From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com Cc: ehabkost@redhat.com, marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>, "David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>, "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, "Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>, "Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Subject: [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:37 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200724025744.69644-4-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200724025744.69644-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything. We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration environment that set the property then cleared it again before constructing the guest. More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult. So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on the final value of the property. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> --- hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index 2f881d6d75..035a1fc631 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -432,14 +432,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value, g_free(ms->memory_encryption); ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value); - - /* - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM, - * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas. - */ - if (value) { - machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp); - } } static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) @@ -1131,6 +1123,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) } } + if (machine->memory_encryption) { + /* + * With host trust limitation, the host can't see the real + * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge + * areas. + */ + machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort); + } + machine_class->init(machine); } -- 2.26.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> To: dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com Cc: "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>, "Cornelia Huck" <cohuck@redhat.com>, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, "David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>, "Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, "Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, "Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>, "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Subject: [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:37 +1000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200724025744.69644-4-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200724025744.69644-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything. We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration environment that set the property then cleared it again before constructing the guest. More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult. So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on the final value of the property. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> --- hw/core/machine.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index 2f881d6d75..035a1fc631 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -432,14 +432,6 @@ static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value, g_free(ms->memory_encryption); ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value); - - /* - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real contents of RAM, - * so there's no point in it trying to merge areas. - */ - if (value) { - machine_set_mem_merge(obj, false, errp); - } } static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) @@ -1131,6 +1123,15 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) } } + if (machine->memory_encryption) { + /* + * With host trust limitation, the host can't see the real + * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge + * areas. + */ + machine_set_mem_merge(OBJECT(machine), false, &error_abort); + } + machine_class->init(machine); } -- 2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-24 2:57 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-07-24 2:57 [for-5.2 v4 00/10] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 01/10] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 02/10] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson [this message] 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 04/10] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 05/10] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 06/10] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 07/10] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 08/10] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-27 15:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-07-27 15:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 09/10] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-27 15:05 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-07-27 15:05 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert 2020-08-13 7:43 ` Greg Kurz 2020-08-13 7:43 ` Greg Kurz 2020-08-13 8:19 ` Greg Kurz 2020-08-13 8:19 ` Greg Kurz 2020-09-07 15:10 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-07 15:10 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-11 2:04 ` David Gibson 2020-09-11 2:04 ` David Gibson 2020-09-11 13:49 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-11 13:49 ` Halil Pasic 2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option David Gibson 2020-07-24 2:57 ` David Gibson 2020-07-27 15:50 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-07-27 15:50 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-08-03 7:40 ` Janosch Frank 2020-08-03 7:40 ` Janosch Frank 2020-08-06 6:14 ` David Gibson 2020-08-06 6:14 ` David Gibson 2020-08-06 7:18 ` David Hildenbrand 2020-08-06 7:18 ` David Hildenbrand 2020-08-03 7:49 ` Janosch Frank 2020-08-03 7:49 ` Janosch Frank 2020-08-03 7:54 ` David Gibson 2020-08-03 7:54 ` David Gibson 2020-08-03 8:07 ` Janosch Frank 2020-08-03 8:07 ` Janosch Frank 2020-08-03 8:14 ` David Gibson 2020-08-03 8:14 ` David Gibson 2020-08-03 8:33 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-08-03 8:33 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-09-07 15:22 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-07 15:22 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-10 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-09-10 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck 2020-09-10 18:29 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-10 18:29 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-11 0:07 ` David Gibson 2020-09-11 0:07 ` David Gibson 2020-09-11 6:25 ` Greg Kurz 2020-09-11 6:25 ` Greg Kurz 2020-09-11 12:45 ` Halil Pasic 2020-09-11 12:45 ` Halil Pasic
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