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From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	Barani Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	Kuohong Wang <kuohong.wang@mediatek.com>,
	Kim Boojin <boojin.kim@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 02/12] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 22:19:56 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200428051956.GB24105@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200428025708.GB251491@gmail.com>

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 07:57:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Or maybe 'struct blk_ksm_keyslot' should contain a pointer to the
> 'struct blk_crypto_key' rather than a copy of it?  If we did that, then:
> 
> - Each duplicate blk_crypto_key would use its own keyslot and not interfere with
>   any others.
> 
> - blk_crypto_evict_key() would be *required* to be called.
> 
> - It would be a kernel bug if blk_crypto_evict_key() were called with any
>   pending I/O, so WARN_ON_ONCE() would be the right thing to do.
> 
> - The hash function used to find a key's keyslot would be
>   hash_ptr(blk_crypto_key, ksm->log_slot_hashtable_size) instead of
>   SipHash(key=perboot_key, data=raw_key).
>   
> I might be forgetting something; was there a reason we didn't do that?
> It wouldn't be as robust against users forgetting to call
> blk_crypto_evict_key(), but that would be a bug anyway.

The above sounds pretty sensible to me (but I'm everything but an expert
in the area).

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, Kim Boojin <boojin.kim@samsung.com>,
	Kuohong Wang <kuohong.wang@mediatek.com>,
	Barani Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>,
	Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH v10 02/12] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 22:19:56 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200428051956.GB24105@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200428025708.GB251491@gmail.com>

On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 07:57:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Or maybe 'struct blk_ksm_keyslot' should contain a pointer to the
> 'struct blk_crypto_key' rather than a copy of it?  If we did that, then:
> 
> - Each duplicate blk_crypto_key would use its own keyslot and not interfere with
>   any others.
> 
> - blk_crypto_evict_key() would be *required* to be called.
> 
> - It would be a kernel bug if blk_crypto_evict_key() were called with any
>   pending I/O, so WARN_ON_ONCE() would be the right thing to do.
> 
> - The hash function used to find a key's keyslot would be
>   hash_ptr(blk_crypto_key, ksm->log_slot_hashtable_size) instead of
>   SipHash(key=perboot_key, data=raw_key).
>   
> I might be forgetting something; was there a reason we didn't do that?
> It wouldn't be as robust against users forgetting to call
> blk_crypto_evict_key(), but that would be a bug anyway.

The above sounds pretty sensible to me (but I'm everything but an expert
in the area).


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  reply	other threads:[~2020-04-28  5:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-08  3:56 [PATCH v10 00/12] Inline Encryption Support Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 01/12] Documentation: Document the blk-crypto framework Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 02/12] block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-22  9:22   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-22  9:22     ` [f2fs-dev] " Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-28  2:14     ` Satya Tangirala
2020-04-28  2:14       ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-28  2:46       ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-28  2:46         ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-04-28  2:57         ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-28  2:57           ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers
2020-04-28  5:19           ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2020-04-28  5:19             ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 03/12] block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-22  9:35   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-22  9:35     ` [f2fs-dev] " Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-28  2:54     ` Satya Tangirala
2020-04-28  2:54       ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-28  5:21       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-28  5:21         ` [f2fs-dev] " Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 04/12] block: Make blk-integrity preclude hardware inline encryption Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 05/12] block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline Encryption Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-22  9:37   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-22  9:37     ` [f2fs-dev] " Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 06/12] scsi: ufs: UFS driver v2.1 spec crypto additions Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 07/12] scsi: ufs: UFS crypto API Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 08/12] scsi: ufs: Add inline encryption support to UFS Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 09/12] fs: introduce SB_INLINECRYPT Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 10/12] fscrypt: add inline encryption support Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 11/12] f2fs: " Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  3:56 ` [PATCH v10 12/12] ext4: " Satya Tangirala
2020-04-08  3:56   ` [f2fs-dev] " Satya Tangirala via Linux-f2fs-devel
2020-04-08  4:18 ` [PATCH v10 00/12] Inline Encryption Support Eric Biggers
2020-04-08  4:18   ` [f2fs-dev] " Eric Biggers

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