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From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
	"Willy Tarreau" <w@1wt.eu>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	"Vito Caputo" <vcaputo@pengaru.com>,
	"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Ray Strode" <rstrode@redhat.com>,
	"William Jon McCann" <mccann@jhu.edu>,
	zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
	"Peter Matthias" <matthias.peter@bsi.bund.de>,
	"Marcelo Henrique Cerri" <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>,
	"Roman Drahtmueller" <draht@schaltsekun.de>,
	"Neil Horman" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Julia Lawall" <julia.lawall@inria.fr>,
	"Dan Carpenter" <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	"Andy Lavr" <andy.lavr@gmail.com>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>,
	"Torsten Duwe" <duwe@suse.de>, "Petr Tesarik" <ptesarik@suse.cz>,
	"Nicolai Stange" <nstange@suse.de>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 13/41] random: convert try_to_generate_entropy() to queued_entropy API
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 09:58:29 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200921075857.4424-14-nstange@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200921075857.4424-1-nstange@suse.de>

In an effort to drop __credit_entropy_bits_fast() in favor of the new
__queue_entropy()/__dispatch_queued_entropy_fast() API, convert
try_to_generate_entropy() from the former to the latter.

Replace the call to __credit_entropy_bits_fast() from the timer callback,
entropy_timer(), by a queue_entropy() operation. Dispatch it from the loop
in try_to_generate_entropy() by invoking __dispatch_queued_entropy_fast()
after the timestamp has been mixed into the input_pool.

In order to provide the timer callback and try_to_generate_entropy() with
access to a common struct queued_entropy instance, move the currently
anonymous struct definition from the local 'stack' variable declaration in
try_to_generate_entropy() to file scope and assign it a name,
"struct try_to_generate_entropy_stack". Make entropy_timer() obtain a
pointer to the corresponding instance by means of container_of() on the
->timer member contained therein. Amend struct
try_to_generate_entropy_stack by a new member ->q of type struct
queued_entropy.

Note that the described scheme alters behaviour a bit: first of all, new
entropy credit now gets only dispatched to the pool after the actual mixing
has completed rather than in an unsynchronized manner directly from the
timer callback. As the mixing loop try_to_generate_entropy() is expected to
run at higher frequency than the timer, this is unlikely to make any
difference in practice.

Furthermore, the pool entropy watermark as tracked over the period from
queuing the entropy in the timer callback and to its subsequent dispatch
from try_to_generate_entropy() is now taken into account when calculating
the actual credit at dispatch. In consequence, the amount of new entropy
dispatched to the pool will potentially be lowered if said period happens
to overlap with the pool extraction from an initial crng_reseed() on the
primary_crng. However, as getting the primary_crng seeded is the whole
point of the try_to_generate_entropy() exercise, this won't matter.

Note that instead of calling queue_entropy() from the timer callback,
an alternative would have been to maintain an invocation counter and queue
that up from try_to_generate_entropy() right before the mix operation.
This would have reduced the described effect of the pool's entropy
watermark and in fact matched the intended queue_entropy() API usage
better. However, in this particular case of try_to_generate_entropy(),
jitter is desired and invoking queue_entropy() with its buffer locking etc.
from the timer callback could potentially contribute to that.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index bd3774c6be4b..dfbe49fdbcf1 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1911,6 +1911,12 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
 
+struct try_to_generate_entropy_stack {
+	unsigned long now;
+	struct timer_list timer;
+	struct queued_entropy q;
+} stack;
+
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1926,14 +1932,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
  */
 static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 {
-	bool reseed;
-	unsigned long flags;
+	struct try_to_generate_entropy_stack *stack;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	reseed = __credit_entropy_bits_fast(&input_pool, 1);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	if (reseed)
-		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+	stack = container_of(t, struct try_to_generate_entropy_stack, timer);
+	queue_entropy(&input_pool, &stack->q, 1 << ENTROPY_SHIFT);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1942,10 +1944,9 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
  */
 static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
 {
-	struct {
-		unsigned long now;
-		struct timer_list timer;
-	} stack;
+	struct try_to_generate_entropy_stack stack = { 0 };
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool reseed;
 
 	stack.now = random_get_entropy();
 
@@ -1957,14 +1958,29 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
 	while (!crng_ready()) {
 		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
 			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
-		mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+		__mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+		reseed = __dispatch_queued_entropy_fast(&input_pool, &stack.q);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+
+		if (reseed)
+			crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+
 		schedule();
 		stack.now = random_get_entropy();
 	}
 
 	del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
 	destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
-	mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+	__mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
+	/*
+	 * Must be called here once more in order to complete a
+	 * previously unmatched queue_entropy() from entropy_timer(),
+	 * if any.
+	 */
+	__dispatch_queued_entropy_fast(&input_pool, &stack.q);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-21  8:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 85+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-21  7:58 [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 01/41] random: remove dead code in credit_entropy_bits() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 02/41] random: remove dead code for nbits < 0 " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 03/41] random: prune dead assignment to entropy_bits " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 04/41] random: drop 'reserved' parameter from extract_entropy() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 05/41] random: don't reset entropy to zero on overflow Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 06/41] random: factor the exponential approximation in credit_entropy_bits() out Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 07/41] random: let pool_entropy_delta() take nbits in units of 2^-ENTROPY_SHIFT Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 08/41] random: introduce __credit_entropy_bits_fast() for hot paths Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 09/41] random: protect ->entropy_count with the pool spinlock Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 10/41] random: implement support for delayed entropy dispatching Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 11/41] random: convert add_timer_randomness() to queued_entropy API Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 12/41] random: convert add_interrupt_randomness() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` Nicolai Stange [this message]
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 14/41] random: drop __credit_entropy_bits_fast() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 15/41] random: convert add_hwgenerator_randomness() to queued_entropy API Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 16/41] random: convert random_ioctl() " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 17/41] random: drop credit_entropy_bits() and credit_entropy_bits_safe() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 18/41] random: move arch_get_random_seed() calls in crng_reseed() into own loop Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 19/41] random: reintroduce arch_has_random() + arch_has_random_seed() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 20/41] random: provide min_crng_reseed_pool_entropy() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 21/41] random: don't invoke arch_get_random_long() from add_interrupt_randomness() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 22/41] random: introduce arch_has_sp800_90b_random_seed() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21 12:18   ` kernel test robot
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 23/41] random: don't award entropy to non-SP800-90B arch RNGs in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 24/41] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 25/41] random: probe cycle counter resolution at initialization Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 26/41] random: implement support for evaluating larger fast_pool entropies Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 27/41] random: increase per-IRQ event entropy estimate if in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 28/41] random: don't award entropy to disk + input events " Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 29/41] random: move definition of struct queued_entropy and related API upwards Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 30/41] random: add a queued_entropy instance to struct fast_pool Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 31/41] random: introduce struct health_test + health_test_reset() placeholders Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 32/41] random: introduce health test stub and wire it up Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 33/41] random: make health_test_process() maintain the get_cycles() delta Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 34/41] random: implement the "Adaptive Proportion" NIST SP800-90B health test Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 35/41] random: improve the APT's statistical power Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 36/41] random: optimize the APT's presearch Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 37/41] random: implement the "Repetition Count" NIST SP800-90B health test Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 38/41] random: enable NIST SP800-90B startup tests Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 39/41] random: make the startup tests include muliple APT invocations Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 40/41] random: trigger startup health test on any failure of the health tests Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  7:58 ` [RFC PATCH 41/41] random: lower per-IRQ entropy estimate upon health test failure Nicolai Stange
2020-09-21  8:09 ` [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-09-21  8:40 ` Stephan Mueller
2020-09-22 13:23   ` Torsten Duwe
2020-09-22 16:21     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-09-22 17:48       ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 12:38 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 13:15   ` Willy Tarreau
2020-10-02 13:33     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 14:05       ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-02 13:56     ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-16 17:26       ` Torsten Duwe
2020-10-19 19:28         ` [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:30           ` [PATCH v36 01/13] Linux Random Number Generator Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:31           ` [PATCH v36 02/13] LRNG - allocate one DRNG instance per NUMA node Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:32           ` [PATCH v36 03/13] LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:32           ` [PATCH v36 04/13] LRNG - add switchable DRNG support Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:33           ` [PATCH v36 05/13] LRNG - add common generic hash support Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:34           ` [PATCH v36 06/13] crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:34           ` [PATCH v36 07/13] LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:35           ` [PATCH v36 08/13] LRNG - add kernel crypto API PRNG extension Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:35           ` [PATCH v36 09/13] crypto: provide access to a static Jitter RNG state Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:36           ` [PATCH v36 10/13] LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:37           ` [PATCH v36 11/13] LRNG - add SP800-90B compliant health tests Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:37           ` [PATCH v36 12/13] LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy Stephan Müller
2020-10-19 19:38           ` [PATCH v36 13/13] LRNG - add power-on and runtime self-tests Stephan Müller
2020-10-28 17:51           ` [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach Torsten Duwe
2020-10-28 18:07             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-11-02 13:44               ` Torsten Duwe
2020-11-04 14:26                 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2020-11-17 14:01                 ` Torsten Duwe
2020-11-10 10:22           ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-02 13:35   ` [DISCUSSION PATCH 00/41] random: possible ways towards NIST SP800-90B compliance Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 14:04     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 14:34       ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 15:13         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-10-02 15:39           ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-02 16:30             ` Randy Dunlap
2020-10-02 18:14             ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2020-10-02 19:09               ` Van Leeuwen, Pascal
2020-10-07  4:24   ` Eric Biggers
2020-10-07  5:52     ` Stephan Mueller
2020-10-07 10:38     ` Nicolai Stange

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