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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: ehabkost@redhat.com, marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
	"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	"Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
	"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Subject: [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption()
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:37 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200724025744.69644-4-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200724025744.69644-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM
merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything.

We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is
thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration
environment that set the property then cleared it again before
constructing the guest.

More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult.
So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on
the final value of the property.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
---
 hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index 2f881d6d75..035a1fc631 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -432,14 +432,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value,
 
     g_free(ms->memory_encryption);
     ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value);
-
-    /*
-     * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM,
-     * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas.
-     */
-    if (value) {
-        machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp);
-    }
 }
 
 static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp)
@@ -1131,6 +1123,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
         }
     }
 
+    if (machine->memory_encryption) {
+        /*
+         * With host trust limitation, the host can't see the real
+         * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge
+         * areas.
+         */
+        machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
+    }
+
     machine_class->init(machine);
 }
 
-- 
2.26.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
	"Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
	"Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>,
	"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Subject: [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption()
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:37 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200724025744.69644-4-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200724025744.69644-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM
merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything.

We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is
thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration
environment that set the property then cleared it again before
constructing the guest.

More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult.
So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on
the final value of the property.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
---
 hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index 2f881d6d75..035a1fc631 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -432,14 +432,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value,
 
     g_free(ms->memory_encryption);
     ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value);
-
-    /*
-     * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM,
-     * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas.
-     */
-    if (value) {
-        machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp);
-    }
 }
 
 static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp)
@@ -1131,6 +1123,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
         }
     }
 
+    if (machine->memory_encryption) {
+        /*
+         * With host trust limitation, the host can't see the real
+         * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge
+         * areas.
+         */
+        machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort);
+    }
+
     machine_class->init(machine);
 }
 
-- 
2.26.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-24  2:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-24  2:57 [for-5.2 v4 00/10] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 01/10] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 02/10] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` David Gibson [this message]
2020-07-24  2:57   ` [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 04/10] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 05/10] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 06/10] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 07/10] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 08/10] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:01   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-27 15:01     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 09/10] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:05   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-27 15:05     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-08-13  7:43     ` Greg Kurz
2020-08-13  7:43       ` Greg Kurz
2020-08-13  8:19       ` Greg Kurz
2020-08-13  8:19         ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-07 15:10   ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-07 15:10     ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11  2:04     ` David Gibson
2020-09-11  2:04       ` David Gibson
2020-09-11 13:49       ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11 13:49         ` Halil Pasic
2020-07-24  2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option David Gibson
2020-07-24  2:57   ` David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:50   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-27 15:50     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-08-03  7:40     ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  7:40       ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-06  6:14     ` David Gibson
2020-08-06  6:14       ` David Gibson
2020-08-06  7:18       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-06  7:18         ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-03  7:49   ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  7:49     ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  7:54     ` David Gibson
2020-08-03  7:54       ` David Gibson
2020-08-03  8:07       ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  8:07         ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03  8:14         ` David Gibson
2020-08-03  8:14           ` David Gibson
2020-08-03  8:33           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-08-03  8:33             ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-07 15:22   ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-07 15:22     ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-10 11:36     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-10 11:36       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-10 18:29       ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-10 18:29         ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11  0:07         ` David Gibson
2020-09-11  0:07           ` David Gibson
2020-09-11  6:25           ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-11  6:25             ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-11 12:45           ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11 12:45             ` Halil Pasic

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