From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> To: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: kbuild-all@lists.01.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security.capability: fix conversions on getxattr Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 05:08:53 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <202101210530.LysniVqn-lkp@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210119162204.2081137-3-mszeredi@redhat.com> [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7383 bytes --] Hi Miklos, I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve: [auto build test WARNING on security/next-testing] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Miklos-Szeredi/capability-conversion-fixes/20210120-152933 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-testing config: x86_64-randconfig-s022-20210120 (attached as .config) compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-15) 9.3.0 reproduce: # apt-get install sparse # sparse version: v0.6.3-208-g46a52ca4-dirty # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/bcf70adf8bcc3e52cb1b262ae2e1d9154da75097 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Miklos-Szeredi/capability-conversion-fixes/20210120-152933 git checkout bcf70adf8bcc3e52cb1b262ae2e1d9154da75097 # save the attached .config to linux build tree make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=x86_64 If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> "sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)" >> security/commoncap.c:424:41: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic @@ got int @@ security/commoncap.c:424:41: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic security/commoncap.c:424:41: sparse: got int >> security/commoncap.c:425:39: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic @@ got unsigned int [usertype] @@ security/commoncap.c:425:39: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic security/commoncap.c:425:39: sparse: got unsigned int [usertype] security/commoncap.c:426:37: sparse: sparse: restricted __le32 degrades to integer security/commoncap.c:427:49: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |= security/commoncap.c:427:49: sparse: left side has type restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:427:49: sparse: right side has type int security/commoncap.c:429:52: sparse: sparse: cast from restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:455:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic @@ got int @@ security/commoncap.c:455:31: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic security/commoncap.c:455:31: sparse: got int security/commoncap.c:456:33: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic @@ got unsigned int [usertype] @@ security/commoncap.c:456:33: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic security/commoncap.c:456:33: sparse: got unsigned int [usertype] security/commoncap.c:457:29: sparse: sparse: restricted __le32 degrades to integer security/commoncap.c:458:39: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |= security/commoncap.c:458:39: sparse: left side has type restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:458:39: sparse: right side has type int security/commoncap.c:460:42: sparse: sparse: cast from restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:1281:41: sparse: sparse: dubious: !x | y vim +424 security/commoncap.c 357 358 /* 359 * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the 360 * xattr from the inode itself. 361 * 362 * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we 363 * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler. 364 * 365 * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called 366 * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values - 367 * so that's good. 368 */ 369 int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, 370 bool alloc) 371 { 372 int size, ret; 373 kuid_t kroot; 374 __le32 nsmagic, magic; 375 uid_t root, mappedroot; 376 char *tmpbuf = NULL; 377 struct vfs_cap_data *cap; 378 struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL; 379 struct dentry *dentry; 380 struct user_namespace *fs_ns; 381 382 if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) 383 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 384 385 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); 386 if (!dentry) 387 return -EINVAL; 388 389 size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); 390 ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, 391 &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS); 392 dput(dentry); 393 394 if (ret < 0) 395 return ret; 396 397 fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; 398 cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf; 399 if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) { 400 root = 0; 401 } else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) { 402 nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf; 403 root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid); 404 } else { 405 size = -EINVAL; 406 goto out_free; 407 } 408 409 kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root); 410 411 /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return 412 * this as a nscap. */ 413 mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot); 414 if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) { 415 size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); 416 if (alloc) { 417 if (!nscap) { 418 /* v2 -> v3 conversion */ 419 nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); 420 if (!nscap) { 421 size = -ENOMEM; 422 goto out_free; 423 } > 424 nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; > 425 magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc); 426 if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) 427 nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; 428 memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); 429 nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic); 430 } else { 431 /* use allocated v3 buffer */ 432 tmpbuf = NULL; 433 } 434 nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot); 435 *buffer = nscap; 436 } 437 goto out_free; 438 } 439 440 if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) { 441 size = -EOVERFLOW; 442 goto out_free; 443 } 444 445 /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */ 446 size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data); 447 if (alloc) { 448 if (nscap) { 449 /* v3 -> v2 conversion */ 450 cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); 451 if (!cap) { 452 size = -ENOMEM; 453 goto out_free; 454 } 455 magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; 456 nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc); 457 if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) 458 magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; 459 memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); 460 cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic); 461 } else { 462 /* use unconverted v2 */ 463 tmpbuf = NULL; 464 } 465 *buffer = cap; 466 } 467 out_free: 468 kfree(tmpbuf); 469 return size; 470 } 471 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org [-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --] [-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 36340 bytes --]
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> To: kbuild-all@lists.01.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security.capability: fix conversions on getxattr Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 05:08:53 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <202101210530.LysniVqn-lkp@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210119162204.2081137-3-mszeredi@redhat.com> [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7558 bytes --] Hi Miklos, I love your patch! Perhaps something to improve: [auto build test WARNING on security/next-testing] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch] url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Miklos-Szeredi/capability-conversion-fixes/20210120-152933 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-testing config: x86_64-randconfig-s022-20210120 (attached as .config) compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-15) 9.3.0 reproduce: # apt-get install sparse # sparse version: v0.6.3-208-g46a52ca4-dirty # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/bcf70adf8bcc3e52cb1b262ae2e1d9154da75097 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Miklos-Szeredi/capability-conversion-fixes/20210120-152933 git checkout bcf70adf8bcc3e52cb1b262ae2e1d9154da75097 # save the attached .config to linux build tree make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=x86_64 If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> "sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)" >> security/commoncap.c:424:41: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic @@ got int @@ security/commoncap.c:424:41: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic security/commoncap.c:424:41: sparse: got int >> security/commoncap.c:425:39: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic @@ got unsigned int [usertype] @@ security/commoncap.c:425:39: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic security/commoncap.c:425:39: sparse: got unsigned int [usertype] security/commoncap.c:426:37: sparse: sparse: restricted __le32 degrades to integer security/commoncap.c:427:49: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |= security/commoncap.c:427:49: sparse: left side has type restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:427:49: sparse: right side has type int security/commoncap.c:429:52: sparse: sparse: cast from restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:455:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic @@ got int @@ security/commoncap.c:455:31: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] magic security/commoncap.c:455:31: sparse: got int security/commoncap.c:456:33: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) @@ expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic @@ got unsigned int [usertype] @@ security/commoncap.c:456:33: sparse: expected restricted __le32 [usertype] nsmagic security/commoncap.c:456:33: sparse: got unsigned int [usertype] security/commoncap.c:457:29: sparse: sparse: restricted __le32 degrades to integer security/commoncap.c:458:39: sparse: sparse: invalid assignment: |= security/commoncap.c:458:39: sparse: left side has type restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:458:39: sparse: right side has type int security/commoncap.c:460:42: sparse: sparse: cast from restricted __le32 security/commoncap.c:1281:41: sparse: sparse: dubious: !x | y vim +424 security/commoncap.c 357 358 /* 359 * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the 360 * xattr from the inode itself. 361 * 362 * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we 363 * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler. 364 * 365 * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called 366 * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values - 367 * so that's good. 368 */ 369 int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, 370 bool alloc) 371 { 372 int size, ret; 373 kuid_t kroot; 374 __le32 nsmagic, magic; 375 uid_t root, mappedroot; 376 char *tmpbuf = NULL; 377 struct vfs_cap_data *cap; 378 struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL; 379 struct dentry *dentry; 380 struct user_namespace *fs_ns; 381 382 if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) 383 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 384 385 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); 386 if (!dentry) 387 return -EINVAL; 388 389 size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); 390 ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, 391 &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS); 392 dput(dentry); 393 394 if (ret < 0) 395 return ret; 396 397 fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; 398 cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf; 399 if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) { 400 root = 0; 401 } else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) { 402 nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf; 403 root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid); 404 } else { 405 size = -EINVAL; 406 goto out_free; 407 } 408 409 kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root); 410 411 /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return 412 * this as a nscap. */ 413 mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot); 414 if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) { 415 size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); 416 if (alloc) { 417 if (!nscap) { 418 /* v2 -> v3 conversion */ 419 nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); 420 if (!nscap) { 421 size = -ENOMEM; 422 goto out_free; 423 } > 424 nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; > 425 magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc); 426 if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) 427 nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; 428 memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); 429 nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic); 430 } else { 431 /* use allocated v3 buffer */ 432 tmpbuf = NULL; 433 } 434 nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot); 435 *buffer = nscap; 436 } 437 goto out_free; 438 } 439 440 if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) { 441 size = -EOVERFLOW; 442 goto out_free; 443 } 444 445 /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */ 446 size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data); 447 if (alloc) { 448 if (nscap) { 449 /* v3 -> v2 conversion */ 450 cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); 451 if (!cap) { 452 size = -ENOMEM; 453 goto out_free; 454 } 455 magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; 456 nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc); 457 if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) 458 magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; 459 memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); 460 cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic); 461 } else { 462 /* use unconverted v2 */ 463 tmpbuf = NULL; 464 } 465 *buffer = cap; 466 } 467 out_free: 468 kfree(tmpbuf); 469 return size; 470 } 471 --- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org [-- Attachment #2: config.gz --] [-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 36340 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-20 23:42 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-01-19 16:22 [PATCH 0/2] capability conversion fixes Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-19 16:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] ecryptfs: fix uid translation for setxattr on security.capability Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-19 21:06 ` Eric W. Biederman 2021-01-20 7:52 ` Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-22 16:04 ` Tyler Hicks 2021-01-22 18:31 ` Tyler Hicks 2021-01-25 13:25 ` Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-25 13:46 ` Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-26 1:52 ` Tyler Hicks 2021-01-19 16:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] security.capability: fix conversions on getxattr Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-20 1:34 ` Eric W. Biederman 2021-01-20 7:58 ` Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-28 16:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2021-01-28 20:19 ` Eric W. Biederman 2021-01-28 20:38 ` Miklos Szeredi 2021-01-28 20:49 ` Eric W. Biederman [not found] ` <20210129154839.GC1130@mail.hallyn.com> 2021-01-29 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2021-01-30 2:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2021-01-31 18:14 ` Eric W. Biederman [not found] ` <CAJfpegt34fO8tUw8R2_ZxxKHBdBO_-quf+-f3N8aZmS=1oRdvQ@mail.gmail.com> [not found] ` <20210129153807.GA1130@mail.hallyn.com> 2021-01-29 23:11 ` Eric W. Biederman 2021-01-30 2:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2021-01-20 19:37 ` kernel test robot 2021-01-20 19:37 ` kernel test robot 2021-01-20 21:08 ` kernel test robot [this message] 2021-01-20 21:08 ` kernel test robot 2021-01-19 21:10 ` [PATCH 0/2] capability conversion fixes Eric W. Biederman 2021-01-20 7:39 ` Miklos Szeredi
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