* [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
@ 2020-10-06 9:58 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Hajnoczi @ 2020-10-06 9:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel
Cc: virtio-fs, Miklos Szeredi, Jens Freimann, Dr. David Alan Gilbert,
Stefan Hajnoczi
In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
read-only file systems.
Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
do this.
Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
{
int fd;
int level = 0;
ino_t last_ino = 0;
fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
for (;;) {
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
perror("fstat");
return;
}
if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
return;
}
last_ino = st.st_ino;
fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
(unsigned long)st.st_dev,
(unsigned long)last_ino);
fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
level++;
}
}
Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
directories.
Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 0b229ebd57..6ae7ffcdd7 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)
static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
{
pid_t child;
- char template[] = "virtiofsd-XXXXXX";
- char *tmpdir;
/*
* Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
@@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
exit(1);
}
- tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
- if (!tmpdir) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "tmpdir(%s): %m\n", template);
+ /*
+ * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
+ * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was
+ * previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only
+ * affects our process.
+ */
+ if (mount("/proc/self/fd", "/proc", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n");
exit(1);
}
- if (mount("/proc/self/fd", tmpdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n",
- tmpdir);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
- lo->proc_self_fd = open(tmpdir, O_PATH);
+ /* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */
+ lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc", O_PATH);
if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", tmpdir);
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n");
exit(1);
}
-
- if (umount2(tmpdir, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n", tmpdir);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (rmdir(tmpdir) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "rmdir(%s): %m\n", tmpdir);
- }
}
/*
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [Virtio-fs] [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
@ 2020-10-06 9:58 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Hajnoczi @ 2020-10-06 9:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: virtio-fs, Jens Freimann
In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
read-only file systems.
Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
do this.
Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
{
int fd;
int level = 0;
ino_t last_ino = 0;
fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
for (;;) {
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
perror("fstat");
return;
}
if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
return;
}
last_ino = st.st_ino;
fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
(unsigned long)st.st_dev,
(unsigned long)last_ino);
fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
level++;
}
}
Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
directories.
Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 0b229ebd57..6ae7ffcdd7 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)
static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
{
pid_t child;
- char template[] = "virtiofsd-XXXXXX";
- char *tmpdir;
/*
* Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
@@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
exit(1);
}
- tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
- if (!tmpdir) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "tmpdir(%s): %m\n", template);
+ /*
+ * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
+ * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was
+ * previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only
+ * affects our process.
+ */
+ if (mount("/proc/self/fd", "/proc", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n");
exit(1);
}
- if (mount("/proc/self/fd", tmpdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n",
- tmpdir);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
- lo->proc_self_fd = open(tmpdir, O_PATH);
+ /* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */
+ lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc", O_PATH);
if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", tmpdir);
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n");
exit(1);
}
-
- if (umount2(tmpdir, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n", tmpdir);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (rmdir(tmpdir) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "rmdir(%s): %m\n", tmpdir);
- }
}
/*
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
2020-10-06 9:58 ` [Virtio-fs] " Stefan Hajnoczi
@ 2020-10-06 11:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dr. David Alan Gilbert @ 2020-10-06 11:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Hajnoczi; +Cc: virtio-fs, Miklos Szeredi, Jens Freimann, qemu-devel
* Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote:
> In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
> created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
> read-only file systems.
>
> Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
> This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
> MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
> do this.
>
> Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
>
> static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
> {
> int fd;
> int level = 0;
> ino_t last_ino = 0;
>
> fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
> for (;;) {
> struct stat st;
>
> if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
> perror("fstat");
> return;
> }
> if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
> fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
> return;
> }
> last_ino = st.st_ino;
>
> fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
> (unsigned long)st.st_dev,
> (unsigned long)last_ino);
> fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
> level++;
> }
> }
>
> Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
> /proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
> directories.
>
> Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Yes, getting rid of the tmpdir altogether seems better.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> ---
> tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++---------------------
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> index 0b229ebd57..6ae7ffcdd7 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> @@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)
> static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
> {
> pid_t child;
> - char template[] = "virtiofsd-XXXXXX";
> - char *tmpdir;
>
> /*
> * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
> @@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
> exit(1);
> }
>
> - tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
> - if (!tmpdir) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "tmpdir(%s): %m\n", template);
> + /*
> + * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
> + * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was
> + * previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only
> + * affects our process.
> + */
> + if (mount("/proc/self/fd", "/proc", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
> + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n");
> exit(1);
> }
>
> - if (mount("/proc/self/fd", tmpdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n",
> - tmpdir);
> - exit(1);
> - }
> -
> - /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
> - lo->proc_self_fd = open(tmpdir, O_PATH);
> + /* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */
> + lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc", O_PATH);
> if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", tmpdir);
> + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n");
> exit(1);
> }
> -
> - if (umount2(tmpdir, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n", tmpdir);
> - exit(1);
> - }
> -
> - if (rmdir(tmpdir) < 0) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "rmdir(%s): %m\n", tmpdir);
> - }
> }
>
> /*
> --
> 2.26.2
>
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
@ 2020-10-06 11:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dr. David Alan Gilbert @ 2020-10-06 11:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Hajnoczi; +Cc: virtio-fs, Jens Freimann, qemu-devel
* Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote:
> In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
> created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
> read-only file systems.
>
> Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
> This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
> MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
> do this.
>
> Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
>
> static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
> {
> int fd;
> int level = 0;
> ino_t last_ino = 0;
>
> fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
> for (;;) {
> struct stat st;
>
> if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
> perror("fstat");
> return;
> }
> if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
> fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
> return;
> }
> last_ino = st.st_ino;
>
> fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
> (unsigned long)st.st_dev,
> (unsigned long)last_ino);
> fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
> level++;
> }
> }
>
> Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
> /proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
> directories.
>
> Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Yes, getting rid of the tmpdir altogether seems better.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
> ---
> tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++---------------------
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> index 0b229ebd57..6ae7ffcdd7 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> @@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)
> static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
> {
> pid_t child;
> - char template[] = "virtiofsd-XXXXXX";
> - char *tmpdir;
>
> /*
> * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
> @@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
> exit(1);
> }
>
> - tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
> - if (!tmpdir) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "tmpdir(%s): %m\n", template);
> + /*
> + * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
> + * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was
> + * previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only
> + * affects our process.
> + */
> + if (mount("/proc/self/fd", "/proc", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
> + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n");
> exit(1);
> }
>
> - if (mount("/proc/self/fd", tmpdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n",
> - tmpdir);
> - exit(1);
> - }
> -
> - /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
> - lo->proc_self_fd = open(tmpdir, O_PATH);
> + /* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */
> + lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc", O_PATH);
> if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", tmpdir);
> + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n");
> exit(1);
> }
> -
> - if (umount2(tmpdir, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n", tmpdir);
> - exit(1);
> - }
> -
> - if (rmdir(tmpdir) < 0) {
> - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "rmdir(%s): %m\n", tmpdir);
> - }
> }
>
> /*
> --
> 2.26.2
>
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
2020-10-06 9:58 ` [Virtio-fs] " Stefan Hajnoczi
@ 2020-10-06 13:43 ` Jens Freimann
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jens Freimann @ 2020-10-06 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Hajnoczi
Cc: virtio-fs, Miklos Szeredi, qemu-devel, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 10:58:26AM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
>In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
>created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
>read-only file systems.
>
>Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
>This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
>MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
>do this.
>
>Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
>
> static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
> {
> int fd;
> int level = 0;
> ino_t last_ino = 0;
>
> fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
> for (;;) {
> struct stat st;
>
> if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
> perror("fstat");
> return;
> }
> if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
> fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
> return;
> }
> last_ino = st.st_ino;
>
> fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
> (unsigned long)st.st_dev,
> (unsigned long)last_ino);
> fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
> level++;
> }
> }
>
>Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
>/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
>directories.
>
>Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
>Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
>Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
>Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Thanks Stefan, it fixes the problem we had!
Tested-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
regards,
Jens
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir
@ 2020-10-06 13:43 ` Jens Freimann
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jens Freimann @ 2020-10-06 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Hajnoczi; +Cc: virtio-fs, qemu-devel
On Tue, Oct 06, 2020 at 10:58:26AM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
>In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
>created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
>read-only file systems.
>
>Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
>This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
>MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
>do this.
>
>Path traversal can be tested with the following function:
>
> static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
> {
> int fd;
> int level = 0;
> ino_t last_ino = 0;
>
> fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
> for (;;) {
> struct stat st;
>
> if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
> perror("fstat");
> return;
> }
> if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
> fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
> return;
> }
> last_ino = st.st_ino;
>
> fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
> (unsigned long)st.st_dev,
> (unsigned long)last_ino);
> fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
> level++;
> }
> }
>
>Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
>/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
>directories.
>
>Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
>Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
>Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
>Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Thanks Stefan, it fixes the problem we had!
Tested-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
regards,
Jens
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
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2020-10-06 9:58 [PATCH] virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-10-06 9:58 ` [Virtio-fs] " Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-10-06 11:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-10-06 11:03 ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-10-06 13:43 ` Jens Freimann
2020-10-06 13:43 ` [Virtio-fs] " Jens Freimann
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