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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	"Lin, Zhenpeng" <zplin@psu.edu>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/3] mm/slub: Fix redzoning for small allocations
Date: Tue,  8 Jun 2021 11:39:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210608183955.280836-3-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210608183955.280836-1-keescook@chromium.org>

The redzone area for SLUB exists between s->object_size and s->inuse
(which is at least the word-aligned object_size). If a cache were created
with an object_size smaller than sizeof(void *), the in-object stored
freelist pointer would overwrite the redzone (e.g. with boot param
"slub_debug=ZF"):

BUG test (Tainted: G    B            ): Right Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

INFO: 0xffff957ead1c05de-0xffff957ead1c05df @offset=1502. First byte 0x1a instead of 0xbb
INFO: Slab 0xffffef3950b47000 objects=170 used=170 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x8000000000000200
INFO: Object 0xffff957ead1c05d8 @offset=1496 fp=0xffff957ead1c0620

Redzone  (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb    ........
Object   (____ptrval____): f6 f4 a5 40 1d e8          ...@..
Redzone  (____ptrval____): 1a aa                      ..
Padding  (____ptrval____): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00    ........

Store the freelist pointer out of line when object_size is smaller than
sizeof(void *) and redzoning is enabled.

Additionally remove the "smaller than sizeof(void *)" check under
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM in kmem_cache_sanity_check() as it is now redundant:
SLAB and SLOB both handle small sizes.

(Note that no caches within this size range are known to exist in the
kernel currently.)

Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 mm/slab_common.c | 3 +--
 mm/slub.c        | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index a4a571428c51..7cab77655f11 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_size);
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
 static int kmem_cache_sanity_check(const char *name, unsigned int size)
 {
-	if (!name || in_interrupt() || size < sizeof(void *) ||
-		size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
+	if (!name || in_interrupt() || size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
 		pr_err("kmem_cache_create(%s) integrity check failed\n", name);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index f91d9fe7d0d8..f58cfd456548 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -3734,15 +3734,17 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
 	 */
 	s->inuse = size;
 
-	if (((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
-		s->ctor)) {
+	if ((flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)) ||
+	    ((flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) && s->object_size < sizeof(void *)) ||
+	    s->ctor) {
 		/*
 		 * Relocate free pointer after the object if it is not
 		 * permitted to overwrite the first word of the object on
 		 * kmem_cache_free.
 		 *
 		 * This is the case if we do RCU, have a constructor or
-		 * destructor or are poisoning the objects.
+		 * destructor, are poisoning the objects, or are
+		 * redzoning an object smaller than sizeof(void *).
 		 *
 		 * The assumption that s->offset >= s->inuse means free
 		 * pointer is outside of the object is used in the
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-08 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-08 18:39 [PATCH v4 0/3] Actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning Kees Cook
2021-06-08 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] mm/slub: Clarify verification reporting Kees Cook
2021-06-08 18:39 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2021-06-11  9:13   ` [PATCH v4 2/3] mm/slub: Fix redzoning for small allocations Vlastimil Babka
2021-06-08 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] mm/slub: Actually fix freelist pointer vs redzoning Kees Cook
2021-06-08 20:56   ` Andrew Morton
2021-06-08 23:11     ` Kees Cook
2021-06-08 20:53 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] " Andrew Morton
2021-06-08 23:08   ` Kees Cook

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