* [PATCH v6 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support
@ 2021-05-13 7:18 Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication Masahisa Kojima
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-13 7:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
This patch series add the PE/COFF measurement support.
Extending PCR and Event Log is tested with fTPM
running as a OP-TEE TA.
Unit test will be added in the separate series.
Masahisa Kojima (3):
lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication
efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is
disabled
efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement
include/efi_loader.h | 6 +
include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++
include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++
lib/Makefile | 5 +-
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +
lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 123 +++++++++++++++---
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +---------
lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 +
10 files changed, 353 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication
2021-05-13 7:18 [PATCH v6 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima
@ 2021-05-13 7:18 ` Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:52 ` Takahiro Akashi
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima
2 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-13 7:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or
CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE is enabled,
because hash-checksum.c is not compiled.
This commit adds hash-checksum.c as a compilation target
if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
---
Changes in v6:
- update lib/Makefile to compile hash-checksum.c, instead of
selecting FIT_SIGNATURE in secure boot and capsule authentication.
Changes in v5:
- Missing option for EFI_TCG2_PROTOROL already added in different commit.
This commit adds FIT_SIGNATURE only.
Changes in v4:
- newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing
the base code.
lib/Makefile | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 6825671955..bd022dd5d3 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ endif
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)ACPIGEN) += acpi/
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MD5) += md5.o
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA) += rsa/
-obj-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += hash-checksum.o
+ifneq (,$(filter y,$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)$(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)\
+$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)))
+obj-y += hash-checksum.o
+endif
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA1) += sha1.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA256) += sha256.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA512_ALGO) += sha512.o
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled
2021-05-13 7:18 [PATCH v6 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication Masahisa Kojima
@ 2021-05-13 7:18 ` Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima
2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-13 7:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support.
PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both
UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in
measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are
gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if
UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.
This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
---
(no changes since v4)
Changes in v4:
- revert #ifdef instead of using "if (!IS_ENABLED())" statement,
not to rely on the compiler optimization.
Changes in v3:
- hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
Changes in v2:
- Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c
- Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
- Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
- Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c
- Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++
lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +------------------------------
lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++
5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
index c259abe033..385a81d7d9 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
select PKCS7_VERIFY
select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
+ select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
default n
help
Select this option if you want to enable capsule
@@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
select PKCS7_VERIFY
+ select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
default n
help
Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
@@ -349,6 +351,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install,
at least, PK, KEK and db.
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
+ bool
+ depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
+
config EFI_ESRT
bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation"
depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o
obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o
-obj-y += efi_signature.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE))
$(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index f53ef367ec..fe1ee198e2 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type(
}
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+/**
+ * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
+ * @regs: Pointer to array of regions
+ * @start: Start address of region (included)
+ * @end: End address of region (excluded)
+ * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions
+ *
+ * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
+ *
+ * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
+ * Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
+ *
+ * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
+ * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
+ const void *start, const void *end,
+ int nocheck)
+{
+ struct image_region *reg;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ if (end < start)
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
+ reg = ®s->reg[i];
+ if (nocheck)
+ continue;
+
+ /* new data after registered region */
+ if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
+ continue;
+
+ /* new data preceding registered region */
+ if (end <= reg->data) {
+ for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
+ memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j],
+ sizeof(*reg));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* new data overlapping registered region */
+ EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ reg = ®s->reg[i];
+ reg->data = start;
+ reg->size = end - start;
+ regs->num++;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/**
* cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
* @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header
@@ -422,6 +483,7 @@ err:
return false;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
/**
* efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with
* SHA256 hash
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c
@@ -15,18 +15,16 @@
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
#include <u-boot/sha256.h>
-const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
- EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
-#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
/* SEQUENCE */
0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7,
@@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out:
return !revoked;
}
-/**
- * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
- * @regs: Pointer to array of regions
- * @start: Start address of region (included)
- * @end: End address of region (excluded)
- * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions
- *
- * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
- *
- * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
- * Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
- *
- * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
- * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
- *
- * Return: status code
- */
-efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
- const void *start, const void *end,
- int nocheck)
-{
- struct image_region *reg;
- int i, j;
-
- if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
- EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
-
- if (end < start)
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
-
- for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
- reg = ®s->reg[i];
- if (nocheck)
- continue;
-
- /* new data after registered region */
- if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
- continue;
-
- /* new data preceding registered region */
- if (end <= reg->data) {
- for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
- memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j],
- sizeof(*reg));
- break;
- }
-
- /* new data overlapping registered region */
- EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
-
- reg = ®s->reg[i];
- reg->data = start;
- reg->size = end - start;
- regs->num++;
-
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
-}
-
/**
* efi_sigstore_free - free signature store
* @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure
@@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size);
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type {
const enum efi_auth_var_type type;
};
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
+
static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
{u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK},
{u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement
2021-05-13 7:18 [PATCH v6 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima
@ 2021-05-13 7:18 ` Masahisa Kojima
2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-13 7:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification"
requires to measure every attempt to load and execute
a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4].
This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR,
and appends measurement into Event Log.
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
---
Changes in v6:
- update lib/Makefile to add hash-checksum.c as a compilation target
(no changes since v2)
Changes in v2:
- Remove duplicate <efi.h> include
- Remove unnecessary __packed attribute
- Add all EV_EFI_* event definition
- Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image
- Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and
EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER
- Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path
- Add function comment
include/efi_loader.h | 6 +
include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++
include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++
lib/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++--
lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
6 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h
index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644
--- a/include/efi_loader.h
+++ b/include/efi_loader.h
@@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void);
efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void);
/* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */
efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void);
+/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */
+efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+ struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
+ struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info);
/* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */
int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc,
const char *if_typename, int diskid,
@@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void);
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi);
+
bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp,
WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len);
diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h
index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644
--- a/include/efi_tcg2.h
+++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
#define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
+#include <efi_api.h>
#include <tpm-v2.h>
#define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \
@@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event {
u8 event[];
} __packed;
+struct uefi_image_load_event {
+ efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory;
+ u64 image_length_in_memory;
+ u64 image_link_time_address;
+ u64 length_of_device_path;
+ struct efi_device_path device_path[];
+};
+
struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability {
u8 size;
struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version;
diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h
index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644
--- a/include/tpm-v2.h
+++ b/include/tpm-v2.h
@@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice;
#define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B)
#define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C)
+/*
+ * event types, cf.
+ * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0"
+ * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019
+ */
+#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002)
+#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003)
+#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004)
+#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005)
+#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006)
+#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007)
+#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008)
+#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009)
+#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010)
+#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0)
+
/* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */
struct tpms_tagged_property {
u32 property;
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index bd022dd5d3..ff5c32baed 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)ACPIGEN) += acpi/
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MD5) += md5.o
obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA) += rsa/
ifneq (,$(filter y,$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)$(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)\
-$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)))
+$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL)))
obj-y += hash-checksum.o
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_SHA1) += sha1.o
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
@@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
return 1;
}
+/**
+ * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image
+ * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size: size of @efi binary
+ * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image
+ *
+ * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates
+ * the image buffer and updates @efi_size.
+ *
+ * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails.
+ */
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi)
+{
+ size_t new_efi_size;
+ void *p;
+
+ /*
+ * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
+ * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) {
+ new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8);
+ p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size);
+ *efi_size = new_efi_size;
+ *new_efi = p;
+ return p;
+ } else {
+ return efi;
+ }
+}
+
/**
* efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image
* @efi: Pointer to image
@@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL;
void *new_efi = NULL;
u8 *auth, *wincerts_end;
- size_t new_efi_size, auth_size;
+ size_t auth_size;
bool ret = false;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
@@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled())
return true;
- /*
- * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be
- * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect.
- */
- if (efi_size & 0x7) {
- new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL;
- new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1);
- if (!new_efi)
- return false;
- memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size);
- efi = new_efi;
- efi_size = new_efi_size;
- }
+ efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi);
+ if (!efi)
+ return false;
if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts,
&wincerts_len)) {
@@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
goto err;
}
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL)
+ /* Measure an PE/COFF image */
+ if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle,
+ loaded_image_info))
+ log_err("PE image measurement failed\n");
+#endif
+
/* Copy PE headers */
memcpy(efi_reloc, efi,
sizeof(*dos)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
index 4530a47b63..6a89cdede5 100644
--- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
+++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c
@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@
#include <efi_loader.h>
#include <efi_tcg2.h>
#include <log.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
#include <version.h>
#include <tpm-v2.h>
+#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
#include <u-boot/sha1.h>
#include <u-boot/sha256.h>
#include <u-boot/sha512.h>
@@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out:
return EFI_EXIT(ret);
}
+/**
+ * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash
+ *
+ * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size: size of @efi binary
+ * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+ struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list)
+{
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL;
+ size_t wincerts_len;
+ struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL;
+ void *new_efi = NULL;
+ u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ efi_status_t ret;
+ u32 active;
+ int i;
+
+ efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi);
+ if (!efi)
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+
+ if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts,
+ &wincerts_len)) {
+ log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n");
+ ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ digest_list->count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) {
+ u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg;
+
+ if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg)))
+ continue;
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA1:
+ hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA256:
+ hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA384:
+ hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ case TPM2_ALG_SHA512:
+ hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash);
+ break;
+ default:
+ EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg);
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg;
+ memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg));
+ digest_list->count++;
+ }
+
+out:
+ free(new_efi);
+ free(regs);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image
+ *
+ * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary
+ * @efi_size: size of @efi binary
+ * @handle: loaded image handle
+ * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol
+ *
+ * Return: status code
+ */
+efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size,
+ struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
+ struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image)
+{
+ struct tpml_digest_values digest_list;
+ efi_status_t ret;
+ struct udevice *dev;
+ u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size;
+ struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event;
+ struct efi_device_path *device_path;
+ u32 device_path_length;
+ IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos;
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
+ struct efi_handler *handler;
+
+ ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (handle->image_type) {
+ case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:
+ pcr_index = 4;
+ event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION;
+ break;
+ case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER:
+ pcr_index = 2;
+ event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+ break;
+ case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER:
+ pcr_index = 2;
+ event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header,
+ &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path,
+ &handler));
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface);
+ device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path);
+ if (device_path_length > 0) {
+ /* add end node size */
+ device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path);
+ }
+ event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length;
+ image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size);
+ if (!image_load_event)
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+
+ image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi;
+ image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size;
+ image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length;
+
+ dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi;
+ nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew);
+ if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt;
+
+ image_load_event->image_link_time_address =
+ nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
+ } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ image_load_event->image_link_time_address =
+ nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
+ } else {
+ ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (device_path_length > 0) {
+ memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path,
+ device_path_length);
+ }
+
+ ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list,
+ event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event);
+
+out:
+ free(image_load_event);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events
*
@@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags,
/*
* if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not
* corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with
- * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash"
- * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature
+ * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash"
+ * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature
* Format"
- * Not supported for now
*/
if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) {
- ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
- goto out;
- }
+ IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
- pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index;
- event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type;
+ ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
+ (void **)&nt);
+ if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
- ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
- &digest_list);
+ ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
+ &digest_list);
+ } else {
+ ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len,
+ &digest_list);
+ }
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
+ pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index;
+ event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type;
+
ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list);
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication Masahisa Kojima
@ 2021-05-13 7:52 ` Takahiro Akashi
2021-05-13 13:51 ` Masahisa Kojima
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Takahiro Akashi @ 2021-05-13 7:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 04:18:29PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or
> CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE is enabled,
> because hash-checksum.c is not compiled.
>
> This commit adds hash-checksum.c as a compilation target
> if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
> is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
> ---
>
> Changes in v6:
> - update lib/Makefile to compile hash-checksum.c, instead of
> selecting FIT_SIGNATURE in secure boot and capsule authentication.
>
> Changes in v5:
> - Missing option for EFI_TCG2_PROTOROL already added in different commit.
> This commit adds FIT_SIGNATURE only.
>
> Changes in v4:
> - newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing
> the base code.
>
> lib/Makefile | 5 ++++-
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
> index 6825671955..bd022dd5d3 100644
> --- a/lib/Makefile
> +++ b/lib/Makefile
> @@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ endif
> obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)ACPIGEN) += acpi/
> obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MD5) += md5.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA) += rsa/
> -obj-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += hash-checksum.o
> +ifneq (,$(filter y,$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)$(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)\
> +$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)))
> +obj-y += hash-checksum.o
> +endif
Why not create a new kconfig option here?
There is a good reason to do so if there are more than one users.
Otherwise, every new user of hash_calculate() needs
to modify generic Makefile.
-Takahiro Akashi
> obj-$(CONFIG_SHA1) += sha1.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_SHA256) += sha256.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_SHA512_ALGO) += sha512.o
> --
> 2.17.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication
2021-05-13 7:52 ` Takahiro Akashi
@ 2021-05-13 13:51 ` Masahisa Kojima
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-13 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
On Thu, 13 May 2021 at 16:52, Takahiro Akashi
<takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 04:18:29PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
> > Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or
> > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE is enabled,
> > because hash-checksum.c is not compiled.
> >
> > This commit adds hash-checksum.c as a compilation target
> > if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
> > is enabled.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org>
> > ---
> >
> > Changes in v6:
> > - update lib/Makefile to compile hash-checksum.c, instead of
> > selecting FIT_SIGNATURE in secure boot and capsule authentication.
> >
> > Changes in v5:
> > - Missing option for EFI_TCG2_PROTOROL already added in different commit.
> > This commit adds FIT_SIGNATURE only.
> >
> > Changes in v4:
> > - newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing
> > the base code.
> >
> > lib/Makefile | 5 ++++-
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
> > index 6825671955..bd022dd5d3 100644
> > --- a/lib/Makefile
> > +++ b/lib/Makefile
> > @@ -61,7 +61,10 @@ endif
> > obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)ACPIGEN) += acpi/
> > obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MD5) += md5.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA) += rsa/
> > -obj-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += hash-checksum.o
> > +ifneq (,$(filter y,$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)$(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)\
> > +$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)))
> > +obj-y += hash-checksum.o
> > +endif
>
> Why not create a new kconfig option here?
> There is a good reason to do so if there are more than one users.
>
> Otherwise, every new user of hash_calculate() needs
> to modify generic Makefile.
I agree with this suggestion, I will send new patch.
Thank you for your comment.
Thanks,
Masahisa Kojima
>
> -Takahiro Akashi
>
>
> > obj-$(CONFIG_SHA1) += sha1.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_SHA256) += sha256.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_SHA512_ALGO) += sha512.o
> > --
> > 2.17.1
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-05-13 13:51 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-05-13 7:18 [PATCH v6 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 1/3] lib: fix build error for secure boot and capsule authentication Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:52 ` Takahiro Akashi
2021-05-13 13:51 ` Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-13 7:18 ` [PATCH v6 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima
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