* [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN
@ 2021-03-12 17:38 Vladimir Murzin
2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-12 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arm-kernel; +Cc: keescook, dave.martin, catalin.marinas, will
Hi
ARM architecture gains support of Enhanced Privileged Access Never
(EPAN) which allows Privileged Access Never to be used with
Execute-only mappings.
As a consequence 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert support for execute-only
user mappings") can be revisited and re-enabled.
Changelog:
RFC -> v1
- removed cap check in pte_valid_not_user (per Catalin)
- local_flush_tlb_all() in cpu_enable_epan() (per Catalin)
- reordered with CnP (per Catalin)
- s/HWCAP2_EPAN/HWCAP2_EXECONLY/ (per Catalin)
v1 -> v2
- rebased on for-next/uaccess (for INIT_SCTLR_EL1_MMU_ON)
- moved EPAN enable to proc.S (via INIT_SCTLR_EL1_MMU_ON),
so no need in enable method from cpufeature, no need to
keep ordering relative to CnP (per Catalin)
v2 -> v3
- rebased on 5.11-rc4
v3 -> v4
- rebased on 5.12-rc2
- restore comments around pte_valid_not_user and
protection_map[] (per Will)
- rework the vm_flags initialisation (per Will)
- moved logic of pte_valid_user() into pte_access_permitted()
(per Catalin)
Thanks!
Vladimir Murzin (2):
arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN
arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 ++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 5 +++--
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 4 +++-
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 15 +++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 18 +++++++++++++++-
mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++++
11 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.24.0
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN 2021-03-12 17:38 [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-12 17:38 ` Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-25 19:06 ` Will Deacon ` (2 more replies) 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-26 11:05 ` (subset) [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Catalin Marinas 2 siblings, 3 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-12 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-arm-kernel; +Cc: keescook, dave.martin, catalin.marinas, will Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged Access Never to be used with Execute-only mappings. Absence of such support was a reason for 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert support for execute-only user mappings"). Thus now it can be revisited and re-enabled. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 5 +++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 3 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 12 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 18 +++++++++++++++- mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++++ 8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 1f212b47a48a..bc0168768b1f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1060,6 +1060,9 @@ config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE def_bool y +config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT + def_bool y + config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK def_bool y if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 @@ -1683,6 +1686,20 @@ config ARM64_MTE endmenu +menu "ARMv8.7 architectural features" + +config ARM64_EPAN + bool "Enable support for Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN)" + default y + depends on ARM64_PAN + help + Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged + Access Never to be used with Execute-only mappings. + + The feature is detected at runtime, and will remain disabled + if the cpu does not implement the feature. +endmenu + config ARM64_SVE bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support" default y diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h index b77d997b173b..9e3ec4dd56d8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h @@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1508412 58 #define ARM64_HAS_LDAPR 59 #define ARM64_KVM_PROTECTED_MODE 60 +#define ARM64_HAS_EPAN 61 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 61 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 62 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h index 046be789fbb4..f91c2aa52489 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h @@ -88,12 +88,13 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings; #define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN) #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN) +#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN) #define __P000 PAGE_NONE #define __P001 PAGE_READONLY #define __P010 PAGE_READONLY #define __P011 PAGE_READONLY -#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC +#define __P100 PAGE_EXECONLY #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __P110 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __P111 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC @@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings; #define __S001 PAGE_READONLY #define __S010 PAGE_SHARED #define __S011 PAGE_SHARED -#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC +#define __S100 PAGE_EXECONLY #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index e17b96d0e4b5..4b92904f278c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -113,11 +113,12 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; #define pte_dirty(pte) (pte_sw_dirty(pte) || pte_hw_dirty(pte)) #define pte_valid(pte) (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_VALID)) +/* + * Execute-only user mappings do not have the PTE_USER bit set. All valid + * kernel mappings have the PTE_UXN bit set. + */ #define pte_valid_not_user(pte) \ - ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == PTE_VALID) -#define pte_valid_user(pte) \ - ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) - + ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER | PTE_UXN)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_UXN)) /* * Could the pte be present in the TLB? We must check mm_tlb_flush_pending * so that we don't erroneously return false for pages that have been @@ -130,12 +131,14 @@ extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; (mm_tlb_flush_pending(mm) ? pte_present(pte) : pte_valid(pte)) /* - * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (subject to the - * write permission check). PROT_NONE mappings do not have the PTE_VALID bit - * set. + * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER + * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only + * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits + * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the + * PTE_VALID bit set. */ #define pte_access_permitted(pte, write) \ - (pte_valid_user(pte) && (!(write) || pte_write(pte))) + (((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) && (!(write) || pte_write(pte))) #define pmd_access_permitted(pmd, write) \ (pte_access_permitted(pmd_pte(pmd), (write))) #define pud_access_permitted(pud, write) \ @@ -992,6 +995,18 @@ static inline bool arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte(void) } #define arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte +static inline pgprot_t arch_filter_pgprot(pgprot_t prot) +{ + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN)) + return prot; + + if (pgprot_val(prot) != pgprot_val(PAGE_EXECONLY)) + return prot; + + return PAGE_READONLY_EXEC; +} + + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_PGTABLE_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index dfd4edbfe360..817cb3dbcb79 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -597,6 +597,7 @@ (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL2) /* SCTLR_EL1 specific flags. */ +#define SCTLR_EL1_EPAN (BIT(57)) #define SCTLR_EL1_ATA0 (BIT(42)) #define SCTLR_EL1_TCF0_SHIFT 38 @@ -637,7 +638,7 @@ SCTLR_EL1_SED | SCTLR_ELx_I | SCTLR_EL1_DZE | SCTLR_EL1_UCT | \ SCTLR_EL1_NTWE | SCTLR_ELx_IESB | SCTLR_EL1_SPAN | SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB | \ SCTLR_ELx_ATA | SCTLR_EL1_ATA0 | ENDIAN_SET_EL1 | SCTLR_EL1_UCI | \ - SCTLR_EL1_RES1) + SCTLR_EL1_EPAN | SCTLR_EL1_RES1) /* MAIR_ELx memory attributes (used by Linux) */ #define MAIR_ATTR_DEVICE_nGnRnE UL(0x00) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 066030717a4c..2ab04967dca7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -1821,6 +1821,18 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_pan, }, #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PAN */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_EPAN + { + .desc = "Enhanced Privileged Access Never", + .capability = ARM64_HAS_EPAN, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, + .field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT, + .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, + .min_field_value = 3, + }, +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_EPAN */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS { .desc = "LSE atomic instructions", diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index c516f3a6dd4e..0635b70bbf78 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, const struct fault_info *inf; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; vm_fault_t fault; - unsigned long vm_flags = VM_ACCESS_FLAGS; + unsigned long vm_flags; unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT; unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far); @@ -544,12 +544,28 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, if (user_mode(regs)) mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER; + /* + * vm_flags tells us what bits we must have in vma->vm_flags + * for the fault to be benign, __do_page_fault() would check + * vma->vm_flags & vm_flags and returns an error if the + * intersection is empty + */ if (is_el0_instruction_abort(esr)) { + /* It was exec fault */ vm_flags = VM_EXEC; mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION; } else if (is_write_abort(esr)) { + /* It was write fault */ vm_flags = VM_WRITE; mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; + } else { + /* It was read fault */ + vm_flags = VM_READ; + /* Write implies read */ + vm_flags |= VM_WRITE; + /* If EPAN is absent then exec implies read */ + if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN)) + vm_flags |= VM_EXEC; } if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr) && is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) { diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 3f287599a7a3..1d96a21acb2f 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm, * MAP_PRIVATE r: (no) no r: (yes) yes r: (no) yes r: (no) yes * w: (no) no w: (no) no w: (copy) copy w: (no) no * x: (no) no x: (no) yes x: (no) yes x: (yes) yes + * + * On arm64, PROT_EXEC has the following behaviour for both MAP_SHARED and + * MAP_PRIVATE (with Enhanced PAN supported): + * r: (no) no + * w: (no) no + * x: (yes) yes */ pgprot_t protection_map[16] __ro_after_init = { __P000, __P001, __P010, __P011, __P100, __P101, __P110, __P111, -- 2.24.0 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-25 19:06 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 11:04 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-30 8:47 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Will Deacon @ 2021-03-25 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Murzin; +Cc: linux-arm-kernel, keescook, dave.martin, catalin.marinas On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 05:38:10PM +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote: > Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged Access Never > to be used with Execute-only mappings. > > Absence of such support was a reason for 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert > support for execute-only user mappings"). Thus now it can be revisited > and re-enabled. > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> > --- > arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++ > arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 ++- > arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 5 +++-- > arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++------- > arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 3 ++- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 12 +++++++++++ > arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 18 +++++++++++++++- > mm/mmap.c | 6 ++++++ > 8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Will _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-25 19:06 ` Will Deacon @ 2021-03-26 11:04 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-30 8:47 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-26 11:04 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Murzin; +Cc: linux-arm-kernel, keescook, dave.martin, will On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 05:38:10PM +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote: > @@ -992,6 +995,18 @@ static inline bool arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte(void) > } > #define arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte arch_wants_old_prefaulted_pte > > +static inline pgprot_t arch_filter_pgprot(pgprot_t prot) > +{ > + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN)) > + return prot; > + > + if (pgprot_val(prot) != pgprot_val(PAGE_EXECONLY)) > + return prot; > + > + return PAGE_READONLY_EXEC; > +} Just a thought: we could allow exec-only permissions if !system_uses_hw_pan(), though not sure it's worth it. We'd have 8.0 CPUs with exec-only then a gap up to 8.7 when we add it back in (since most kernels will turn PAN on). -- Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-25 19:06 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 11:04 ` Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-30 8:47 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2021-03-30 9:30 ` Catalin Marinas 2 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2021-03-30 8:47 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Murzin Cc: Linux ARM, Kees Cook, Dave Martin, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon Hi Vladimir, On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 6:47 PM Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> wrote: > Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged Access Never > to be used with Execute-only mappings. > > Absence of such support was a reason for 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert > support for execute-only user mappings"). Thus now it can be revisited > and re-enabled. > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> Thanks for your patch, which is now commit 18107f8a2df6bf1c ("arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN") in arm64/for-next. > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > @@ -1060,6 +1060,9 @@ config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE > config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE > def_bool y > > +config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT > + def_bool y > + > config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK > def_bool y if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 > > @@ -1683,6 +1686,20 @@ config ARM64_MTE > > endmenu > > +menu "ARMv8.7 architectural features" > + > +config ARM64_EPAN > + bool "Enable support for Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN)" > + default y > + depends on ARM64_PAN > + help > + Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged > + Access Never to be used with Execute-only mappings. Does EPAN require more hardware support than PAN, which is part of the ARMv8.1 Extensions according to the help text for ARM64_PAN? If yes, it is a good idea to document that here, so people know if it makes sense to enable this option for their hardware. Thanks! > + > + The feature is detected at runtime, and will remain disabled > + if the cpu does not implement the feature. > +endmenu > + Gr{oetje,eeting}s, Geert -- Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@linux-m68k.org In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that. -- Linus Torvalds _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN 2021-03-30 8:47 ` Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2021-03-30 9:30 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-30 9:34 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-30 9:30 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: Vladimir Murzin, Linux ARM, Kees Cook, Dave Martin, Will Deacon On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 10:47:31AM +0200, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote: > On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 6:47 PM Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> wrote: > > Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged Access Never > > to be used with Execute-only mappings. > > > > Absence of such support was a reason for 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert > > support for execute-only user mappings"). Thus now it can be revisited > > and re-enabled. > > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> > > Thanks for your patch, which is now commit 18107f8a2df6bf1c ("arm64: > Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN") in arm64/for-next. > > > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > > @@ -1060,6 +1060,9 @@ config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE > > config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE > > def_bool y > > > > +config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT > > + def_bool y > > + > > config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK > > def_bool y if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 > > > > @@ -1683,6 +1686,20 @@ config ARM64_MTE > > > > endmenu > > > > +menu "ARMv8.7 architectural features" > > + > > +config ARM64_EPAN > > + bool "Enable support for Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN)" > > + default y > > + depends on ARM64_PAN > > + help > > + Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged > > + Access Never to be used with Execute-only mappings. > > Does EPAN require more hardware support than PAN, which is part of the > ARMv8.1 Extensions according to the help text for ARM64_PAN? > If yes, it is a good idea to document that here, so people know if it > makes sense to enable this option for their hardware. The ARM64_EPAN option is under the "ARMv8.7 architectural features" as it's a new CPU feature (same as PAN but also works on exec-only user mappings). We could expand this text a bit to include ARMv8.7 as we do for ARM64_PAN, if that's what you meant. -- Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN 2021-03-30 9:30 ` Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-30 9:34 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2021-03-30 9:34 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Catalin Marinas Cc: Vladimir Murzin, Linux ARM, Kees Cook, Dave Martin, Will Deacon Hi Catalin, On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 11:30 AM Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote: > On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 10:47:31AM +0200, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 6:47 PM Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> wrote: > > > Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged Access Never > > > to be used with Execute-only mappings. > > > > > > Absence of such support was a reason for 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert > > > support for execute-only user mappings"). Thus now it can be revisited > > > and re-enabled. > > > > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > > > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> > > > > Thanks for your patch, which is now commit 18107f8a2df6bf1c ("arm64: > > Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN") in arm64/for-next. > > > > > --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig > > > +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig > > > @@ -1060,6 +1060,9 @@ config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE > > > config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE > > > def_bool y > > > > > > +config ARCH_HAS_FILTER_PGPROT > > > + def_bool y > > > + > > > config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK > > > def_bool y if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 > > > > > > @@ -1683,6 +1686,20 @@ config ARM64_MTE > > > > > > endmenu > > > > > > +menu "ARMv8.7 architectural features" > > > + > > > +config ARM64_EPAN > > > + bool "Enable support for Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN)" > > > + default y > > > + depends on ARM64_PAN > > > + help > > > + Enhanced Privileged Access Never (EPAN) allows Privileged > > > + Access Never to be used with Execute-only mappings. > > > > Does EPAN require more hardware support than PAN, which is part of the > > ARMv8.1 Extensions according to the help text for ARM64_PAN? > > If yes, it is a good idea to document that here, so people know if it > > makes sense to enable this option for their hardware. > > The ARM64_EPAN option is under the "ARMv8.7 architectural features" as > it's a new CPU feature (same as PAN but also works on exec-only user > mappings). We could expand this text a bit to include ARMv8.7 as we do > for ARM64_PAN, if that's what you meant. Thank you, I completely missed that menu header when running "make oldconfig". Sorry for the noise. Gr{oetje,eeting}s, Geert -- Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@linux-m68k.org In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that. -- Linus Torvalds _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY 2021-03-12 17:38 [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-12 17:38 ` Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-25 19:00 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 11:05 ` (subset) [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Catalin Marinas 2 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-12 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-arm-kernel; +Cc: keescook, dave.martin, catalin.marinas, will With EPAN supported it might be handy to user know that PROT_EXEC gives execute-only permission, so advertise it via HWCAPS2_EXECONLY Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h index 9a5498c2c8ee..5ee5bce79233 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ #define KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG __khwcap2_feature(RNG) #define KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI __khwcap2_feature(BTI) #define KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE __khwcap2_feature(MTE) +#define KERNEL_HWCAP_EXECONLY __khwcap2_feature(EXECONLY) /* * This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 817cb3dbcb79..7421139dc44f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -817,6 +817,7 @@ #define ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_8 0 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_16 2 +#define ID_AA64MMFR1_EPAN 3 /* id_aa64mmfr2 */ #define ID_AA64MMFR2_E0PD_SHIFT 60 diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h index b8f41aa234ee..61471f47db32 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h @@ -75,5 +75,6 @@ #define HWCAP2_RNG (1 << 16) #define HWCAP2_BTI (1 << 17) #define HWCAP2_MTE (1 << 18) +#define HWCAP2_EXECONLY (1 << 19) #endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 2ab04967dca7..a49bccb80873 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, ID_AA64PFR1_MTE, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE), #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_EPAN + HWCAP_CAP(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT, FTR_UNSIGNED, ID_AA64MMFR1_EPAN, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_EXECONLY), +#endif {}, }; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c index 77605aec25fe..34c98d984fe3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = { [KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG] = "rng", [KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI] = "bti", [KERNEL_HWCAP_MTE] = "mte", + [KERNEL_HWCAP_EXECONLY] = "xo", }; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -- 2.24.0 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-25 19:00 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 9:35 ` Catalin Marinas 0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Will Deacon @ 2021-03-25 19:00 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Murzin; +Cc: linux-arm-kernel, keescook, dave.martin, catalin.marinas On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 05:38:11PM +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote: > With EPAN supported it might be handy to user know that PROT_EXEC > gives execute-only permission, so advertise it via HWCAPS2_EXECONLY > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> > --- > arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + > arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + > arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +++ > arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + > 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+) I still don't see the need for this patch. Can we avoid merging it until somebody has a use for it, please? Will _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY 2021-03-25 19:00 ` Will Deacon @ 2021-03-26 9:35 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-29 8:53 ` Will Deacon 0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread From: Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-26 9:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Will Deacon; +Cc: Vladimir Murzin, linux-arm-kernel, keescook, dave.martin On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 07:00:00PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote: > On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 05:38:11PM +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote: > > With EPAN supported it might be handy to user know that PROT_EXEC > > gives execute-only permission, so advertise it via HWCAPS2_EXECONLY > > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> > > --- > > arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + > > arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + > > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + > > arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +++ > > arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + > > 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+) > > I still don't see the need for this patch. Can we avoid merging it until > somebody has a use for it, please? It's more about telling user-space that the feature is present though we didn't do this last time we had exec-only permissions either. I was hoping we can do better this time. OTOH, probably no-one will check for this HWCAP anyway, so let's wait until someone asks for it. -- Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY 2021-03-26 9:35 ` Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-29 8:53 ` Will Deacon 0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Will Deacon @ 2021-03-29 8:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Catalin Marinas; +Cc: Vladimir Murzin, linux-arm-kernel, keescook, dave.martin On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 09:35:53AM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote: > On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 07:00:00PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 05:38:11PM +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote: > > > With EPAN supported it might be handy to user know that PROT_EXEC > > > gives execute-only permission, so advertise it via HWCAPS2_EXECONLY > > > > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > > > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> > > > --- > > > arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + > > > arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 1 + > > > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + > > > arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +++ > > > arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + > > > 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+) > > > > I still don't see the need for this patch. Can we avoid merging it until > > somebody has a use for it, please? > > It's more about telling user-space that the feature is present though we > didn't do this last time we had exec-only permissions either. I was > hoping we can do better this time. OTOH, probably no-one will check for > this HWCAP anyway, so let's wait until someone asks for it. Yes, that's what I mean by "somebody has a use for it" -- I don't understand what userspace would do with this and it's certainly not using it now. Will _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: (subset) [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN 2021-03-12 17:38 [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY Vladimir Murzin @ 2021-03-26 11:05 ` Catalin Marinas 2 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread From: Catalin Marinas @ 2021-03-26 11:05 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Murzin, linux-arm-kernel; +Cc: Will Deacon, dave.martin, keescook On Fri, 12 Mar 2021 17:38:09 +0000, Vladimir Murzin wrote: > ARM architecture gains support of Enhanced Privileged Access Never > (EPAN) which allows Privileged Access Never to be used with > Execute-only mappings. > > As a consequence 24cecc377463 ("arm64: Revert support for execute-only > user mappings") can be revisited and re-enabled. > > [...] Applied to arm64 (for-next/epan), thanks! [1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with Enhanced PAN https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/18107f8a2df6 -- Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-03-30 9:37 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 12+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-03-12 17:38 [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Support execute-only permissions with " Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-25 19:06 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 11:04 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-30 8:47 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2021-03-30 9:30 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-30 9:34 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2021-03-12 17:38 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Introduce HWCAPS2_EXECONLY Vladimir Murzin 2021-03-25 19:00 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 9:35 ` Catalin Marinas 2021-03-29 8:53 ` Will Deacon 2021-03-26 11:05 ` (subset) [PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Support Enhanced PAN Catalin Marinas
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