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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: READ_ONCE() + STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG == :/ (was Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull powerpc/linux.git powerpc-5.5-2 tag (topic/kasan-bitops))
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:28:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191213144359.GA3826@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAK8P3a2QYpT_u3D7c_w+hoyeO-Stkj5MWyU_LgGOqnMtKLEudg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Dec 13, 2019 at 02:17:08PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 9:50 PM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 11:34 AM Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > The root of my concern in all of this, and what started me looking at it in
> > > the first place, is the interaction with 'typeof()'. Inheriting 'volatile'
> > > for a pointer means that local variables in macros declared using typeof()
> > > suddenly start generating *hideous* code, particularly when pointless stack
> > > spills get stackprotector all excited.
> >
> > Yeah, removing volatile can be a bit annoying.
> >
> > For the particular case of the bitops, though, it's not an issue.
> > Since you know the type there, you can just cast it.
> >
> > And if we had the rule that READ_ONCE() was an arithmetic type, you could do
> >
> >     typeof(0+(*p)) __var;
> >
> > since you might as well get the integer promotion anyway (on the
> > non-volatile result).
> >
> > But that doesn't work with structures or unions, of course.
> >
> > I'm not entirely sure we have READ_ONCE() with a struct. I do know we
> > have it with 64-bit entities on 32-bit machines, but that's ok with
> > the "0+" trick.
> 
> I'll have my randconfig builder look for instances, so far I found one,
> see below. My feeling is that it would be better to enforce at least
> the size being a 1/2/4/8, to avoid cases where someone thinks
> the access is atomic, but it falls back on a memcpy.

I've been using something similar built on compiletime_assert_atomic_type()
and I spotted another instance in the xdp code (xskq_validate_desc()) which
tries to READ_ONCE() on a 128-bit descriptor, although a /very/ quick read
of the code suggests that this probably can't be concurrently modified if
the ring indexes are synchronised properly.

However, enabling this for 32-bit ARM is total carnage; as Linus mentioned,
a whole bunch of code appears to be relying on atomic 64-bit access of
READ_ONCE(); the perf ring buffer, io_uring, the scheduler, pm_runtime,
cpuidle, ... :(

Unfortunately, at least some of these *do* look like bugs, but I can't see
how we can fix them, not least because the first two are user ABI afaict. It
may also be that in practice we get 2x32-bit stores, and that works out fine
when storing a 32-bit virtual address. I'm not sure what (if anything) the
compiler guarantees in these cases.

Will

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Subject: Re: READ_ONCE() + STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG == :/ (was Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull powerpc/linux.git powerpc-5.5-2 tag (topic/kasan-bitops))
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:28:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191213144359.GA3826@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAK8P3a2QYpT_u3D7c_w+hoyeO-Stkj5MWyU_LgGOqnMtKLEudg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Dec 13, 2019 at 02:17:08PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 9:50 PM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 11:34 AM Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > The root of my concern in all of this, and what started me looking at it in
> > > the first place, is the interaction with 'typeof()'. Inheriting 'volatile'
> > > for a pointer means that local variables in macros declared using typeof()
> > > suddenly start generating *hideous* code, particularly when pointless stack
> > > spills get stackprotector all excited.
> >
> > Yeah, removing volatile can be a bit annoying.
> >
> > For the particular case of the bitops, though, it's not an issue.
> > Since you know the type there, you can just cast it.
> >
> > And if we had the rule that READ_ONCE() was an arithmetic type, you could do
> >
> >     typeof(0+(*p)) __var;
> >
> > since you might as well get the integer promotion anyway (on the
> > non-volatile result).
> >
> > But that doesn't work with structures or unions, of course.
> >
> > I'm not entirely sure we have READ_ONCE() with a struct. I do know we
> > have it with 64-bit entities on 32-bit machines, but that's ok with
> > the "0+" trick.
> 
> I'll have my randconfig builder look for instances, so far I found one,
> see below. My feeling is that it would be better to enforce at least
> the size being a 1/2/4/8, to avoid cases where someone thinks
> the access is atomic, but it falls back on a memcpy.

I've been using something similar built on compiletime_assert_atomic_type()
and I spotted another instance in the xdp code (xskq_validate_desc()) which
tries to READ_ONCE() on a 128-bit descriptor, although a /very/ quick read
of the code suggests that this probably can't be concurrently modified if
the ring indexes are synchronised properly.

However, enabling this for 32-bit ARM is total carnage; as Linus mentioned,
a whole bunch of code appears to be relying on atomic 64-bit access of
READ_ONCE(); the perf ring buffer, io_uring, the scheduler, pm_runtime,
cpuidle, ... :(

Unfortunately, at least some of these *do* look like bugs, but I can't see
how we can fix them, not least because the first two are user ABI afaict. It
may also be that in practice we get 2x32-bit stores, and that works out fine
when storing a 32-bit virtual address. I'm not sure what (if anything) the
compiler guarantees in these cases.

Will

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-12-16 10:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-06 12:46 [GIT PULL] Please pull powerpc/linux.git powerpc-5.5-2 tag (topic/kasan-bitops) Michael Ellerman
2019-12-06 12:46 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-06 13:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-06 13:16   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-10  5:38   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-10  5:38     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-10 10:15     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-10 10:15       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-11  0:29       ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-11  0:29         ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-12  5:42   ` READ_ONCE() + STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG == :/ (was Re: [GIT PULL] Please pull powerpc/linux.git powerpc-5.5-2 tag (topic/kasan-bitops)) Michael Ellerman
2019-12-12  5:42     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-12  8:01     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12  8:01       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12 10:07       ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 10:07         ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 10:46         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12 10:46           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12 17:04           ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 17:04             ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 17:16             ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 17:16               ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 17:41           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-12 17:41             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-12 17:50             ` Segher Boessenkool
2019-12-12 17:50               ` Segher Boessenkool
2019-12-12 18:06             ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 18:06               ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 18:29               ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 18:29                 ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12 18:43               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-12 18:43                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-12 19:34                 ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 19:34                   ` Will Deacon
2019-12-12 20:21                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12 20:21                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12 20:53                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-12 20:53                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-13 10:47                       ` Luc Van Oostenryck
2019-12-13 10:47                         ` Luc Van Oostenryck
2019-12-13 12:56                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-13 12:56                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-13 14:28                           ` Luc Van Oostenryck
2019-12-13 14:28                             ` Luc Van Oostenryck
2019-12-12 20:49                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-12 20:49                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-13 13:17                     ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-12-13 13:17                       ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-12-13 21:32                       ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-12-13 21:32                         ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-12-13 22:01                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-13 22:01                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-16 10:28                       ` Will Deacon [this message]
2019-12-16 10:28                         ` Will Deacon
2019-12-16 11:47                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-16 11:47                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-16 12:06                         ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-12-16 12:06                           ` Arnd Bergmann
2019-12-17 17:07                     ` Will Deacon
2019-12-17 17:07                       ` Will Deacon
2019-12-17 18:04                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-17 18:04                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-17 18:05                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-17 18:05                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-17 18:31                           ` Will Deacon
2019-12-17 18:31                             ` Will Deacon
2019-12-17 18:32                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-17 18:32                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-12-18 12:17                           ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-18 12:17                             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-19 12:11                           ` Will Deacon
2019-12-19 12:11                             ` Will Deacon
2019-12-18 10:22                     ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-18 10:22                       ` Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-18 10:35                       ` Will Deacon
2019-12-18 10:35                         ` Will Deacon
2019-12-13 12:07           ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-13 12:07             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-13 13:53             ` Segher Boessenkool
2019-12-13 13:53               ` Segher Boessenkool
2019-12-13 21:06               ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-13 21:06                 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-12-12 15:10     ` Segher Boessenkool
2019-12-12 15:10       ` Segher Boessenkool
2019-12-06 22:15 ` [GIT PULL] Please pull powerpc/linux.git powerpc-5.5-2 tag (topic/kasan-bitops) pr-tracker-bot
2019-12-06 22:15   ` pr-tracker-bot

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