* [PATCH v4 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support
@ 2021-05-12 6:59 Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
This patch series add the PE/COFF measurement support.
Extending PCR and Event Log is tested with fTPM
running as a OP-TEE TA.
Unit test will be added in the separate series.
Masahisa Kojima (3):
efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is
disabled
efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement
efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate()
include/efi_loader.h | 6 +
include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++
include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 14 ++
lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 123 +++++++++++++++---
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +---------
lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 +
9 files changed, 357 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 1/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-05-12 6:59 [PATCH v4 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() Masahisa Kojima 2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support. PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled. This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- Changes in v4: - revert #ifdef instead of using "if (!IS_ENABLED())" statement, not to rely on the compiler optimization. Changes in v3: - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option Changes in v2: - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++ lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +------------------------------ lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule @@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. @@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, at least, PK, KEK and db. +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT + bool + depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE + config EFI_ESRT bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation" depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o -obj-y += efi_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)) $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f53ef367ec..fe1ee198e2 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( } } -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +/** + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region + * @regs: Pointer to array of regions + * @start: Start address of region (included) + * @end: End address of region (excluded) + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions + * + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. + * + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. + * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. + * + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence + * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, + const void *start, const void *end, + int nocheck) +{ + struct image_region *reg; + int i, j; + + if (regs->num >= regs->max) { + EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + if (end < start) + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + if (nocheck) + continue; + + /* new data after registered region */ + if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) + continue; + + /* new data preceding registered region */ + if (end <= reg->data) { + for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) + memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], + sizeof(*reg)); + break; + } + + /* new data overlapping registered region */ + EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + reg->data = start; + reg->size = end - start; + regs->num++; + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + /** * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header @@ -422,6 +483,7 @@ err: return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT /** * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with * SHA256 hash diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { /* SEQUENCE */ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out: return !revoked; } -/** - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region - * @regs: Pointer to array of regions - * @start: Start address of region (included) - * @end: End address of region (excluded) - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions - * - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. - * - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. - * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. - * - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence - * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. - * - * Return: status code - */ -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, - const void *start, const void *end, - int nocheck) -{ - struct image_region *reg; - int i, j; - - if (regs->num >= regs->max) { - EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - } - - if (end < start) - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - - for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - if (nocheck) - continue; - - /* new data after registered region */ - if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) - continue; - - /* new data preceding registered region */ - if (end <= reg->data) { - for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) - memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], - sizeof(*reg)); - break; - } - - /* new data overlapping registered region */ - EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - } - - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - reg->data = start; - reg->size = end - start; - regs->num++; - - return EFI_SUCCESS; -} - /** * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store * @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type { const enum efi_auth_var_type type; }; +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; + static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK}, {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK}, -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 2/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-12 6:59 [PATCH v4 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 8:34 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() Masahisa Kojima 2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" requires to measure every attempt to load and execute a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, and appends measurement into Event Log. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- (no changes since v2) Changes in v2: - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path - Add function comment include/efi_loader.h | 6 + include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, const char *if_typename, int diskid, @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); + bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ +#include <efi_api.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { u8 event[]; } __packed; +struct uefi_image_load_event { + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; + u64 image_length_in_memory; + u64 image_link_time_address; + u64 length_of_device_path; + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; +}; + struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { u8 size; struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 --- a/include/tpm-v2.h +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) +/* + * event types, cf. + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 + */ +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) + /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ struct tpms_tagged_property { u32 property; diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) return 1; } +/** + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image + * + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. + * + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. + */ +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) +{ + size_t new_efi_size; + void *p; + + /* + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. + */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); + if (!p) + return NULL; + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); + *efi_size = new_efi_size; + *new_efi = p; + return p; + } else { + return efi; + } +} + /** * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image * @efi: Pointer to image @@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; void *new_efi = NULL; u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; + size_t auth_size; bool ret = false; EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); @@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true; - /* - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. - */ - if (efi_size & 0x7) { - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); - if (!new_efi) - return false; - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); - efi = new_efi; - efi_size = new_efi_size; - } + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return false; if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, &wincerts_len)) { @@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, goto err; } +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, + loaded_image_info)) + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); +#endif + /* Copy PE headers */ memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, sizeof(*dos) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c index 94e8f22bbb..7ad9cb2b89 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ #include <efi_loader.h> #include <efi_tcg2.h> #include <log.h> +#include <malloc.h> #include <version.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> +#include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha1.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> #include <u-boot/sha512.h> @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: return EFI_EXIT(ret); } +/** + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend + * + * Return: status code + */ +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) +{ + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; + size_t wincerts_len; + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; + void *new_efi = NULL; + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + efi_status_t ret; + u32 active; + int i; + + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, + &wincerts_len)) { + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + digest_list->count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; + + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) + continue; + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + default: + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); + digest_list->count++; + } + +out: + free(new_efi); + free(regs); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @handle: loaded image handle + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) +{ + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; + efi_status_t ret; + struct udevice *dev; + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; + struct efi_device_path *device_path; + u32 device_path_length; + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; + struct efi_handler *handler; + + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + switch (handle->image_type) { + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: + pcr_index = 4; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + default: + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, + &handler)); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); + if (device_path_length > 0) { + /* add end node size */ + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); + } + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); + if (!image_load_event) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; + + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; + + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else { + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + if (device_path_length > 0) { + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, + device_path_length); + } + + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); + +out: + free(image_load_event); + + return ret; +} + /** * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events * @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, /* * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature * Format" - * Not supported for now */ if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; - goto out; - } + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + (void **)&nt); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); + goto out; + } - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, - &digest_list); + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } else { + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 2/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 8:34 ` Ilias Apalodimas 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-05-12 8:34 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 03:59:46PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" > requires to measure every attempt to load and execute > a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. > This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, > and appends measurement into Event Log. > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > --- > > (no changes since v2) > > Changes in v2: > - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include > - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute > - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition > - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image > - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and > EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER > - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path > - Add function comment > > include/efi_loader.h | 6 + > include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ > include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ > lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- > lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 5 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h > index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 > --- a/include/efi_loader.h > +++ b/include/efi_loader.h > @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); > efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); > /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ > efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); > +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); > /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ > int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, > const char *if_typename, int diskid, > @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); > > bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); > + > bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h > index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 > --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h > +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > +#include <efi_api.h> > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ > @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { > u8 event[]; > } __packed; > > +struct uefi_image_load_event { > + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; > + u64 image_length_in_memory; > + u64 image_link_time_address; > + u64 length_of_device_path; > + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; > +}; > + > struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { > u8 size; > struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; > #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) > #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) > > +/* > + * event types, cf. > + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" > + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 > + */ > +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) > +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) > +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) > +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) > +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) > +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) > +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) > + > /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ > struct tpms_tagged_property { > u32 property; > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) > return 1; > } > > +/** > + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image > + * > + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates > + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. > + * > + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. > + */ > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) > +{ > + size_t new_efi_size; > + void *p; > + > + /* > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > + */ > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { > + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); > + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > + if (!p) > + return NULL; > + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); > + *efi_size = new_efi_size; > + *new_efi = p; > + return p; > + } else { > + return efi; > + } > +} > + > /** > * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image > * @efi: Pointer to image > @@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; > void *new_efi = NULL; > u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; > - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; > + size_t auth_size; > bool ret = false; > > EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > @@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > return true; > > - /* > - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > - */ > - if (efi_size & 0x7) { > - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; > - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > - if (!new_efi) > - return false; > - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); > - efi = new_efi; > - efi_size = new_efi_size; > - } > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); > + if (!efi) > + return false; > > if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > &wincerts_len)) { > @@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > goto err; > } > > +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) > + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ > + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, > + loaded_image_info)) > + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); > +#endif > + > /* Copy PE headers */ > memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, > sizeof(*dos) > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > index 94e8f22bbb..7ad9cb2b89 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ > #include <efi_loader.h> > #include <efi_tcg2.h> > #include <log.h> > +#include <malloc.h> > #include <version.h> > #include <tpm-v2.h> > +#include <u-boot/rsa.h> > #include <u-boot/sha1.h> > #include <u-boot/sha256.h> > #include <u-boot/sha512.h> > @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: > return EFI_EXIT(ret); > } > > +/** > + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash > + * > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend > + * > + * Return: status code > + */ > +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) > +{ > + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; > + size_t wincerts_len; > + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; > + void *new_efi = NULL; > + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + efi_status_t ret; > + u32 active; > + int i; > + > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); > + if (!efi) > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + > + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > + &wincerts_len)) { > + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + goto out; > + } > + > + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; > + goto out; > + } > + > + digest_list->count = 0; > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { > + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; > + > + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) > + continue; > + switch (hash_alg) { > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: > + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: > + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: > + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: > + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + default: > + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + } > + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; > + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); > + digest_list->count++; > + } > + > +out: > + free(new_efi); > + free(regs); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/** > + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image > + * > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @handle: loaded image handle > + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol > + * > + * Return: status code > + */ > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) > +{ > + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; > + efi_status_t ret; > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; > + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; > + struct efi_device_path *device_path; > + u32 device_path_length; > + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > + struct efi_handler *handler; > + > + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + switch (handle->image_type) { > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: > + pcr_index = 4; > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; > + break; > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: > + pcr_index = 2; > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; > + break; > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: > + pcr_index = 2; > + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; > + break; > + default: > + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > + } > + > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, > + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, > + &handler)); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); > + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > + /* add end node size */ > + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); > + } > + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; > + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); > + if (!image_load_event) > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + > + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; > + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; > + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; > + > + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; > + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); > + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; > + > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > + } else { > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + goto out; > + } > + > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, > + device_path_length); > + } > + > + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, > + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); > + > +out: > + free(image_load_event); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > /** > * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events > * > @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, > /* > * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not > * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with > - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > * Format" > - * Not supported for now > */ > if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { > - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > - goto out; > - } > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > > - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > + (void **)&nt); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); > + goto out; > + } > > - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > - &digest_list); > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > + &digest_list); > + } else { > + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > + &digest_list); > + } > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > goto out; > > + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > + > ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > goto out; > -- > 2.17.1 > This might need a rebase since Heinrich merged some minor cleanups yesterday. Other than that Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() 2021-05-12 6:59 [PATCH v4 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 8:32 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT/ CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE/CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL is enabled, because hash-checksum.c is not compiled. With the following commit, commit 0bcb28dfb946 ("lib: Rename rsa-checksum.c to hash-checksum.c") CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE option is required to use hash_calculate() function. This commit adds CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE option in Kconfig, and missing required options for CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- Changes in v4: - newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing the base code. lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index b76e77180e..93463fb362 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT + select FIT_SIGNATURE default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule @@ -302,6 +303,12 @@ config EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL bool "EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL support" depends on TPM_V2 + select FIT_SIGNATURE + select SHA1 + select SHA256 + select SHA512_ALGO + select SHA384 + select SHA512 help Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware of the platform. @@ -338,6 +345,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT + select FIT_SIGNATURE default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 8:32 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-12 11:32 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-05-12 8:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 03:59:47PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT/ > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE/CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > is enabled, because hash-checksum.c is not compiled. > > With the following commit, > commit 0bcb28dfb946 ("lib: Rename rsa-checksum.c to hash-checksum.c") > CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE option is required to use hash_calculate() function. > > This commit adds CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE option in Kconfig, and missing > required options for CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL. > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > --- > > Changes in v4: > - newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing > the base code. > > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > index b76e77180e..93463fb362 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE > select PKCS7_VERIFY > select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO > select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > + select FIT_SIGNATURE > default n > help > Select this option if you want to enable capsule > @@ -302,6 +303,12 @@ config EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL > config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > bool "EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL support" > depends on TPM_V2 > + select FIT_SIGNATURE > + select SHA1 > + select SHA256 > + select SHA512_ALGO > + select SHA384 > + select SHA512 > help > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > of the platform. > @@ -338,6 +345,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT > select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER > select PKCS7_VERIFY > select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > + select FIT_SIGNATURE > default n > help > Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. > -- > 2.17.1 > I've sent a similar patch yesterday that Heinrich already applied on his tree, you'll only need to add FIT_SIGNATURE now Cheers /Ilias ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() 2021-05-12 8:32 ` Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-05-12 11:32 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 11:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On Wed, 12 May 2021 at 17:32, Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> wrote: > > On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 03:59:47PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT/ > > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE/CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > > is enabled, because hash-checksum.c is not compiled. > > > > With the following commit, > > commit 0bcb28dfb946 ("lib: Rename rsa-checksum.c to hash-checksum.c") > > CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE option is required to use hash_calculate() function. > > > > This commit adds CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE option in Kconfig, and missing > > required options for CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL. > > > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > > --- > > > > Changes in v4: > > - newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing > > the base code. > > > > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++ > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > index b76e77180e..93463fb362 100644 > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE > > select PKCS7_VERIFY > > select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO > > select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > > + select FIT_SIGNATURE > > default n > > help > > Select this option if you want to enable capsule > > @@ -302,6 +303,12 @@ config EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL > > config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > > bool "EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL support" > > depends on TPM_V2 > > + select FIT_SIGNATURE > > + select SHA1 > > + select SHA256 > > + select SHA512_ALGO > > + select SHA384 > > + select SHA512 > > help > > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > > of the platform. > > @@ -338,6 +345,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT > > select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER > > select PKCS7_VERIFY > > select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > > + select FIT_SIGNATURE > > default n > > help > > Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. > > -- > > 2.17.1 > > > > I've sent a similar patch yesterday that Heinrich already applied on his > tree, you'll only need to add FIT_SIGNATURE now Hi Ilias, Thank you for your comment. I rebase and will send v5. Thanks, Masahisa > > Cheers > /Ilias ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-05-12 11:32 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-05-12 6:59 [PATCH v4 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 8:34 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-12 6:59 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] efi_loader: add required option to use hash_calculate() Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 8:32 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-12 11:32 ` Masahisa Kojima
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.