* [PATCH] x86/asm/entry: Actually disable stack protector
@ 2020-06-26 20:34 Kees Cook
2020-07-19 11:08 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/entry: " tip-bot2 for Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-06-26 20:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Gleixner
Cc: Peter Zijlstra, Andy Lutomirski, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
x86, H. Peter Anvin, Alexandre Chartre, linux-kernel
Some builds of GCC enable stack protector by default. Simply removing
the arguments is not sufficient to disable stack protector, as the stack
protector for those GCC builds must be explicitly disabled. Remove the
argument removals and add -fno-stack-protector. Additionally include
missed x32 argument updates, and adjust whitespace for readability.
Fixes: 20355e5f73a7 ("x86/entry: Exclude low level entry code from sanitizing")
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
RESEND (missed lkml)...
---
arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
index b7a5790d8d63..08bf95dbc911 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
@@ -7,12 +7,20 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_x32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+
+CFLAGS_common.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += -fno-stack-protector
CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
+CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
+
obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
obj-y += common.o
--
2.25.1
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* [tip: x86/urgent] x86/entry: Actually disable stack protector
2020-06-26 20:34 [PATCH] x86/asm/entry: Actually disable stack protector Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-19 11:08 ` tip-bot2 for Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: tip-bot2 for Kees Cook @ 2020-07-19 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-tip-commits; +Cc: Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, x86, LKML
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 58ac3154b83938515129c20aa76d456a4c9202a8
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/58ac3154b83938515129c20aa76d456a4c9202a8
Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
AuthorDate: Fri, 26 Jun 2020 13:34:25 -07:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 13:07:10 +02:00
x86/entry: Actually disable stack protector
Some builds of GCC enable stack protector by default. Simply removing
the arguments is not sufficient to disable stack protector, as the stack
protector for those GCC builds must be explicitly disabled. Remove the
argument removals and add -fno-stack-protector. Additionally include
missed x32 argument updates, and adjust whitespace for readability.
Fixes: 20355e5f73a7 ("x86/entry: Exclude low level entry code from sanitizing")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202006261333.585319CA6B@keescook
---
arch/x86/entry/Makefile | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
index b7a5790..08bf95d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/Makefile
@@ -7,12 +7,20 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE := n
UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_64.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall_x32.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+
+CFLAGS_common.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += -fno-stack-protector
CFLAGS_syscall_64.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
CFLAGS_syscall_32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
+CFLAGS_syscall_x32.o += $(call cc-option,-Wno-override-init,)
+
obj-y := entry_$(BITS).o thunk_$(BITS).o syscall_$(BITS).o
obj-y += common.o
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2020-07-19 11:08 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/entry: " tip-bot2 for Kees Cook
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