[PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt]

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3)
(cherry picked from commit 0a60996c7fa7010ea00d9b62fb6996d908a01ead)
---
AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.

 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 28 +++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 7c0c83dfe86e..0269a772bfe1 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -1235,10 +1235,26 @@ static inline void hci_auth_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 		conn->security_cfm_cb(conn, status);
 }
 
-static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status,
-								__u8 encrypt)
+static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 {
 	struct hci_cb *cb;
+	__u8 encrypt;
+
+	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
+		if (status)
+			conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
+
+		hci_connect_cfm(conn, status);
+		hci_conn_drop(conn);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
+		encrypt = 0x00;
+	else if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags))
+		encrypt = 0x02;
+	else
+		encrypt = 0x01;
 
 	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
 		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 03319ab8a7c6..bb9c13506bca 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 				     &cp);
 		} else {
 			clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
-			hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status, 0x00);
+			hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2565,22 +2565,7 @@ static void read_enc_key_size_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status,
 		conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size;
 	}
 
-	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
-		conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, 0);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-	} else {
-		u8 encrypt;
-
-		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
-			encrypt = 0x00;
-		else if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags))
-			encrypt = 0x02;
-		else
-			encrypt = 0x01;
-
-		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0, encrypt);
-	}
+	hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0);
 
 unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
@@ -2674,14 +2659,7 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 notify:
-	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
-		if (!ev->status)
-			conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
-
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, ev->status);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-	} else
-		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status, ev->encrypt);
+	hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 
 unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 2/2] Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

[Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt]

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

  '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
   required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
   SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
   not shortened'

SC enabled:

> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
          Secure Connections (Host Support)
> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

> HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5)
(cherry picked from commit f263237a1709a6dbf1dc9945187f1e64c53a4b73)
---
AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.

 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 10 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 20 ++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 0269a772bfe1..d07730be8d5a 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -1256,11 +1256,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 	else
 		encrypt = 0x01;
 
-	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
-		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
+	if (!status) {
+		if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
+			conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
-	if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
-		conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+		if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+			conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index 2ff5950e9712..2567249b5bce 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -1175,6 +1175,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+	 /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
+	  *
+	  * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
+	  * page 1319:
+	  *
+	  * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
+	  * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
+	  * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
+	  * not shortened)
+	  */
+	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
+		bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
+			   "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
 	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 		return 0;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index bb9c13506bca..f0e6cce921d8 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -2612,24 +2612,20 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
 
+	/* Check link security requirements are met */
+	if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
+		ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+
 	if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
+		/* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
+		 * disconnecting.
+		 */
+		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 		hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 		hci_conn_drop(conn);
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
-	/* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
-	 * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
-	 * combination key.
-	 */
-	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
-	    (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
-	     conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-		goto unlock;
-	}
-
 	/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
 	if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
 		struct hci_cp_read_enc_key_size cp;
-- 
2.27.0

Re: [PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[Greg KH]

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 09:43:32AM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote:
> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
> 
> This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
> state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
> (cherry picked from commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3)

This is only in 5.8, what about all the other stable kernels?

> (cherry picked from commit 0a60996c7fa7010ea00d9b62fb6996d908a01ead)

Where is this commit from?  I don't see it in Linus's tree.

> ---
> AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
> left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
> the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
> add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.

Why are you merging 2 commits together?  Please provide backports for
all stable kernels, if you want to see this in the 4.4.y tree.  We can
not have someone move from an older tree to a newer one and have a
regression.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 2/2] Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

[Greg KH]

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 09:43:33AM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote:
> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
> 
> E0 is not allowed with Level 4:
> 
> BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:
> 
>   '128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
>    required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
>    SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
>    not shortened'
> 
> SC enabled:
> 
> > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
>         Status: Success (0x00)
>         Handle: 256
>         Page: 1/2
>         Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
>           Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
>           LE Supported (Host)
>           Secure Connections (Host Support)
> > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
>         Status: Success (0x00)
>         Handle: 256
>         Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)
> 
> SC disabled:
> 
> > HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13
>         Status: Success (0x00)
>         Handle: 256
>         Page: 1/2
>         Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
>           Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
>           LE Supported (Host)
> > HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
>         Status: Success (0x00)
>         Handle: 256
>         Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
> [May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
> < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
>         Handle: 256
>         Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
> 
> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
> (cherry picked from commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5)
> (cherry picked from commit f263237a1709a6dbf1dc9945187f1e64c53a4b73)

I do not see this commit in Linus's tree.

> ---
> AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
> left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
> the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
> add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.

Same thing as before, we need this in all kernels.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt)]

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On 15/10/2020 11:57, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 09:43:32AM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote:
>> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
>>
>> This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
>> state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
>> (cherry picked from commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3)
> 
> This is only in 5.8, what about all the other stable kernels?
> 
>> (cherry picked from commit 0a60996c7fa7010ea00d9b62fb6996d908a01ead)
> 
> Where is this commit from?  I don't see it in Linus's tree.

Ops, my bad, I have a Linux 4.9 branch, which also includes the Android
4.9 kernel changes from Google. And since I noticed the patches in my
(merged from Android latest) linux-4.9.y branch, I thought the patches
were applied through all stable releases 4.9 and up.

>> ---
>> AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
>> left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
>> the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
>> add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.
> 
> Why are you merging 2 commits together?  Please provide backports for
> all stable kernels, if you want to see this in the 4.4.y tree.  We can
> not have someone move from an older tree to a newer one and have a
> regression.

Agreed, I have managed to trick myself into thinking the 4.4.y branch
was left out, but I assume these patches are required for all LTS branches.

That is a bigger job AFAIK, the newer branches might need additional
patches. Perhaps Luiz can assist?

-- 
Best regards, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt

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Re: [PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[Greg KH]

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:18:39AM +0000, Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt) wrote:
> On 15/10/2020 11:57, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 09:43:32AM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote:
> >> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
> >>
> >> This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
> >> state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
> >> (cherry picked from commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3)
> > 
> > This is only in 5.8, what about all the other stable kernels?
> > 
> >> (cherry picked from commit 0a60996c7fa7010ea00d9b62fb6996d908a01ead)
> > 
> > Where is this commit from?  I don't see it in Linus's tree.
> 
> Ops, my bad, I have a Linux 4.9 branch, which also includes the Android
> 4.9 kernel changes from Google. And since I noticed the patches in my
> (merged from Android latest) linux-4.9.y branch, I thought the patches
> were applied through all stable releases 4.9 and up.

I just looked at the google common android trees, and do not see this
commit in the android-4.9-q branch.  What branch are you seeing it in?

> >> ---
> >> AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
> >> left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
> >> the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
> >> add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.
> > 
> > Why are you merging 2 commits together?  Please provide backports for
> > all stable kernels, if you want to see this in the 4.4.y tree.  We can
> > not have someone move from an older tree to a newer one and have a
> > regression.
> 
> Agreed, I have managed to trick myself into thinking the 4.4.y branch
> was left out, but I assume these patches are required for all LTS branches.

They are, but if you have copies of them, please feel free to share
them.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt)]

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On 15/10/2020 14:02, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:18:39AM +0000, Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt) wrote:
>> On 15/10/2020 11:57, Greg KH wrote:
>>> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 09:43:32AM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote:
>>>> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
>>>>
>>>> This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
>>>> state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
>>>> (cherry picked from commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3)
>>>
>>> This is only in 5.8, what about all the other stable kernels?
>>>
>>>> (cherry picked from commit 0a60996c7fa7010ea00d9b62fb6996d908a01ead)
>>>
>>> Where is this commit from?  I don't see it in Linus's tree.
>>
>> Ops, my bad, I have a Linux 4.9 branch, which also includes the Android
>> 4.9 kernel changes from Google. And since I noticed the patches in my
>> (merged from Android latest) linux-4.9.y branch, I thought the patches
>> were applied through all stable releases 4.9 and up.
> 
> I just looked at the google common android trees, and do not see this
> commit in the android-4.9-q branch.  What branch are you seeing it in?

Well this is embarrassing:

commit 0a60996c7fa7010ea00d9b62fb6996d908a01ead
Author: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Commit: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <hegtvedt@cisco.com>

>>>> ---
>>>> AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
>>>> left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
>>>> the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
>>>> add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.
>>>
>>> Why are you merging 2 commits together?  Please provide backports for
>>> all stable kernels, if you want to see this in the 4.4.y tree.  We can
>>> not have someone move from an older tree to a newer one and have a
>>> regression.
>>
>> Agreed, I have managed to trick myself into thinking the 4.4.y branch
>> was left out, but I assume these patches are required for all LTS branches.
> 
> They are, but if you have copies of them, please feel free to share
> them.

I will repeat cherry-picking from a clean linux-stable git tree and send
patches, sorry for this noise.

I see linux-5.8.y has partial patches, while the older branches need the
full series of three commits. I just discovered an additional fix.

-- 
Best regards, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt

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Re: [PATCH v4.4/bluetooth 1/2] Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

[Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt)]

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On 15/10/2020 14:44, Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt) wrote:
> On 15/10/2020 14:02, Greg KH wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 11:18:39AM +0000, Hans-Christian Egtvedt (hegtvedt) wrote:
>>> On 15/10/2020 11:57, Greg KH wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 09:43:32AM +0200, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt wrote:
>>>>> From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

<snipp embarrassing reference to local commit>

>>>>> ---
>>>>> AFAICT, fixing CVE 2020-10135 Bluetooth impersonation attacks have been
>>>>> left out for the 4.4 stable kernel. I cherry picked what I assume are
>>>>> the appropriate two patches missing from the 4.9 stable kernel. Please
>>>>> add them to upcoming 4.4 stable releases.
>>>>
>>>> Why are you merging 2 commits together?  Please provide backports for
>>>> all stable kernels, if you want to see this in the 4.4.y tree.  We can
>>>> not have someone move from an older tree to a newer one and have a
>>>> regression.
>>>
>>> Agreed, I have managed to trick myself into thinking the 4.4.y branch
>>> was left out, but I assume these patches are required for all LTS branches.
>>
>> They are, but if you have copies of them, please feel free to share
>> them.
> 
> I will repeat cherry-picking from a clean linux-stable git tree and send
> patches, sorry for this noise.
> 
> I see linux-5.8.y has partial patches, while the older branches need the
> full series of three commits. I just discovered an additional fix.

I sent three iterations.

5.8.y only requires a single cherry-pick.

4.9.y to 5.4.y has non-conflicting cherry-pick from upstream commits.

4.4.y needs to resolve a conflict when cherry-picking.

I would still want Luiz to ack that this completes the mitigation for
this Bluetooth vulnerability in the stable kernels.

-- 
Best regards, Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt

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