From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v26 05/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 13:07:47 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210513200807.15910-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210513200807.15910-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ca9485105f00..916a0f606035 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1944,7 +1944,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule); #else @@ -1960,8 +1961,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void **lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a2340e81cfa7..6a04d762d272 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1362,8 +1363,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) if (f->lsm_isset) { security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 392afe3e2fd6..71d894dcdc01 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -472,6 +472,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -670,8 +671,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, - f->op, f->lsm_rules); + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, + f->lsm_rules); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: @@ -684,15 +687,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_isset) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) { @@ -704,7 +709,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index f0e448ed1f9f..55f3bd4f0b01 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -433,8 +433,8 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d804b9a0dd95..a05841e1012b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsmblob lsmdata; if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule, i)) { if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) @@ -619,14 +620,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); break; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 9471bcecc052..a5793b4bf684 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2669,11 +2669,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule) { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc; @@ -2681,7 +2684,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v26 05/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 13:07:47 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210513200807.15910-6-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210513200807.15910-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ca9485105f00..916a0f606035 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1944,7 +1944,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule); #else @@ -1960,8 +1961,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void **lsmrule) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a2340e81cfa7..6a04d762d272 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: @@ -1362,8 +1363,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) if (f->lsm_isset) { security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 392afe3e2fd6..71d894dcdc01 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -472,6 +472,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); @@ -670,8 +671,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, - f->op, f->lsm_rules); + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, + f->lsm_rules); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: @@ -684,15 +687,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_isset) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) { @@ -704,7 +709,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index f0e448ed1f9f..55f3bd4f0b01 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -433,8 +433,8 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, - void *lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, + u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d804b9a0dd95..a05841e1012b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; + struct lsmblob lsmdata; if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule, i)) { if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) @@ -619,14 +620,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); break; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 9471bcecc052..a5793b4bf684 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2669,11 +2669,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, + void **lsmrule) { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc; @@ -2681,7 +2684,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule) hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) + continue; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.29.2 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-13 20:13 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20210513200807.15910-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 02/25] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-22 8:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2021-05-22 8:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2021-05-25 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 23:52 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-26 9:53 ` Mickaël Salaün 2021-05-26 9:53 ` Mickaël Salaün 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 03/25] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-14 19:00 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-14 19:00 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-21 20:18 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:18 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 04/25] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-14 19:00 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-14 19:00 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 05/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 07/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-14 19:03 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-14 19:03 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-21 20:18 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:18 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-14 19:05 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-14 19:05 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-21 20:18 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:18 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 12/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 13/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 14/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-14 19:23 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-14 19:23 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-17 19:52 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-17 19:52 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 15/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 16/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` [PATCH v26 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:07 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-14 19:24 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-14 19:24 ` Kees Cook 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 19/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 21/25] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 22/25] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 20:19 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-21 21:26 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-21 21:26 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-21 22:05 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-21 22:05 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-22 2:20 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-22 2:20 ` Paul Moore 2021-05-22 12:58 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-22 12:58 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-23 2:00 ` Steve Grubb 2021-05-24 15:53 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-24 16:06 ` Steve Grubb 2021-05-25 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 16:26 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 17:28 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 17:28 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 18:23 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-25 18:23 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-25 19:06 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 19:06 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 20:08 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-25 20:08 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2021-05-25 22:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-25 22:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 23/25] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` [PATCH v26 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2021-05-13 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler
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