All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	Mrunal Patel <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 03/40] fs: add file and path permissions helpers
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:19:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210121131959.646623-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210112220124.837960-16-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
patch not present

/* v3 */
patch not present

/* v4 */
patch not present

/* v5 */
patch not present

/* v6 */
base-commit: 19c329f6808995b142b3966301f217c831e7cf31

- Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>:
  - Make file_user_ns() static inline.
  - Add file_permission() and path_permission() helpers.
---
 fs/init.c                          | 6 +++---
 fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 2 +-
 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c   | 2 +-
 fs/open.c                          | 6 +++---
 fs/udf/file.c                      | 2 +-
 fs/verity/enable.c                 | 2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h                 | 8 ++++++++
 kernel/bpf/inode.c                 | 2 +-
 kernel/sys.c                       | 2 +-
 mm/madvise.c                       | 2 +-
 mm/memcontrol.c                    | 2 +-
 mm/mincore.c                       | 2 +-
 net/unix/af_unix.c                 | 2 +-
 13 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/init.c b/fs/init.c
index e9c320a48cf1..02723bea8499 100644
--- a/fs/init.c
+++ b/fs/init.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int __init init_chdir(const char *filename)
 	error = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &path);
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int __init init_chroot(const char *filename)
 	error = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 	error = -EPERM;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int __init init_eaccess(const char *filename)
 	error = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = inode_permission(d_inode(path.dentry), MAY_ACCESS);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS);
 	path_put(&path);
 	return error;
 }
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index dcab112e1f00..64cfc1a3015d 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static int fanotify_find_path(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
 	}
 
 	/* you can only watch an inode if you have read permissions on it */
-	ret = inode_permission(path->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ);
+	ret = path_permission(path, MAY_READ);
 	if (ret) {
 		path_put(path);
 		goto out;
diff --git a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
index 59c177011a0f..e1155d32ef6f 100644
--- a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int inotify_find_inode(const char __user *dirname, struct path *path,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	/* you can only watch an inode if you have read permissions on it */
-	error = inode_permission(path->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ);
+	error = path_permission(path, MAY_READ);
 	if (error) {
 		path_put(path);
 		return error;
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 1e06e443a565..cd1efd254cad 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 	if (!d_can_lookup(f.file->f_path.dentry))
 		goto out_putf;
 
-	error = inode_permission(file_inode(f.file), MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = file_permission(f.file, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &f.file->f_path);
 out_putf:
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
diff --git a/fs/udf/file.c b/fs/udf/file.c
index ad8eefad27d7..3671a40ed3c3 100644
--- a/fs/udf/file.c
+++ b/fs/udf/file.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ long udf_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	long old_block, new_block;
 	int result;
 
-	if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ) != 0) {
+	if (file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0) {
 		udf_debug("no permission to access inode %lu\n", inode->i_ino);
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
index f7e997a01ad0..77e159a0346b 100644
--- a/fs/verity/enable.c
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
 	 * has verity enabled, and to stabilize the data being hashed.
 	 */
 
-	err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
+	err = file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3165998e2294..bcd17097d441 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2812,6 +2812,14 @@ static inline int bmap(struct inode *inode,  sector_t *block)
 extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
 extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int);
 extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int);
+static inline int file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return inode_permission(file_inode(file), mask);
+}
+static inline int path_permission(const struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+	return inode_permission(d_inode(path->dentry), mask);
+}
 extern int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode);
 
 static inline bool execute_ok(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
index dd4b7fd60ee7..8962f139521e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const char __user *pathname,
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 
 	inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
-	ret = inode_permission(inode, ACC_MODE(flags));
+	ret = path_permission(&path, ACC_MODE(flags));
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 51f00fe20e4d..138fb253b344 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
 		goto exit;
 
-	err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+	err = file_permission(exe.file, MAY_EXEC);
 	if (err)
 		goto exit;
 
diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index 6a660858784b..175c5582d8a9 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_pageout(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	 * opens a side channel.
 	 */
 	return inode_owner_or_capable(file_inode(vma->vm_file)) ||
-		inode_permission(file_inode(vma->vm_file), MAY_WRITE) == 0;
+	       file_permission(vma->vm_file, MAY_WRITE) == 0;
 }
 
 static long madvise_pageout(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c
index 605f671203ef..cf9076f58582 100644
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -4899,7 +4899,7 @@ static ssize_t memcg_write_event_control(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 
 	/* the process need read permission on control file */
 	/* AV: shouldn't we check that it's been opened for read instead? */
-	ret = inode_permission(file_inode(cfile.file), MAY_READ);
+	ret = file_permission(cfile.file, MAY_READ);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_put_cfile;
 
diff --git a/mm/mincore.c b/mm/mincore.c
index 02db1a834021..7bdb4673f776 100644
--- a/mm/mincore.c
+++ b/mm/mincore.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_mincore(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	 * mappings, which opens a side channel.
 	 */
 	return inode_owner_or_capable(file_inode(vma->vm_file)) ||
-		inode_permission(file_inode(vma->vm_file), MAY_WRITE) == 0;
+	       file_permission(vma->vm_file, MAY_WRITE) == 0;
 }
 
 static const struct mm_walk_ops mincore_walk_ops = {
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 41c3303c3357..18453d15dddf 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(struct net *net,
 		if (err)
 			goto fail;
 		inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
-		err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
+		err = path_permission(&path, MAY_WRITE);
 		if (err)
 			goto put_fail;
 
-- 
2.30.0

_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	"OGAWA Hirofumi" <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	"Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	"Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	"Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>, "Alban Crequy" <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	"Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, "Phil Estes" <estesp@gmail.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 03/40] fs: add file and path permissions helpers
Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 14:19:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210121131959.646623-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210112220124.837960-16-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
patch not present

/* v3 */
patch not present

/* v4 */
patch not present

/* v5 */
patch not present

/* v6 */
base-commit: 19c329f6808995b142b3966301f217c831e7cf31

- Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>:
  - Make file_user_ns() static inline.
  - Add file_permission() and path_permission() helpers.
---
 fs/init.c                          | 6 +++---
 fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 2 +-
 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c   | 2 +-
 fs/open.c                          | 6 +++---
 fs/udf/file.c                      | 2 +-
 fs/verity/enable.c                 | 2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h                 | 8 ++++++++
 kernel/bpf/inode.c                 | 2 +-
 kernel/sys.c                       | 2 +-
 mm/madvise.c                       | 2 +-
 mm/memcontrol.c                    | 2 +-
 mm/mincore.c                       | 2 +-
 net/unix/af_unix.c                 | 2 +-
 13 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/init.c b/fs/init.c
index e9c320a48cf1..02723bea8499 100644
--- a/fs/init.c
+++ b/fs/init.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int __init init_chdir(const char *filename)
 	error = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &path);
 	path_put(&path);
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int __init init_chroot(const char *filename)
 	error = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 	error = -EPERM;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int __init init_eaccess(const char *filename)
 	error = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
-	error = inode_permission(d_inode(path.dentry), MAY_ACCESS);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS);
 	path_put(&path);
 	return error;
 }
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index dcab112e1f00..64cfc1a3015d 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static int fanotify_find_path(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
 	}
 
 	/* you can only watch an inode if you have read permissions on it */
-	ret = inode_permission(path->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ);
+	ret = path_permission(path, MAY_READ);
 	if (ret) {
 		path_put(path);
 		goto out;
diff --git a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
index 59c177011a0f..e1155d32ef6f 100644
--- a/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int inotify_find_inode(const char __user *dirname, struct path *path,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	/* you can only watch an inode if you have read permissions on it */
-	error = inode_permission(path->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ);
+	error = path_permission(path, MAY_READ);
 	if (error) {
 		path_put(path);
 		return error;
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 1e06e443a565..cd1efd254cad 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 	if (!d_can_lookup(f.file->f_path.dentry))
 		goto out_putf;
 
-	error = inode_permission(file_inode(f.file), MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = file_permission(f.file, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &f.file->f_path);
 out_putf:
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
+	error = path_permission(&path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
diff --git a/fs/udf/file.c b/fs/udf/file.c
index ad8eefad27d7..3671a40ed3c3 100644
--- a/fs/udf/file.c
+++ b/fs/udf/file.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ long udf_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	long old_block, new_block;
 	int result;
 
-	if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ) != 0) {
+	if (file_permission(filp, MAY_READ) != 0) {
 		udf_debug("no permission to access inode %lu\n", inode->i_ino);
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
index f7e997a01ad0..77e159a0346b 100644
--- a/fs/verity/enable.c
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
 	 * has verity enabled, and to stabilize the data being hashed.
 	 */
 
-	err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
+	err = file_permission(filp, MAY_WRITE);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3165998e2294..bcd17097d441 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2812,6 +2812,14 @@ static inline int bmap(struct inode *inode,  sector_t *block)
 extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *, struct inode **);
 extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int);
 extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int);
+static inline int file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return inode_permission(file_inode(file), mask);
+}
+static inline int path_permission(const struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+	return inode_permission(d_inode(path->dentry), mask);
+}
 extern int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode);
 
 static inline bool execute_ok(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
index dd4b7fd60ee7..8962f139521e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const char __user *pathname,
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 
 	inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
-	ret = inode_permission(inode, ACC_MODE(flags));
+	ret = path_permission(&path, ACC_MODE(flags));
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 51f00fe20e4d..138fb253b344 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1848,7 +1848,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
 		goto exit;
 
-	err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+	err = file_permission(exe.file, MAY_EXEC);
 	if (err)
 		goto exit;
 
diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index 6a660858784b..175c5582d8a9 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_pageout(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	 * opens a side channel.
 	 */
 	return inode_owner_or_capable(file_inode(vma->vm_file)) ||
-		inode_permission(file_inode(vma->vm_file), MAY_WRITE) == 0;
+	       file_permission(vma->vm_file, MAY_WRITE) == 0;
 }
 
 static long madvise_pageout(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c
index 605f671203ef..cf9076f58582 100644
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -4899,7 +4899,7 @@ static ssize_t memcg_write_event_control(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 
 	/* the process need read permission on control file */
 	/* AV: shouldn't we check that it's been opened for read instead? */
-	ret = inode_permission(file_inode(cfile.file), MAY_READ);
+	ret = file_permission(cfile.file, MAY_READ);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_put_cfile;
 
diff --git a/mm/mincore.c b/mm/mincore.c
index 02db1a834021..7bdb4673f776 100644
--- a/mm/mincore.c
+++ b/mm/mincore.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_mincore(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	 * mappings, which opens a side channel.
 	 */
 	return inode_owner_or_capable(file_inode(vma->vm_file)) ||
-		inode_permission(file_inode(vma->vm_file), MAY_WRITE) == 0;
+	       file_permission(vma->vm_file, MAY_WRITE) == 0;
 }
 
 static const struct mm_walk_ops mincore_walk_ops = {
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 41c3303c3357..18453d15dddf 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(struct net *net,
 		if (err)
 			goto fail;
 		inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
-		err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
+		err = path_permission(&path, MAY_WRITE);
 		if (err)
 			goto put_fail;
 
-- 
2.30.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-21 13:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 163+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-21 13:19 [PATCH v6 00/40] idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 01/40] mount: attach mappings to mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 02/40] fs: add id translation helpers Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-13  0:05   ` Vivek Goyal
2021-03-13  0:05     ` Vivek Goyal
2021-03-13 14:31     ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-14 22:02       ` Vivek Goyal
2021-03-15  8:40       ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-21 13:19 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2021-01-21 13:19   ` [PATCH v6 03/40] fs: add file and path permissions helpers Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  2:55   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  2:55     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 04/40] capability: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  2:57   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  2:57     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  3:02   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  3:02     ` James Morris
2021-01-22 22:26   ` J. Bruce Fields
2021-01-22 22:26     ` J. Bruce Fields
2021-01-23 13:09     ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-23 13:09       ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-24 22:18       ` J. Bruce Fields
2021-01-24 22:18         ` J. Bruce Fields
2021-01-24 22:44         ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-24 22:44           ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 06/40] inode: make init and " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  3:10   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  3:10     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 07/40] attr: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 08/40] acl: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 09/40] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  3:21   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  3:21     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 10/40] commoncap: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  3:27   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  3:27     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 11/40] stat: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  3:28   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  3:28     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 12/40] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  3:47   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  3:47     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 13/40] namei: introduce struct renamedata Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 14/40] namei: prepare for idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 15/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22 17:20   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-22 17:20     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 16/40] open: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:14   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:14     ` James Morris
2021-01-22 17:21   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-22 17:21     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 17/40] af_unix: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:14   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:14     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 18/40] utimes: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:15   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:15     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 19/40] fcntl: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:17   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:17     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 20/40] init: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22 17:23   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-22 17:23     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 21/40] ioctl: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:33   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:33     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 22/40] would_dump: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:35   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:35     ` James Morris
2021-01-25 16:39   ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-25 16:39     ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-25 16:44     ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-25 16:44       ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-25 17:03       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-01-25 17:03         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-01-25 17:06         ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-25 17:06           ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-27  5:50       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-01-27  5:50         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 24/40] fs: make helpers idmap mount aware Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 25/40] apparmor: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 26/39] ima: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 27/40] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:37   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:37     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 28/40] overlayfs: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22  4:38   ` James Morris
2021-01-22  4:38     ` James Morris
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 29/40] namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 30/40] mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 31/40] namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 32/40] fs: split out functions to hold writers Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 33/40] fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 34/40] fs: add mount_setattr() Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 35/40] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-22 17:33   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-22 17:33     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-22 17:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-22 17:34       ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 36/40] tests: add mount_setattr() selftests Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 37/40] fat: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 38/40] ext4: support " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 39/40] xfs: " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-01 20:05   ` Darrick J. Wong
2021-03-01 20:05     ` Darrick J. Wong
2021-03-01 20:46     ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-01 20:46       ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-03  7:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-03-03  7:01       ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-01-21 13:19 ` [PATCH v6 40/40] generic/622: add fstests for " Christian Brauner
2021-01-21 13:19   ` Christian Brauner
2021-01-27  5:40 ` [PATCH v6 00/40] " Serge E. Hallyn
2021-01-27  5:40   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-03-03 13:24 ` [PATCH v6 09/40] xattr: handle " David Howells
2021-03-03 13:24   ` David Howells
2021-03-03 14:05   ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-03 14:05     ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-03 14:45   ` David Howells
2021-03-03 14:45     ` David Howells
2021-03-03 16:15     ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-03 16:15       ` Christian Brauner

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
    --to=christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=adilger.kernel@dilger.ca \
    --cc=alban@kinvolk.io \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=cyphar@cyphar.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=geofft@ldpreload.com \
    --cc=hch@lst.de \
    --cc=hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=josh@joshtriplett.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=lennart@poettering.net \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mpatel@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=seth.forshee@canonical.com \
    --cc=smbarber@chromium.org \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=tkjos@google.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=tycho@tycho.ws \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.