* [PATCH v2 0/3] A bunch of trusted keys fixes @ 2020-10-05 3:49 Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen ` (2 more replies) 0 siblings, 3 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity; +Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen v2: Fix a kernel test bot warning: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/202010051152.9kxy43LO-lkp@intel.com/ Jarkko Sakkinen (3): KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 - include/linux/tpm.h | 16 +++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +- 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() 2020-10-05 3:49 [PATCH v2 0/3] A bunch of trusted keys fixes Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, Mimi Zohar, James E.J. Bottomley, David Howells, Kent Yoder, James Bottomley, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, H. Peter Anvin, David Safford, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value: 1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated. 2. A negative value on error. However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense. Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value. Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b9fe02e5f84f..c7b1701cdac5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, int ret; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + if (ret < 0) return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + return -EIO; + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); @@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - goto out; + return -EIO; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); datsize = htonl(datalen); pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); @@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; + return -EIO; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), @@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + ret = -EIO; goto out; } if (tpm2) -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() @ 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, Mimi Zohar, James E.J. Bottomley, David Howells, Kent Yoder, James Bottomley, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, H. Peter Anvin, David Safford, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value: 1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated. 2. A negative value on error. However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense. Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value. Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b9fe02e5f84f..c7b1701cdac5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, int ret; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + if (ret < 0) return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + return -EIO; + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); @@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - goto out; + return -EIO; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); datsize = htonl(datalen); pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); @@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; + return -EIO; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), @@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + ret = -EIO; goto out; } if (tpm2) -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations 2020-10-05 3:49 [PATCH v2 0/3] A bunch of trusted keys fixes Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, James E.J. Bottomley, stable, David Howells, Mimi Zohar, Sumit Garg, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, James Bottomley, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Jerry Snitselaar, Alexey Klimov, open list, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT need to be done as a one single atom. Fix this issue by introducting trusted_tpm_load() and trusted_tpm_new(), which wrap these operations, and take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything. Use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 -- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 ++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 78 +++++++++++++++-------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +- 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 947d1db0a5cc..283f78211c3a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -164,8 +164,6 @@ extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops; extern struct idr dev_nums_idr; ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz); -ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *); int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec) int tpm_chip_start(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_chip_stop(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev, const struct tpm_class_ops *ops); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 8f4ff39f51e7..fc0ece0d8d46 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -397,6 +397,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, @@ -410,7 +414,17 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) { return -ENODEV; } - +static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ +} +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc) +{ +} static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c7b1701cdac5..c1dfc32c780b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -950,6 +950,51 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) return p; } +static int trusted_tpm_load(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_tpm_new(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, payload->key_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ret != payload->key_len) + return -EIO; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_seal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + /* * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key * @@ -968,12 +1013,6 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, char *datablob; int ret = 0; int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return tpm2; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -1011,32 +1050,21 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + ret = trusted_tpm_load(chip, payload, options); + dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); + if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: load failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + ret = trusted_tpm_new(chip, payload, options); - if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); - ret = -EIO; - goto out; - } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: new failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; default: ret = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 08ec7f48f01d..effdb67fac6d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); if (rc) goto out; @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); if (!rc) *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->blobauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); if (rc > 0) rc = -EPERM; -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations @ 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, James E.J. Bottomley, stable, David Howells, Mimi Zohar, Sumit Garg, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, Arnd Bergmann, Greg Kroah-Hartman, James Bottomley, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Jerry Snitselaar, Alexey Klimov, open list, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT need to be done as a one single atom. Fix this issue by introducting trusted_tpm_load() and trusted_tpm_new(), which wrap these operations, and take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything. Use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 4 -- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 ++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 78 +++++++++++++++-------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +- 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 947d1db0a5cc..283f78211c3a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -164,8 +164,6 @@ extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops; extern struct idr dev_nums_idr; ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz); -ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *); int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -194,8 +192,6 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec) int tpm_chip_start(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_chip_stop(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev, const struct tpm_class_ops *ops); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 8f4ff39f51e7..fc0ece0d8d46 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -397,6 +397,10 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, @@ -410,7 +414,17 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) { return -ENODEV; } - +static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ +} +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc) +{ +} static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c7b1701cdac5..c1dfc32c780b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -950,6 +950,51 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) return p; } +static int trusted_tpm_load(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_tpm_new(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, payload->key_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ret != payload->key_len) + return -EIO; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_seal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + /* * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key * @@ -968,12 +1013,6 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, char *datablob; int ret = 0; int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return tpm2; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -1011,32 +1050,21 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + ret = trusted_tpm_load(chip, payload, options); + dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); + if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: load failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + ret = trusted_tpm_new(chip, payload, options); - if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); - ret = -EIO; - goto out; - } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: new failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; default: ret = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 08ec7f48f01d..effdb67fac6d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); if (rc) goto out; @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); if (!rc) *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->blobauth /* hmac */, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf)); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); if (rc > 0) rc = -EPERM; -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-11 1:54 ` kernel test robot -1 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: kernel test robot @ 2020-10-11 1:54 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jarkko Sakkinen, linux-integrity Cc: kbuild-all, Jarkko Sakkinen, James E.J. Bottomley, stable, David Howells, Mimi Zohar, Sumit Garg, Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, Arnd Bergmann [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3480 bytes --] Hi Jarkko, I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve: [auto build test WARNING on security/next-testing] [also build test WARNING on integrity/next-integrity char-misc/char-misc-testing linus/master v5.9-rc8 next-20201009] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Jarkko-Sakkinen/KEYS-trusted-Fix-incorrect-handling-of-tpm_get_random/20201005-125026 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-testing config: ia64-randconfig-r014-20201011 (attached as .config) compiler: ia64-linux-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/3e5e85d67d3042826e12884edeca679090efe227 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jarkko-Sakkinen/KEYS-trusted-Fix-incorrect-handling-of-tpm_get_random/20201005-125026 git checkout 3e5e85d67d3042826e12884edeca679090efe227 # save the attached .config to linux build tree COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-9.3.0 make.cross ARCH=ia64 If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): In file included from include/keys/trusted-type.h:12, from security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:22: include/linux/tpm.h: In function 'tpm_transmit_cmd': >> include/linux/tpm.h:426:1: warning: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Wreturn-type] 426 | } | ^ vim +426 include/linux/tpm.h 397 398 extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); 399 extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); 400 extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); 401 extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, 402 size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); 403 extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, 404 struct tpm_digest *digest); 405 extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, 406 struct tpm_digest *digests); 407 extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen); 408 extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); 409 extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); 410 void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); 411 #else 412 static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) 413 { 414 return -ENODEV; 415 } 416 static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) 417 { 418 return -ENODEV; 419 } 420 static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) 421 { 422 } 423 static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, 424 size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc) 425 { > 426 } 427 static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, 428 struct tpm_digest *digest) 429 { 430 return -ENODEV; 431 } 432 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org [-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --] [-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 25980 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations @ 2020-10-11 1:54 ` kernel test robot 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: kernel test robot @ 2020-10-11 1:54 UTC (permalink / raw) To: kbuild-all [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3560 bytes --] Hi Jarkko, I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve: [auto build test WARNING on security/next-testing] [also build test WARNING on integrity/next-integrity char-misc/char-misc-testing linus/master v5.9-rc8 next-20201009] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Jarkko-Sakkinen/KEYS-trusted-Fix-incorrect-handling-of-tpm_get_random/20201005-125026 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-testing config: ia64-randconfig-r014-20201011 (attached as .config) compiler: ia64-linux-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/3e5e85d67d3042826e12884edeca679090efe227 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jarkko-Sakkinen/KEYS-trusted-Fix-incorrect-handling-of-tpm_get_random/20201005-125026 git checkout 3e5e85d67d3042826e12884edeca679090efe227 # save the attached .config to linux build tree COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-9.3.0 make.cross ARCH=ia64 If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): In file included from include/keys/trusted-type.h:12, from security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:22: include/linux/tpm.h: In function 'tpm_transmit_cmd': >> include/linux/tpm.h:426:1: warning: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Wreturn-type] 426 | } | ^ vim +426 include/linux/tpm.h 397 398 extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); 399 extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); 400 extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); 401 extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, 402 size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); 403 extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, 404 struct tpm_digest *digest); 405 extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, 406 struct tpm_digest *digests); 407 extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen); 408 extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); 409 extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); 410 void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); 411 #else 412 static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) 413 { 414 return -ENODEV; 415 } 416 static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) 417 { 418 return -ENODEV; 419 } 420 static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) 421 { 422 } 423 static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, 424 size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc) 425 { > 426 } 427 static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, 428 struct tpm_digest *digest) 429 { 430 return -ENODEV; 431 } 432 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org [-- Attachment #2: config.gz --] [-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 25980 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing 2020-10-05 3:49 [PATCH v2 0/3] A bunch of trusted keys fixes Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, James E.J. Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, David Safford, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list Consider the following transcript: $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle€000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument The documentation has the following description: migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL. [*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c1dfc32c780b..20ca18e17437 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from = '0') pay->migratable = 0; - else + else if (*args[0].from != '1') return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_pcrlock: -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing @ 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-10-05 3:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, James E.J. Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, David Safford, open list:KEYS-TRUSTED, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM, open list Consider the following transcript: $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument The documentation has the following description: migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL. [*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c1dfc32c780b..20ca18e17437 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, case Opt_migratable: if (*args[0].from == '0') pay->migratable = 0; - else + else if (*args[0].from != '1') return -EINVAL; break; case Opt_pcrlock: -- 2.25.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-10-11 1:54 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2020-10-05 3:49 [PATCH v2 0/3] A bunch of trusted keys fixes Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-11 1:54 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-11 1:54 ` kernel test robot 2020-10-05 3:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-05 3:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.