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* [zeus][PATCH 1/3] rsync: whitelist CVE-2017-16548
@ 2020-02-05  7:39 Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 2/3] curl: fix CVE-2019-15601 Anuj Mittal
                   ` (2 more replies)
  0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Anuj Mittal @ 2020-02-05  7:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core

From: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>

patch for this CVE applies to v3.1.3pre1 not for v3.1.3.
patch already in v3.1.3.
see
https://git.samba.org/rsync.git/?p=rsync.git;a=commitdiff;h=47a63d90e71d3e19e0e96052bb8c6b9cb140ecc1;hp=bc112b0e7feece62ce98708092306639a8a53cce

(From OE-Core rev: 1e2739c821312527010fb0afbde5a20cd3f03d24)

Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb
index ffb1d061c0..152ff02a25 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.1.3.bb
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "1581a588fde9d89f6bc6201e8129afaf"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "55cc554efec5fdaad70de921cd5a5eeb6c29a95524c715f3bbf849235b0800c0"
 
+# -16548 required for v3.1.3pre1. Already in v3.1.3.
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += " CVE-2017-16548 "
+
 inherit autotools
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "acl attr \
-- 
2.24.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [zeus][PATCH 2/3] curl: fix CVE-2019-15601
  2020-02-05  7:39 [zeus][PATCH 1/3] rsync: whitelist CVE-2017-16548 Anuj Mittal
@ 2020-02-05  7:39 ` Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 3/3] cpio: fix CVE-2019-14866 Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  8:02 ` ✗ patchtest: failure for "[zeus] rsync: whitelist CVE-20..." and 2 more Patchwork
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Anuj Mittal @ 2020-02-05  7:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core

Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
 .../curl/curl/CVE-2019-15601.patch            | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.66.0.bb      |  1 +
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-15601.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-15601.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-15601.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7bfaae7b21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-15601.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1b71bc532bde8621fd3260843f8197182a467ff2]
+CVE: CVE-2019-15601
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+
+From 1b71bc532bde8621fd3260843f8197182a467ff2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 10:13:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] file: on Windows, refuse paths that start with \\
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+... as that might cause an unexpected SMB connection to a given host
+name.
+
+Reported-by: Fernando Muñoz
+CVE-2019-15601
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-15601.html
+---
+ lib/file.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/file.c b/lib/file.c
+index d349cd9241..166931d7f1 100644
+--- a/lib/file.c
++++ b/lib/file.c
+@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static CURLcode file_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
+   struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+   char *real_path;
+   struct FILEPROTO *file = data->req.protop;
+-  int fd;
++  int fd = -1;
+ #ifdef DOS_FILESYSTEM
+   size_t i;
+   char *actual_path;
+@@ -181,7 +181,9 @@ static CURLcode file_connect(struct connectdata *conn, bool *done)
+       return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;
+     }
+ 
+-  fd = open_readonly(actual_path, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY);
++  if(strncmp("\\\\", actual_path, 2))
++    /* refuse to open path that starts with two backslashes */
++    fd = open_readonly(actual_path, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY);
+   file->path = actual_path;
+ #else
+   if(memchr(real_path, 0, real_path_len)) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.66.0.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.66.0.bb
index d1975f2460..a54e0536e9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.66.0.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.66.0.bb
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=be5d9e1419c4363f4b32037a2d3b7ffa"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://0001-replace-krb5-config-with-pkg-config.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-15601.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c238aa394e3aa47ca4fcb0491774149f"
-- 
2.24.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* [zeus][PATCH 3/3] cpio: fix CVE-2019-14866
  2020-02-05  7:39 [zeus][PATCH 1/3] rsync: whitelist CVE-2017-16548 Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 2/3] curl: fix CVE-2019-15601 Anuj Mittal
@ 2020-02-05  7:39 ` Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  8:02 ` ✗ patchtest: failure for "[zeus] rsync: whitelist CVE-20..." and 2 more Patchwork
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Anuj Mittal @ 2020-02-05  7:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: openembedded-core

Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
---
 .../cpio/cpio-2.12/CVE-2019-14866.patch       | 316 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb       |   1 +
 2 files changed, 317 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/CVE-2019-14866.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/CVE-2019-14866.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/CVE-2019-14866.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d587fc832
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio-2.12/CVE-2019-14866.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+CVE: CVE-2019-14866
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/cpio.git/commit/?id=7554e3e42cd72f6f8304410c47fe6f8918e9bfd7]
+Signed-off-by: Anuj Mittal <anuj.mittal@intel.com>
+
+From a052401293e45a13cded5959b258204dae6d0af5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sergey Poznyakoff <gray@gnu.org>
+Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2019 23:59:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2019-14866
+
+* src/copyout.c (to_ascii): Additional argument nul controls whether
+to add the terminating nul character.
+(field_width_error): Improve diagnostics: print the actual and the
+maximum allowed field value.
+* src/extern.h (to_ascii, field_width_error): New prototypes.
+* src/tar.c (to_oct): Remove.
+(to_oct_or_error): New function.
+(TO_OCT): New macro.
+(write_out_tar_header): Use TO_OCT and to_ascii. Return 0 on
+success, 1 on error.
+---
+ src/copyout.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ src/extern.h  | 15 +++++++++--
+ src/tar.c     | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/copyout.c b/src/copyout.c
+index 1f0987a..1ae5477 100644
+--- a/src/copyout.c
++++ b/src/copyout.c
+@@ -269,26 +269,32 @@ writeout_final_defers (int out_des)
+    so it should be moved to paxutils too.
+    Allowed values for logbase are: 1 (binary), 2, 3 (octal), 4 (hex) */
+ int
+-to_ascii (char *where, uintmax_t v, size_t digits, unsigned logbase)
++to_ascii (char *where, uintmax_t v, size_t digits, unsigned logbase, bool nul)
+ {
+   static char codetab[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+-  int i = digits;
+-  
+-  do
++
++  if (nul)
++    where[--digits] = 0;
++  while (digits > 0)
+     {
+-      where[--i] = codetab[(v & ((1 << logbase) - 1))];
++      where[--digits] = codetab[(v & ((1 << logbase) - 1))];
+       v >>= logbase;
+     }
+-  while (i);
+ 
+   return v != 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static void
+-field_width_error (const char *filename, const char *fieldname)
++void
++field_width_error (const char *filename, const char *fieldname,
++		   uintmax_t value, size_t width, bool nul)
+ {
+-  error (0, 0, _("%s: field width not sufficient for storing %s"),
+-	 filename, fieldname);
++  char valbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND + 1];
++  char maxbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND + 1];
++  error (0, 0, _("%s: value %s %s out of allowed range 0..%s"),
++	 filename, fieldname,
++	 STRINGIFY_BIGINT (value, valbuf),
++	 STRINGIFY_BIGINT (MAX_VAL_WITH_DIGITS (width - nul, LG_8),
++			   maxbuf));
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -303,7 +309,7 @@ to_ascii_or_warn (char *where, uintmax_t n, size_t digits,
+ 		  unsigned logbase,
+ 		  const char *filename, const char *fieldname)
+ {
+-  if (to_ascii (where, n, digits, logbase))
++  if (to_ascii (where, n, digits, logbase, false))
+     field_width_warning (filename, fieldname);
+ }    
+ 
+@@ -312,9 +318,9 @@ to_ascii_or_error (char *where, uintmax_t n, size_t digits,
+ 		   unsigned logbase,
+ 		   const char *filename, const char *fieldname)
+ {
+-  if (to_ascii (where, n, digits, logbase))
++  if (to_ascii (where, n, digits, logbase, false))
+     {
+-      field_width_error (filename, fieldname);
++      field_width_error (filename, fieldname, n, digits, false);
+       return 1;
+     }
+   return 0;
+@@ -371,7 +377,7 @@ write_out_new_ascii_header (const char *magic_string,
+ 			 _("name size")))
+     return 1;
+   p += 8;
+-  to_ascii (p, file_hdr->c_chksum & 0xffffffff, 8, LG_16);
++  to_ascii (p, file_hdr->c_chksum & 0xffffffff, 8, LG_16, false);
+ 
+   tape_buffered_write (ascii_header, out_des, sizeof ascii_header);
+ 
+@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ write_out_old_ascii_header (dev_t dev, dev_t rdev,
+   char ascii_header[76];
+   char *p = ascii_header;
+   
+-  to_ascii (p, file_hdr->c_magic, 6, LG_8);
++  to_ascii (p, file_hdr->c_magic, 6, LG_8, false);
+   p += 6;
+   to_ascii_or_warn (p, dev, 6, LG_8, file_hdr->c_name, _("device number"));
+   p += 6;
+@@ -492,7 +498,10 @@ write_out_binary_header (dev_t rdev,
+   short_hdr.c_namesize = file_hdr->c_namesize & 0xFFFF;
+   if (short_hdr.c_namesize != file_hdr->c_namesize)
+     {
+-      field_width_error (file_hdr->c_name, _("name size"));
++      char maxbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND + 1];
++      error (0, 0, _("%s: value %s %s out of allowed range 0..%u"),
++	     file_hdr->c_name, _("name size"),
++	     STRINGIFY_BIGINT (file_hdr->c_namesize, maxbuf), 0xFFFFu);
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 		      
+@@ -502,7 +511,10 @@ write_out_binary_header (dev_t rdev,
+   if (((off_t)short_hdr.c_filesizes[0] << 16) + short_hdr.c_filesizes[1]
+        != file_hdr->c_filesize)
+     {
+-      field_width_error (file_hdr->c_name, _("file size"));
++      char maxbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND + 1];
++      error (0, 0, _("%s: value %s %s out of allowed range 0..%lu"),
++	     file_hdr->c_name, _("file size"),
++	     STRINGIFY_BIGINT (file_hdr->c_namesize, maxbuf), 0xFFFFFFFFlu);
+       return 1;
+     }
+ 		      
+@@ -552,8 +564,7 @@ write_out_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des)
+ 	  error (0, 0, _("%s: file name too long"), file_hdr->c_name);
+ 	  return 1;
+ 	}
+-      write_out_tar_header (file_hdr, out_des); /* FIXME: No error checking */
+-      return 0;
++      return write_out_tar_header (file_hdr, out_des);
+ 
+     case arf_binary:
+       return write_out_binary_header (makedev (file_hdr->c_rdev_maj,
+diff --git a/src/extern.h b/src/extern.h
+index e27d662..f9ef56a 100644
+--- a/src/extern.h
++++ b/src/extern.h
+@@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ void print_name_with_quoting (char *p);
+ /* copyout.c */
+ int write_out_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des);
+ void process_copy_out (void);
++int to_ascii (char *where, uintmax_t v, size_t digits, unsigned logbase,
++	      bool nul);
++void field_width_error (const char *filename, const char *fieldname,
++			uintmax_t value, size_t width, bool nul);
+ 
+ /* copypass.c */
+ void process_copy_pass (void);
+@@ -145,7 +149,7 @@ int make_path (char *argpath, uid_t owner, gid_t group,
+ 	       const char *verbose_fmt_string);
+ 
+ /* tar.c */
+-void write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des);
++int write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des);
+ int null_block (long *block, int size);
+ void read_in_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int in_des);
+ int otoa (char *s, unsigned long *n);
+@@ -204,9 +208,16 @@ void cpio_safer_name_suffix (char *name, bool link_target,
+ int cpio_create_dir (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int existing_dir);
+ void change_dir (void);
+ 
+-/* FIXME: These two defines should be defined in paxutils */
++/* FIXME: The following three should be defined in paxutils */
+ #define LG_8  3
+ #define LG_16 4
++/* The maximum uintmax_t value that can be represented with DIGITS digits,
++   assuming that each digit is BITS_PER_DIGIT wide.  */
++#define MAX_VAL_WITH_DIGITS(digits, bits_per_digit) \
++   ((digits) * (bits_per_digit) < sizeof (uintmax_t) * CHAR_BIT \
++    ? ((uintmax_t) 1 << ((digits) * (bits_per_digit))) - 1 \
++    : (uintmax_t) -1)
++
+ 
+ uintmax_t from_ascii (char const *where, size_t digs, unsigned logbase);
+ 
+diff --git a/src/tar.c b/src/tar.c
+index a2ce171..ef58027 100644
+--- a/src/tar.c
++++ b/src/tar.c
+@@ -79,36 +79,17 @@ stash_tar_filename (char *prefix, char *filename)
+   return hold_tar_filename;
+ }
+ 
+-/* Convert a number into a string of octal digits.
+-   Convert long VALUE into a DIGITS-digit field at WHERE,
+-   including a trailing space and room for a NUL.  DIGITS==3 means
+-   1 digit, a space, and room for a NUL.
+-
+-   We assume the trailing NUL is already there and don't fill it in.
+-   This fact is used by start_header and finish_header, so don't change it!
+-
+-   This is be equivalent to:
+-   sprintf (where, "%*lo ", digits - 2, value);
+-   except that sprintf fills in the trailing NUL and we don't.  */
+-
+-static void
+-to_oct (register long value, register int digits, register char *where)
++static int
++to_oct_or_error (uintmax_t value, size_t digits, char *where, char const *field,
++		 char const *file)
+ {
+-  --digits;			/* Leave the trailing NUL slot alone.  */
+-
+-  /* Produce the digits -- at least one.  */
+-  do
++  if (to_ascii (where, value, digits, LG_8, true))
+     {
+-      where[--digits] = '0' + (char) (value & 7); /* One octal digit.  */
+-      value >>= 3;
++      field_width_error (file, field, value, digits, true);
++      return 1;
+     }
+-  while (digits > 0 && value != 0);
+-
+-  /* Add leading zeroes, if necessary.  */
+-  while (digits > 0)
+-    where[--digits] = '0';
++  return 0;
+ }
+-
+ \f
+ 
+ /* Compute and return a checksum for TAR_HDR,
+@@ -134,10 +115,22 @@ tar_checksum (struct tar_header *tar_hdr)
+   return sum;
+ }
+ 
++#define TO_OCT(file_hdr, c_fld, digits, tar_hdr, tar_field) \
++  do							    \
++    {							    \
++       if (to_oct_or_error (file_hdr -> c_fld,		    \
++			    digits,			    \
++			    tar_hdr -> tar_field,	    \
++			    #tar_field,			    \
++			    file_hdr->c_name))		    \
++	 return 1;					    \
++    }							    \
++  while (0)
++
+ /* Write out header FILE_HDR, including the file name, to file
+    descriptor OUT_DES.  */
+ 
+-void
++int
+ write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des)
+ {
+   int name_len;
+@@ -166,11 +159,11 @@ write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des)
+ 
+   /* Ustar standard (POSIX.1-1988) requires the mode to contain only 3 octal
+      digits */
+-  to_oct (file_hdr->c_mode & MODE_ALL, 8, tar_hdr->mode);
+-  to_oct (file_hdr->c_uid, 8, tar_hdr->uid);
+-  to_oct (file_hdr->c_gid, 8, tar_hdr->gid);
+-  to_oct (file_hdr->c_filesize, 12, tar_hdr->size);
+-  to_oct (file_hdr->c_mtime, 12, tar_hdr->mtime);
++  TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_mode & MODE_ALL, 8, tar_hdr, mode);
++  TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_uid, 8, tar_hdr, uid);
++  TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_gid, 8, tar_hdr, gid);
++  TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_filesize, 12, tar_hdr, size);
++  TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_mtime, 12, tar_hdr, mtime);
+ 
+   switch (file_hdr->c_mode & CP_IFMT)
+     {
+@@ -182,7 +175,7 @@ write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des)
+ 	  strncpy (tar_hdr->linkname, file_hdr->c_tar_linkname,
+ 		   TARLINKNAMESIZE);
+ 	  tar_hdr->typeflag = LNKTYPE;
+-	  to_oct (0, 12, tar_hdr->size);
++	  to_ascii (tar_hdr->size, 0, 12, LG_8, true);
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	tar_hdr->typeflag = REGTYPE;
+@@ -208,7 +201,7 @@ write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des)
+ 	 than TARLINKNAMESIZE.  */
+       strncpy (tar_hdr->linkname, file_hdr->c_tar_linkname,
+ 	       TARLINKNAMESIZE);
+-      to_oct (0, 12, tar_hdr->size);
++      to_ascii (tar_hdr->size, 0, 12, LG_8, true);
+       break;
+ #endif /* CP_IFLNK */
+     }
+@@ -227,13 +220,15 @@ write_out_tar_header (struct cpio_file_stat *file_hdr, int out_des)
+       if (name)
+ 	strcpy (tar_hdr->gname, name);
+ 
+-      to_oct (file_hdr->c_rdev_maj, 8, tar_hdr->devmajor);
+-      to_oct (file_hdr->c_rdev_min, 8, tar_hdr->devminor);
++      TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_rdev_maj, 8, tar_hdr, devmajor);
++      TO_OCT (file_hdr, c_rdev_min, 8, tar_hdr, devminor);
+     }
+ 
+-  to_oct (tar_checksum (tar_hdr), 8, tar_hdr->chksum);
++  to_ascii (tar_hdr->chksum, tar_checksum (tar_hdr), 8, LG_8, true);
+ 
+   tape_buffered_write ((char *) &tar_rec, out_des, TARRECORDSIZE);
++
++  return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Return nonzero iff all the bytes in BLOCK are NUL.
+-- 
+2.24.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb
index 3713bf0b1f..5abe494ebc 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.12.bb
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/cpio/cpio-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-Fix-CVE-2015-1197.patch \
            file://0001-CVE-2016-2037-1-byte-out-of-bounds-write.patch \
            file://0001-Fix-segfault-with-append.patch \
+           file://CVE-2019-14866.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "fc207561a86b63862eea4b8300313e86"
-- 
2.24.1



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* ✗ patchtest: failure for "[zeus] rsync: whitelist CVE-20..." and 2 more
  2020-02-05  7:39 [zeus][PATCH 1/3] rsync: whitelist CVE-2017-16548 Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 2/3] curl: fix CVE-2019-15601 Anuj Mittal
  2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 3/3] cpio: fix CVE-2019-14866 Anuj Mittal
@ 2020-02-05  8:02 ` Patchwork
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Patchwork @ 2020-02-05  8:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Anuj Mittal; +Cc: openembedded-core

== Series Details ==

Series: "[zeus] rsync: whitelist CVE-20..." and 2 more
Revision: 1
URL   : https://patchwork.openembedded.org/series/22429/
State : failure

== Summary ==


Thank you for submitting this patch series to OpenEmbedded Core. This is
an automated response. Several tests have been executed on the proposed
series by patchtest resulting in the following failures:



* Patch            [zeus,1/3] rsync: whitelist CVE-2017-16548
 Issue             Missing or incorrectly formatted CVE tag in included patch file [test_cve_tag_format] 
  Suggested fix    Correct or include the CVE tag on cve patch with format: "CVE: CVE-YYYY-XXXX"



If you believe any of these test results are incorrect, please reply to the
mailing list (openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org) raising your concerns.
Otherwise we would appreciate you correcting the issues and submitting a new
version of the patchset if applicable. Please ensure you add/increment the
version number when sending the new version (i.e. [PATCH] -> [PATCH v2] ->
[PATCH v3] -> ...).

---
Guidelines:     https://www.openembedded.org/wiki/Commit_Patch_Message_Guidelines
Test framework: http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/patchtest
Test suite:     http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/patchtest-oe



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-02-05  7:39 [zeus][PATCH 1/3] rsync: whitelist CVE-2017-16548 Anuj Mittal
2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 2/3] curl: fix CVE-2019-15601 Anuj Mittal
2020-02-05  7:39 ` [zeus][PATCH 3/3] cpio: fix CVE-2019-14866 Anuj Mittal
2020-02-05  8:02 ` ✗ patchtest: failure for "[zeus] rsync: whitelist CVE-20..." and 2 more Patchwork

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