prop
+ *
+ * This function frees all the memories allocated by rsa_gen_key_prop().
+ */
+void rsa_free_key_prop(struct key_prop *prop)
+{
+ if (!prop)
+ return;
+
+ free((void *)prop->modulus);
+ free((void *)prop->public_exponent);
+ free((void *)prop->rr);
+
+ free(prop);
+}
+
+/**
+ * rsa_gen_key_prop() - Generate key properties of RSA public key
+ * @key: Specifies key data in DER format
+ * @keylen: Length of @key
+ *
+ * This function takes a blob of encoded RSA public key data in DER
+ * format, parse it and generate all the relevant properties
+ * in key_prop structure.
+ *
+ * Return: Pointer to struct key_prop on success, NULL on error
+ */
+struct key_prop *rsa_gen_key_prop(const void *key, uint32_t keylen)
+{
+ struct key_prop *prop;
+ struct rsa_key rsa_key;
+#define BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE 4096
+ uint32_t *n, *rr, *rrtmp;
+ int rlen, i, ret;
+
+ prop = calloc(sizeof(*prop), 1);
+ if (!prop)
+ return NULL;
+ n = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
+ rr = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
+ rrtmp = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
+ if (!n || !rr || !rrtmp)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = rsa_parse_pub_key(&rsa_key, key, keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* modulus */
+ /* removing leading 0's */
+ for (i = 0; i < rsa_key.n_sz && !rsa_key.n[i]; i++)
+ ;
+ prop->num_bits = (rsa_key.n_sz - i) * 8;
+ prop->modulus = malloc(rsa_key.n_sz - i);
+ if (!prop->modulus)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy((void *)prop->modulus, &rsa_key.n[i], rsa_key.n_sz - i);
+
+ /* exponent */
+ prop->public_exponent = calloc(1, sizeof(uint64_t));
+ if (!prop->public_exponent)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy((void *)prop->public_exponent + sizeof(uint64_t) - rsa_key.e_sz,
+ rsa_key.e, rsa_key.e_sz);
+ prop->exp_len = rsa_key.e_sz;
+
+ /* n0 inverse */
+ br_i32_decode(n, &rsa_key.n[i], rsa_key.n_sz - i);
+ prop->n0inv = br_i32_ninv32(n[1]);
+
+ /* R^2 mod n; R = 2^(num_bits) */
+ rlen = prop->num_bits * 2; /* #bits of R^2 = (2^num_bits)^2 */
+ rr[0] = 0;
+ *(uint8_t *)&rr[0] = (1 << (rlen % 8));
+ for (i = 1; i < (((rlen + 31) >> 5) + 1); i++)
+ rr[i] = 0;
+ br_i32_decode(rrtmp, rr, ((rlen + 7) >> 3) + 1);
+ br_i32_reduce(rr, rrtmp, n);
+
+ rlen = (prop->num_bits + 7) >> 3; /* #bytes of R^2 mod n */
+ prop->rr = malloc(rlen);
+ if (!prop->rr)
+ goto err;
+ br_i32_encode((void *)prop->rr, rlen, rr);
+
+ return prop;
+
+err:
+ free(n);
+ free(rr);
+ free(rrtmp);
+ rsa_free_key_prop(prop);
+ return NULL;
+}
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey()
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test AKASHI Takahiro
5 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
This function, and hence rsa_verify(), will perform RSA verification
with two essential parameters for a RSA public key in contract of
rsa_verify_with_keynode(), which requires additional three parameters
stored in FIT image.
It will be used in implementing UEFI secure boot, i.e. image authentication
and variable authentication.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
index d2fd0692fa13..3f63bd9c175b 100644
--- a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
+++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
@@ -17,9 +17,14 @@
#include "mkimage.h"
#include <fdt_support.h>
#endif
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
+#ifndef __UBOOT__ /* for host tools */
+#undef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
+#endif
+
/* Default public exponent for backward compatibility */
#define RSA_DEFAULT_PUBEXP 65537
@@ -270,7 +275,7 @@ out:
}
#endif
-#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY)
/**
* rsa_verify_key() - Verify a signature against some data using RSA Key
*
@@ -344,6 +349,49 @@ static int rsa_verify_key(struct image_sign_info *info,
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
+/**
+ * rsa_verify_with_pkey() - Verify a signature against some data using
+ * only modulus and exponent as RSA key properties.
+ * @info: Specifies key information
+ * @hash: Pointer to the expected hash
+ * @sig: Signature
+ * @sig_len: Number of bytes in signature
+ *
+ * Parse a RSA public key blob in DER format pointed to in @info and fill
+ * a key_prop structure with properties of the key. Then verify a RSA PKCS1.5
+ * signature against an expected hash using the calculated properties.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if verified, -ve on error
+ */
+static int rsa_verify_with_pkey(struct image_sign_info *info,
+ const void *hash, uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
+{
+ struct key_prop *prop;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Public key is self-described to fill key_prop */
+ prop = rsa_gen_key_prop(info->key, info->keylen);
+ if (!prop) {
+ debug("Generating necessary parameter for decoding failed\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ ret = rsa_verify_key(info, prop, sig, sig_len, hash,
+ info->crypto->key_len);
+
+ rsa_free_key_prop(prop);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static int rsa_verify_with_pkey(struct image_sign_info *info,
+ const void *hash, uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
+{
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+#endif
+
#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
/**
* rsa_verify_with_keynode() - Verify a signature against some data using
@@ -434,6 +482,13 @@ int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) && !info->fdt_blob) {
+ /* don't rely on fdt properties */
+ ret = rsa_verify_with_pkey(info, hash, sig, sig_len);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)) {
const void *blob = info->fdt_blob;
int ndepth, noffset;
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey() AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-13 0:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
5 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-13 0:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
In this patch, a very simple test is added to verify that rsa_verify()
using rsa_verify_with_pkey() work correctly.
To keep the code simple, all the test data, either public key and
verified binary data, are embedded in the source.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
---
test/Kconfig | 12 +++
test/lib/Makefile | 1 +
test/lib/rsa.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 220 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 test/lib/rsa.c
diff --git a/test/Kconfig b/test/Kconfig
index cb7954041eda..64d76c3b20a5 100644
--- a/test/Kconfig
+++ b/test/Kconfig
@@ -28,6 +28,18 @@ config UT_LIB_ASN1
Enables a test which exercises asn1 compiler and decoder function
via various parsers.
+config UT_LIB_RSA
+ bool "Unit test for rsa_verify() function"
+ imply RSA
+ imply ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ imply ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ imply RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER
+ imply RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
+ default y
+ help
+ Enables rsa_verify() test, currently rsa_verify_with_pkey only()
+ only, at the 'ut lib' command.
+
endif
config UT_TIME
diff --git a/test/lib/Makefile b/test/lib/Makefile
index 72d2ec74b5f4..2bf6ef3935bb 100644
--- a/test/lib/Makefile
+++ b/test/lib/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += lmb.o
obj-y += string.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ERRNO_STR) += test_errno_str.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UT_LIB_ASN1) += asn1.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_UT_LIB_RSA) += rsa.o
diff --git a/test/lib/rsa.c b/test/lib/rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ef3860b59a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/lib/rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro Limited
+ * Author: AKASHI Takahiro
+ *
+ * Unit test for rsa_verify() function
+ */
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <command.h>
+#include <test/lib.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
+#include <test/ut.h>
+
+#include <image.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
+/*
+ * openssl genrsa 2048 -out private.pem
+ * openssl rsa -in private.pem -pubout -outform der -out public.der
+ * dd if=public.der of=public.raw bs=24 skip=1
+ */
+static unsigned char public_key[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xca, 0x25, 0x23,
+ 0xe0, 0x0a, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0x56, 0xfc, 0xc9, 0x06, 0x4c, 0xcc, 0x94, 0x43,
+ 0xe0, 0x56, 0x44, 0x6e, 0x37, 0x54, 0x87, 0x12, 0x84, 0xf9, 0x07, 0x4f,
+ 0xe4, 0x23, 0x40, 0xc3, 0x43, 0x84, 0x37, 0x86, 0xd3, 0x9d, 0x95, 0x1c,
+ 0xe4, 0x8a, 0x66, 0x02, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x3d, 0xce, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0x02, 0x6a,
+ 0xd4, 0x65, 0x61, 0xff, 0x85, 0x6f, 0x88, 0x63, 0xba, 0x31, 0x62, 0x1e,
+ 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x08, 0x3c, 0xe9, 0x35, 0xde, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x92, 0xb8,
+ 0x9e, 0x71, 0xa4, 0xcd, 0x47, 0xfd, 0x04, 0x26, 0xb9, 0x78, 0xbf, 0x05,
+ 0x0d, 0xfc, 0x00, 0x84, 0x08, 0xfc, 0xc4, 0x4b, 0xea, 0xf5, 0x97, 0x68,
+ 0x0d, 0x97, 0xd7, 0xff, 0x4f, 0x92, 0x82, 0xd7, 0xbb, 0xef, 0xb7, 0x67,
+ 0x8e, 0x72, 0x54, 0xe8, 0xc5, 0x9e, 0xfd, 0xd8, 0x38, 0xe9, 0xbe, 0x19,
+ 0x37, 0x5b, 0x36, 0x8b, 0xbf, 0x49, 0xa1, 0x59, 0x3a, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x92,
+ 0x08, 0x0b, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x7d, 0xd3, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0xc7,
+ 0xda, 0xd3, 0x19, 0x86, 0x37, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xab, 0x30, 0x96, 0xab, 0xa4,
+ 0xa2, 0x31, 0xa0, 0x38, 0xfb, 0xbf, 0x85, 0xd3, 0x24, 0x39, 0xed, 0xbf,
+ 0xe1, 0x31, 0xed, 0x6c, 0x39, 0xc1, 0xe5, 0x05, 0x2e, 0x12, 0x30, 0x36,
+ 0x73, 0x5d, 0x62, 0xf3, 0x82, 0xaf, 0x38, 0xc8, 0xca, 0xfa, 0xa1, 0x99,
+ 0x57, 0x3c, 0xe1, 0xc1, 0x7b, 0x05, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xa9, 0x10, 0xc8,
+ 0x68, 0xbd, 0x27, 0xb6, 0x19, 0x9c, 0xd2, 0xad, 0xb3, 0x1f, 0xca, 0x35,
+ 0x6e, 0x84, 0x23, 0xa1, 0xe9, 0xa4, 0x4c, 0xab, 0x19, 0x09, 0x79, 0x6e,
+ 0x3c, 0x7b, 0x74, 0xfc, 0x33, 0x05, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x2e, 0xeb, 0x55, 0x60,
+ 0x05, 0xc7, 0xcf, 0x3f, 0x92, 0xac, 0x2d, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x19, 0x16, 0x79,
+ 0x75, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01
+};
+
+static unsigned int public_key_len = 270;
+
+/*
+ * dd if=/dev/urandom of=data.raw bs=512 count=1
+ */
+static unsigned char data_raw[] = {
+ 0x3e, 0x48, 0x6e, 0xef, 0x83, 0xd1, 0x4c, 0xfd, 0x92, 0x47, 0x92, 0xd7,
+ 0xf6, 0x16, 0x25, 0x0a, 0xdf, 0xe2, 0xb6, 0x6c, 0xe7, 0xe0, 0x55, 0xb2,
+ 0x70, 0x66, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0xaf, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x4b,
+ 0xb5, 0xa7, 0x23, 0x1f, 0x2c, 0xce, 0xf8, 0x83, 0x00, 0x6d, 0xeb, 0xdd,
+ 0x19, 0x71, 0x13, 0xb4, 0xae, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xae, 0x52, 0xc8, 0xe1, 0x77,
+ 0x9e, 0x98, 0x75, 0xbc, 0xef, 0x36, 0x9f, 0x0c, 0x14, 0xed, 0x1a, 0x0a,
+ 0x4f, 0x6c, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0xbb, 0x0e, 0x43, 0x93, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x2e, 0x82,
+ 0x93, 0x4e, 0xcb, 0xa2, 0xcd, 0x59, 0x3f, 0xc5, 0x11, 0x38, 0x3a, 0x88,
+ 0xc3, 0xcf, 0xf9, 0x61, 0xa8, 0x9e, 0x96, 0xb6, 0xbf, 0xa6, 0x5b, 0x0d,
+ 0xd9, 0xbd, 0x05, 0x4c, 0xbe, 0xed, 0x86, 0xca, 0x10, 0x63, 0x72, 0x75,
+ 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x86, 0x42, 0x30, 0x9d, 0x54, 0x4e, 0x12, 0xda, 0xf4, 0xb4,
+ 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x54, 0x95, 0x8f, 0x83, 0xc2, 0x63, 0x44, 0xdd, 0x96, 0x1a,
+ 0xd0, 0x7c, 0xcf, 0xcb, 0x16, 0xd6, 0xff, 0xa3, 0xbb, 0xeb, 0x24, 0x06,
+ 0xbf, 0x81, 0xd0, 0x29, 0x76, 0x19, 0x66, 0x84, 0xfc, 0x49, 0xde, 0x7b,
+ 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x27, 0x58, 0x21, 0x7b, 0xff, 0x4d, 0x64, 0xf3, 0x89, 0xe3,
+ 0xea, 0xb6, 0x54, 0x4e, 0xb1, 0x62, 0x52, 0x89, 0xe3, 0x22, 0xf2, 0x26,
+ 0x3e, 0x4f, 0x43, 0x58, 0x78, 0x91, 0x55, 0xbc, 0x1e, 0xd6, 0x97, 0xfc,
+ 0x0b, 0x85, 0x4c, 0x92, 0x9c, 0xbf, 0xc4, 0xb1, 0x62, 0x93, 0x27, 0xa9,
+ 0xb2, 0xf4, 0xb4, 0x7a, 0xfb, 0x56, 0xe5, 0x8f, 0xe1, 0x94, 0x4d, 0xfd,
+ 0xe4, 0x72, 0x8d, 0xa9, 0x71, 0x65, 0xcb, 0x2e, 0x6d, 0x39, 0xd5, 0x95,
+ 0xe7, 0x3f, 0xab, 0xaa, 0x7a, 0x74, 0x84, 0x25, 0x4b, 0x42, 0x1e, 0xd3,
+ 0x86, 0xca, 0x47, 0x4a, 0xf0, 0x24, 0x81, 0x24, 0xb0, 0xe1, 0xbb, 0x6c,
+ 0x3f, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd6, 0x01, 0xce, 0x63, 0x51, 0xe1, 0x81,
+ 0xd2, 0x32, 0x43, 0x56, 0x44, 0x4a, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x24, 0xa2, 0xc7, 0x39,
+ 0x7c, 0x54, 0xda, 0xf8, 0xd4, 0x93, 0x7c, 0x8e, 0x4e, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x08,
+ 0xce, 0x27, 0xd8, 0x28, 0xb0, 0x5b, 0x75, 0x32, 0x43, 0xe8, 0xd6, 0xbf,
+ 0x12, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x12, 0x8e, 0xeb, 0x77, 0x8f, 0x00, 0xde, 0x45, 0x1e,
+ 0xdd, 0xf3, 0xef, 0x43, 0x99, 0x79, 0x86, 0xea, 0x01, 0xce, 0xf2, 0x4d,
+ 0xa0, 0xfe, 0x5a, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x1f, 0xce, 0xe8, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0x66, 0xdb,
+ 0xcb, 0x3f, 0xa5, 0x48, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x49, 0xa1, 0x29, 0x65, 0x5b, 0x62,
+ 0x39, 0xcc, 0xef, 0xbe, 0x86, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0x44, 0x67, 0x04, 0x04, 0xb1,
+ 0xec, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x38, 0xbc, 0x10, 0xea, 0x7a, 0x0e, 0xa4, 0xa4,
+ 0xcb, 0x21, 0xd9, 0xc7, 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xb8, 0x39, 0xb4, 0x07, 0x53, 0x3f,
+ 0xb9, 0x55, 0x55, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x11, 0x49, 0xc0, 0x94, 0x77, 0xaf, 0x76,
+ 0x97, 0x7f, 0x31, 0x08, 0xdd, 0x72, 0x48, 0x72, 0xf8, 0x11, 0x4f, 0x69,
+ 0x10, 0xef, 0x23, 0x06, 0xf3, 0x34, 0xac, 0xee, 0x97, 0x89, 0x41, 0x1c,
+ 0x36, 0x38, 0xb1, 0x80, 0x96, 0x7a, 0x9e, 0x72, 0xab, 0x25, 0xeb, 0xce,
+ 0x7b, 0xb8, 0x5d, 0xc8, 0xef, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x8f, 0x01, 0x54,
+ 0xce, 0x58, 0x19, 0xe5, 0x7e, 0xfa, 0x77, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x53, 0xc1, 0xcc,
+ 0x08, 0xe8, 0x1d, 0xe0, 0x82, 0x5e, 0xe1, 0xe6, 0xbd, 0xbb, 0x59, 0x7e,
+ 0x12, 0x9c, 0x39, 0x60, 0x23, 0xf7, 0xbe, 0x0a, 0x7c, 0x48, 0x12, 0xa0,
+ 0x84, 0x04, 0x3f, 0xa1, 0x6e, 0x92, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0xac, 0xee, 0x0b, 0xbc,
+ 0x18, 0x30, 0x28, 0xbd, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x3a, 0x35
+};
+
+static unsigned int data_raw_len = 512;
+
+/*
+ * openssl dgst -sha256 -sign private.key -out data.enc data.raw
+ */
+unsigned char data_enc[] = {
+ 0xa7, 0x4a, 0x12, 0x8f, 0xee, 0x65, 0x4b, 0xcd, 0x88, 0xca, 0x4d, 0xed,
+ 0xe3, 0x04, 0xe7, 0x7c, 0x59, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0xad, 0x95, 0x73, 0x5b, 0x2c,
+ 0x4e, 0xb5, 0xda, 0x5e, 0x3a, 0x6d, 0xb4, 0xc5, 0x84, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x4a,
+ 0x62, 0x0d, 0x5f, 0xba, 0x10, 0xee, 0xb1, 0x2a, 0xe1, 0xfe, 0x50, 0x18,
+ 0x97, 0xcc, 0xea, 0x26, 0x62, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x1d, 0x51, 0x38, 0x52, 0x89,
+ 0x4d, 0xa7, 0x18, 0xff, 0xa6, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0x7a, 0xc0, 0xa6, 0x22, 0xdf,
+ 0x41, 0x89, 0x93, 0x9b, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0xc1, 0xc8, 0x80, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x3f,
+ 0xa4, 0x7a, 0xd0, 0x07, 0xcb, 0x5c, 0xa4, 0x75, 0x12, 0x54, 0x78, 0x67,
+ 0xbf, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1e, 0x56, 0x33, 0x9e, 0xe0, 0x6e, 0x33, 0xa7, 0x58,
+ 0xb0, 0x47, 0x49, 0xa8, 0x37, 0xdb, 0x82, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x32, 0x9c, 0xdc,
+ 0xf4, 0x67, 0x17, 0x24, 0x55, 0xfd, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0x5c, 0xf9,
+ 0x15, 0x6c, 0x5e, 0xaa, 0x72, 0x03, 0x9e, 0x7c, 0x17, 0xf5, 0x7c, 0x37,
+ 0x96, 0x00, 0xb0, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x05, 0xfa, 0xaa, 0xa1, 0x78, 0x77, 0xd5,
+ 0x09, 0xdd, 0x05, 0xc7, 0xe2, 0x9f, 0x68, 0xc7, 0xf8, 0xfb, 0x0b, 0x6f,
+ 0x18, 0x1e, 0xcc, 0x93, 0xd3, 0x3f, 0xc9, 0x26, 0x29, 0x64, 0xe7, 0x15,
+ 0xdc, 0xb8, 0x19, 0x10, 0x24, 0x55, 0x55, 0x3b, 0x79, 0xa1, 0x65, 0x12,
+ 0xe0, 0x0b, 0x88, 0x44, 0x4c, 0xea, 0x85, 0x5a, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x45, 0x6e,
+ 0xe7, 0x83, 0x6f, 0x3a, 0xaa, 0x1e, 0xf1, 0x9c, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xb9, 0x37,
+ 0xa2, 0x15, 0x61, 0x93, 0x06, 0x23, 0xf5, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf8, 0x2b, 0xf7,
+ 0xc0, 0x68, 0x67, 0xf6, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x0d, 0x0d, 0x08, 0xbe, 0xfb, 0x2c,
+ 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x1a, 0xad, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xa1, 0x8d, 0x94, 0x1c, 0xd1,
+ 0x89, 0x06, 0xc9, 0x3a
+};
+
+static unsigned int data_enc_len = 256;
+
+/**
+ * lib_rsa_verify_valid() - unit test for rsa_verify()
+ *
+ * Test rsa_verify() with valid hash
+ *
+ * @uts: unit test state
+ * Return: 0 = success, 1 = failure
+ */
+static int lib_rsa_verify_valid(struct unit_test_state *uts)
+{
+ struct image_sign_info info;
+ struct image_region reg;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&info, '\0', sizeof(info));
+ info.name = "sha256,rsa2048";
+ info.padding = image_get_padding_algo("pkcs-1.5");
+ info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha256,rsa2048");
+ info.crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(info.name);
+
+ info.key = public_key;
+ info.keylen = public_key_len;
+
+ reg.data = data_raw;
+ reg.size = data_raw_len;
+ ret = rsa_verify(&info, ®, 1, data_enc, data_enc_len);
+ ut_assertf(ret == 0, "verification unexpectedly failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+ return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+LIB_TEST(lib_rsa_verify_valid, 0);
+
+/**
+ * lib_rsa_verify_invalid() - unit test for rsa_verify()
+ *
+ * Test rsa_verify() with invalid hash
+ *
+ * @uts: unit test state
+ * Return: 0 = success, 1 = failure
+ */
+static int lib_rsa_verify_invalid(struct unit_test_state *uts)
+{
+ struct image_sign_info info;
+ struct image_region reg;
+ unsigned char ctmp;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&info, '\0', sizeof(info));
+ info.name = "sha256,rsa2048";
+ info.padding = image_get_padding_algo("pkcs-1.5");
+ info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha256,rsa2048");
+ info.crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(info.name);
+
+ info.key = public_key;
+ info.keylen = public_key_len;
+
+ /* randomly corrupt enc'ed data */
+ ctmp = data_enc[data_enc_len - 10];
+ data_enc[data_enc_len - 10] = 0x12;
+
+ reg.data = data_raw;
+ reg.size = data_raw_len;
+ ret = rsa_verify(&info, ®, 1, data_enc, data_enc_len);
+
+ /* revert a change */
+ data_enc[data_enc_len - 10] = ctmp;
+
+ ut_assertf(ret != 0, "verification unexpectedly succeeded\n");
+
+ return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+LIB_TEST(lib_rsa_verify_invalid, 0);
+#endif /* RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY */
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2019-11-20 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Introduce new configuration, CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY which will decouple building
> RSA functions from FIT verification and allow for adding a RSA-based
> signature verification for other file formats, in particular PE file
> for UEFI secure boot.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> Kconfig | 1 +
> common/Makefile | 3 +-
> common/image-fit-sig.c | 417 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> common/image-fit.c | 6 +-
> common/image-sig.c | 396 --------------------------------------
> include/image.h | 13 +-
> lib/rsa/Kconfig | 12 ++
> lib/rsa/Makefile | 2 +-
> lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 78 +++++---
> tools/Makefile | 2 +-
> 10 files changed, 493 insertions(+), 437 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 common/image-fit-sig.c
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/6] rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/6] rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2019-11-20 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> In the next couple of commits, under new CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY,
> rsa_verify() will be extended to be able to perform RSA decryption without
> additional RSA key properties from FIT image, i.e. rr and n0inv.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> lib/rsa/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2019-11-20 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Hi Takahiro,
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> For FIT verification, all the properties of a public key come from
> "control fdt" pointed to by fdt_blob. In UEFI secure boot, on the other
> hand, a public key is located and retrieved from dedicated signature
> database stored as UEFI variables.
>
> Added two fields may hold values of a public key if fdt_blob is NULL, and
> will be used in rsa_verify_with_pkey() to verify a signature in UEFI
> sub-system.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> include/image.h | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
> diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
> index 7eb0b4b53184..bff87f51f01b 100644
> --- a/include/image.h
> +++ b/include/image.h
> @@ -1142,6 +1142,16 @@ struct image_sign_info {
> int required_keynode; /* Node offset of key to use: -1=any */
> const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */
> const char *engine_id; /* Engine to use for signing */
> + /*
> + * Note: the following two fields
> + * are always valid even w/o
> + * RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY in order
> + * to make sure this structure is
> + * the same on target and host.
> + * Otherwise, vboot test may fail.
> + */
Can you please align this comment to one tab in (to line up with 'const' above)?
> + const void *key; /* Pointer to public key in DER */
> + int keylen; /* Length of public key */
> };
>
> /* A part of an image, used for hashing */
> --
> 2.21.0
>
Regards,
Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey()
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey() AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:54 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2019-11-20 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Hi Takahiro,
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> This function, and hence rsa_verify(), will perform RSA verification
> with two essential parameters for a RSA public key in contract of
> rsa_verify_with_keynode(), which requires additional three parameters
> stored in FIT image.
>
> It will be used in implementing UEFI secure boot, i.e. image authentication
> and variable authentication.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Nits below though
>
> diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> index d2fd0692fa13..3f63bd9c175b 100644
> --- a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> @@ -17,9 +17,14 @@
> #include "mkimage.h"
> #include <fdt_support.h>
> #endif
> +#include <linux/kconfig.h>
> #include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
> #include <u-boot/rsa.h>
>
> +#ifndef __UBOOT__ /* for host tools */
Comment here as to why this is needed
> +#undef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> +#endif
> +
> /* Default public exponent for backward compatibility */
> #define RSA_DEFAULT_PUBEXP 65537
>
> @@ -270,7 +275,7 @@ out:
> }
> #endif
>
> -#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
> +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY)
> /**
> * rsa_verify_key() - Verify a signature against some data using RSA Key
> *
> @@ -344,6 +349,49 @@ static int rsa_verify_key(struct image_sign_info *info,
> }
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> +/**
> + * rsa_verify_with_pkey() - Verify a signature against some data using
> + * only modulus and exponent as RSA key properties.
> + * @info: Specifies key information
> + * @hash: Pointer to the expected hash
> + * @sig: Signature
> + * @sig_len: Number of bytes in signature
> + *
> + * Parse a RSA public key blob in DER format pointed to in @info and fill
> + * a key_prop structure with properties of the key. Then verify a RSA PKCS1.5
> + * signature against an expected hash using the calculated properties.
> + *
> + * Return 0 if verified, -ve on error
> + */
> +static int rsa_verify_with_pkey(struct image_sign_info *info,
> + const void *hash, uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
> +{
> + struct key_prop *prop;
> + int ret;
> +
> + /* Public key is self-described to fill key_prop */
> + prop = rsa_gen_key_prop(info->key, info->keylen);
This function should return an int error code, with the pointer as one
of the parameters. It isn't good to lose the real error here.
> + if (!prop) {
> + debug("Generating necessary parameter for decoding failed\n");
> + return -EACCES;
return real error here.
> + }
> +
> + ret = rsa_verify_key(info, prop, sig, sig_len, hash,
> + info->crypto->key_len);
> +
> + rsa_free_key_prop(prop);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +#else
> +static int rsa_verify_with_pkey(struct image_sign_info *info,
> + const void *hash, uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
> +{
> + return -EACCES;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> #if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
> /**
> * rsa_verify_with_keynode() - Verify a signature against some data using
> @@ -434,6 +482,13 @@ int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) && !info->fdt_blob) {
> + /* don't rely on fdt properties */
> + ret = rsa_verify_with_pkey(info, hash, sig, sig_len);
> +
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)) {
> const void *blob = info->fdt_blob;
> int ndepth, noffset;
> --
> 2.21.0
>
Regards,
Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:58 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2019-11-20 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Hi Takahiro,
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> In this patch, a very simple test is added to verify that rsa_verify()
> using rsa_verify_with_pkey() work correctly.
>
> To keep the code simple, all the test data, either public key and
> verified binary data, are embedded in the source.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> test/Kconfig | 12 +++
> test/lib/Makefile | 1 +
> test/lib/rsa.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 220 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 test/lib/rsa.c
>
> diff --git a/test/Kconfig b/test/Kconfig
> index cb7954041eda..64d76c3b20a5 100644
> --- a/test/Kconfig
> +++ b/test/Kconfig
> @@ -28,6 +28,18 @@ config UT_LIB_ASN1
> Enables a test which exercises asn1 compiler and decoder function
> via various parsers.
>
> +config UT_LIB_RSA
> + bool "Unit test for rsa_verify() function"
> + imply RSA
> + imply ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
> + imply ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
> + imply RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER
> + imply RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> + default y
> + help
> + Enables rsa_verify() test, currently rsa_verify_with_pkey only()
> + only, at the 'ut lib' command.
> +
> endif
>
> config UT_TIME
> diff --git a/test/lib/Makefile b/test/lib/Makefile
> index 72d2ec74b5f4..2bf6ef3935bb 100644
> --- a/test/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/test/lib/Makefile
> @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += lmb.o
> obj-y += string.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_ERRNO_STR) += test_errno_str.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UT_LIB_ASN1) += asn1.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_UT_LIB_RSA) += rsa.o
> diff --git a/test/lib/rsa.c b/test/lib/rsa.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..ef3860b59a2b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/test/lib/rsa.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro Limited
> + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro
> + *
> + * Unit test for rsa_verify() function
> + */
> +
> +#include <common.h>
> +#include <command.h>
> +#include <test/lib.h>
> +#include <test/test.h>
> +#include <test/ut.h>
> +
> +#include <image.h>
This should go below command.h above
[..]
> +/**
> + * lib_rsa_verify_valid() - unit test for rsa_verify()
> + *
> + * Test rsa_verify() with valid hash
> + *
> + * @uts: unit test state
> + * Return: 0 = success, 1 = failure
> + */
> +static int lib_rsa_verify_valid(struct unit_test_state *uts)
> +{
> + struct image_sign_info info;
> + struct image_region reg;
> + int ret;
> +
> + memset(&info, '\0', sizeof(info));
> + info.name = "sha256,rsa2048";
> + info.padding = image_get_padding_algo("pkcs-1.5");
> + info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha256,rsa2048");
> + info.crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(info.name);
> +
> + info.key = public_key;
> + info.keylen = public_key_len;
> +
> + reg.data = data_raw;
> + reg.size = data_raw_len;
> + ret = rsa_verify(&info, ®, 1, data_enc, data_enc_len);
> + ut_assertf(ret == 0, "verification unexpectedly failed (%d)\n", ret);
Should there not be a test for success as well?
> +
> + return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
> +}
> +
> +LIB_TEST(lib_rsa_verify_valid, 0);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key AKASHI Takahiro
@ 2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:53 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread
From: Simon Glass @ 2019-11-20 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Hi Takahiro,
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> In the current implementation of FIT_SIGNATURE, five parameters for
> a RSA public key are required while only two of them are essential.
> (See rsa-mod-exp.h and uImage.FIT/signature.txt)
> This is a result of considering relatively limited computer power
> and resources on embedded systems, while such a assumption may not
> be quite practical for other use cases.
>
> In this patch, added is a function, rsa_gen_key_prop(), which will
> generate additional parameters for other uses, in particular
> UEFI secure boot, on the fly.
>
> Note: the current code uses some "big number" routines from BearSSL
> for the calculation.
>
> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> ---
> include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h | 21 +
> lib/rsa/Kconfig | 1 +
> lib/rsa/Makefile | 1 +
> lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c | 717 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 740 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
>
> diff --git a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
> index 8a428c4b6a1a..374169b8304e 100644
> --- a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
> +++ b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct key_prop {
> uint32_t exp_len; /* Exponent length in number of uint8_t */
> };
>
> +/**
> + * rsa_gen_key_prop() - Generate key properties of RSA public key
> + * @key: Specifies key data in DER format
> + * @keylen: Length of @key
> + *
> + * This function takes a blob of encoded RSA public key data in DER
> + * format, parse it and generate all the relevant properties
> + * in key_prop structure.
> + *
> + * Return: Pointer to struct key_prop on success, NULL on error
> + */
> +struct key_prop *rsa_gen_key_prop(const void *key, uint32_t keylen);
> +
> +/**
> + * rsa_free_key_prop() - Free key properties
> + * @prop: Pointer to struct key_prop
> + *
> + * This function frees all the memories allocated by rsa_gen_key_prop().
> + */
> +void rsa_free_key_prop(struct key_prop *prop);
> +
> /**
> * rsa_mod_exp_sw() - Perform RSA Modular Exponentiation in sw
> *
> diff --git a/lib/rsa/Kconfig b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
> index 71e4c06bf883..d1d6f6cf64a3 100644
> --- a/lib/rsa/Kconfig
> +++ b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ config RSA_VERIFY
> config RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> bool "Execute RSA verification without key parameters from FDT"
> depends on RSA
> + imply RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER
> help
> The standard RSA-signature verification code (FIT_SIGNATURE) uses
> pre-calculated key properties, that are stored in fdt blob, in
> diff --git a/lib/rsa/Makefile b/lib/rsa/Makefile
> index c07305188e0c..14ed3cb4012b 100644
> --- a/lib/rsa/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/rsa/Makefile
> @@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
> # Wolfgang Denk, DENX Software Engineering, wd at denx.de.
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA_VERIFY) += rsa-verify.o rsa-checksum.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) += rsa-keyprop.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP) += rsa-mod-exp.o
> diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..9458337cc608
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,717 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ and MIT
> +/*
> + * RSA library - generate parameters for a public key
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro Limited
> + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro
> + *
> + * Big number routines in this file come from BearSSL:
Can we put these in their own file if we expect to update them? Really
should be called by the original filename and go in lib/bearsll.
[..]
> +/**
> + * rsa_gen_key_prop() - Generate key properties of RSA public key
> + * @key: Specifies key data in DER format
> + * @keylen: Length of @key
> + *
> + * This function takes a blob of encoded RSA public key data in DER
> + * format, parse it and generate all the relevant properties
> + * in key_prop structure.
> + *
> + * Return: Pointer to struct key_prop on success, NULL on error
> + */
> +struct key_prop *rsa_gen_key_prop(const void *key, uint32_t keylen)
> +{
> + struct key_prop *prop;
> + struct rsa_key rsa_key;
> +#define BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE 4096
const int?
> + uint32_t *n, *rr, *rrtmp;
> + int rlen, i, ret;
> +
> + prop = calloc(sizeof(*prop), 1);
> + if (!prop)
> + return NULL;
> + n = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
> + rr = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
> + rrtmp = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
> + if (!n || !rr || !rrtmp)
> + return NULL;
This can cause memory leak and will likely generate a coverity warning.
> +
> + ret = rsa_parse_pub_key(&rsa_key, key, keylen);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err;
> +
> + /* modulus */
> + /* removing leading 0's */
> + for (i = 0; i < rsa_key.n_sz && !rsa_key.n[i]; i++)
> + ;
> + prop->num_bits = (rsa_key.n_sz - i) * 8;
> + prop->modulus = malloc(rsa_key.n_sz - i);
> + if (!prop->modulus)
> + goto err;
> + memcpy((void *)prop->modulus, &rsa_key.n[i], rsa_key.n_sz - i);
> +
> + /* exponent */
> + prop->public_exponent = calloc(1, sizeof(uint64_t));
> + if (!prop->public_exponent)
> + goto err;
> + memcpy((void *)prop->public_exponent + sizeof(uint64_t) - rsa_key.e_sz,
> + rsa_key.e, rsa_key.e_sz);
> + prop->exp_len = rsa_key.e_sz;
> +
> + /* n0 inverse */
> + br_i32_decode(n, &rsa_key.n[i], rsa_key.n_sz - i);
> + prop->n0inv = br_i32_ninv32(n[1]);
> +
> + /* R^2 mod n; R = 2^(num_bits) */
> + rlen = prop->num_bits * 2; /* #bits of R^2 = (2^num_bits)^2 */
> + rr[0] = 0;
> + *(uint8_t *)&rr[0] = (1 << (rlen % 8));
> + for (i = 1; i < (((rlen + 31) >> 5) + 1); i++)
> + rr[i] = 0;
> + br_i32_decode(rrtmp, rr, ((rlen + 7) >> 3) + 1);
> + br_i32_reduce(rr, rrtmp, n);
> +
> + rlen = (prop->num_bits + 7) >> 3; /* #bytes of R^2 mod n */
> + prop->rr = malloc(rlen);
> + if (!prop->rr)
> + goto err;
> + br_i32_encode((void *)prop->rr, rlen, rr);
> +
> + return prop;
> +
> +err:
> + free(n);
> + free(rr);
> + free(rrtmp);
> + rsa_free_key_prop(prop);
> + return NULL;
This should return -ENOMEM if we are out of memory. The caller cannot
divine what went wrong.
> +}
> --
> 2.21.0
>
Regards,
Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
@ 2019-11-20 5:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-20 5:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Simon,
Thank you for your review.
On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 06:59:54PM -0800, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Takahiro,
>
> On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
> <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > For FIT verification, all the properties of a public key come from
> > "control fdt" pointed to by fdt_blob. In UEFI secure boot, on the other
> > hand, a public key is located and retrieved from dedicated signature
> > database stored as UEFI variables.
> >
> > Added two fields may hold values of a public key if fdt_blob is NULL, and
> > will be used in rsa_verify_with_pkey() to verify a signature in UEFI
> > sub-system.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > include/image.h | 10 ++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
> >
>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
>
> > diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
> > index 7eb0b4b53184..bff87f51f01b 100644
> > --- a/include/image.h
> > +++ b/include/image.h
> > @@ -1142,6 +1142,16 @@ struct image_sign_info {
> > int required_keynode; /* Node offset of key to use: -1=any */
> > const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */
> > const char *engine_id; /* Engine to use for signing */
> > + /*
> > + * Note: the following two fields
> > + * are always valid even w/o
> > + * RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY in order
> > + * to make sure this structure is
> > + * the same on target and host.
> > + * Otherwise, vboot test may fail.
> > + */
>
> Can you please align this comment to one tab in (to line up with 'const' above)?
Sure.
-Takahiro Akashi
> > + const void *key; /* Pointer to public key in DER */
> > + int keylen; /* Length of public key */
> > };
> >
> > /* A part of an image, used for hashing */
> > --
> > 2.21.0
> >
>
> Regards,
> Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
@ 2019-11-20 5:53 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-20 5:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Simon,
On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 06:59:59PM -0800, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Takahiro,
>
> On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
> <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > In the current implementation of FIT_SIGNATURE, five parameters for
> > a RSA public key are required while only two of them are essential.
> > (See rsa-mod-exp.h and uImage.FIT/signature.txt)
> > This is a result of considering relatively limited computer power
> > and resources on embedded systems, while such a assumption may not
> > be quite practical for other use cases.
> >
> > In this patch, added is a function, rsa_gen_key_prop(), which will
> > generate additional parameters for other uses, in particular
> > UEFI secure boot, on the fly.
> >
> > Note: the current code uses some "big number" routines from BearSSL
> > for the calculation.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h | 21 +
> > lib/rsa/Kconfig | 1 +
> > lib/rsa/Makefile | 1 +
> > lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c | 717 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 740 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
> >
> > diff --git a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
> > index 8a428c4b6a1a..374169b8304e 100644
> > --- a/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
> > +++ b/include/u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h
> > @@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct key_prop {
> > uint32_t exp_len; /* Exponent length in number of uint8_t */
> > };
> >
> > +/**
> > + * rsa_gen_key_prop() - Generate key properties of RSA public key
> > + * @key: Specifies key data in DER format
> > + * @keylen: Length of @key
> > + *
> > + * This function takes a blob of encoded RSA public key data in DER
> > + * format, parse it and generate all the relevant properties
> > + * in key_prop structure.
> > + *
> > + * Return: Pointer to struct key_prop on success, NULL on error
> > + */
> > +struct key_prop *rsa_gen_key_prop(const void *key, uint32_t keylen);
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * rsa_free_key_prop() - Free key properties
> > + * @prop: Pointer to struct key_prop
> > + *
> > + * This function frees all the memories allocated by rsa_gen_key_prop().
> > + */
> > +void rsa_free_key_prop(struct key_prop *prop);
> > +
> > /**
> > * rsa_mod_exp_sw() - Perform RSA Modular Exponentiation in sw
> > *
> > diff --git a/lib/rsa/Kconfig b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
> > index 71e4c06bf883..d1d6f6cf64a3 100644
> > --- a/lib/rsa/Kconfig
> > +++ b/lib/rsa/Kconfig
> > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ config RSA_VERIFY
> > config RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> > bool "Execute RSA verification without key parameters from FDT"
> > depends on RSA
> > + imply RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER
> > help
> > The standard RSA-signature verification code (FIT_SIGNATURE) uses
> > pre-calculated key properties, that are stored in fdt blob, in
> > diff --git a/lib/rsa/Makefile b/lib/rsa/Makefile
> > index c07305188e0c..14ed3cb4012b 100644
> > --- a/lib/rsa/Makefile
> > +++ b/lib/rsa/Makefile
> > @@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
> > # Wolfgang Denk, DENX Software Engineering, wd at denx.de.
> >
> > obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA_VERIFY) += rsa-verify.o rsa-checksum.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) += rsa-keyprop.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_RSA_SOFTWARE_EXP) += rsa-mod-exp.o
> > diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..9458337cc608
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-keyprop.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,717 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ and MIT
> > +/*
> > + * RSA library - generate parameters for a public key
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro Limited
> > + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro
> > + *
> > + * Big number routines in this file come from BearSSL:
>
> Can we put these in their own file if we expect to update them? Really
> should be called by the original filename and go in lib/bearsll.
Honestly, I'd rather disagree with you because
* in the original code, each file has only a single function, then
we will have to introduce bunch of small source files.
* it is quite unlikely for other components to re-use some of
those functions in the future.
So splitting the file would practically make little use.
> [..]
>
> > +/**
> > + * rsa_gen_key_prop() - Generate key properties of RSA public key
> > + * @key: Specifies key data in DER format
> > + * @keylen: Length of @key
> > + *
> > + * This function takes a blob of encoded RSA public key data in DER
> > + * format, parse it and generate all the relevant properties
> > + * in key_prop structure.
> > + *
> > + * Return: Pointer to struct key_prop on success, NULL on error
> > + */
> > +struct key_prop *rsa_gen_key_prop(const void *key, uint32_t keylen)
> > +{
> > + struct key_prop *prop;
> > + struct rsa_key rsa_key;
> > +#define BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE 4096
>
> const int?
Will change it to
const int max_rsa_size = 4096;
> > + uint32_t *n, *rr, *rrtmp;
> > + int rlen, i, ret;
> > +
> > + prop = calloc(sizeof(*prop), 1);
> > + if (!prop)
> > + return NULL;
> > + n = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
> > + rr = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
> > + rrtmp = calloc(sizeof(uint32_t), 1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5));
> > + if (!n || !rr || !rrtmp)
> > + return NULL;
>
> This can cause memory leak and will likely generate a coverity warning.
Okay, will fix it.
> > +
> > + ret = rsa_parse_pub_key(&rsa_key, key, keylen);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto err;
> > +
> > + /* modulus */
> > + /* removing leading 0's */
> > + for (i = 0; i < rsa_key.n_sz && !rsa_key.n[i]; i++)
> > + ;
> > + prop->num_bits = (rsa_key.n_sz - i) * 8;
> > + prop->modulus = malloc(rsa_key.n_sz - i);
> > + if (!prop->modulus)
> > + goto err;
> > + memcpy((void *)prop->modulus, &rsa_key.n[i], rsa_key.n_sz - i);
> > +
> > + /* exponent */
> > + prop->public_exponent = calloc(1, sizeof(uint64_t));
> > + if (!prop->public_exponent)
> > + goto err;
> > + memcpy((void *)prop->public_exponent + sizeof(uint64_t) - rsa_key.e_sz,
> > + rsa_key.e, rsa_key.e_sz);
> > + prop->exp_len = rsa_key.e_sz;
> > +
> > + /* n0 inverse */
> > + br_i32_decode(n, &rsa_key.n[i], rsa_key.n_sz - i);
> > + prop->n0inv = br_i32_ninv32(n[1]);
> > +
> > + /* R^2 mod n; R = 2^(num_bits) */
> > + rlen = prop->num_bits * 2; /* #bits of R^2 = (2^num_bits)^2 */
> > + rr[0] = 0;
> > + *(uint8_t *)&rr[0] = (1 << (rlen % 8));
> > + for (i = 1; i < (((rlen + 31) >> 5) + 1); i++)
> > + rr[i] = 0;
> > + br_i32_decode(rrtmp, rr, ((rlen + 7) >> 3) + 1);
> > + br_i32_reduce(rr, rrtmp, n);
> > +
> > + rlen = (prop->num_bits + 7) >> 3; /* #bytes of R^2 mod n */
> > + prop->rr = malloc(rlen);
> > + if (!prop->rr)
> > + goto err;
> > + br_i32_encode((void *)prop->rr, rlen, rr);
> > +
> > + return prop;
> > +
> > +err:
> > + free(n);
> > + free(rr);
> > + free(rrtmp);
> > + rsa_free_key_prop(prop);
> > + return NULL;
>
> This should return -ENOMEM if we are out of memory. The caller cannot
> divine what went wrong.
Agree.
Thank you for your review,
-Takahiro Akashi
> > +}
> > --
> > 2.21.0
> >
>
> Regards,
> Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey()
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
@ 2019-11-20 5:54 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-20 5:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Simon,
On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 06:59:56PM -0800, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Takahiro,
>
> On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
> <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > This function, and hence rsa_verify(), will perform RSA verification
> > with two essential parameters for a RSA public key in contract of
> > rsa_verify_with_keynode(), which requires additional three parameters
> > stored in FIT image.
> >
> > It will be used in implementing UEFI secure boot, i.e. image authentication
> > and variable authentication.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
>
> Nits below though
>
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> > index d2fd0692fa13..3f63bd9c175b 100644
> > --- a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> > +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c
> > @@ -17,9 +17,14 @@
> > #include "mkimage.h"
> > #include <fdt_support.h>
> > #endif
> > +#include <linux/kconfig.h>
> > #include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
> > #include <u-boot/rsa.h>
> >
> > +#ifndef __UBOOT__ /* for host tools */
>
> Comment here as to why this is needed
Sure.
> > +#undef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> > +#endif
> > +
> > /* Default public exponent for backward compatibility */
> > #define RSA_DEFAULT_PUBEXP 65537
> >
> > @@ -270,7 +275,7 @@ out:
> > }
> > #endif
> >
> > -#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
> > +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY)
> > /**
> > * rsa_verify_key() - Verify a signature against some data using RSA Key
> > *
> > @@ -344,6 +349,49 @@ static int rsa_verify_key(struct image_sign_info *info,
> > }
> > #endif
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> > +/**
> > + * rsa_verify_with_pkey() - Verify a signature against some data using
> > + * only modulus and exponent as RSA key properties.
> > + * @info: Specifies key information
> > + * @hash: Pointer to the expected hash
> > + * @sig: Signature
> > + * @sig_len: Number of bytes in signature
> > + *
> > + * Parse a RSA public key blob in DER format pointed to in @info and fill
> > + * a key_prop structure with properties of the key. Then verify a RSA PKCS1.5
> > + * signature against an expected hash using the calculated properties.
> > + *
> > + * Return 0 if verified, -ve on error
> > + */
> > +static int rsa_verify_with_pkey(struct image_sign_info *info,
> > + const void *hash, uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
> > +{
> > + struct key_prop *prop;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + /* Public key is self-described to fill key_prop */
> > + prop = rsa_gen_key_prop(info->key, info->keylen);
>
> This function should return an int error code, with the pointer as one
> of the parameters. It isn't good to lose the real error here.
Okay.
> > + if (!prop) {
> > + debug("Generating necessary parameter for decoding failed\n");
> > + return -EACCES;
>
> return real error here.
Okay.
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = rsa_verify_key(info, prop, sig, sig_len, hash,
> > + info->crypto->key_len);
> > +
> > + rsa_free_key_prop(prop);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +#else
> > +static int rsa_verify_with_pkey(struct image_sign_info *info,
> > + const void *hash, uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len)
> > +{
> > + return -EACCES;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > #if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
> > /**
> > * rsa_verify_with_keynode() - Verify a signature against some data using
> > @@ -434,6 +482,13 @@ int rsa_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
> > return -EINVAL;
> > }
> >
> > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY) && !info->fdt_blob) {
> > + /* don't rely on fdt properties */
> > + ret = rsa_verify_with_pkey(info, hash, sig, sig_len);
> > +
> > + return ret;
> > + }
> > +
> > if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)) {
> > const void *blob = info->fdt_blob;
> > int ndepth, noffset;
> > --
> > 2.21.0
> >
>
> Regards,
> Simon
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
@ 2019-11-20 5:58 ` AKASHI Takahiro
0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: AKASHI Takahiro @ 2019-11-20 5:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Simon,
On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 06:59:57PM -0800, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Takahiro,
>
> On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 at 16:47, AKASHI Takahiro
> <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
> >
> > In this patch, a very simple test is added to verify that rsa_verify()
> > using rsa_verify_with_pkey() work correctly.
> >
> > To keep the code simple, all the test data, either public key and
> > verified binary data, are embedded in the source.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
> > ---
> > test/Kconfig | 12 +++
> > test/lib/Makefile | 1 +
> > test/lib/rsa.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 220 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 test/lib/rsa.c
> >
> > diff --git a/test/Kconfig b/test/Kconfig
> > index cb7954041eda..64d76c3b20a5 100644
> > --- a/test/Kconfig
> > +++ b/test/Kconfig
> > @@ -28,6 +28,18 @@ config UT_LIB_ASN1
> > Enables a test which exercises asn1 compiler and decoder function
> > via various parsers.
> >
> > +config UT_LIB_RSA
> > + bool "Unit test for rsa_verify() function"
> > + imply RSA
> > + imply ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
> > + imply ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
> > + imply RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARSER
> > + imply RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY
> > + default y
> > + help
> > + Enables rsa_verify() test, currently rsa_verify_with_pkey only()
> > + only, at the 'ut lib' command.
> > +
> > endif
> >
> > config UT_TIME
> > diff --git a/test/lib/Makefile b/test/lib/Makefile
> > index 72d2ec74b5f4..2bf6ef3935bb 100644
> > --- a/test/lib/Makefile
> > +++ b/test/lib/Makefile
> > @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += lmb.o
> > obj-y += string.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_ERRNO_STR) += test_errno_str.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_UT_LIB_ASN1) += asn1.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_UT_LIB_RSA) += rsa.o
> > diff --git a/test/lib/rsa.c b/test/lib/rsa.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..ef3860b59a2b
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/test/lib/rsa.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro Limited
> > + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro
> > + *
> > + * Unit test for rsa_verify() function
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <common.h>
> > +#include <command.h>
> > +#include <test/lib.h>
> > +#include <test/test.h>
> > +#include <test/ut.h>
> > +
> > +#include <image.h>
>
> This should go below command.h above
Okay.
> [..]
>
> > +/**
> > + * lib_rsa_verify_valid() - unit test for rsa_verify()
> > + *
> > + * Test rsa_verify() with valid hash
> > + *
> > + * @uts: unit test state
> > + * Return: 0 = success, 1 = failure
> > + */
> > +static int lib_rsa_verify_valid(struct unit_test_state *uts)
> > +{
> > + struct image_sign_info info;
> > + struct image_region reg;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + memset(&info, '\0', sizeof(info));
> > + info.name = "sha256,rsa2048";
> > + info.padding = image_get_padding_algo("pkcs-1.5");
> > + info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha256,rsa2048");
> > + info.crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(info.name);
> > +
> > + info.key = public_key;
> > + info.keylen = public_key_len;
> > +
> > + reg.data = data_raw;
> > + reg.size = data_raw_len;
> > + ret = rsa_verify(&info, ®, 1, data_enc, data_enc_len);
> > + ut_assertf(ret == 0, "verification unexpectedly failed (%d)\n", ret);
>
> Should there not be a test for success as well?
I'm not quite sure what you meant here.
I think that lib_rsa_verify_invalid() covers a test case for your request.
Thanks,
-Takahiro Akashi
> > +
> > + return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
> > +}
> > +
> > +LIB_TEST(lib_rsa_verify_valid, 0);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-11-20 5:58 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-11-13 0:47 [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 0/6] rsa: extend rsa_verify() for UEFI secure boot AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 1/6] lib: rsa: decouple rsa from FIT image verification AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 2/6] rsa: add CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY config AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 3/6] include: image.h: add key info to image_sign_info AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:47 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 4/6] lib: rsa: generate additional parameters for public key AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:53 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 5/6] lib: rsa: add rsa_verify_with_pkey() AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:54 ` AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-13 0:47 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH v3 6/6] test: add rsa_verify() unit test AKASHI Takahiro
2019-11-20 2:59 ` Simon Glass
2019-11-20 5:58 ` AKASHI Takahiro
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