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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, nd@arm.com,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 11/26] arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:45:45 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200601144544.GC23419@gaia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200601085536.GV5031@arm.com>

On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 09:55:38AM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 05:34:13PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:05:09PM +0100, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> > > The 05/28/2020 10:14, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > > On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 11:57:39AM -0700, Peter Collingbourne wrote:
> > > > > Should the userspace stack always be mapped as if with PROT_MTE if the
> > > > > hardware supports it? Such a change would be invisible to non-MTE
> > > > > aware userspace since it would already need to opt in to tag checking
> > > > > via prctl. This would let userspace avoid a complex stack
> > > > > initialization sequence when running with stack tagging enabled on the
> > > > > main thread.
> > > > 
> > > > I don't think the stack initialisation is that difficult. On program
> > > > startup (can be the dynamic loader). Something like (untested):
> > > > 
> > > > 	register unsigned long stack asm ("sp");
> > > > 	unsigned long page_sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> > > > 
> > > > 	mprotect((void *)(stack & ~(page_sz - 1)), page_sz,
> > > > 		 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_MTE | PROT_GROWSDOWN);
> > > > 
> > > > (the essential part it PROT_GROWSDOWN so that you don't have to specify
> > > > a stack lower limit)
> > > 
> > > does this work even if the currently mapped stack is more than page_sz?
> > > determining the mapped main stack area is i think non-trivial to do in
> > > userspace (requires parsing /proc/self/maps or similar).
> > 
> > Because of PROT_GROWSDOWN, the kernel adjusts the start of the range
> > down automatically. It is potentially problematic if the top of the
> > stack is more than a page away and you want the whole stack coloured. I
> > haven't run a test but my reading of the kernel code is that the stack
> > vma would be split in this scenario, so the range beyond sp+page_sz
> > won't have PROT_MTE set.
> > 
> > My assumption is that if you do this during program start, the stack is
> > smaller than a page. Alternatively, could we use argv or envp to
> > determine the top of the user stack (the bottom is taken care of by the
> > kernel)?
> 
> I don't think you can easily know when the stack ends, but perhaps it
> doesn't matter.
> 
> From memory, the initial stack looks like:
> 
> 	argv/env strings
> 	AT_NULL
> 	auxv
> 	NULL
> 	env
> 	NULL
> 	argv
> 	argc	<--- sp
> 
> If we don't care about tagging the strings correctly, we could step to
> the end of auxv and tag down from there.
> 
> If we do care about tagging the strings, there's probably no good way
> to find the end of the string area, other than looking up sp in
> /proc/self/maps.  I'm not sure we should trust all past and future
> kernels to spit out the strings in a predictable order.

I don't think we care about tagging whatever the kernel places on the
stack since the argv/envp pointers are untagged. An mprotect(PROT_MTE)
may or may not cover the environment but it shouldn't matter as the
kernel clears the tags on the corresponding pages anyway.

AFAIK stack tagging works by colouring a stack frame on function entry
and clearing the tags on return. We would only hit a problem if the
function issuing mprotect(sp, PROT_MTE) on and its callers already
assumed a PROT_MTE stack. Without PROT_MTE, an STG would be
write-ignore, so subsequently turning it on would lead to a mismatch
between the pointer and the allocation tags.

So PROT_MTE turning on should happen very early in the user process
startup code before any code with stack tagging enabled. Whether you
reach the top of the stack with such mprotect() doesn't really matter
since up to that point there should not be any use of stack tagging. If
that's not possible, for example the glibc code setting up the stack was
compiled to stack tagging itself, the kernel would have to enable it
when the user process starts. However, I'd only do this based on some
ELF note.

-- 
Catalin

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	nd@arm.com, Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 11/26] arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2020 15:45:45 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200601144544.GC23419@gaia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200601085536.GV5031@arm.com>

On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 09:55:38AM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 05:34:13PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:05:09PM +0100, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> > > The 05/28/2020 10:14, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > > On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 11:57:39AM -0700, Peter Collingbourne wrote:
> > > > > Should the userspace stack always be mapped as if with PROT_MTE if the
> > > > > hardware supports it? Such a change would be invisible to non-MTE
> > > > > aware userspace since it would already need to opt in to tag checking
> > > > > via prctl. This would let userspace avoid a complex stack
> > > > > initialization sequence when running with stack tagging enabled on the
> > > > > main thread.
> > > > 
> > > > I don't think the stack initialisation is that difficult. On program
> > > > startup (can be the dynamic loader). Something like (untested):
> > > > 
> > > > 	register unsigned long stack asm ("sp");
> > > > 	unsigned long page_sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> > > > 
> > > > 	mprotect((void *)(stack & ~(page_sz - 1)), page_sz,
> > > > 		 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_MTE | PROT_GROWSDOWN);
> > > > 
> > > > (the essential part it PROT_GROWSDOWN so that you don't have to specify
> > > > a stack lower limit)
> > > 
> > > does this work even if the currently mapped stack is more than page_sz?
> > > determining the mapped main stack area is i think non-trivial to do in
> > > userspace (requires parsing /proc/self/maps or similar).
> > 
> > Because of PROT_GROWSDOWN, the kernel adjusts the start of the range
> > down automatically. It is potentially problematic if the top of the
> > stack is more than a page away and you want the whole stack coloured. I
> > haven't run a test but my reading of the kernel code is that the stack
> > vma would be split in this scenario, so the range beyond sp+page_sz
> > won't have PROT_MTE set.
> > 
> > My assumption is that if you do this during program start, the stack is
> > smaller than a page. Alternatively, could we use argv or envp to
> > determine the top of the user stack (the bottom is taken care of by the
> > kernel)?
> 
> I don't think you can easily know when the stack ends, but perhaps it
> doesn't matter.
> 
> From memory, the initial stack looks like:
> 
> 	argv/env strings
> 	AT_NULL
> 	auxv
> 	NULL
> 	env
> 	NULL
> 	argv
> 	argc	<--- sp
> 
> If we don't care about tagging the strings correctly, we could step to
> the end of auxv and tag down from there.
> 
> If we do care about tagging the strings, there's probably no good way
> to find the end of the string area, other than looking up sp in
> /proc/self/maps.  I'm not sure we should trust all past and future
> kernels to spit out the strings in a predictable order.

I don't think we care about tagging whatever the kernel places on the
stack since the argv/envp pointers are untagged. An mprotect(PROT_MTE)
may or may not cover the environment but it shouldn't matter as the
kernel clears the tags on the corresponding pages anyway.

AFAIK stack tagging works by colouring a stack frame on function entry
and clearing the tags on return. We would only hit a problem if the
function issuing mprotect(sp, PROT_MTE) on and its callers already
assumed a PROT_MTE stack. Without PROT_MTE, an STG would be
write-ignore, so subsequently turning it on would lead to a mismatch
between the pointer and the allocation tags.

So PROT_MTE turning on should happen very early in the user process
startup code before any code with stack tagging enabled. Whether you
reach the top of the stack with such mprotect() doesn't really matter
since up to that point there should not be any use of stack tagging. If
that's not possible, for example the glibc code setting up the stack was
compiled to stack tagging itself, the kernel would have to enable it
when the user process starts. However, I'd only do this based on some
ELF note.

-- 
Catalin

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-01 14:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-15 17:15 [PATCH v4 00/26] arm64: Memory Tagging Extension user-space support Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 01/26] arm64: mte: system register definitions Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 02/26] arm64: mte: CPU feature detection and initial sysreg configuration Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 03/26] arm64: mte: Use Normal Tagged attributes for the linear map Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 04/26] arm64: mte: Add specific SIGSEGV codes Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 05/26] arm64: mte: Handle synchronous and asynchronous tag check faults Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 06/26] mm: Add PG_ARCH_2 page flag Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 07/26] arm64: mte: Clear the tags when a page is mapped in user-space with PROT_MTE Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 08/26] arm64: mte: Tags-aware copy_page() implementation Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 09/26] arm64: mte: Tags-aware aware memcmp_pages() implementation Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 10/26] mm: Introduce arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 11/26] arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27 18:57   ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-05-27 18:57     ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-05-27 18:57     ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-05-27 18:57     ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-05-28  9:14     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-28  9:14       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-28 11:05       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-28 11:05         ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-28 11:05         ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-28 16:34         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-28 16:34           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-28 18:35           ` Evgenii Stepanov
2020-05-28 18:35             ` Evgenii Stepanov
2020-05-29 11:19             ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-29 11:19               ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01  8:55           ` Dave Martin
2020-06-01  8:55             ` Dave Martin
2020-06-01 14:45             ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2020-06-01 14:45               ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01 15:04               ` Dave Martin
2020-06-01 15:04                 ` Dave Martin
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 12/26] mm: Introduce arch_validate_flags() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 13/26] arm64: mte: Validate the PROT_MTE request via arch_validate_flags() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 14/26] mm: Allow arm64 mmap(PROT_MTE) on RAM-based files Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 15/26] arm64: mte: Allow user control of the tag check mode via prctl() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27  7:46   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27  7:46     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27  8:32     ` Dave Martin
2020-05-27  8:32       ` Dave Martin
2020-05-27  8:48       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27  8:48         ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27 11:16       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27 11:16         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 16/26] arm64: mte: Allow user control of the generated random tags " Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 17/26] arm64: mte: Restore the GCR_EL1 register after a suspend Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 18/26] arm64: mte: Add PTRACE_{PEEK,POKE}MTETAGS support Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-29 21:25   ` Luis Machado
2020-05-29 21:25     ` Luis Machado
2020-06-01 12:07     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01 12:07       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01 15:17       ` Luis Machado
2020-06-01 15:17         ` Luis Machado
2020-06-01 16:33         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01 16:33           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 19/26] fs: Handle intra-page faults in copy_mount_options() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 20/26] mm: Add arch hooks for saving/restoring tags Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 21/26] arm64: mte: Enable swap of tagged pages Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 22/26] arm64: mte: Save tags when hibernating Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 23/26] arm64: mte: Check the DT memory nodes for MTE support Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 24/26] arm64: mte: Introduce early param to disable " Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-18 11:26   ` Vladimir Murzin
2020-05-18 11:26     ` Vladimir Murzin
2020-05-18 11:31     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 11:31       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 17:20       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-18 17:20         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-22  5:57         ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-22  5:57           ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-22 10:37           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-22 10:37             ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27  2:11             ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-27  2:11               ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-27  2:11               ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-27  9:55               ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27  9:55                 ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27 10:37                 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-27 10:37                   ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-27 11:12                 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27 11:12                   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-19 16:14     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-19 16:14       ` Catalin Marinas
2021-01-21 19:37   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-21 19:37     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-21 19:37     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22  2:03     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22  2:03       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22  2:03       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22 14:41     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-01-22 14:41       ` Catalin Marinas
2021-01-22 17:28       ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22 17:28         ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22 17:28         ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 25/26] arm64: mte: Kconfig entry Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 26/26] arm64: mte: Add Memory Tagging Extension documentation Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16   ` Catalin Marinas

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