[PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.258 release.
There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:07:46 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.258-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.9.258-rc1

Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
    kvm: check tlbs_dirty directly

Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>
    scsi: qla2xxx: Fix crash during driver load on big endian machines

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    xen-blkback: fix error handling in xen_blkbk_map()

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    xen-scsiback: don't "handle" error by BUG()

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    xen-netback: don't "handle" error by BUG()

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    xen-blkback: don't "handle" error by BUG()

Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
    xen/arm: don't ignore return errors from set_phys_to_machine

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    Xen/gntdev: correct error checking in gntdev_map_grant_pages()

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    Xen/gntdev: correct dev_bus_addr handling in gntdev_map_grant_pages()

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    Xen/x86: also check kernel mapping in set_foreign_p2m_mapping()

Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
    Xen/x86: don't bail early from clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()

Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
    tracing: Avoid calling cc-option -mrecord-mcount for every Makefile

Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
    tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount

Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
    trace: Use -mcount-record for dynamic ftrace

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel for 32-bit too

Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
    vsock: fix locking in vsock_shutdown()

Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
    vsock/virtio: update credit only if socket is not closed

Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
    net: watchdog: hold device global xmit lock during tx disable

Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
    net/vmw_vsock: improve locking in vsock_connect_timeout()

Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru>
    usb: dwc3: ulpi: Replace CPU-based busyloop with Protocol-based one

Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
    usb: dwc3: ulpi: fix checkpatch warning

Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
    h8300: fix PREEMPTION build, TI_PRE_COUNT undefined

Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
    netfilter: conntrack: skip identical origin tuple in same zone only

Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
    xen/netback: avoid race in xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available()

Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@mail.kfki.hu>
    netfilter: xt_recent: Fix attempt to update deleted entry

Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
    bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()

Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
    memblock: do not start bottom-up allocations with kernel_end

Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
    ARM: dts: lpc32xx: Revert set default clock rate of HCLK PLL

Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
    ovl: skip getxattr of security labels

Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer

Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    tracing: Do not count ftrace events in top level enable output

Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
    squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup

Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
    squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup

Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
    squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    futex: Cure exit race

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex: Change locking rules

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    futex: Ensure the correct return value from futex_lock_pi()

Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
    memcg: fix a crash in wb_workfn when a device disappears

Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
    include/trace/events/writeback.h: fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings

Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
    lib/string: Add strscpy_pad() function

Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
    SUNRPC: Handle 0 length opaque XDR object data properly

Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
    SUNRPC: Move simple_get_bytes and simple_get_netobj into private header

Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
    iwlwifi: mvm: guard against device removal in reprobe

Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
    iwlwifi: pcie: add a NULL check in iwl_pcie_txq_unmap

Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
    iwlwifi: mvm: take mutex for calling iwl_mvm_get_sync_time()

Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
    af_key: relax availability checks for skb size calculation

Sibi Sankar <sibis@codeaurora.org>
    remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_mss: Validate MBA firmware size before load

Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    fgraph: Initialize tracing_graph_pause at task creation

Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
    mm: memcontrol: fix NULL pointer crash in test_clear_page_writeback()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |  11 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi                     |   3 -
 arch/arm/xen/p2m.c                                 |   6 +-
 arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c                    |   3 +
 arch/x86/Makefile                                  |   6 +-
 arch/x86/xen/p2m.c                                 |  15 +-
 drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c                |  30 +--
 .../net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c   |   3 +
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c       |   3 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c       |   5 +
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c                  |   4 +-
 drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c                       |   9 +-
 drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c                 |   6 +
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.c                    |   9 +-
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.h                    |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c                            |  20 +-
 drivers/xen/gntdev.c                               |  33 ++-
 drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c                         |   4 +-
 fs/fs-writeback.c                                  |   2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c                             |  15 +-
 fs/squashfs/export.c                               |  41 +++-
 fs/squashfs/id.c                                   |  40 +++-
 fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h                       |   1 +
 fs/squashfs/super.c                                |   6 +-
 fs/squashfs/xattr.h                                |  10 +-
 fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c                             |  66 +++++-
 include/linux/backing-dev.h                        |  10 +
 include/linux/ftrace.h                             |   4 +-
 include/linux/memcontrol.h                         |  33 ++-
 include/linux/netdevice.h                          |   2 +
 include/linux/string.h                             |   4 +
 include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h                         |   3 +-
 include/trace/events/writeback.h                   |  35 ++--
 include/xen/grant_table.h                          |   1 +
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c                              |   2 +
 kernel/futex.c                                     | 233 +++++++++++++++++----
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c                              |   2 -
 kernel/trace/trace.c                               |   2 +-
 kernel/trace/trace_events.c                        |   3 +-
 lib/string.c                                       |  47 ++++-
 mm/backing-dev.c                                   |   1 +
 mm/memblock.c                                      |  48 +----
 mm/memcontrol.c                                    |  43 ++--
 mm/page-writeback.c                                |  14 +-
 net/key/af_key.c                                   |   6 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c                  |   3 +-
 net/netfilter/xt_recent.c                          |  12 +-
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c                     |  30 +--
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h            |  45 ++++
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c                |  31 +--
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c                           |  13 +-
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c            |   4 +-
 scripts/Makefile.build                             |   3 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                                |   3 +-
 54 files changed, 681 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.9 01/49] mm: memcontrol: fix NULL pointer crash in test_clear_page_writeback()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>

commit 739f79fc9db1b38f96b5a5109b247a650fbebf6d upstream.

Jaegeuk and Brad report a NULL pointer crash when writeback ending tries
to update the memcg stats:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000003b0
    IP: test_clear_page_writeback+0x12e/0x2c0
    [...]
    RIP: 0010:test_clear_page_writeback+0x12e/0x2c0
    Call Trace:
     <IRQ>
     end_page_writeback+0x47/0x70
     f2fs_write_end_io+0x76/0x180 [f2fs]
     bio_endio+0x9f/0x120
     blk_update_request+0xa8/0x2f0
     scsi_end_request+0x39/0x1d0
     scsi_io_completion+0x211/0x690
     scsi_finish_command+0xd9/0x120
     scsi_softirq_done+0x127/0x150
     __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x13/0x20
     flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x56/0x110
     generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x13/0x30
     smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x27/0x40
     call_function_single_interrupt+0x89/0x90
    RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10

    (gdb) l *(test_clear_page_writeback+0x12e)
    0xffffffff811bae3e is in test_clear_page_writeback (./include/linux/memcontrol.h:619).
    614		mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), idx, val);
    615		if (mem_cgroup_disabled() || !page->mem_cgroup)
    616			return;
    617		mod_memcg_state(page->mem_cgroup, idx, val);
    618		pn = page->mem_cgroup->nodeinfo[page_to_nid(page)];
    619		this_cpu_add(pn->lruvec_stat->count[idx], val);
    620	}
    621
    622	unsigned long mem_cgroup_soft_limit_reclaim(pg_data_t *pgdat, int order,
    623							gfp_t gfp_mask,

The issue is that writeback doesn't hold a page reference and the page
might get freed after PG_writeback is cleared (and the mapping is
unlocked) in test_clear_page_writeback().  The stat functions looking up
the page's node or zone are safe, as those attributes are static across
allocation and free cycles.  But page->mem_cgroup is not, and it will
get cleared if we race with truncation or migration.

It appears this race window has been around for a while, but less likely
to trigger when the memcg stats were updated first thing after
PG_writeback is cleared.  Recent changes reshuffled this code to update
the global node stats before the memcg ones, though, stretching the race
window out to an extent where people can reproduce the problem.

Update test_clear_page_writeback() to look up and pin page->mem_cgroup
before clearing PG_writeback, then not use that pointer afterward.  It
is a partial revert of 62cccb8c8e7a ("mm: simplify lock_page_memcg()")
but leaves the pageref-holding callsites that aren't affected alone.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170809183825.GA26387@cmpxchg.org
Fixes: 62cccb8c8e7a ("mm: simplify lock_page_memcg()")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reported-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Bradley Bolen <bradleybolen@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Brad Bolen <bradleybolen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[guptap@codeaurora.org: Resolved merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Prakash Gupta <guptap@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/memcontrol.h |   33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 mm/memcontrol.c            |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 mm/page-writeback.c        |   14 +++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/memcontrol.h
+++ b/include/linux/memcontrol.h
@@ -490,9 +490,21 @@ bool mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize(bool wai
 extern int do_swap_account;
 #endif
 
-void lock_page_memcg(struct page *page);
+struct mem_cgroup *lock_page_memcg(struct page *page);
+void __unlock_page_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg);
 void unlock_page_memcg(struct page *page);
 
+static inline void __mem_cgroup_update_page_stat(struct page *page,
+						 struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
+						 enum mem_cgroup_stat_index idx,
+						 int val)
+{
+	VM_BUG_ON(!(rcu_read_lock_held() || PageLocked(page)));
+
+	if (memcg && memcg->stat)
+		this_cpu_add(memcg->stat->count[idx], val);
+}
+
 /**
  * mem_cgroup_update_page_stat - update page state statistics
  * @page: the page
@@ -508,13 +520,12 @@ void unlock_page_memcg(struct page *page
  *     mem_cgroup_update_page_stat(page, state, -1);
  *   unlock_page(page) or unlock_page_memcg(page)
  */
+
 static inline void mem_cgroup_update_page_stat(struct page *page,
 				 enum mem_cgroup_stat_index idx, int val)
 {
-	VM_BUG_ON(!(rcu_read_lock_held() || PageLocked(page)));
 
-	if (page->mem_cgroup)
-		this_cpu_add(page->mem_cgroup->stat->count[idx], val);
+	__mem_cgroup_update_page_stat(page, page->mem_cgroup, idx, val);
 }
 
 static inline void mem_cgroup_inc_page_stat(struct page *page,
@@ -709,7 +720,12 @@ mem_cgroup_print_oom_info(struct mem_cgr
 {
 }
 
-static inline void lock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
+static inline struct mem_cgroup *lock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void __unlock_page_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
 {
 }
 
@@ -745,6 +761,13 @@ static inline void mem_cgroup_update_pag
 {
 }
 
+static inline void __mem_cgroup_update_page_stat(struct page *page,
+						 struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
+						 enum mem_cgroup_stat_index idx,
+						 int nr)
+{
+}
+
 static inline void mem_cgroup_inc_page_stat(struct page *page,
 					    enum mem_cgroup_stat_index idx)
 {
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c
+++ b/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -1638,9 +1638,13 @@ cleanup:
  * @page: the page
  *
  * This function protects unlocked LRU pages from being moved to
- * another cgroup and stabilizes their page->mem_cgroup binding.
+ * another cgroup.
+ *
+ * It ensures lifetime of the returned memcg. Caller is responsible
+ * for the lifetime of the page; __unlock_page_memcg() is available
+ * when @page might get freed inside the locked section.
  */
-void lock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
+struct mem_cgroup *lock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
 {
 	struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -1649,18 +1653,24 @@ void lock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
 	 * The RCU lock is held throughout the transaction.  The fast
 	 * path can get away without acquiring the memcg->move_lock
 	 * because page moving starts with an RCU grace period.
-	 */
+	 *
+	 * The RCU lock also protects the memcg from being freed when
+	 * the page state that is going to change is the only thing
+	 * preventing the page itself from being freed. E.g. writeback
+	 * doesn't hold a page reference and relies on PG_writeback to
+	 * keep off truncation, migration and so forth.
+         */
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
-		return;
+		return NULL;
 again:
 	memcg = page->mem_cgroup;
 	if (unlikely(!memcg))
-		return;
+		return NULL;
 
 	if (atomic_read(&memcg->moving_account) <= 0)
-		return;
+		return memcg;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&memcg->move_lock, flags);
 	if (memcg != page->mem_cgroup) {
@@ -1676,18 +1686,18 @@ again:
 	memcg->move_lock_task = current;
 	memcg->move_lock_flags = flags;
 
-	return;
+	return memcg;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(lock_page_memcg);
 
 /**
- * unlock_page_memcg - unlock a page->mem_cgroup binding
- * @page: the page
+ * __unlock_page_memcg - unlock and unpin a memcg
+ * @memcg: the memcg
+ *
+ * Unlock and unpin a memcg returned by lock_page_memcg().
  */
-void unlock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
+void __unlock_page_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
 {
-	struct mem_cgroup *memcg = page->mem_cgroup;
-
 	if (memcg && memcg->move_lock_task == current) {
 		unsigned long flags = memcg->move_lock_flags;
 
@@ -1699,6 +1709,15 @@ void unlock_page_memcg(struct page *page
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
+
+/**
+ * unlock_page_memcg - unlock a page->mem_cgroup binding
+ * @page: the page
+ */
+void unlock_page_memcg(struct page *page)
+{
+	__unlock_page_memcg(page->mem_cgroup);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unlock_page_memcg);
 
 /*
--- a/mm/page-writeback.c
+++ b/mm/page-writeback.c
@@ -2717,9 +2717,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page_dirty_for_io);
 int test_clear_page_writeback(struct page *page)
 {
 	struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(page);
+	struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
 	int ret;
 
-	lock_page_memcg(page);
+	memcg = lock_page_memcg(page);
 	if (mapping && mapping_use_writeback_tags(mapping)) {
 		struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
 		struct backing_dev_info *bdi = inode_to_bdi(inode);
@@ -2747,13 +2748,20 @@ int test_clear_page_writeback(struct pag
 	} else {
 		ret = TestClearPageWriteback(page);
 	}
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: Page might be free now! Writeback doesn't hold a page
+	 * reference on its own, it relies on truncation to wait for
+	 * the clearing of PG_writeback. The below can only access
+	 * page state that is static across allocation cycles.
+	 */
 	if (ret) {
-		mem_cgroup_dec_page_stat(page, MEM_CGROUP_STAT_WRITEBACK);
+		__mem_cgroup_update_page_stat(page, memcg,
+					      MEM_CGROUP_STAT_WRITEBACK, -1);
 		dec_node_page_state(page, NR_WRITEBACK);
 		dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING);
 		inc_node_page_state(page, NR_WRITTEN);
 	}
-	unlock_page_memcg(page);
+	__unlock_page_memcg(memcg);
 	return ret;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 02/49] fgraph: Initialize tracing_graph_pause at task creation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 7e0a9220467dbcfdc5bc62825724f3e52e50ab31 upstream.

On some archs, the idle task can call into cpu_suspend(). The cpu_suspend()
will disable or pause function graph tracing, as there's some paths in
bringing down the CPU that can have issues with its return address being
modified. The task_struct structure has a "tracing_graph_pause" atomic
counter, that when set to something other than zero, the function graph
tracer will not modify the return address.

The problem is that the tracing_graph_pause counter is initialized when the
function graph tracer is enabled. This can corrupt the counter for the idle
task if it is suspended in these architectures.

   CPU 1				CPU 2
   -----				-----
  do_idle()
    cpu_suspend()
      pause_graph_tracing()
          task_struct->tracing_graph_pause++ (0 -> 1)

				start_graph_tracing()
				  for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
				    ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(cpu)
				      task-struct->tracing_graph_pause = 0 (1 -> 0)

      unpause_graph_tracing()
          task_struct->tracing_graph_pause-- (0 -> -1)

The above should have gone from 1 to zero, and enabled function graph
tracing again. But instead, it is set to -1, which keeps it disabled.

There's no reason that the field tracing_graph_pause on the task_struct can
not be initialized at boot up.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 380c4b1411ccd ("tracing/function-graph-tracer: append the tracing_graph_flag")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211339
Reported-by: pierre.gondois@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/ftrace.h |    4 +++-
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c  |    2 --
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/ftrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ftrace.h
@@ -783,7 +783,9 @@ typedef int (*trace_func_graph_ent_t)(st
 #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
 
 /* for init task */
-#define INIT_FTRACE_GRAPH		.ret_stack = NULL,
+#define INIT_FTRACE_GRAPH				\
+	.ret_stack		= NULL,			\
+	.tracing_graph_pause	= ATOMIC_INIT(0),
 
 /*
  * Stack of return addresses for functions
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -5803,7 +5803,6 @@ static int alloc_retstack_tasklist(struc
 		}
 
 		if (t->ret_stack == NULL) {
-			atomic_set(&t->tracing_graph_pause, 0);
 			atomic_set(&t->trace_overrun, 0);
 			t->curr_ret_stack = -1;
 			/* Make sure the tasks see the -1 first: */
@@ -6015,7 +6014,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct ftrace_ret_
 static void
 graph_init_task(struct task_struct *t, struct ftrace_ret_stack *ret_stack)
 {
-	atomic_set(&t->tracing_graph_pause, 0);
 	atomic_set(&t->trace_overrun, 0);
 	t->ftrace_timestamp = 0;
 	/* make curr_ret_stack visible before we add the ret_stack */

[PATCH 4.9 03/49] remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_mss: Validate MBA firmware size before load

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sibi Sankar <sibis@codeaurora.org>

commit e013f455d95add874f310dc47c608e8c70692ae5 upstream

The following mem abort is observed when the mba firmware size exceeds
the allocated mba region. MBA firmware size is restricted to a maximum
size of 1M and remaining memory region is used by modem debug policy
firmware when available. Hence verify whether the MBA firmware size lies
within the allocated memory region and is not greater than 1M before
loading.

Err Logs:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
Mem abort info:
...
Call trace:
  __memcpy+0x110/0x180
  rproc_start+0x40/0x218
  rproc_boot+0x5b4/0x608
  state_store+0x54/0xf8
  dev_attr_store+0x44/0x60
  sysfs_kf_write+0x58/0x80
  kernfs_fop_write+0x140/0x230
  vfs_write+0xc4/0x208
  ksys_write+0x74/0xf8
  __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
...

Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Fixes: 051fb70fd4ea4 ("remoteproc: qcom: Driver for the self-authenticating Hexagon v5")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sibi Sankar <sibis@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200722201047.12975-2-sibis@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
[sudip: manual backport to old file path]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c
+++ b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pil.c
@@ -193,6 +193,12 @@ static int q6v5_load(struct rproc *rproc
 {
 	struct q6v5 *qproc = rproc->priv;
 
+	/* MBA is restricted to a maximum size of 1M */
+	if (fw->size > qproc->mba_size || fw->size > SZ_1M) {
+		dev_err(qproc->dev, "MBA firmware load failed\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	memcpy(qproc->mba_region, fw->data, fw->size);
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 4.9 04/49] af_key: relax availability checks for skb size calculation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>

[ Upstream commit afbc293add6466f8f3f0c3d944d85f53709c170f ]

xfrm_probe_algs() probes kernel crypto modules and changes the
availability of struct xfrm_algo_desc. But there is a small window
where ealg->available and aalg->available get changed between
count_ah_combs()/count_esp_combs() and dump_ah_combs()/dump_esp_combs(),
in this case we may allocate a smaller skb but later put a larger
amount of data and trigger the panic in skb_put().

Fix this by relaxing the checks when counting the size, that is,
skipping the test of ->available. We may waste some memory for a few
of sizeof(struct sadb_comb), but it is still much better than a panic.

Reported-by: syzbot+b2bf2652983d23734c5c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/key/af_key.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 76a008b1cbe5f..adc93329e6aac 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -2933,7 +2933,7 @@ static int count_ah_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
 			break;
 		if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)
 			continue;
-		if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available)
+		if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg))
 			sz += sizeof(struct sadb_comb);
 	}
 	return sz + sizeof(struct sadb_prop);
@@ -2951,7 +2951,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
 		if (!ealg->pfkey_supported)
 			continue;
 
-		if (!(ealg_tmpl_set(t, ealg) && ealg->available))
+		if (!(ealg_tmpl_set(t, ealg)))
 			continue;
 
 		for (k = 1; ; k++) {
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
 			if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)
 				continue;
 
-			if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available)
+			if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg))
 				sz += sizeof(struct sadb_comb);
 		}
 	}
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 05/49] iwlwifi: mvm: take mutex for calling iwl_mvm_get_sync_time()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 5c56d862c749669d45c256f581eac4244be00d4d ]

We need to take the mutex to call iwl_mvm_get_sync_time(), do it.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210115130252.4bb5ccf881a6.I62973cbb081e80aa5b0447a5c3b9c3251a65cf6b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c
index f4d75ffe3d8a8..7f01fb91ea668 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/debugfs-vif.c
@@ -518,7 +518,10 @@ static ssize_t iwl_dbgfs_os_device_timediff_read(struct file *file,
 	const size_t bufsz = sizeof(buf);
 	int pos = 0;
 
+	mutex_lock(&mvm->mutex);
 	iwl_mvm_get_sync_time(mvm, &curr_gp2, &curr_os);
+	mutex_unlock(&mvm->mutex);
+
 	do_div(curr_os, NSEC_PER_USEC);
 	diff = curr_os - curr_gp2;
 	pos += scnprintf(buf + pos, bufsz - pos, "diff=%lld\n", diff);
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 06/49] iwlwifi: pcie: add a NULL check in iwl_pcie_txq_unmap

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 98c7d21f957b10d9c07a3a60a3a5a8f326a197e5 ]

I hit a NULL pointer exception in this function when the
init flow went really bad.

Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210115130252.2e8da9f2c132.I0234d4b8ddaf70aaa5028a20c863255e05bc1f84@changeid
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
index 174e45d78c46a..ff564198d2cef 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/tx.c
@@ -676,6 +676,11 @@ static void iwl_pcie_txq_unmap(struct iwl_trans *trans, int txq_id)
 	struct iwl_trans_pcie *trans_pcie = IWL_TRANS_GET_PCIE_TRANS(trans);
 	struct iwl_txq *txq = &trans_pcie->txq[txq_id];
 
+	if (!txq) {
+		IWL_ERR(trans, "Trying to free a queue that wasn't allocated?\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_bh(&txq->lock);
 	while (txq->write_ptr != txq->read_ptr) {
 		IWL_DEBUG_TX_REPLY(trans, "Q %d Free %d\n",
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 07/49] iwlwifi: mvm: guard against device removal in reprobe

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 7a21b1d4a728a483f07c638ccd8610d4b4f12684 ]

If we get into a problem severe enough to attempt a reprobe,
we schedule a worker to do that. However, if the problem gets
more severe and the device is actually destroyed before this
worker has a chance to run, we use a free device. Bump up the
reference count of the device until the worker runs to avoid
this situation.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210122144849.871f0892e4b2.I94819e11afd68d875f3e242b98bef724b8236f1e@changeid
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c
index 6d38eec3f9d3c..a78aaf17116e9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ops.c
@@ -1104,6 +1104,7 @@ static void iwl_mvm_reprobe_wk(struct work_struct *wk)
 	reprobe = container_of(wk, struct iwl_mvm_reprobe, work);
 	if (device_reprobe(reprobe->dev))
 		dev_err(reprobe->dev, "reprobe failed!\n");
+	put_device(reprobe->dev);
 	kfree(reprobe);
 	module_put(THIS_MODULE);
 }
@@ -1202,7 +1203,7 @@ void iwl_mvm_nic_restart(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, bool fw_error)
 			module_put(THIS_MODULE);
 			return;
 		}
-		reprobe->dev = mvm->trans->dev;
+		reprobe->dev = get_device(mvm->trans->dev);
 		INIT_WORK(&reprobe->work, iwl_mvm_reprobe_wk);
 		schedule_work(&reprobe->work);
 	} else if (mvm->cur_ucode == IWL_UCODE_REGULAR) {
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 08/49] SUNRPC: Move simple_get_bytes and simple_get_netobj into private header

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit ba6dfce47c4d002d96cd02a304132fca76981172 ]

Remove duplicated helper functions to parse opaque XDR objects
and place inside new file net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h.
In the new file carry the license and copyright from the source file
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c.  Finally, update the comment inside
include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h since lockd is not the only user of
struct xdr_netobj.

Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h              |  3 +-
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c          | 30 +-----------------
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c     | 31 ++----------------
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h

diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h
index 56c48c884a242..bf0db32b40aa0 100644
--- a/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h
+++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/xdr.h
@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@
 #define XDR_QUADLEN(l)		(((l) + 3) >> 2)
 
 /*
- * Generic opaque `network object.' At the kernel level, this type
- * is used only by lockd.
+ * Generic opaque `network object.'
  */
 #define XDR_MAX_NETOBJ		1024
 struct xdr_netobj {
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
index 591d378d1a188..1d00f49dfe48d 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
 
+#include "auth_gss_internal.h"
 #include "../netns.h"
 
 static const struct rpc_authops authgss_ops;
@@ -147,35 +148,6 @@ gss_cred_set_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred, struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx)
 	clear_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_NEW, &cred->cr_flags);
 }
 
-static const void *
-simple_get_bytes(const void *p, const void *end, void *res, size_t len)
-{
-	const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
-	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-	memcpy(res, p, len);
-	return q;
-}
-
-static inline const void *
-simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *dest)
-{
-	const void *q;
-	unsigned int len;
-
-	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &len, sizeof(len));
-	if (IS_ERR(p))
-		return p;
-	q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
-	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-	dest->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (unlikely(dest->data == NULL))
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	dest->len = len;
-	return q;
-}
-
 static struct gss_cl_ctx *
 gss_cred_get_ctx(struct rpc_cred *cred)
 {
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..c5603242b54bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * linux/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
+ *
+ * Internal definitions for RPCSEC_GSS client authentication
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
+
+static inline const void *
+simple_get_bytes(const void *p, const void *end, void *res, size_t len)
+{
+	const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	memcpy(res, p, len);
+	return q;
+}
+
+static inline const void *
+simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *dest)
+{
+	const void *q;
+	unsigned int len;
+
+	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &len, sizeof(len));
+	if (IS_ERR(p))
+		return p;
+	q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
+	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	dest->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (unlikely(dest->data == NULL))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	dest->len = len;
+	return q;
+}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
index 60595835317af..ea2f6022b3d5d 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
 #include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
 #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5_enctypes.h>
 
+#include "auth_gss_internal.h"
+
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
 # define RPCDBG_FACILITY	RPCDBG_AUTH
 #endif
@@ -187,35 +189,6 @@ get_gss_krb5_enctype(int etype)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static const void *
-simple_get_bytes(const void *p, const void *end, void *res, int len)
-{
-	const void *q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
-	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-	memcpy(res, p, len);
-	return q;
-}
-
-static const void *
-simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *res)
-{
-	const void *q;
-	unsigned int len;
-
-	p = simple_get_bytes(p, end, &len, sizeof(len));
-	if (IS_ERR(p))
-		return p;
-	q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
-	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-	res->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (unlikely(res->data == NULL))
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	res->len = len;
-	return q;
-}
-
 static inline const void *
 get_key(const void *p, const void *end,
 	struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct crypto_skcipher **res)
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 09/49] SUNRPC: Handle 0 length opaque XDR object data properly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit e4a7d1f7707eb44fd953a31dd59eff82009d879c ]

When handling an auth_gss downcall, it's possible to get 0-length
opaque object for the acceptor.  In the case of a 0-length XDR
object, make sure simple_get_netobj() fills in dest->data = NULL,
and does not continue to kmemdup() which will set
dest->data = ZERO_SIZE_PTR for the acceptor.

The trace event code can handle NULL but not ZERO_SIZE_PTR for a
string, and so without this patch the rpcgss_context trace event
will crash the kernel as follows:

[  162.887992] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[  162.898693] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  162.900830] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  162.902940] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  162.904027] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  162.905493] CPU: 4 PID: 4321 Comm: rpc.gssd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0 #133
[  162.908548] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[  162.910978] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20
[  162.912505] Code: 48 89 f9 74 09 48 83 c1 01 80 39 00 75 f7 31 d2 44 0f b6 04 16 44 88 04 11 48 83 c2 01 45 84 c0 75 ee c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <80> 3f 00 74 10 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 31
[  162.920101] RSP: 0018:ffffaec900c77d90 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  162.922263] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000fffde697
[  162.925158] RDX: 000000000000002f RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: 0000000000000010
[  162.928073] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000e10 R09: 0000000000000000
[  162.930976] R10: ffff8e698a590cb8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000e10
[  162.933883] R13: 00000000fffde697 R14: 000000010034d517 R15: 0000000000070028
[  162.936777] FS:  00007f1e1eb93700(0000) GS:ffff8e6ab7d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  162.940067] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  162.942417] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000104eba000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[  162.945300] Call Trace:
[  162.946428]  trace_event_raw_event_rpcgss_context+0x84/0x140 [auth_rpcgss]
[  162.949308]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x35/0x5a0
[  162.951224]  ? gss_pipe_downcall+0x3a3/0x6a0 [auth_rpcgss]
[  162.953484]  gss_pipe_downcall+0x585/0x6a0 [auth_rpcgss]
[  162.955953]  rpc_pipe_write+0x58/0x70 [sunrpc]
[  162.957849]  vfs_write+0xcb/0x2c0
[  162.959264]  ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
[  162.960706]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[  162.962238]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  162.964346] RIP: 0033:0x7f1e1f1e57df

Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
index c5603242b54bf..f6d9631bd9d00 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss_internal.h
@@ -34,9 +34,12 @@ simple_get_netobj(const void *p, const void *end, struct xdr_netobj *dest)
 	q = (const void *)((const char *)p + len);
 	if (unlikely(q > end || q < p))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-	dest->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (unlikely(dest->data == NULL))
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	if (len) {
+		dest->data = kmemdup(p, len, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (unlikely(dest->data == NULL))
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	} else
+		dest->data = NULL;
 	dest->len = len;
 	return q;
 }
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 10/49] lib/string: Add strscpy_pad() function

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 458a3bf82df4fe1f951d0f52b1e0c1e9d5a88a3b ]

We have a function to copy strings safely and we have a function to copy
strings and zero the tail of the destination (if source string is
shorter than destination buffer) but we do not have a function to do
both at once.  This means developers must write this themselves if they
desire this functionality.  This is a chore, and also leaves us open to
off by one errors unnecessarily.

Add a function that calls strscpy() then memset()s the tail to zero if
the source string is shorter than the destination buffer.

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/string.h |  4 ++++
 lib/string.c           | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
index 42eed573ebb63..66a91f5a34499 100644
--- a/include/linux/string.h
+++ b/include/linux/string.h
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ size_t strlcpy(char *, const char *, size_t);
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRSCPY
 ssize_t strscpy(char *, const char *, size_t);
 #endif
+
+/* Wraps calls to strscpy()/memset(), no arch specific code required */
+ssize_t strscpy_pad(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count);
+
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCAT
 extern char * strcat(char *, const char *);
 #endif
diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
index d099762a9bd60..8fe13371aed7a 100644
--- a/lib/string.c
+++ b/lib/string.c
@@ -157,11 +157,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strlcpy);
  * @src: Where to copy the string from
  * @count: Size of destination buffer
  *
- * Copy the string, or as much of it as fits, into the dest buffer.
- * The routine returns the number of characters copied (not including
- * the trailing NUL) or -E2BIG if the destination buffer wasn't big enough.
- * The behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap.
- * The destination buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized.
+ * Copy the string, or as much of it as fits, into the dest buffer.  The
+ * behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap.  The destination
+ * buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized.
  *
  * Preferred to strlcpy() since the API doesn't require reading memory
  * from the src string beyond the specified "count" bytes, and since
@@ -171,8 +169,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strlcpy);
  *
  * Preferred to strncpy() since it always returns a valid string, and
  * doesn't unnecessarily force the tail of the destination buffer to be
- * zeroed.  If the zeroing is desired, it's likely cleaner to use strscpy()
- * with an overflow test, then just memset() the tail of the dest buffer.
+ * zeroed.  If zeroing is desired please use strscpy_pad().
+ *
+ * Return: The number of characters copied (not including the trailing
+ *         %NUL) or -E2BIG if the destination buffer wasn't big enough.
  */
 ssize_t strscpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count)
 {
@@ -259,6 +259,39 @@ char *stpcpy(char *__restrict__ dest, const char *__restrict__ src)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stpcpy);
 
+/**
+ * strscpy_pad() - Copy a C-string into a sized buffer
+ * @dest: Where to copy the string to
+ * @src: Where to copy the string from
+ * @count: Size of destination buffer
+ *
+ * Copy the string, or as much of it as fits, into the dest buffer.  The
+ * behavior is undefined if the string buffers overlap.  The destination
+ * buffer is always %NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized.
+ *
+ * If the source string is shorter than the destination buffer, zeros
+ * the tail of the destination buffer.
+ *
+ * For full explanation of why you may want to consider using the
+ * 'strscpy' functions please see the function docstring for strscpy().
+ *
+ * Return: The number of characters copied (not including the trailing
+ *         %NUL) or -E2BIG if the destination buffer wasn't big enough.
+ */
+ssize_t strscpy_pad(char *dest, const char *src, size_t count)
+{
+	ssize_t written;
+
+	written = strscpy(dest, src, count);
+	if (written < 0 || written == count - 1)
+		return written;
+
+	memset(dest + written + 1, 0, count - written - 1);
+
+	return written;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(strscpy_pad);
+
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_STRCAT
 /**
  * strcat - Append one %NUL-terminated string to another
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 11/49] include/trace/events/writeback.h: fix -Wstringop-truncation warnings

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>

[ Upstream commit d1a445d3b86c9341ce7a0954c23be0edb5c9bec5 ]

There are many of those warnings.

In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h:15,
                 from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/current.h:13,
                 from ./include/linux/thread_info.h:21,
                 from ./include/asm-generic/preempt.h:5,
                 from ./arch/powerpc/include/generated/asm/preempt.h:1,
                 from ./include/linux/preempt.h:78,
                 from ./include/linux/spinlock.h:51,
                 from fs/fs-writeback.c:19:
In function 'strncpy',
    inlined from 'perf_trace_writeback_page_template' at
./include/trace/events/writeback.h:56:1:
./include/linux/string.h:260:9: warning: '__builtin_strncpy' specified
bound 32 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
  return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Fix it by using the new strscpy_pad() which was introduced in "lib/string:
Add strscpy_pad() function" and will always be NUL-terminated instead of
strncpy().  Also, change strlcpy() to use strscpy_pad() in this file for
consistency.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564075099-27750-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Fixes: 455b2864686d ("writeback: Initial tracing support")
Fixes: 028c2dd184c0 ("writeback: Add tracing to balance_dirty_pages")
Fixes: e84d0a4f8e39 ("writeback: trace event writeback_queue_io")
Fixes: b48c104d2211 ("writeback: trace event bdi_dirty_ratelimit")
Fixes: cc1676d917f3 ("writeback: Move requeueing when I_SYNC set to writeback_sb_inodes()")
Fixes: 9fb0a7da0c52 ("writeback: add more tracepoints")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Nitin Gote <nitin.r.gote@intel.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/trace/events/writeback.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/trace/events/writeback.h b/include/trace/events/writeback.h
index ec964a924cd2f..c6cea40e6e6fc 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/writeback.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/writeback.h
@@ -65,8 +65,9 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_dirty_page,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name,
-			mapping ? dev_name(inode_to_bdi(mapping->host)->dev) : "(unknown)", 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
+			    mapping ? dev_name(inode_to_bdi(mapping->host)->dev) : "(unknown)",
+			    32);
 		__entry->ino = mapping ? mapping->host->i_ino : 0;
 		__entry->index = page->index;
 	),
@@ -95,8 +96,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_dirty_inode_template,
 		struct backing_dev_info *bdi = inode_to_bdi(inode);
 
 		/* may be called for files on pseudo FSes w/ unregistered bdi */
-		strncpy(__entry->name,
-			bdi->dev ? dev_name(bdi->dev) : "(unknown)", 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
+			    bdi->dev ? dev_name(bdi->dev) : "(unknown)", 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->state		= inode->i_state;
 		__entry->flags		= flags;
@@ -175,8 +176,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_write_inode_template,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name,
-			dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
+			    dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->sync_mode	= wbc->sync_mode;
 		__entry->cgroup_ino	= __trace_wbc_assign_cgroup(wbc);
@@ -219,8 +220,9 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_work_class,
 		__field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name,
-			wb->bdi->dev ? dev_name(wb->bdi->dev) : "(unknown)", 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
+			    wb->bdi->dev ? dev_name(wb->bdi->dev) :
+			    "(unknown)", 32);
 		__entry->nr_pages = work->nr_pages;
 		__entry->sb_dev = work->sb ? work->sb->s_dev : 0;
 		__entry->sync_mode = work->sync_mode;
@@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_class,
 		__field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
 		__entry->cgroup_ino = __trace_wb_assign_cgroup(wb);
 	),
 	TP_printk("bdi %s: cgroup_ino=%u",
@@ -296,7 +298,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_bdi_register,
 		__array(char, name, 32)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32);
 	),
 	TP_printk("bdi %s",
 		__entry->name
@@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(wbc_class,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32);
 		__entry->nr_to_write	= wbc->nr_to_write;
 		__entry->pages_skipped	= wbc->pages_skipped;
 		__entry->sync_mode	= wbc->sync_mode;
@@ -372,7 +374,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_queue_io,
 		__field(unsigned int,	cgroup_ino)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strncpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
 		__entry->older	= dirtied_before;
 		__entry->age	= (jiffies - dirtied_before) * 1000 / HZ;
 		__entry->moved	= moved;
@@ -457,7 +459,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(bdi_dirty_ratelimit,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strlcpy(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
 		__entry->write_bw	= KBps(wb->write_bandwidth);
 		__entry->avg_write_bw	= KBps(wb->avg_write_bandwidth);
 		__entry->dirty_rate	= KBps(dirty_rate);
@@ -522,7 +524,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(balance_dirty_pages,
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		unsigned long freerun = (thresh + bg_thresh) / 2;
-		strlcpy(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
 
 		__entry->limit		= global_wb_domain.dirty_limit;
 		__entry->setpoint	= (global_wb_domain.dirty_limit +
@@ -582,8 +584,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_sb_inodes_requeue,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name,
-		        dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
+			    dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->state		= inode->i_state;
 		__entry->dirtied_when	= inode->dirtied_when;
@@ -656,8 +658,8 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_single_inode_template,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy(__entry->name,
-			dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
+			    dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->state		= inode->i_state;
 		__entry->dirtied_when	= inode->dirtied_when;
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 12/49] memcg: fix a crash in wb_workfn when a device disappears

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

[ Upstream commit 68f23b89067fdf187763e75a56087550624fdbee ]

Without memcg, there is a one-to-one mapping between the bdi and
bdi_writeback structures.  In this world, things are fairly
straightforward; the first thing bdi_unregister() does is to shutdown
the bdi_writeback structure (or wb), and part of that writeback ensures
that no other work queued against the wb, and that the wb is fully
drained.

With memcg, however, there is a one-to-many relationship between the bdi
and bdi_writeback structures; that is, there are multiple wb objects
which can all point to a single bdi.  There is a refcount which prevents
the bdi object from being released (and hence, unregistered).  So in
theory, the bdi_unregister() *should* only get called once its refcount
goes to zero (bdi_put will drop the refcount, and when it is zero,
release_bdi gets called, which calls bdi_unregister).

Unfortunately, del_gendisk() in block/gen_hd.c never got the memo about
the Brave New memcg World, and calls bdi_unregister directly.  It does
this without informing the file system, or the memcg code, or anything
else.  This causes the root wb associated with the bdi to be
unregistered, but none of the memcg-specific wb's are shutdown.  So when
one of these wb's are woken up to do delayed work, they try to
dereference their wb->bdi->dev to fetch the device name, but
unfortunately bdi->dev is now NULL, thanks to the bdi_unregister()
called by del_gendisk().  As a result, *boom*.

Fortunately, it looks like the rest of the writeback path is perfectly
happy with bdi->dev and bdi->owner being NULL, so the simplest fix is to
create a bdi_dev_name() function which can handle bdi->dev being NULL.
This also allows us to bulletproof the writeback tracepoints to prevent
them from dereferencing a NULL pointer and crashing the kernel if one is
tracing with memcg's enabled, and an iSCSI device dies or a USB storage
stick is pulled.

The most common way of triggering this will be hotremoval of a device
while writeback with memcg enabled is going on.  It was triggering
several times a day in a heavily loaded production environment.

Google Bug Id: 145475544

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191227194829.150110-1-tytso@mit.edu
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191228005211.163952-1-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/fs-writeback.c                |  2 +-
 include/linux/backing-dev.h      | 10 ++++++++++
 include/trace/events/writeback.h | 29 +++++++++++++----------------
 mm/backing-dev.c                 |  1 +
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fs-writeback.c b/fs/fs-writeback.c
index f978ae2bb846f..2de656ecc48bb 100644
--- a/fs/fs-writeback.c
+++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c
@@ -1971,7 +1971,7 @@ void wb_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
 						struct bdi_writeback, dwork);
 	long pages_written;
 
-	set_worker_desc("flush-%s", dev_name(wb->bdi->dev));
+	set_worker_desc("flush-%s", bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi));
 	current->flags |= PF_SWAPWRITE;
 
 	if (likely(!current_is_workqueue_rescuer() ||
diff --git a/include/linux/backing-dev.h b/include/linux/backing-dev.h
index 63f17b106a4a6..57db558c9a616 100644
--- a/include/linux/backing-dev.h
+++ b/include/linux/backing-dev.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/writeback.h>
 #include <linux/blk-cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev-defs.h>
@@ -517,4 +518,13 @@ static inline int bdi_rw_congested(struct backing_dev_info *bdi)
 				  (1 << WB_async_congested));
 }
 
+extern const char *bdi_unknown_name;
+
+static inline const char *bdi_dev_name(struct backing_dev_info *bdi)
+{
+	if (!bdi || !bdi->dev)
+		return bdi_unknown_name;
+	return dev_name(bdi->dev);
+}
+
 #endif	/* _LINUX_BACKING_DEV_H */
diff --git a/include/trace/events/writeback.h b/include/trace/events/writeback.h
index c6cea40e6e6fc..49a72adc7135c 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/writeback.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/writeback.h
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_dirty_page,
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
-			    mapping ? dev_name(inode_to_bdi(mapping->host)->dev) : "(unknown)",
-			    32);
+			    bdi_dev_name(mapping ? inode_to_bdi(mapping->host) :
+					 NULL), 32);
 		__entry->ino = mapping ? mapping->host->i_ino : 0;
 		__entry->index = page->index;
 	),
@@ -96,8 +96,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_dirty_inode_template,
 		struct backing_dev_info *bdi = inode_to_bdi(inode);
 
 		/* may be called for files on pseudo FSes w/ unregistered bdi */
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
-			    bdi->dev ? dev_name(bdi->dev) : "(unknown)", 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(bdi), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->state		= inode->i_state;
 		__entry->flags		= flags;
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_write_inode_template,
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
-			    dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
+			    bdi_dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->sync_mode	= wbc->sync_mode;
 		__entry->cgroup_ino	= __trace_wbc_assign_cgroup(wbc);
@@ -220,9 +219,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_work_class,
 		__field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
-			    wb->bdi->dev ? dev_name(wb->bdi->dev) :
-			    "(unknown)", 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32);
 		__entry->nr_pages = work->nr_pages;
 		__entry->sb_dev = work->sb ? work->sb->s_dev : 0;
 		__entry->sync_mode = work->sync_mode;
@@ -275,7 +272,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_class,
 		__field(unsigned int, cgroup_ino)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32);
 		__entry->cgroup_ino = __trace_wb_assign_cgroup(wb);
 	),
 	TP_printk("bdi %s: cgroup_ino=%u",
@@ -298,7 +295,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_bdi_register,
 		__array(char, name, 32)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(bdi), 32);
 	),
 	TP_printk("bdi %s",
 		__entry->name
@@ -323,7 +320,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(wbc_class,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(bdi), 32);
 		__entry->nr_to_write	= wbc->nr_to_write;
 		__entry->pages_skipped	= wbc->pages_skipped;
 		__entry->sync_mode	= wbc->sync_mode;
@@ -374,7 +371,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_queue_io,
 		__field(unsigned int,	cgroup_ino)
 	),
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strncpy_pad(__entry->name, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->name, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32);
 		__entry->older	= dirtied_before;
 		__entry->age	= (jiffies - dirtied_before) * 1000 / HZ;
 		__entry->moved	= moved;
@@ -459,7 +456,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(bdi_dirty_ratelimit,
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32);
 		__entry->write_bw	= KBps(wb->write_bandwidth);
 		__entry->avg_write_bw	= KBps(wb->avg_write_bandwidth);
 		__entry->dirty_rate	= KBps(dirty_rate);
@@ -524,7 +521,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(balance_dirty_pages,
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		unsigned long freerun = (thresh + bg_thresh) / 2;
-		strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, dev_name(wb->bdi->dev), 32);
+		strscpy_pad(__entry->bdi, bdi_dev_name(wb->bdi), 32);
 
 		__entry->limit		= global_wb_domain.dirty_limit;
 		__entry->setpoint	= (global_wb_domain.dirty_limit +
@@ -585,7 +582,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(writeback_sb_inodes_requeue,
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
-			    dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
+			    bdi_dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->state		= inode->i_state;
 		__entry->dirtied_when	= inode->dirtied_when;
@@ -659,7 +656,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(writeback_single_inode_template,
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		strscpy_pad(__entry->name,
-			    dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)->dev), 32);
+			    bdi_dev_name(inode_to_bdi(inode)), 32);
 		__entry->ino		= inode->i_ino;
 		__entry->state		= inode->i_state;
 		__entry->dirtied_when	= inode->dirtied_when;
diff --git a/mm/backing-dev.c b/mm/backing-dev.c
index 113b7d3170799..aad61d0175a1c 100644
--- a/mm/backing-dev.c
+++ b/mm/backing-dev.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct backing_dev_info noop_backing_dev_info = {
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(noop_backing_dev_info);
 
 static struct class *bdi_class;
+const char *bdi_unknown_name = "(unknown)";
 
 /*
  * bdi_lock protects updates to bdi_list. bdi_list has RCU reader side
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 13/49] futex: Ensure the correct return value from futex_lock_pi()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 12bb3f7f1b03d5913b3f9d4236a488aa7774dfe9 upstream

In case that futex_lock_pi() was aborted by a signal or a timeout and the
task returned without acquiring the rtmutex, but is the designated owner of
the futex due to a concurrent futex_unlock_pi() fixup_owner() is invoked to
establish consistent state. In that case it invokes fixup_pi_state_owner()
which in turn tries to acquire the rtmutex again. If that succeeds then it
does not propagate this success to fixup_owner() and futex_lock_pi()
returns -EINTR or -ETIMEOUT despite having the futex locked.

Return success from fixup_pi_state_owner() in all cases where the current
task owns the rtmutex and therefore the futex and propagate it correctly
through fixup_owner(). Fixup the other callsite which does not expect a
positive return value.

Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[Lee: Back-ported in support of a previous futex attempt]
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2322,7 +2322,7 @@ retry:
 		}
 
 		if (__rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
-			/* We got the lock after all, nothing to fix. */
+			/* We got the lock. pi_state is correct. Tell caller. */
 			return 1;
 		}
 
@@ -2364,7 +2364,7 @@ retry:
 	 */
 	pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, newowner);
 
-	return 0;
+	return argowner == current;
 
 	/*
 	 * To handle the page fault we need to drop the hash bucket
@@ -2447,8 +2447,6 @@ static long futex_wait_restart(struct re
  */
 static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked)
 {
-	int ret = 0;
-
 	if (locked) {
 		/*
 		 * Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
@@ -2459,8 +2457,8 @@ static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr
 		 * stable state, anything else needs more attention.
 		 */
 		if (q->pi_state->owner != current)
-			ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
-		goto out;
+			return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
+		return 1;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2471,10 +2469,8 @@ static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr
 	 * Another speculative read; pi_state->owner == current is unstable
 	 * but needs our attention.
 	 */
-	if (q->pi_state->owner == current) {
-		ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, NULL);
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (q->pi_state->owner == current)
+		return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, NULL);
 
 	/*
 	 * Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock, then we should not be
@@ -2483,8 +2479,7 @@ static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex) == current))
 		return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
 
-out:
-	return ret ? ret : locked;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3106,6 +3101,11 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __u
 			 */
 			put_pi_state(q.pi_state);
 			spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
+			/*
+			 * Adjust the return value. It's either -EFAULT or
+			 * success (1) but the caller expects 0 for success.
+			 */
+			ret = ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
 		}
 	} else {
 		struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex;

[PATCH 4.9 14/49] futex: Change locking rules

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

Currently futex-pi relies on hb->lock to serialize everything. But hb->lock
creates another set of problems, especially priority inversions on RT where
hb->lock becomes a rt_mutex itself.

The rt_mutex::wait_lock is the most obvious protection for keeping the
futex user space value and the kernel internal pi_state in sync.

Rework and document the locking so rt_mutex::wait_lock is held accross all
operations which modify the user space value and the pi state.

This allows to invoke rt_mutex_unlock() (including deboost) without holding
hb->lock as a next step.

Nothing yet relies on the new locking rules.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170322104151.751993333@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[Lee: Back-ported in support of a previous futex back-port attempt]
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |  138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1019,6 +1019,39 @@ static void exit_pi_state_list(struct ta
  * [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
  *	TID out of sync. Except one error case where the kernel is denied
  *	write access to the user address, see fixup_pi_state_owner().
+ *
+ *
+ * Serialization and lifetime rules:
+ *
+ * hb->lock:
+ *
+ *	hb -> futex_q, relation
+ *	futex_q -> pi_state, relation
+ *
+ *	(cannot be raw because hb can contain arbitrary amount
+ *	 of futex_q's)
+ *
+ * pi_mutex->wait_lock:
+ *
+ *	{uval, pi_state}
+ *
+ *	(and pi_mutex 'obviously')
+ *
+ * p->pi_lock:
+ *
+ *	p->pi_state_list -> pi_state->list, relation
+ *
+ * pi_state->refcount:
+ *
+ *	pi_state lifetime
+ *
+ *
+ * Lock order:
+ *
+ *   hb->lock
+ *     pi_mutex->wait_lock
+ *       p->pi_lock
+ *
  */
 
 /*
@@ -1026,10 +1059,12 @@ static void exit_pi_state_list(struct ta
  * the pi_state against the user space value. If correct, attach to
  * it.
  */
-static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
+static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
+			      struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
 			      struct futex_pi_state **ps)
 {
 	pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
+	int ret, uval2;
 
 	/*
 	 * Userspace might have messed up non-PI and PI futexes [3]
@@ -1037,9 +1072,34 @@ static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 uval,
 	if (unlikely(!pi_state))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * We get here with hb->lock held, and having found a
+	 * futex_top_waiter(). This means that futex_lock_pi() of said futex_q
+	 * has dropped the hb->lock in between queue_me() and unqueue_me_pi(),
+	 * which in turn means that futex_lock_pi() still has a reference on
+	 * our pi_state.
+	 */
 	WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&pi_state->refcount));
 
 	/*
+	 * Now that we have a pi_state, we can acquire wait_lock
+	 * and do the state validation.
+	 */
+	raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Since {uval, pi_state} is serialized by wait_lock, and our current
+	 * uval was read without holding it, it can have changed. Verify it
+	 * still is what we expect it to be, otherwise retry the entire
+	 * operation.
+	 */
+	if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval2, uaddr))
+		goto out_efault;
+
+	if (uval != uval2)
+		goto out_eagain;
+
+	/*
 	 * Handle the owner died case:
 	 */
 	if (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
@@ -1054,11 +1114,11 @@ static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 uval,
 			 * is not 0. Inconsistent state. [5]
 			 */
 			if (pid)
-				return -EINVAL;
+				goto out_einval;
 			/*
 			 * Take a ref on the state and return success. [4]
 			 */
-			goto out_state;
+			goto out_attach;
 		}
 
 		/*
@@ -1070,14 +1130,14 @@ static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 uval,
 		 * Take a ref on the state and return success. [6]
 		 */
 		if (!pid)
-			goto out_state;
+			goto out_attach;
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * If the owner died bit is not set, then the pi_state
 		 * must have an owner. [7]
 		 */
 		if (!pi_state->owner)
-			return -EINVAL;
+			goto out_einval;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1086,11 +1146,29 @@ static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 uval,
 	 * user space TID. [9/10]
 	 */
 	if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner))
-		return -EINVAL;
-out_state:
+		goto out_einval;
+
+out_attach:
 	atomic_inc(&pi_state->refcount);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	*ps = pi_state;
 	return 0;
+
+out_einval:
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	goto out_error;
+
+out_eagain:
+	ret = -EAGAIN;
+	goto out_error;
+
+out_efault:
+	ret = -EFAULT;
+	goto out_error;
+
+out_error:
+	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1183,6 +1261,9 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 uval,
 
 	/*
 	 * No existing pi state. First waiter. [2]
+	 *
+	 * This creates pi_state, we have hb->lock held, this means nothing can
+	 * observe this state, wait_lock is irrelevant.
 	 */
 	pi_state = alloc_pi_state();
 
@@ -1207,7 +1288,8 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 uval,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
+static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
+			   struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
 			   union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
 			   struct task_struct **exiting)
 {
@@ -1218,7 +1300,7 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, str
 	 * attach to the pi_state when the validation succeeds.
 	 */
 	if (match)
-		return attach_to_pi_state(uval, match->pi_state, ps);
+		return attach_to_pi_state(uaddr, uval, match->pi_state, ps);
 
 	/*
 	 * We are the first waiter - try to look up the owner based on
@@ -1237,7 +1319,7 @@ static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __u
 	if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	/*If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
+	/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
 	return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
 }
 
@@ -1301,7 +1383,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __us
 	 */
 	match = futex_top_waiter(hb, key);
 	if (match)
-		return attach_to_pi_state(uval, match->pi_state, ps);
+		return attach_to_pi_state(uaddr, uval, match->pi_state, ps);
 
 	/*
 	 * No waiter and user TID is 0. We are here because the
@@ -1441,6 +1523,7 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uad
 
 	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
+
 	} else if (curval != uval) {
 		/*
 		 * If a unconditional UNLOCK_PI operation (user space did not
@@ -1977,7 +2060,7 @@ retry_private:
 			 * If that call succeeds then we have pi_state and an
 			 * initial refcount on it.
 			 */
-			ret = lookup_pi_state(ret, hb2, &key2,
+			ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2,
 					      &pi_state, &exiting);
 		}
 
@@ -2282,7 +2365,6 @@ static int __fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __
 	int err = 0;
 
 	oldowner = pi_state->owner;
-
 	/* Owner died? */
 	if (!pi_state->owner)
 		newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
@@ -2305,11 +2387,10 @@ static int __fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __
 	 * because we can fault here. Imagine swapped out pages or a fork
 	 * that marked all the anonymous memory readonly for cow.
 	 *
-	 * Modifying pi_state _before_ the user space value would
-	 * leave the pi_state in an inconsistent state when we fault
-	 * here, because we need to drop the hash bucket lock to
-	 * handle the fault. This might be observed in the PID check
-	 * in lookup_pi_state.
+	 * Modifying pi_state _before_ the user space value would leave the
+	 * pi_state in an inconsistent state when we fault here, because we
+	 * need to drop the locks to handle the fault. This might be observed
+	 * in the PID check in lookup_pi_state.
 	 */
 retry:
 	if (!argowner) {
@@ -2367,21 +2448,26 @@ retry:
 	return argowner == current;
 
 	/*
-	 * To handle the page fault we need to drop the hash bucket
-	 * lock here. That gives the other task (either the highest priority
-	 * waiter itself or the task which stole the rtmutex) the
-	 * chance to try the fixup of the pi_state. So once we are
-	 * back from handling the fault we need to check the pi_state
-	 * after reacquiring the hash bucket lock and before trying to
-	 * do another fixup. When the fixup has been done already we
-	 * simply return.
+	 * To handle the page fault we need to drop the locks here. That gives
+	 * the other task (either the highest priority waiter itself or the
+	 * task which stole the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the
+	 * pi_state. So once we are back from handling the fault we need to
+	 * check the pi_state after reacquiring the locks and before trying to
+	 * do another fixup. When the fixup has been done already we simply
+	 * return.
+	 *
+	 * Note: we hold both hb->lock and pi_mutex->wait_lock. We can safely
+	 * drop hb->lock since the caller owns the hb -> futex_q relation.
+	 * Dropping the pi_mutex->wait_lock requires the state revalidate.
 	 */
 handle_fault:
+	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
 
 	err = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
 
 	spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
+	raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 
 	/*
 	 * Check if someone else fixed it for us:

[PATCH 4.9 15/49] futex: Cure exit race

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit da791a667536bf8322042e38ca85d55a78d3c273 upstream.

Stefan reported, that the glibc tst-robustpi4 test case fails
occasionally. That case creates the following race between
sys_exit() and sys_futex_lock_pi():

 CPU0				CPU1

 sys_exit()			sys_futex()
  do_exit()			 futex_lock_pi()
   exit_signals(tsk)		  No waiters:
    tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;	  *uaddr == 0x00000PID
  mm_release(tsk)		  Set waiter bit
   exit_robust_list(tsk) {	  *uaddr = 0x80000PID;
      Set owner died		  attach_to_pi_owner() {
    *uaddr = 0xC0000000;	   tsk = get_task(PID);
   }				   if (!tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) {
  ...				     attach();
  tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;	   } else {
				     if (!(tsk->flags & PF_EXITPIDONE))
				       return -EAGAIN;
				     return -ESRCH; <--- FAIL
				   }

ESRCH is returned all the way to user space, which triggers the glibc test
case assert. Returning ESRCH unconditionally is wrong here because the user
space value has been changed by the exiting task to 0xC0000000, i.e. the
FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set and the futex PID value has been cleared. This
is a valid state and the kernel has to handle it, i.e. taking the futex.

Cure it by rereading the user space value when PF_EXITING and PF_EXITPIDONE
is set in the task which 'owns' the futex. If the value has changed, let
the kernel retry the operation, which includes all regular sanity checks
and correctly handles the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED case.

If it hasn't changed, then return ESRCH as there is no way to distinguish
this case from malfunctioning user space. This happens when the exiting
task did not have a robust list, the robust list was corrupted or the user
space value in the futex was simply bogus.

Reported-by: Stefan Liebler <stli@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200467
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210152311.986181245@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[Lee: Required to satisfy functional dependency from futex back-port.
 Re-add the missing handle_exit_race() parts from:
 3d4775df0a89 ("futex: Replace PF_EXITPIDONE with a state")]
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1201,11 +1201,67 @@ static void wait_for_owner_exiting(int r
 	put_task_struct(exiting);
 }
 
+static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
+			    struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	u32 uval2;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the futex exit state is not yet FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, wait
+	 * for it to finish.
+	 */
+	if (tsk && tsk->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
+	/*
+	 * Reread the user space value to handle the following situation:
+	 *
+	 * CPU0				CPU1
+	 *
+	 * sys_exit()			sys_futex()
+	 *  do_exit()			 futex_lock_pi()
+	 *                                futex_lock_pi_atomic()
+	 *   exit_signals(tsk)		    No waiters:
+	 *    tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;	    *uaddr == 0x00000PID
+	 *  mm_release(tsk)		    Set waiter bit
+	 *   exit_robust_list(tsk) {	    *uaddr = 0x80000PID;
+	 *      Set owner died		    attach_to_pi_owner() {
+	 *    *uaddr = 0xC0000000;	     tsk = get_task(PID);
+	 *   }				     if (!tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) {
+	 *  ...				       attach();
+	 *  tsk->futex_state =               } else {
+	 *	FUTEX_STATE_DEAD;              if (tsk->futex_state !=
+	 *					  FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
+	 *				         return -EAGAIN;
+	 *				       return -ESRCH; <--- FAIL
+	 *				     }
+	 *
+	 * Returning ESRCH unconditionally is wrong here because the
+	 * user space value has been changed by the exiting task.
+	 *
+	 * The same logic applies to the case where the exiting task is
+	 * already gone.
+	 */
+	if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval2, uaddr))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* If the user space value has changed, try again. */
+	if (uval2 != uval)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
+	/*
+	 * The exiting task did not have a robust list, the robust list was
+	 * corrupted or the user space value in *uaddr is simply bogus.
+	 * Give up and tell user space.
+	 */
+	return -ESRCH;
+}
+
 /*
  * Lookup the task for the TID provided from user space and attach to
  * it after doing proper sanity checks.
  */
-static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
+static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
 			      struct futex_pi_state **ps,
 			      struct task_struct **exiting)
 {
@@ -1216,12 +1272,15 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 uval,
 	/*
 	 * We are the first waiter - try to look up the real owner and attach
 	 * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0 [1]
+	 *
+	 * The !pid check is paranoid. None of the call sites should end up
+	 * with pid == 0, but better safe than sorry. Let the caller retry
 	 */
 	if (!pid)
-		return -ESRCH;
+		return -EAGAIN;
 	p = futex_find_get_task(pid);
 	if (!p)
-		return -ESRCH;
+		return handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, NULL);
 
 	if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
 		put_task_struct(p);
@@ -1240,7 +1299,7 @@ static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 uval,
 		 * FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, we know that the task has finished
 		 * the cleanup:
 		 */
-		int ret = (p->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_DEAD) ? -ESRCH : -EAGAIN;
+		int ret = handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, p);
 
 		raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
 		/*
@@ -1306,7 +1365,7 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *u
 	 * We are the first waiter - try to look up the owner based on
 	 * @uval and attach to it.
 	 */
-	return attach_to_pi_owner(uval, key, ps, exiting);
+	return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, uval, key, ps, exiting);
 }
 
 static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
@@ -1422,7 +1481,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __us
 	 * attach to the owner. If that fails, no harm done, we only
 	 * set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in the user space variable.
 	 */
-	return attach_to_pi_owner(uval, key, ps, exiting);
+	return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps, exiting);
 }
 
 /**

[PATCH 4.9 16/49] squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>

commit f37aa4c7366e23f91b81d00bafd6a7ab54e4a381 upstream.

Sysbot has reported a number of "slab-out-of-bounds reads" and
"use-after-free read" errors which has been identified as being caused
by a corrupted index value read from the inode.  This could be because
the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the "compression" bit has
been corrupted (turning a compressed block into an uncompressed block).

This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the
following corruption.

1. It checks against corruption of the ids count.  This can either
   lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected
   table to be read.

   In the case of a too large ids count, this would often have been
   trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces
   a more exact check, which can identify too small values.

2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-3-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+b06d57ba83f604522af2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c021ba012da41ee9807c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+5024636e8b5fd19f0f19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+bcbc661df46657d0fa4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/squashfs/id.c             |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h |    1 +
 fs/squashfs/super.c          |    6 +++---
 fs/squashfs/xattr.h          |   10 +++++++++-
 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/squashfs/id.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/id.c
@@ -48,10 +48,15 @@ int squashfs_get_id(struct super_block *
 	struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;
 	int block = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK(index);
 	int offset = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_OFFSET(index);
-	u64 start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->id_table[block]);
+	u64 start_block;
 	__le32 disk_id;
 	int err;
 
+	if (index >= msblk->ids)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->id_table[block]);
+
 	err = squashfs_read_metadata(sb, &disk_id, &start_block, &offset,
 							sizeof(disk_id));
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -69,7 +74,10 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(str
 		u64 id_table_start, u64 next_table, unsigned short no_ids)
 {
 	unsigned int length = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCK_BYTES(no_ids);
+	unsigned int indexes = SQUASHFS_ID_BLOCKS(no_ids);
+	int n;
 	__le64 *table;
+	u64 start, end;
 
 	TRACE("In read_id_index_table, length %d\n", length);
 
@@ -80,20 +88,36 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(str
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	/*
-	 * length bytes should not extend into the next table - this check
-	 * also traps instances where id_table_start is incorrectly larger
-	 * than the next table start
+	 * The computed size of the index table (length bytes) should exactly
+	 * match the table start and end points
 	 */
-	if (id_table_start + length > next_table)
+	if (length != (next_table - id_table_start))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	table = squashfs_read_table(sb, id_table_start, length);
+	if (IS_ERR(table))
+		return table;
 
 	/*
-	 * table[0] points to the first id lookup table metadata block, this
-	 * should be less than id_table_start
+	 * table[0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations
+	 * of the compressed id blocks.   Each entry should be less than
+	 * the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference between them
+	 * should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less.  table[indexes - 1]
+	 * should be less than id_table_start, and again the difference
+	 * should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less
 	 */
-	if (!IS_ERR(table) && le64_to_cpu(table[0]) >= id_table_start) {
+	for (n = 0; n < (indexes - 1); n++) {
+		start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]);
+		end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]);
+
+		if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+			kfree(table);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]);
+	if (start >= id_table_start || (id_table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
 		kfree(table);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
--- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h
+++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_sb.h
@@ -77,5 +77,6 @@ struct squashfs_sb_info {
 	unsigned int				inodes;
 	unsigned int				fragments;
 	int					xattr_ids;
+	unsigned int				ids;
 };
 #endif
--- a/fs/squashfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/super.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct su
 	msblk->directory_table = le64_to_cpu(sblk->directory_table_start);
 	msblk->inodes = le32_to_cpu(sblk->inodes);
 	msblk->fragments = le32_to_cpu(sblk->fragments);
+	msblk->ids = le16_to_cpu(sblk->no_ids);
 	flags = le16_to_cpu(sblk->flags);
 
 	TRACE("Found valid superblock on %pg\n", sb->s_bdev);
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct su
 	TRACE("Block size %d\n", msblk->block_size);
 	TRACE("Number of inodes %d\n", msblk->inodes);
 	TRACE("Number of fragments %d\n", msblk->fragments);
-	TRACE("Number of ids %d\n", le16_to_cpu(sblk->no_ids));
+	TRACE("Number of ids %d\n", msblk->ids);
 	TRACE("sblk->inode_table_start %llx\n", msblk->inode_table);
 	TRACE("sblk->directory_table_start %llx\n", msblk->directory_table);
 	TRACE("sblk->fragment_table_start %llx\n",
@@ -244,8 +245,7 @@ static int squashfs_fill_super(struct su
 allocate_id_index_table:
 	/* Allocate and read id index table */
 	msblk->id_table = squashfs_read_id_index_table(sb,
-		le64_to_cpu(sblk->id_table_start), next_table,
-		le16_to_cpu(sblk->no_ids));
+		le64_to_cpu(sblk->id_table_start), next_table, msblk->ids);
 	if (IS_ERR(msblk->id_table)) {
 		ERROR("unable to read id index table\n");
 		err = PTR_ERR(msblk->id_table);
--- a/fs/squashfs/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr.h
@@ -30,8 +30,16 @@ extern int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct
 static inline __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb,
 		u64 start, u64 *xattr_table_start, int *xattr_ids)
 {
+	struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table;
+
+	id_table = squashfs_read_table(sb, start, sizeof(*id_table));
+	if (IS_ERR(id_table))
+		return (__le64 *) id_table;
+
+	*xattr_table_start = le64_to_cpu(id_table->xattr_table_start);
+	kfree(id_table);
+
 	ERROR("Xattrs in filesystem, these will be ignored\n");
-	*xattr_table_start = start;
 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 17/49] squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>

commit eabac19e40c095543def79cb6ffeb3a8588aaff4 upstream.

Sysbot has reported an "slab-out-of-bounds read" error which has been
identified as being caused by a corrupted "ino_num" value read from the
inode.  This could be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or
because the "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed
block into an uncompressed block).

This patch adds additional sanity checks to detect this, and the
following corruption.

1. It checks against corruption of the inodes count.  This can either
   lead to a larger table to be read, or a smaller than expected
   table to be read.

   In the case of a too large inodes count, this would often have been
   trapped by the existing sanity checks, but this patch introduces
   a more exact check, which can identify too small values.

2. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.

[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/527909353.754618.1612769948607@webmail.123-reg.co.uk

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-4-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+04419e3ff19d2970ea28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/squashfs/export.c |   41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/squashfs/export.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/export.c
@@ -54,12 +54,17 @@ static long long squashfs_inode_lookup(s
 	struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;
 	int blk = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK(ino_num - 1);
 	int offset = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK_OFFSET(ino_num - 1);
-	u64 start = le64_to_cpu(msblk->inode_lookup_table[blk]);
+	u64 start;
 	__le64 ino;
 	int err;
 
 	TRACE("Entered squashfs_inode_lookup, inode_number = %d\n", ino_num);
 
+	if (ino_num == 0 || (ino_num - 1) >= msblk->inodes)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	start = le64_to_cpu(msblk->inode_lookup_table[blk]);
+
 	err = squashfs_read_metadata(sb, &ino, &start, &offset, sizeof(ino));
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
@@ -124,7 +129,10 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_table
 		u64 lookup_table_start, u64 next_table, unsigned int inodes)
 {
 	unsigned int length = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCK_BYTES(inodes);
+	unsigned int indexes = SQUASHFS_LOOKUP_BLOCKS(inodes);
+	int n;
 	__le64 *table;
+	u64 start, end;
 
 	TRACE("In read_inode_lookup_table, length %d\n", length);
 
@@ -134,20 +142,37 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_table
 	if (inodes == 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	/* length bytes should not extend into the next table - this check
-	 * also traps instances where lookup_table_start is incorrectly larger
-	 * than the next table start
+	/*
+	 * The computed size of the lookup table (length bytes) should exactly
+	 * match the table start and end points
 	 */
-	if (lookup_table_start + length > next_table)
+	if (length != (next_table - lookup_table_start))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	table = squashfs_read_table(sb, lookup_table_start, length);
+	if (IS_ERR(table))
+		return table;
 
 	/*
-	 * table[0] points to the first inode lookup table metadata block,
-	 * this should be less than lookup_table_start
+	 * table0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations
+	 * of the compressed inode lookup blocks.  Each entry should be
+	 * less than the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference
+	 * between them should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less.
+	 * table[indexes - 1] should  be less than lookup_table_start, and
+	 * again the difference should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less
 	 */
-	if (!IS_ERR(table) && le64_to_cpu(table[0]) >= lookup_table_start) {
+	for (n = 0; n < (indexes - 1); n++) {
+		start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]);
+		end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]);
+
+		if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+			kfree(table);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]);
+	if (start >= lookup_table_start || (lookup_table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
 		kfree(table);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}

[PATCH 4.9 18/49] squashfs: add more sanity checks in xattr id lookup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>

commit 506220d2ba21791314af569211ffd8870b8208fa upstream.

Sysbot has reported a warning where a kmalloc() attempt exceeds the
maximum limit.  This has been identified as corruption of the xattr_ids
count when reading the xattr id lookup table.

This patch adds a number of additional sanity checks to detect this
corruption and others.

1. It checks for a corrupted xattr index read from the inode.  This could
   be because the metadata block is uncompressed, or because the
   "compression" bit has been corrupted (turning a compressed block
   into an uncompressed block).  This would cause an out of bounds read.

2. It checks against corruption of the xattr_ids count.  This can either
   lead to the above kmalloc failure, or a smaller than expected
   table to be read.

3. It checks the contents of the index table for corruption.

[phillip@squashfs.org.uk: fix checkpatch issue]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/270245655.754655.1612770082682@webmail.123-reg.co.uk

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210204130249.4495-5-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: syzbot+2ccea6339d368360800d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c |   66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c
@@ -44,10 +44,15 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_b
 	struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;
 	int block = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK(index);
 	int offset = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_OFFSET(index);
-	u64 start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->xattr_id_table[block]);
+	u64 start_block;
 	struct squashfs_xattr_id id;
 	int err;
 
+	if (index >= msblk->xattr_ids)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	start_block = le64_to_cpu(msblk->xattr_id_table[block]);
+
 	err = squashfs_read_metadata(sb, &id, &start_block, &offset,
 							sizeof(id));
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -63,13 +68,17 @@ int squashfs_xattr_lookup(struct super_b
 /*
  * Read uncompressed xattr id lookup table indexes from disk into memory
  */
-__le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 start,
+__le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(struct super_block *sb, u64 table_start,
 		u64 *xattr_table_start, int *xattr_ids)
 {
-	unsigned int len;
+	struct squashfs_sb_info *msblk = sb->s_fs_info;
+	unsigned int len, indexes;
 	struct squashfs_xattr_id_table *id_table;
+	__le64 *table;
+	u64 start, end;
+	int n;
 
-	id_table = squashfs_read_table(sb, start, sizeof(*id_table));
+	id_table = squashfs_read_table(sb, table_start, sizeof(*id_table));
 	if (IS_ERR(id_table))
 		return (__le64 *) id_table;
 
@@ -83,13 +92,52 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(str
 	if (*xattr_ids == 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	/* xattr_table should be less than start */
-	if (*xattr_table_start >= start)
+	len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids);
+	indexes = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCKS(*xattr_ids);
+
+	/*
+	 * The computed size of the index table (len bytes) should exactly
+	 * match the table start and end points
+	 */
+	start = table_start + sizeof(*id_table);
+	end = msblk->bytes_used;
+
+	if (len != (end - start))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	len = SQUASHFS_XATTR_BLOCK_BYTES(*xattr_ids);
+	table = squashfs_read_table(sb, start, len);
+	if (IS_ERR(table))
+		return table;
+
+	/* table[0], table[1], ... table[indexes - 1] store the locations
+	 * of the compressed xattr id blocks.  Each entry should be less than
+	 * the next (i.e. table[0] < table[1]), and the difference between them
+	 * should be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less.  table[indexes - 1]
+	 * should be less than table_start, and again the difference
+	 * shouls be SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE or less.
+	 *
+	 * Finally xattr_table_start should be less than table[0].
+	 */
+	for (n = 0; n < (indexes - 1); n++) {
+		start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]);
+		end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]);
+
+		if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+			kfree(table);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]);
+	if (start >= table_start || (table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+		kfree(table);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
 
-	TRACE("In read_xattr_index_table, length %d\n", len);
+	if (*xattr_table_start >= le64_to_cpu(table[0])) {
+		kfree(table);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
 
-	return squashfs_read_table(sb, start + sizeof(*id_table), len);
+	return table;
 }

[PATCH 4.9 19/49] tracing: Do not count ftrace events in top level enable output

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 256cfdd6fdf70c6fcf0f7c8ddb0ebd73ce8f3bc9 upstream.

The file /sys/kernel/tracing/events/enable is used to enable all events by
echoing in "1", or disabling all events when echoing in "0". To know if all
events are enabled, disabled, or some are enabled but not all of them,
cating the file should show either "1" (all enabled), "0" (all disabled), or
"X" (some enabled but not all of them). This works the same as the "enable"
files in the individule system directories (like tracing/events/sched/enable).

But when all events are enabled, the top level "enable" file shows "X". The
reason is that its checking the "ftrace" events, which are special events
that only exist for their format files. These include the format for the
function tracer events, that are enabled when the function tracer is
enabled, but not by the "enable" file. The check includes these events,
which will always be disabled, and even though all true events are enabled,
the top level "enable" file will show "X" instead of "1".

To fix this, have the check test the event's flags to see if it has the
"IGNORE_ENABLE" flag set, and if so, not test it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 553552ce1796c ("tracing: Combine event filter_active and enable into single flags field")
Reported-by: "Yordan Karadzhov (VMware)" <y.karadz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c
@@ -1105,7 +1105,8 @@ system_enable_read(struct file *filp, ch
 	mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry(file, &tr->events, list) {
 		call = file->event_call;
-		if (!trace_event_name(call) || !call->class || !call->class->reg)
+		if ((call->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_IGNORE_ENABLE) ||
+		    !trace_event_name(call) || !call->class || !call->class->reg)
 			continue;
 
 		if (system && strcmp(call->class->system, system->name) != 0)

[PATCH 4.9 20/49] tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit b220c049d5196dd94d992dd2dc8cba1a5e6123bf upstream.

When filters are used by trace events, a page is allocated on each CPU and
used to copy the trace event fields to this page before writing to the ring
buffer. The reason to use the filter and not write directly into the ring
buffer is because a filter may discard the event and there's more overhead
on discarding from the ring buffer than the extra copy.

The problem here is that there is no check against the size being allocated
when using this page. If an event asks for more than a page size while being
filtered, it will get only a page, leading to the caller writing more that
what was allocated.

Check the length of the request, and if it is more than PAGE_SIZE minus the
header default back to allocating from the ring buffer directly. The ring
buffer may reject the event if its too big anyway, but it wont overflow.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ath10k/1612839593-2308-1-git-send-email-wgong@codeaurora.org/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff4 ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events")
Reported-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve(struct r
 	    (entry = this_cpu_read(trace_buffered_event))) {
 		/* Try to use the per cpu buffer first */
 		val = this_cpu_inc_return(trace_buffered_event_cnt);
-		if (val == 1) {
+		if ((len < (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*entry))) && val == 1) {
 			trace_event_setup(entry, type, flags, pc);
 			entry->array[0] = len;
 			return entry;

[PATCH 4.9 21/49] ovl: skip getxattr of security labels

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 03fedf93593c82538b18476d8c4f0e8f8435ea70 ]

When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.

When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr.  This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.

This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().

ovl_copy_xattr() skips copy up of security labels that are indentified by
inode_copy_up_xattr LSM hooks, but it does that after vfs_getxattr().
Since we are not going to copy them, skip vfs_getxattr() of the security
labels.

Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 299dbf59f28f8..3a583aa1fafeb 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ int ovl_copy_xattr(struct dentry *old, struct dentry *new)
 
 		if (ovl_is_private_xattr(name))
 			continue;
+
+		error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+		if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			break;
+		if (error == 1) {
+			error = 0;
+			continue; /* Discard */
+		}
 retry:
 		size = vfs_getxattr(old, name, value, value_size);
 		if (size == -ERANGE)
@@ -115,13 +123,6 @@ retry:
 			goto retry;
 		}
 
-		error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
-		if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
-			break;
-		if (error == 1) {
-			error = 0;
-			continue; /* Discard */
-		}
 		error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
 		if (error)
 			break;
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 22/49] ARM: dts: lpc32xx: Revert set default clock rate of HCLK PLL

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>

[ Upstream commit 5638159f6d93b99ec9743ac7f65563fca3cf413d ]

This reverts commit c17e9377aa81664d94b4f2102559fcf2a01ec8e7.

The lpc32xx clock driver is not able to actually change the PLL rate as
this would require reparenting ARM_CLK, DDRAM_CLK, PERIPH_CLK to SYSCLK,
then stop the PLL, update the register, restart the PLL and wait for the
PLL to lock and finally reparent ARM_CLK, DDRAM_CLK, PERIPH_CLK to HCLK
PLL.

Currently, the HCLK driver simply updates the registers but this has no
real effect and all the clock rate calculation end up being wrong. This is
especially annoying for the peripheral (e.g. UARTs, I2C, SPI).

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Tested-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210203090320.GA3760268@piout.net'
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi
index 2802c9565b6ca..976a75a4eb2c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi
@@ -323,9 +323,6 @@
 
 					clocks = <&xtal_32k>, <&xtal>;
 					clock-names = "xtal_32k", "xtal";
-
-					assigned-clocks = <&clk LPC32XX_CLK_HCLK_PLL>;
-					assigned-clock-rates = <208000000>;
 				};
 			};
 
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 23/49] memblock: do not start bottom-up allocations with kernel_end

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>

[ Upstream commit 2dcb3964544177c51853a210b6ad400de78ef17d ]

With kaslr the kernel image is placed at a random place, so starting the
bottom-up allocation with the kernel_end can result in an allocation
failure and a warning like this one:

  hugetlb_cma: reserve 2048 MiB, up to 2048 MiB per node
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  memblock: bottom-up allocation failed, memory hotremove may be affected
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at mm/memblock.c:332 memblock_find_in_range_node+0x178/0x25a
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.10.0+ #1169
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:memblock_find_in_range_node+0x178/0x25a
  Code: e9 6d ff ff ff 48 85 c0 0f 85 da 00 00 00 80 3d 9b 35 df 00 00 75 15 48 c7 c7 c0 75 59 88 c6 05 8b 35 df 00 01 e8 25 8a fa ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 44 24 20 ff ff ff ff 44 89 e6 44 89 ea 48 c7 c1 70 5c
  RSP: 0000:ffffffff88803d18 EFLAGS: 00010086 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000240000000 RCX: 00000000ffffdfff
  RDX: 00000000ffffdfff RSI: 00000000ffffffea RDI: 0000000000000046
  RBP: 0000000100000000 R08: ffffffff88922788 R09: 0000000000009ffb
  R10: 00000000ffffe000 R11: 3fffffffffffffff R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000080000000 R15: 00000001fb42c000
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff88f71000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffa080fb401000 CR3: 00000001fa80a000 CR4: 00000000000406b0
  Call Trace:
    memblock_alloc_range_nid+0x8d/0x11e
    cma_declare_contiguous_nid+0x2c4/0x38c
    hugetlb_cma_reserve+0xdc/0x128
    flush_tlb_one_kernel+0xc/0x20
    native_set_fixmap+0x82/0xd0
    flat_get_apic_id+0x5/0x10
    register_lapic_address+0x8e/0x97
    setup_arch+0x8a5/0xc3f
    start_kernel+0x66/0x547
    load_ucode_bsp+0x4c/0xcd
    secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
  random: get_random_bytes called from __warn+0xab/0x110 with crng_init=0
  ---[ end trace f151227d0b39be70 ]---

At the same time, the kernel image is protected with memblock_reserve(),
so we can just start searching at PAGE_SIZE.  In this case the bottom-up
allocation has the same chances to success as a top-down allocation, so
there is no reason to fallback in the case of a failure.  All together it
simplifies the logic.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201217201214.3414100-2-guro@fb.com
Fixes: 8fabc623238e ("powerpc: Ensure that swiotlb buffer is allocated from low memory")
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Wonhyuk Yang <vvghjk1234@gmail.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 mm/memblock.c | 48 ++++++------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/memblock.c b/mm/memblock.c
index 42b98af6a4158..e43065b13c08c 100644
--- a/mm/memblock.c
+++ b/mm/memblock.c
@@ -186,14 +186,6 @@ __memblock_find_range_top_down(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end,
  *
  * Find @size free area aligned to @align in the specified range and node.
  *
- * When allocation direction is bottom-up, the @start should be greater
- * than the end of the kernel image. Otherwise, it will be trimmed. The
- * reason is that we want the bottom-up allocation just near the kernel
- * image so it is highly likely that the allocated memory and the kernel
- * will reside in the same node.
- *
- * If bottom-up allocation failed, will try to allocate memory top-down.
- *
  * RETURNS:
  * Found address on success, 0 on failure.
  */
@@ -201,8 +193,6 @@ phys_addr_t __init_memblock memblock_find_in_range_node(phys_addr_t size,
 					phys_addr_t align, phys_addr_t start,
 					phys_addr_t end, int nid, ulong flags)
 {
-	phys_addr_t kernel_end, ret;
-
 	/* pump up @end */
 	if (end == MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE)
 		end = memblock.current_limit;
@@ -210,39 +200,13 @@ phys_addr_t __init_memblock memblock_find_in_range_node(phys_addr_t size,
 	/* avoid allocating the first page */
 	start = max_t(phys_addr_t, start, PAGE_SIZE);
 	end = max(start, end);
-	kernel_end = __pa_symbol(_end);
-
-	/*
-	 * try bottom-up allocation only when bottom-up mode
-	 * is set and @end is above the kernel image.
-	 */
-	if (memblock_bottom_up() && end > kernel_end) {
-		phys_addr_t bottom_up_start;
-
-		/* make sure we will allocate above the kernel */
-		bottom_up_start = max(start, kernel_end);
 
-		/* ok, try bottom-up allocation first */
-		ret = __memblock_find_range_bottom_up(bottom_up_start, end,
-						      size, align, nid, flags);
-		if (ret)
-			return ret;
-
-		/*
-		 * we always limit bottom-up allocation above the kernel,
-		 * but top-down allocation doesn't have the limit, so
-		 * retrying top-down allocation may succeed when bottom-up
-		 * allocation failed.
-		 *
-		 * bottom-up allocation is expected to be fail very rarely,
-		 * so we use WARN_ONCE() here to see the stack trace if
-		 * fail happens.
-		 */
-		WARN_ONCE(1, "memblock: bottom-up allocation failed, memory hotunplug may be affected\n");
-	}
-
-	return __memblock_find_range_top_down(start, end, size, align, nid,
-					      flags);
+	if (memblock_bottom_up())
+		return __memblock_find_range_bottom_up(start, end, size, align,
+						       nid, flags);
+	else
+		return __memblock_find_range_top_down(start, end, size, align,
+						      nid, flags);
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 24/49] bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6183f4d3a0a2ad230511987c6c362ca43ec0055f ]

On 32-bit architecture, roundup_pow_of_two() can return 0 when the argument
has upper most bit set due to resulting 1UL << 32. Add a check for this case.

Fixes: d5a3b1f69186 ("bpf: introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210127063653.3576-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index a2a232dec2363..2fdf6f96f9762 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 
 	/* hash table size must be power of 2 */
 	n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries);
+	if (!n_buckets)
+		return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
 
 	cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap);
 	if (cost >= U32_MAX - PAGE_SIZE)
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 25/49] netfilter: xt_recent: Fix attempt to update deleted entry

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@mail.kfki.hu>

[ Upstream commit b1bdde33b72366da20d10770ab7a49fe87b5e190 ]

When both --reap and --update flag are specified, there's a code
path at which the entry to be updated is reaped beforehand,
which then leads to kernel crash. Reap only entries which won't be
updated.

Fixes kernel bugzilla #207773.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207773
Reported-by: Reindl Harald <h.reindl@thelounge.net>
Fixes: 0079c5aee348 ("netfilter: xt_recent: add an entry reaper")
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/xt_recent.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c
index 79d7ad621a80f..03c8bd854e56a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c
@@ -155,7 +155,8 @@ static void recent_entry_remove(struct recent_table *t, struct recent_entry *e)
 /*
  * Drop entries with timestamps older then 'time'.
  */
-static void recent_entry_reap(struct recent_table *t, unsigned long time)
+static void recent_entry_reap(struct recent_table *t, unsigned long time,
+			      struct recent_entry *working, bool update)
 {
 	struct recent_entry *e;
 
@@ -164,6 +165,12 @@ static void recent_entry_reap(struct recent_table *t, unsigned long time)
 	 */
 	e = list_entry(t->lru_list.next, struct recent_entry, lru_list);
 
+	/*
+	 * Do not reap the entry which are going to be updated.
+	 */
+	if (e == working && update)
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * The last time stamp is the most recent.
 	 */
@@ -306,7 +313,8 @@ recent_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 
 		/* info->seconds must be non-zero */
 		if (info->check_set & XT_RECENT_REAP)
-			recent_entry_reap(t, time);
+			recent_entry_reap(t, time, e,
+				info->check_set & XT_RECENT_UPDATE && ret);
 	}
 
 	if (info->check_set & XT_RECENT_SET ||
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 26/49] xen/netback: avoid race in xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit ec7d8e7dd3a59528e305a18e93f1cb98f7faf83b ]

Since commit 23025393dbeb3b8b3 ("xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding")
xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available() is no longer called only from the rx
queue kernel thread, so it needs to access the rx queue with the
associated queue held.

Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Fixes: 23025393dbeb3b8b3 ("xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210202070938.7863-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
index f152246c7dfb7..ddfb1cfa2dd94 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
@@ -38,10 +38,15 @@ static bool xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
 	RING_IDX prod, cons;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int needed;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->rx_queue.lock, flags);
 
 	skb = skb_peek(&queue->rx_queue);
-	if (!skb)
+	if (!skb) {
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->rx_queue.lock, flags);
 		return false;
+	}
 
 	needed = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (skb_is_gso(skb))
@@ -49,6 +54,8 @@ static bool xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
 	if (skb->sw_hash)
 		needed++;
 
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->rx_queue.lock, flags);
+
 	do {
 		prod = queue->rx.sring->req_prod;
 		cons = queue->rx.req_cons;
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 27/49] netfilter: conntrack: skip identical origin tuple in same zone only

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit 07998281c268592963e1cd623fe6ab0270b65ae4 ]

The origin skip check needs to re-test the zone. Else, we might skip
a colliding tuple in the reply direction.

This only occurs when using 'directional zones' where origin tuples
reside in different zones but the reply tuples share the same zone.

This causes the new conntrack entry to be dropped at confirmation time
because NAT clash resolution was elided.

Fixes: 4e35c1cb9460240 ("netfilter: nf_nat: skip nat clash resolution for same-origin entries")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
index d507d0fc7858a..ddd90a3820d39 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -903,7 +903,8 @@ nf_conntrack_tuple_taken(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 			 * Let nf_ct_resolve_clash() deal with this later.
 			 */
 			if (nf_ct_tuple_equal(&ignored_conntrack->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple,
-					      &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple))
+					      &ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple) &&
+					      nf_ct_zone_equal(ct, zone, IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL))
 				continue;
 
 			NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC(net, found);
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 28/49] h8300: fix PREEMPTION build, TI_PRE_COUNT undefined

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit ade9679c159d5bbe14fb7e59e97daf6062872e2b ]

Fix a build error for undefined 'TI_PRE_COUNT' by adding it to
asm-offsets.c.

  h8300-linux-ld: arch/h8300/kernel/entry.o: in function `resume_kernel': (.text+0x29a): undefined reference to `TI_PRE_COUNT'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210212021650.22740-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: df2078b8daa7 ("h8300: Low level entry")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index dc2d16ce8a0d5..3e33a9844d99a 100644
--- a/arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/h8300/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ int main(void)
 	OFFSET(TI_FLAGS, thread_info, flags);
 	OFFSET(TI_CPU, thread_info, cpu);
 	OFFSET(TI_PRE, thread_info, preempt_count);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
+	DEFINE(TI_PRE_COUNT, offsetof(struct thread_info, preempt_count));
+#endif
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH 4.9 29/49] usb: dwc3: ulpi: fix checkpatch warning

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>

commit 2a499b45295206e7f3dc76edadde891c06cc4447 upstream

no functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 
 static int dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 {
-	unsigned count = 1000;
+	unsigned int count = 1000;
 	u32 reg;
 
 	while (count--) {

[PATCH 4.9 30/49] usb: dwc3: ulpi: Replace CPU-based busyloop with Protocol-based one

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru>

commit fca3f138105727c3a22edda32d02f91ce1bf11c9 upstream

Originally the procedure of the ULPI transaction finish detection has been
developed as a simple busy-loop with just decrementing counter and no
delays. It's wrong since on different systems the loop will take a
different time to complete. So if the system bus and CPU are fast enough
to overtake the ULPI bus and the companion PHY reaction, then we'll get to
take a false timeout error. Fix this by converting the busy-loop procedure
to take the standard bus speed, address value and the registers access
mode into account for the busy-loop delay calculation.

Here is the way the fix works. It's known that the ULPI bus is clocked
with 60MHz signal. In accordance with [1] the ULPI bus protocol is created
so to spend 5 and 6 clock periods for immediate register write and read
operations respectively, and 6 and 7 clock periods - for the extended
register writes and reads. Based on that we can easily pre-calculate the
time which will be needed for the controller to perform a requested IO
operation. Note we'll still preserve the attempts counter in case if the
DWC USB3 controller has got some internals delays.

[1] UTMI+ Low Pin Interface (ULPI) Specification, Revision 1.1,
    October 20, 2004, pp. 30 - 36.

Fixes: 88bc9d194ff6 ("usb: dwc3: add ULPI interface support")
Acked-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201210085008.13264-3-Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c |   18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/ulpi.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/time64.h>
 #include <linux/ulpi/regs.h>
 
 #include "core.h"
@@ -20,12 +22,22 @@
 		DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC_ADDR(ULPI_ACCESS_EXTENDED) | \
 		DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC_EXTEND_ADDR(a) : DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC_ADDR(a))
 
-static int dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(struct dwc3 *dwc)
+#define DWC3_ULPI_BASE_DELAY	DIV_ROUND_UP(NSEC_PER_SEC, 60000000L)
+
+static int dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(struct dwc3 *dwc, u8 addr, bool read)
 {
+	unsigned long ns = 5L * DWC3_ULPI_BASE_DELAY;
 	unsigned int count = 1000;
 	u32 reg;
 
+	if (addr >= ULPI_EXT_VENDOR_SPECIFIC)
+		ns += DWC3_ULPI_BASE_DELAY;
+
+	if (read)
+		ns += DWC3_ULPI_BASE_DELAY;
+
 	while (count--) {
+		ndelay(ns);
 		reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC(0));
 		if (!(reg & DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC_BUSY))
 			return 0;
@@ -44,7 +56,7 @@ static int dwc3_ulpi_read(struct device
 	reg = DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC_NEWREGREQ | DWC3_ULPI_ADDR(addr);
 	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC(0), reg);
 
-	ret = dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(dwc);
+	ret = dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(dwc, addr, true);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -62,7 +74,7 @@ static int dwc3_ulpi_write(struct device
 	reg |= DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC_WRITE | val;
 	dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYACC(0), reg);
 
-	return dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(dwc);
+	return dwc3_ulpi_busyloop(dwc, addr, false);
 }
 
 static const struct ulpi_ops dwc3_ulpi_ops = {

[PATCH 4.9 31/49] net/vmw_vsock: improve locking in vsock_connect_timeout()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>

commit 3d0bc44d39bca615b72637e340317b7899b7f911 upstream.

A possible locking issue in vsock_connect_timeout() was recognized by
Eric Dumazet which might cause a null pointer dereference in
vsock_transport_cancel_pkt(). This patch assures that
vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() will be called within the lock, so a race
condition won't occur which could result in vsk->transport to be set to NULL.

Fixes: 380feae0def7 ("vsock: cancel packets when failing to connect")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/trinity-f8e0937a-cf0e-4d80-a76e-d9a958ba3ef1-1612535522360@3c-app-gmx-bap12
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
@@ -1121,7 +1121,6 @@ static void vsock_connect_timeout(struct
 {
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct vsock_sock *vsk;
-	int cancel = 0;
 
 	vsk = container_of(work, struct vsock_sock, connect_work.work);
 	sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
@@ -1132,11 +1131,9 @@ static void vsock_connect_timeout(struct
 		sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
 		sk->sk_err = ETIMEDOUT;
 		sk->sk_error_report(sk);
-		cancel = 1;
+		vsock_transport_cancel_pkt(vsk);
 	}
 	release_sock(sk);
-	if (cancel)
-		vsock_transport_cancel_pkt(vsk);
 
 	sock_put(sk);
 }

[PATCH 4.9 32/49] net: watchdog: hold device global xmit lock during tx disable

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>

commit 3aa6bce9af0e25b735c9c1263739a5639a336ae8 upstream.

Prevent netif_tx_disable() running concurrently with dev_watchdog() by
taking the device global xmit lock. Otherwise, the recommended:

	netif_carrier_off(dev);
	netif_tx_disable(dev);

driver shutdown sequence can happen after the watchdog has already
checked carrier, resulting in possible false alarms. This is because
netif_tx_lock() only sets the frozen bit without maintaining the locks
on the individual queues.

Fixes: c3f26a269c24 ("netdev: Fix lockdep warnings in multiqueue configurations.")
Signed-off-by: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/netdevice.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
@@ -3701,6 +3701,7 @@ static inline void netif_tx_disable(stru
 
 	local_bh_disable();
 	cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	spin_lock(&dev->tx_global_lock);
 	for (i = 0; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) {
 		struct netdev_queue *txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i);
 
@@ -3708,6 +3709,7 @@ static inline void netif_tx_disable(stru
 		netif_tx_stop_queue(txq);
 		__netif_tx_unlock(txq);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&dev->tx_global_lock);
 	local_bh_enable();
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 33/49] vsock/virtio: update credit only if socket is not closed

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>

commit ce7536bc7398e2ae552d2fabb7e0e371a9f1fe46 upstream.

If the socket is closed or is being released, some resources used by
virtio_transport_space_update() such as 'vsk->trans' may be released.

To avoid a use after free bug we should only update the available credit
when we are sure the socket is still open and we have the lock held.

Fixes: 06a8fc78367d ("VSOCK: Introduce virtio_vsock_common.ko")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210208144454.84438-1-sgarzare@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c
@@ -959,10 +959,10 @@ void virtio_transport_recv_pkt(struct vi
 
 	vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
 
-	space_available = virtio_transport_space_update(sk, pkt);
-
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
+	space_available = virtio_transport_space_update(sk, pkt);
+
 	/* Update CID in case it has changed after a transport reset event */
 	vsk->local_addr.svm_cid = dst.svm_cid;
 

[PATCH 4.9 34/49] vsock: fix locking in vsock_shutdown()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>

commit 1c5fae9c9a092574398a17facc31c533791ef232 upstream.

In vsock_shutdown() we touched some socket fields without holding the
socket lock, such as 'state' and 'sk_flags'.

Also, after the introduction of multi-transport, we are accessing
'vsk->transport' in vsock_send_shutdown() without holding the lock
and this call can be made while the connection is in progress, so
the transport can change in the meantime.

To avoid issues, we hold the socket lock when we enter in
vsock_shutdown() and release it when we leave.

Among the transports that implement the 'shutdown' callback, only
hyperv_transport acquired the lock. Since the caller now holds it,
we no longer take it.

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
@@ -830,10 +830,12 @@ static int vsock_shutdown(struct socket
 	 */
 
 	sk = sock->sk;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED) {
 		err = -ENOTCONN;
 		if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
-			return err;
+			goto out;
 	} else {
 		sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING;
 		err = 0;
@@ -842,10 +844,8 @@ static int vsock_shutdown(struct socket
 	/* Receive and send shutdowns are treated alike. */
 	mode = mode & (RCV_SHUTDOWN | SEND_SHUTDOWN);
 	if (mode) {
-		lock_sock(sk);
 		sk->sk_shutdown |= mode;
 		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
-		release_sock(sk);
 
 		if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) {
 			sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
@@ -853,6 +853,8 @@ static int vsock_shutdown(struct socket
 		}
 	}
 
+out:
+	release_sock(sk);
 	return err;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 35/49] x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel for 32-bit too

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit 256b92af784d5043eeb7d559b6d5963dcc2ecb10 upstream.

Commit

  20bf2b378729 ("x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel")

disabled CET instrumentation which gets added by default by the Ubuntu
gcc9 and 10 by default, but did that only for 64-bit builds. It would
still fail when building a 32-bit target. So disable CET for all x86
builds.

Fixes: 20bf2b378729 ("x86/build: Disable CET instrumentation in the kernel")
Reported-by: AC <achirvasub@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: AC <achirvasub@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YCCIgMHkzh/xT4ex@arch-chirva.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/Makefile |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ endif
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-sse -mno-mmx -mno-sse2 -mno-3dnow
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mno-avx,)
 
+# Intel CET isn't enabled in the kernel
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
+
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y)
         BITS := 32
         UTS_MACHINE := i386
@@ -137,9 +140,6 @@ else
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-red-zone
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mcmodel=kernel
 
-	# Intel CET isn't enabled in the kernel
-	KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
-
         # -funit-at-a-time shrinks the kernel .text considerably
         # unfortunately it makes reading oopses harder.
         KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-funit-at-a-time)

[PATCH 4.9 36/49] trace: Use -mcount-record for dynamic ftrace

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

commit 96f60dfa5819a065bfdd2f2ba0df7d9cbce7f4dd upstream.

gcc 5 supports a new -mcount-record option to generate ftrace
tables directly. This avoids the need to run record_mcount
manually.

Use this option when available.

So far doesn't use -mcount-nop, which also exists now.

This is needed to make ftrace work with LTO because the
normal record-mcount script doesn't run over the link
time output.

It should also improve build times slightly in the general
case.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127213423.27218-12-andi@firstfloor.org

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 scripts/Makefile.build |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/scripts/Makefile.build
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ cmd_modversions_c =								\
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
+# gcc 5 supports generating the mcount tables directly
+ifneq ($(call cc-option,-mrecord-mcount,y),y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mrecord-mcount
+else
+# else do it all manually
 ifdef BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT
 ifeq ("$(origin RECORDMCOUNT_WARN)", "command line")
   RECORDMCOUNT_FLAGS = -w
@@ -264,6 +269,7 @@ endif
 ifdef CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL
 objtool_args += --no-unreachable
 endif
+endif
 
 # 'OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y': skip objtool checking for a directory
 # 'OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_foo.o := 'y': skip objtool checking for a file

[PATCH 4.9 37/49] tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>

commit ed7d40bc67b8353c677b38c6cdddcdc310c0f452 upstream.

Non gcc-5 builds with CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y and
SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 fail.
Example output:
  /bin/sh: init/.tmp_main.o: Permission denied

commit 96f60dfa5819 ("trace: Use -mcount-record for dynamic ftrace"),
added a mismatched endif.  This causes cmd_objtool to get mistakenly
set.

Relocate endif to balance the newly added -record-mcount check.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180608214746.136554-1-gthelen@google.com

Fixes: 96f60dfa5819 ("trace: Use -mcount-record for dynamic ftrace")
Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 scripts/Makefile.build |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/scripts/Makefile.build
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ cmd_record_mcount =						\
 	     "$(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)" ]; then			\
 		$(sub_cmd_record_mcount)			\
 	fi;
+endif # -record-mcount
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
@@ -269,7 +270,6 @@ endif
 ifdef CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL
 objtool_args += --no-unreachable
 endif
-endif
 
 # 'OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y': skip objtool checking for a directory
 # 'OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_foo.o := 'y': skip objtool checking for a file

[PATCH 4.9 38/49] tracing: Avoid calling cc-option -mrecord-mcount for every Makefile

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>

commit 07d0408120216b60625c9a5b8012d1c3a907984d upstream.

Currently if CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD is enabled -mrecord-mcount
compiler flag support is tested for every Makefile.

Top 4 cc-option usages:
    511 -mrecord-mcount
     11  -fno-stack-protector
      9 -Wno-override-init
      2 -fsched-pressure

To address that move cc-option from scripts/Makefile.build to top Makefile
and export CC_USING_RECORD_MCOUNT to be used in original place.

While doing that also add -mrecord-mcount to CC_FLAGS_FTRACE (if gcc
actually supports it).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/patch-2.thread-aa7b8d.git-de935bace15a.your-ad-here.call-01533557518-ext-9465@work.hours

Acked-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Makefile               |    7 +++++++
 scripts/Makefile.build |    9 +++------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -762,6 +762,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 ifndef CC_FLAGS_FTRACE
 CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -pg
 endif
+ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
+  # gcc 5 supports generating the mcount tables directly
+  ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn,-mrecord-mcount),y)
+    CC_FLAGS_FTRACE	+= -mrecord-mcount
+    export CC_USING_RECORD_MCOUNT := 1
+  endif
+endif
 export CC_FLAGS_FTRACE
 ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_FENTRY
 CC_USING_FENTRY	:= $(call cc-option, -mfentry -DCC_USING_FENTRY)
--- a/scripts/Makefile.build
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.build
@@ -222,11 +222,8 @@ cmd_modversions_c =								\
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
-# gcc 5 supports generating the mcount tables directly
-ifneq ($(call cc-option,-mrecord-mcount,y),y)
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mrecord-mcount
-else
-# else do it all manually
+ifndef CC_USING_RECORD_MCOUNT
+# compiler will not generate __mcount_loc use recordmcount or recordmcount.pl
 ifdef BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT
 ifeq ("$(origin RECORDMCOUNT_WARN)", "command line")
   RECORDMCOUNT_FLAGS = -w
@@ -255,7 +252,7 @@ cmd_record_mcount =						\
 	     "$(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)" ]; then			\
 		$(sub_cmd_record_mcount)			\
 	fi;
-endif # -record-mcount
+endif # CC_USING_RECORD_MCOUNT
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION

[PATCH 4.9 39/49] Xen/x86: dont bail early from clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit a35f2ef3b7376bfd0a57f7844bd7454389aae1fc upstream.

Its sibling (set_foreign_p2m_mapping()) as well as the sibling of its
only caller (gnttab_map_refs()) don't clean up after themselves in case
of error. Higher level callers are expected to do so. However, in order
for that to really clean up any partially set up state, the operation
should not terminate upon encountering an entry in unexpected state. It
is particularly relevant to notice here that set_foreign_p2m_mapping()
would skip setting up a p2m entry if its grant mapping failed, but it
would continue to set up further p2m entries as long as their mappings
succeeded.

Arguably down the road set_foreign_p2m_mapping() may want its page state
related WARN_ON() also converted to an error return.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/xen/p2m.c |   12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
@@ -763,17 +763,15 @@ int clear_foreign_p2m_mapping(struct gnt
 		unsigned long mfn = __pfn_to_mfn(page_to_pfn(pages[i]));
 		unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(pages[i]);
 
-		if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY || !(mfn & FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT)) {
+		if (mfn != INVALID_P2M_ENTRY && (mfn & FOREIGN_FRAME_BIT))
+			set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY);
+		else
 			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
-		set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY);
 	}
 	if (kunmap_ops)
 		ret = HYPERVISOR_grant_table_op(GNTTABOP_unmap_grant_ref,
-						kunmap_ops, count);
-out:
+						kunmap_ops, count) ?: ret;
+
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clear_foreign_p2m_mapping);

[PATCH 4.9 40/49] Xen/x86: also check kernel mapping in set_foreign_p2m_mapping()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit b512e1b077e5ccdbd6e225b15d934ab12453b70a upstream.

We should not set up further state if either mapping failed; paying
attention to just the user mapping's status isn't enough.

Also use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/xen/p2m.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/p2m.c
@@ -725,7 +725,8 @@ int set_foreign_p2m_mapping(struct gntta
 		unsigned long mfn, pfn;
 
 		/* Do not add to override if the map failed. */
-		if (map_ops[i].status)
+		if (map_ops[i].status != GNTST_okay ||
+		    (kmap_ops && kmap_ops[i].status != GNTST_okay))
 			continue;
 
 		if (map_ops[i].flags & GNTMAP_contains_pte) {

[PATCH 4.9 41/49] Xen/gntdev: correct dev_bus_addr handling in gntdev_map_grant_pages()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit dbe5283605b3bc12ca45def09cc721a0a5c853a2 upstream.

We may not skip setting the field in the unmap structure when
GNTMAP_device_map is in use - such an unmap would fail to release the
respective resources (a page ref in the hypervisor). Otoh the field
doesn't need setting at all when GNTMAP_device_map is not in use.

To record the value for unmapping, we also better don't use our local
p2m: In particular after a subsequent change it may not have got updated
for all the batch elements. Instead it can simply be taken from the
respective map's results.

We can additionally avoid playing this game altogether for the kernel
part of the mappings in (x86) PV mode.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/xen/gntdev.c |   16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
@@ -293,18 +293,25 @@ static int map_grant_pages(struct grant_
 		 * to the kernel linear addresses of the struct pages.
 		 * These ptes are completely different from the user ptes dealt
 		 * with find_grant_ptes.
+		 * Note that GNTMAP_device_map isn't needed here: The
+		 * dev_bus_addr output field gets consumed only from ->map_ops,
+		 * and by not requesting it when mapping we also avoid needing
+		 * to mirror dev_bus_addr into ->unmap_ops (and holding an extra
+		 * reference to the page in the hypervisor).
 		 */
+		unsigned int flags = (map->flags & ~GNTMAP_device_map) |
+				     GNTMAP_host_map;
+
 		for (i = 0; i < map->count; i++) {
 			unsigned long address = (unsigned long)
 				pfn_to_kaddr(page_to_pfn(map->pages[i]));
 			BUG_ON(PageHighMem(map->pages[i]));
 
-			gnttab_set_map_op(&map->kmap_ops[i], address,
-				map->flags | GNTMAP_host_map,
+			gnttab_set_map_op(&map->kmap_ops[i], address, flags,
 				map->grants[i].ref,
 				map->grants[i].domid);
 			gnttab_set_unmap_op(&map->kunmap_ops[i], address,
-				map->flags | GNTMAP_host_map, -1);
+				flags, -1);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -320,6 +327,9 @@ static int map_grant_pages(struct grant_
 			continue;
 		}
 
+		if (map->flags & GNTMAP_device_map)
+			map->unmap_ops[i].dev_bus_addr = map->map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr;
+
 		map->unmap_ops[i].handle = map->map_ops[i].handle;
 		if (use_ptemod)
 			map->kunmap_ops[i].handle = map->kmap_ops[i].handle;

[PATCH 4.9 42/49] Xen/gntdev: correct error checking in gntdev_map_grant_pages()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit ebee0eab08594b2bd5db716288a4f1ae5936e9bc upstream.

Failure of the kernel part of the mapping operation should also be
indicated as an error to the caller, or else it may assume the
respective kernel VA is okay to access.

Furthermore gnttab_map_refs() failing still requires recording
successfully mapped handles, so they can be unmapped subsequently. This
in turn requires there to be a way to tell full hypercall failure from
partial success - preset map_op status fields such that they won't
"happen" to look as if the operation succeeded.

Also again use GNTST_okay instead of implying its value (zero).

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/xen/gntdev.c      |   17 +++++++++--------
 include/xen/grant_table.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
@@ -318,21 +318,22 @@ static int map_grant_pages(struct grant_
 	pr_debug("map %d+%d\n", map->index, map->count);
 	err = gnttab_map_refs(map->map_ops, use_ptemod ? map->kmap_ops : NULL,
 			map->pages, map->count);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < map->count; i++) {
-		if (map->map_ops[i].status) {
+		if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay)
+			map->unmap_ops[i].handle = map->map_ops[i].handle;
+		else if (!err)
 			err = -EINVAL;
-			continue;
-		}
 
 		if (map->flags & GNTMAP_device_map)
 			map->unmap_ops[i].dev_bus_addr = map->map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr;
 
-		map->unmap_ops[i].handle = map->map_ops[i].handle;
-		if (use_ptemod)
-			map->kunmap_ops[i].handle = map->kmap_ops[i].handle;
+		if (use_ptemod) {
+			if (map->kmap_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay)
+				map->kunmap_ops[i].handle = map->kmap_ops[i].handle;
+			else if (!err)
+				err = -EINVAL;
+		}
 	}
 	return err;
 }
--- a/include/xen/grant_table.h
+++ b/include/xen/grant_table.h
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ gnttab_set_map_op(struct gnttab_map_gran
 	map->flags = flags;
 	map->ref = ref;
 	map->dom = domid;
+	map->status = 1; /* arbitrary positive value */
 }
 
 static inline void

[PATCH 4.9 43/49] xen/arm: dont ignore return errors from set_phys_to_machine

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>

commit 36bf1dfb8b266e089afa9b7b984217f17027bf35 upstream.

set_phys_to_machine can fail due to lack of memory, see the kzalloc call
in arch/arm/xen/p2m.c:__set_phys_to_machine_multi.

Don't ignore the potential return error in set_foreign_p2m_mapping,
returning it to the caller instead.

This is part of XSA-361.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/xen/p2m.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c
+++ b/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c
@@ -93,8 +93,10 @@ int set_foreign_p2m_mapping(struct gntta
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		if (map_ops[i].status)
 			continue;
-		set_phys_to_machine(map_ops[i].host_addr >> XEN_PAGE_SHIFT,
-				    map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr >> XEN_PAGE_SHIFT);
+		if (unlikely(!set_phys_to_machine(map_ops[i].host_addr >> XEN_PAGE_SHIFT,
+				    map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr >> XEN_PAGE_SHIFT))) {
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 4.9 44/49] xen-blkback: dont "handle" error by BUG()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit 5a264285ed1cd32e26d9de4f3c8c6855e467fd63 upstream.

In particular -ENOMEM may come back here, from set_foreign_p2m_mapping().
Don't make problems worse, the more that handling elsewhere (together
with map's status fields now indicating whether a mapping wasn't even
attempted, and hence has to be considered failed) doesn't require this
odd way of dealing with errors.

This is part of XSA-362.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
@@ -860,10 +860,8 @@ again:
 			break;
 	}
 
-	if (segs_to_map) {
+	if (segs_to_map)
 		ret = gnttab_map_refs(map, NULL, pages_to_gnt, segs_to_map);
-		BUG_ON(ret);
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Now swizzle the MFN in our domain with the MFN from the other domain
@@ -878,7 +876,7 @@ again:
 				pr_debug("invalid buffer -- could not remap it\n");
 				put_free_pages(ring, &pages[seg_idx]->page, 1);
 				pages[seg_idx]->handle = BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-				ret |= 1;
+				ret |= !ret;
 				goto next;
 			}
 			pages[seg_idx]->handle = map[new_map_idx].handle;

[PATCH 4.9 45/49] xen-netback: dont "handle" error by BUG()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit 3194a1746e8aabe86075fd3c5e7cf1f4632d7f16 upstream.

In particular -ENOMEM may come back here, from set_foreign_p2m_mapping().
Don't make problems worse, the more that handling elsewhere (together
with map's status fields now indicating whether a mapping wasn't even
attempted, and hence has to be considered failed) doesn't require this
odd way of dealing with errors.

This is part of XSA-362.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -1328,13 +1328,11 @@ int xenvif_tx_action(struct xenvif_queue
 		return 0;
 
 	gnttab_batch_copy(queue->tx_copy_ops, nr_cops);
-	if (nr_mops != 0) {
+	if (nr_mops != 0)
 		ret = gnttab_map_refs(queue->tx_map_ops,
 				      NULL,
 				      queue->pages_to_map,
 				      nr_mops);
-		BUG_ON(ret);
-	}
 
 	work_done = xenvif_tx_submit(queue);
 

[PATCH 4.9 46/49] xen-scsiback: dont "handle" error by BUG()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit 7c77474b2d22176d2bfb592ec74e0f2cb71352c9 upstream.

In particular -ENOMEM may come back here, from set_foreign_p2m_mapping().
Don't make problems worse, the more that handling elsewhere (together
with map's status fields now indicating whether a mapping wasn't even
attempted, and hence has to be considered failed) doesn't require this
odd way of dealing with errors.

This is part of XSA-362.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
@@ -423,12 +423,12 @@ static int scsiback_gnttab_data_map_batc
 		return 0;
 
 	err = gnttab_map_refs(map, NULL, pg, cnt);
-	BUG_ON(err);
 	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
 		if (unlikely(map[i].status != GNTST_okay)) {
 			pr_err("invalid buffer -- could not remap it\n");
 			map[i].handle = SCSIBACK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-			err = -ENOMEM;
+			if (!err)
+				err = -ENOMEM;
 		} else {
 			get_page(pg[i]);
 		}

[PATCH 4.9 47/49] xen-blkback: fix error handling in xen_blkbk_map()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

commit 871997bc9e423f05c7da7c9178e62dde5df2a7f8 upstream.

The function uses a goto-based loop, which may lead to an earlier error
getting discarded by a later iteration. Exit this ad-hoc loop when an
error was encountered.

The out-of-memory error path additionally fails to fill a structure
field looked at by xen_blkbk_unmap_prepare() before inspecting the
handle which does get properly set (to BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE).

Since the earlier exiting from the ad-hoc loop requires the same field
filling (invalidation) as that on the out-of-memory path, fold both
paths. While doing so, drop the pr_alert(), as extra log messages aren't
going to help the situation (the kernel will log oom conditions already
anyway).

This is XSA-365.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c |   24 ++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
@@ -843,8 +843,11 @@ again:
 			pages[i]->page = persistent_gnt->page;
 			pages[i]->persistent_gnt = persistent_gnt;
 		} else {
-			if (get_free_page(ring, &pages[i]->page))
-				goto out_of_memory;
+			if (get_free_page(ring, &pages[i]->page)) {
+				put_free_pages(ring, pages_to_gnt, segs_to_map);
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
 			addr = vaddr(pages[i]->page);
 			pages_to_gnt[segs_to_map] = pages[i]->page;
 			pages[i]->persistent_gnt = NULL;
@@ -928,17 +931,18 @@ next:
 	}
 	segs_to_map = 0;
 	last_map = map_until;
-	if (map_until != num)
+	if (!ret && map_until != num)
 		goto again;
 
-	return ret;
-
-out_of_memory:
-	pr_alert("%s: out of memory\n", __func__);
-	put_free_pages(ring, pages_to_gnt, segs_to_map);
-	for (i = last_map; i < num; i++)
+out:
+	for (i = last_map; i < num; i++) {
+		/* Don't zap current batch's valid persistent grants. */
+		if(i >= last_map + segs_to_map)
+			pages[i]->persistent_gnt = NULL;
 		pages[i]->handle = BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int xen_blkbk_map_seg(struct pending_req *pending_req)

[PATCH 4.9 48/49] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix crash during driver load on big endian machines

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>

commit 8de309e7299a00b3045fb274f82b326f356404f0 upstream

Crash stack:
	[576544.715489] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xd00000000f970000
	[576544.715497] Faulting instruction address: 0xd00000000f880f64
	[576544.715503] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
	[576544.715506] SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
	:
	[576544.715703] NIP [d00000000f880f64] .qla27xx_fwdt_template_valid+0x94/0x100 [qla2xxx]
	[576544.715722] LR [d00000000f7952dc] .qla24xx_load_risc_flash+0x2fc/0x590 [qla2xxx]
	[576544.715726] Call Trace:
	[576544.715731] [c0000004d0ffb000] [c0000006fe02c350] 0xc0000006fe02c350 (unreliable)
	[576544.715750] [c0000004d0ffb080] [d00000000f7952dc] .qla24xx_load_risc_flash+0x2fc/0x590 [qla2xxx]
	[576544.715770] [c0000004d0ffb170] [d00000000f7aa034] .qla81xx_load_risc+0x84/0x1a0 [qla2xxx]
	[576544.715789] [c0000004d0ffb210] [d00000000f79f7c8] .qla2x00_setup_chip+0xc8/0x910 [qla2xxx]
	[576544.715808] [c0000004d0ffb300] [d00000000f7a631c] .qla2x00_initialize_adapter+0x4dc/0xb00 [qla2xxx]
	[576544.715826] [c0000004d0ffb3e0] [d00000000f78ce28] .qla2x00_probe_one+0xf08/0x2200 [qla2xxx]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201202132312.19966-8-njavali@marvell.com
Fixes: f73cb695d3ec ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add support for ISP2071.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.c |    9 +++++----
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.h |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.c
@@ -878,7 +878,8 @@ qla27xx_template_checksum(void *p, ulong
 static inline int
 qla27xx_verify_template_checksum(struct qla27xx_fwdt_template *tmp)
 {
-	return qla27xx_template_checksum(tmp, tmp->template_size) == 0;
+	return qla27xx_template_checksum(tmp,
+		le32_to_cpu(tmp->template_size)) == 0;
 }
 
 static inline int
@@ -894,7 +895,7 @@ qla27xx_execute_fwdt_template(struct scs
 	ulong len;
 
 	if (qla27xx_fwdt_template_valid(tmp)) {
-		len = tmp->template_size;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(tmp->template_size);
 		tmp = memcpy(vha->hw->fw_dump, tmp, len);
 		ql27xx_edit_template(vha, tmp);
 		qla27xx_walk_template(vha, tmp, tmp, &len);
@@ -910,7 +911,7 @@ qla27xx_fwdt_calculate_dump_size(struct
 	ulong len = 0;
 
 	if (qla27xx_fwdt_template_valid(tmp)) {
-		len = tmp->template_size;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(tmp->template_size);
 		qla27xx_walk_template(vha, tmp, NULL, &len);
 	}
 
@@ -922,7 +923,7 @@ qla27xx_fwdt_template_size(void *p)
 {
 	struct qla27xx_fwdt_template *tmp = p;
 
-	return tmp->template_size;
+	return le32_to_cpu(tmp->template_size);
 }
 
 ulong
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_tmpl.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 struct __packed qla27xx_fwdt_template {
 	uint32_t template_type;
 	uint32_t entry_offset;
-	uint32_t template_size;
+	__le32 template_size;
 	uint32_t reserved_1;
 
 	uint32_t entry_count;

[PATCH 4.9 49/49] kvm: check tlbs_dirty directly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>

commit 88bf56d04bc3564542049ec4ec168a8b60d0b48c upstream

In kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(), tlbs_dirty is used as:
        need_tlb_flush |= kvm->tlbs_dirty;
with need_tlb_flush's type being int and tlbs_dirty's type being long.

It means that tlbs_dirty is always used as int and the higher 32 bits
is useless.  We need to check tlbs_dirty in a correct way and this
change checks it directly without propagating it to need_tlb_flush.

Note: it's _extremely_ unlikely this neglecting of higher 32 bits can
cause problems in practice.  It would require encountering tlbs_dirty
on a 4 billion count boundary, and KVM would need to be using shadow
paging or be running a nested guest.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a4ee1ca4a36e ("KVM: MMU: delay flush all tlbs on sync_page path")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <20201217154118.16497-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -382,9 +382,8 @@ static void kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_
 	 */
 	kvm->mmu_notifier_count++;
 	need_tlb_flush = kvm_unmap_hva_range(kvm, start, end);
-	need_tlb_flush |= kvm->tlbs_dirty;
 	/* we've to flush the tlb before the pages can be freed */
-	if (need_tlb_flush)
+	if (need_tlb_flush || kvm->tlbs_dirty)
 		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
 
 	spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[Florian Fainelli]

On 2/22/2021 4:35 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.258 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:07:46 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.258-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.

On ARCH_BRCMST, 32-bit and 64-bit ARM:

Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
-- 
Florian

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 01:35:58PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.258 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:07:46 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 168 pass: 168 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 383 pass: 383 fail: 0

Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Mon, 22 Feb 2021 at 18:11, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.258 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:07:46 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.258-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h


Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.9.258-rc1
git repo: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: f0cf73f13b3979117e50a90dc884d48c1738105a
git describe: v4.9.257-50-gf0cf73f13b39
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.9.y/build/v4.9.257-50-gf0cf73f13b39

No regressions (compared to build v4.9.257)

No fixes (compared to build v4.9.257)

Ran 39549 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- arm
- arm64
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-64k_page_size
- juno-r2 - arm64
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- mips
- qemu-arm64-kasan
- qemu-x86_64-kasan
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_arm64-compat
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- qemu_x86_64-compat
- sparc
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
- x86-kasan
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* linux-log-parser
* igt-gpu-tools
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-zram
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* perf
* v4l2-compliance
* fwts
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* network-basic-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-x86

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[Jon Hunter]

On Mon, 22 Feb 2021 13:35:58 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.258 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:07:46 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.258-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.9:
    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    30 tests:	30 pass, 0 fail

Linux version:	4.9.258-rc1-gf0cf73f13b39
Boards tested:	tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>

Jon

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/49] 4.9.258-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 2/22/21 5:35 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.258 release.
> There are 49 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 24 Feb 2021 12:07:46 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.258-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

thanks,
-- Shuah