From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> To: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, dyoung@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, mcgrof@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, cai@lca.pw, rdunlap@infradead.org, tytso@mit.edu, bunk@kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, labbott@redhat.com, jeffm@suse.com, jikos@kernel.org, jeyu@suse.de, tiwai@suse.de, AnDavis@suse.com, rpalethorpe@suse.de Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 14:22:02 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200510182202.GA31704@t490s> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200510025921.GA10165@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:59:21AM +0800, Baoquan He wrote: > On 05/09/20 at 09:57am, Rafael Aquini wrote: > > Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch > > introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to > > provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch > > a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag. > > > > This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding > > the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into > > code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest. > > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be > > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode) > > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system. > > > > Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> > > Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> > > --- > > Changelog: > > * v2: get rid of unnecessary/misguided compiler hints (Luis) > > * v2: enhance documentation text for the new kernel parameter (Randy) > > * v3: drop sysctl interface, keep it only as a kernel parameter (Luis) > > > > Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst | 10 +++++ > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++++++ > > include/linux/kernel.h | 2 + > > kernel/panic.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ > > kernel/sysctl.c | 9 ++++- > > 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst > > index ac7e131d2935..de3cf6d377cc 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst > > @@ -521,6 +521,16 @@ will cause a kdump to occur at the panic() call. In cases where a user wants > > to specify this during runtime, /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn can be set to 1 > > to achieve the same behaviour. > > > > +Trigger Kdump on add_taint() > > +============================ > > + > > +The kernel parameter, panic_on_taint, calls panic() from within add_taint(), > > +whenever the value set in this bitmask matches with the bit flag being set > > +by add_taint(). This will cause a kdump to occur at the panic() call. > > +In cases where a user wants to specify this during runtime, > > +/proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_taint can be set to a respective bitmask value > > +to achieve the same behaviour. > > + > > Contact > > ======= > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > index 7bc83f3d9bdf..4a69fe49a70d 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > @@ -3404,6 +3404,21 @@ > > panic_on_warn panic() instead of WARN(). Useful to cause kdump > > on a WARN(). > > > > + panic_on_taint= [KNL] conditionally panic() in add_taint() > > + Format: <str> > Changed it as 'Format: <string>' to be > consistent with the existing other options? I can resubmit with the change, if it's a strong req and the surgery cannot be done at merge time. > > + Specifies, as a string, the TAINT flag set that will > > + compose a bitmask for calling panic() when the kernel > > + gets tainted. > > + See Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst for > > + details on the taint flags that users can pick to > > + compose the bitmask to assign to panic_on_taint. > > + When the string is prefixed with a '-' the bitmask > > + set in panic_on_taint will be mutually exclusive > > + with the sysctl knob kernel.tainted, and any attempt > > + to write to that sysctl will fail with -EINVAL for > > + any taint value that masks with the flags set for > > + this option. > > + > > crash_kexec_post_notifiers > > Run kdump after running panic-notifiers and dumping > > kmsg. This only for the users who doubt kdump always > > diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h > > index 9b7a8d74a9d6..66bc102cb59a 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/kernel.h > > +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h > > @@ -528,6 +528,8 @@ extern int panic_on_oops; > > extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; > > extern int panic_on_io_nmi; > > extern int panic_on_warn; > > +extern unsigned long panic_on_taint; > > +extern bool panic_on_taint_exclusive; > > extern int sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall; > > extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; > > > > diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c > > index b69ee9e76cb2..65c62f8a1de8 100644 > > --- a/kernel/panic.c > > +++ b/kernel/panic.c > > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ > > #include <linux/kexec.h> > > #include <linux/sched.h> > > #include <linux/sysrq.h> > > +#include <linux/ctype.h> > > #include <linux/init.h> > > #include <linux/nmi.h> > > #include <linux/console.h> > > @@ -44,6 +45,8 @@ static int pause_on_oops_flag; > > static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock); > > bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers; > > int panic_on_warn __read_mostly; > > +unsigned long panic_on_taint; > > +bool panic_on_taint_exclusive = false; > > > > int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT; > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout); > > @@ -434,6 +437,11 @@ void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) > > pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); > > > > set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); > > + > > + if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) { > > + panic_on_taint = 0; > > This panic_on_taint resetting is redundant? It will trigger crash, do we > need care if it's 0 or not? > We might still get more than one CPU hitting a taint adding code path after the one that tripped here called panic. To avoid multiple calls to panic, in that particular scenario, we clear the panic_on_taint bitmask out. Also, albeit non-frequent, we might be tracking TAINT_WARN, and still hit a WARN_ON() in the panic / kdump path, thus incurring in a second (and unwanted) call to panic here. > > + panic("panic_on_taint set ..."); > > + } > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint); > > > > @@ -686,3 +694,35 @@ static int __init oops_setup(char *s) > > return 0; > > } > > early_param("oops", oops_setup); > > + > > +static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s) > > +{ > > + /* we just ignore panic_on_taint if passed without flags */ > > + if (!s) > > + goto out; > > + > > + for (; *s; s++) { > > + int i; > > + > > + if (*s == '-') { > > + panic_on_taint_exclusive = true; > > + continue; > > + } > > + > > + for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) { > > + if (toupper(*s) == taint_flags[i].c_true) { > > + set_bit(i, &panic_on_taint); > > + break; > > + } > > + } > > Read admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst, but still do not get what 'G' means. > If I specify 'panic_on_taint="G"' or 'panic_on_taint="-G"' in cmdline, > what is expected for this customer behaviour? > This will not panic the system as no taint flag gets actually set in panic_on_taint bitmask for G. G is the counterpart of P, and appears on print_tainted() whenever TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE is not set. panic_on_taint doesn't set anything for G, as it doesn't represent any taint, but the lack of one particular taint, instead. (apparently, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE is the only taint flag that follows that pattern of having an extra assigned letter that means its absence, and perhaps it should be removed) > Except of above minor nitpicks, this patch looks good to me, thanks. > > Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> > > Thanks > Baoquan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> To: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, tiwai@suse.de, jeffm@suse.com, corbet@lwn.net, labbott@redhat.com, dyoung@redhat.com, AnDavis@suse.com, rpalethorpe@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org, jikos@kernel.org, cai@lca.pw, bunk@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, jeyu@suse.de, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rdunlap@infradead.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 14:22:02 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200510182202.GA31704@t490s> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200510025921.GA10165@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> On Sun, May 10, 2020 at 10:59:21AM +0800, Baoquan He wrote: > On 05/09/20 at 09:57am, Rafael Aquini wrote: > > Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch > > introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to > > provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch > > a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag. > > > > This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding > > the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into > > code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest. > > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be > > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode) > > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system. > > > > Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> > > Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> > > --- > > Changelog: > > * v2: get rid of unnecessary/misguided compiler hints (Luis) > > * v2: enhance documentation text for the new kernel parameter (Randy) > > * v3: drop sysctl interface, keep it only as a kernel parameter (Luis) > > > > Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst | 10 +++++ > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++++++ > > include/linux/kernel.h | 2 + > > kernel/panic.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ > > kernel/sysctl.c | 9 ++++- > > 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst > > index ac7e131d2935..de3cf6d377cc 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/kdump.rst > > @@ -521,6 +521,16 @@ will cause a kdump to occur at the panic() call. In cases where a user wants > > to specify this during runtime, /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn can be set to 1 > > to achieve the same behaviour. > > > > +Trigger Kdump on add_taint() > > +============================ > > + > > +The kernel parameter, panic_on_taint, calls panic() from within add_taint(), > > +whenever the value set in this bitmask matches with the bit flag being set > > +by add_taint(). This will cause a kdump to occur at the panic() call. > > +In cases where a user wants to specify this during runtime, > > +/proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_taint can be set to a respective bitmask value > > +to achieve the same behaviour. > > + > > Contact > > ======= > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > index 7bc83f3d9bdf..4a69fe49a70d 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > @@ -3404,6 +3404,21 @@ > > panic_on_warn panic() instead of WARN(). Useful to cause kdump > > on a WARN(). > > > > + panic_on_taint= [KNL] conditionally panic() in add_taint() > > + Format: <str> > Changed it as 'Format: <string>' to be > consistent with the existing other options? I can resubmit with the change, if it's a strong req and the surgery cannot be done at merge time. > > + Specifies, as a string, the TAINT flag set that will > > + compose a bitmask for calling panic() when the kernel > > + gets tainted. > > + See Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst for > > + details on the taint flags that users can pick to > > + compose the bitmask to assign to panic_on_taint. > > + When the string is prefixed with a '-' the bitmask > > + set in panic_on_taint will be mutually exclusive > > + with the sysctl knob kernel.tainted, and any attempt > > + to write to that sysctl will fail with -EINVAL for > > + any taint value that masks with the flags set for > > + this option. > > + > > crash_kexec_post_notifiers > > Run kdump after running panic-notifiers and dumping > > kmsg. This only for the users who doubt kdump always > > diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h > > index 9b7a8d74a9d6..66bc102cb59a 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/kernel.h > > +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h > > @@ -528,6 +528,8 @@ extern int panic_on_oops; > > extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; > > extern int panic_on_io_nmi; > > extern int panic_on_warn; > > +extern unsigned long panic_on_taint; > > +extern bool panic_on_taint_exclusive; > > extern int sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall; > > extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; > > > > diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c > > index b69ee9e76cb2..65c62f8a1de8 100644 > > --- a/kernel/panic.c > > +++ b/kernel/panic.c > > @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ > > #include <linux/kexec.h> > > #include <linux/sched.h> > > #include <linux/sysrq.h> > > +#include <linux/ctype.h> > > #include <linux/init.h> > > #include <linux/nmi.h> > > #include <linux/console.h> > > @@ -44,6 +45,8 @@ static int pause_on_oops_flag; > > static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock); > > bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers; > > int panic_on_warn __read_mostly; > > +unsigned long panic_on_taint; > > +bool panic_on_taint_exclusive = false; > > > > int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT; > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout); > > @@ -434,6 +437,11 @@ void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) > > pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); > > > > set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); > > + > > + if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) { > > + panic_on_taint = 0; > > This panic_on_taint resetting is redundant? It will trigger crash, do we > need care if it's 0 or not? > We might still get more than one CPU hitting a taint adding code path after the one that tripped here called panic. To avoid multiple calls to panic, in that particular scenario, we clear the panic_on_taint bitmask out. Also, albeit non-frequent, we might be tracking TAINT_WARN, and still hit a WARN_ON() in the panic / kdump path, thus incurring in a second (and unwanted) call to panic here. > > + panic("panic_on_taint set ..."); > > + } > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint); > > > > @@ -686,3 +694,35 @@ static int __init oops_setup(char *s) > > return 0; > > } > > early_param("oops", oops_setup); > > + > > +static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s) > > +{ > > + /* we just ignore panic_on_taint if passed without flags */ > > + if (!s) > > + goto out; > > + > > + for (; *s; s++) { > > + int i; > > + > > + if (*s == '-') { > > + panic_on_taint_exclusive = true; > > + continue; > > + } > > + > > + for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) { > > + if (toupper(*s) == taint_flags[i].c_true) { > > + set_bit(i, &panic_on_taint); > > + break; > > + } > > + } > > Read admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst, but still do not get what 'G' means. > If I specify 'panic_on_taint="G"' or 'panic_on_taint="-G"' in cmdline, > what is expected for this customer behaviour? > This will not panic the system as no taint flag gets actually set in panic_on_taint bitmask for G. G is the counterpart of P, and appears on print_tainted() whenever TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE is not set. panic_on_taint doesn't set anything for G, as it doesn't represent any taint, but the lack of one particular taint, instead. (apparently, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE is the only taint flag that follows that pattern of having an extra assigned letter that means its absence, and perhaps it should be removed) > Except of above minor nitpicks, this patch looks good to me, thanks. > > Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> > > Thanks > Baoquan _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-10 18:22 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-05-09 13:57 [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint Rafael Aquini 2020-05-09 13:57 ` Rafael Aquini 2020-05-09 18:59 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-09 18:59 ` Kees Cook 2020-05-10 2:59 ` Baoquan He 2020-05-10 2:59 ` Baoquan He 2020-05-10 4:10 ` Randy Dunlap 2020-05-10 4:10 ` Randy Dunlap 2020-05-10 5:16 ` Baoquan He 2020-05-10 5:16 ` Baoquan He 2020-05-10 18:22 ` Rafael Aquini [this message] 2020-05-10 18:22 ` Rafael Aquini 2020-05-11 1:11 ` Baoquan He 2020-05-11 1:11 ` Baoquan He 2020-05-11 18:24 ` Luis Chamberlain 2020-05-11 18:24 ` Luis Chamberlain 2020-05-11 20:03 ` Rafael Aquini 2020-05-11 20:03 ` Rafael Aquini 2020-05-11 21:05 ` Luis Chamberlain 2020-05-11 21:05 ` Luis Chamberlain
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