From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v8 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 15:58:04 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201211235807.30815-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201211235807.30815-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems. Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=". Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6ec7daa87cba..0f4ee9e0a455 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_source:= [label] + label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 07116ff35c25..fea996a9e26c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -930,7 +931,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_source, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -967,6 +968,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1134,7 +1136,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) return false; - if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR)) + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_DATA_SOURCE)) return false; if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) @@ -1344,6 +1347,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS; break; + case Opt_data_source: + ima_log_string(ab, "data_source", args[0].from); + + if (entry->data_source) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + entry->data_source = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args); + if (IS_ERR(entry->data_source)) { + result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_source); + entry->data_source = NULL; + break; + } + + entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCE; + break; case Opt_fsuuid: ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); @@ -1724,6 +1744,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) { + seq_puts(m, "data_source="); + ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_source); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 15:58:04 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201211235807.30815-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201211235807.30815-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems. Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=". Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 6ec7daa87cba..0f4ee9e0a455 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_source:= [label] + label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 07116ff35c25..fea996a9e26c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -930,7 +931,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_source, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -967,6 +968,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1134,7 +1136,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) return false; - if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR)) + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_DATA_SOURCE)) return false; if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) @@ -1344,6 +1347,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |= IMA_KEYRINGS; break; + case Opt_data_source: + ima_log_string(ab, "data_source", args[0].from); + + if (entry->data_source) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + entry->data_source = ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args); + if (IS_ERR(entry->data_source)) { + result = PTR_ERR(entry->data_source); + entry->data_source = NULL; + break; + } + + entry->flags |= IMA_DATA_SOURCE; + break; case Opt_fsuuid: ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); @@ -1724,6 +1744,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DATA_SOURCE) { + seq_puts(m, "data_source="); + ima_show_rule_opt_list(m, entry->data_source); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); -- 2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-12 1:01 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-12-11 23:57 [PATCH v8 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:57 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 0:08 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 0:08 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 0:09 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 0:09 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 0:13 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 0:13 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 0:25 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 0:25 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 1:17 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 1:17 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 14:47 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 14:47 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 17:34 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 17:34 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message] 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v8 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-11 23:58 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-12-12 0:32 ` Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 0:32 ` [dm-devel] " Tyler Hicks 2020-12-12 0:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-12-12 0:33 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
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