[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 01/16] mac80211: remove warning in ieee80211_get_sband()

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 01/16] mac80211: remove warning in ieee80211_get_sband()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 0ee4d55534f82a0624701d0bb9fc2304d4529086 ]

Syzbot reports that it's possible to hit this from userspace,
by trying to add a station before any other connection setup
has been done. Instead of trying to catch this in some other
way simply remove the warning, that will appropriately reject
the call from userspace.

Reported-by: syzbot+7716dbc401d9a437890d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517164715.f537da276d17.Id05f40ec8761d6a8cc2df87f1aa09c651988a586@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 6c9d9c94983b..dea48696f994 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ ieee80211_get_sband(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!chanctx_conf)) {
+	if (!chanctx_conf) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return NULL;
 	}
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 02/16] cfg80211: call cfg80211_leave_ocb when switching away from OCB

[Sasha Levin]

From: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd9f984ed05fade603a00e2eae787d2f ]

If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and
NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a
chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads
to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by
u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:

struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
    ...
    union {
        struct ieee80211_if_ap ap;
        struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan;
        struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd;
        struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // <- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh;
        struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // <- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr;
        struct ieee80211_if_nan nan;
    } u;
    ...
}

Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during
cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.

link to syzkaller bug:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d5

Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/wireless/util.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c
index c4536468dfbe..e7be500b6452 100644
--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -965,6 +965,9 @@ int cfg80211_change_iface(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 		case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT:
 			/* mesh should be handled? */
 			break;
+		case NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB:
+			cfg80211_leave_ocb(rdev, dev);
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 03/16] mac80211: drop multicast fragments

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]

These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fcdc47f8ac52b883a9c50@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/rx.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 2ba19decb126..012697efafc3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2124,17 +2124,15 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl);
 	frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
 
-	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
-		I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount);
-		goto out_no_led;
-	}
-
 	if (rx->sta)
 		cache = &rx->sta->frags;
 
 	if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
 		goto out;
 
+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
+		return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+
 	I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
 
 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
@@ -2260,7 +2258,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
  out:
 	ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
- out_no_led:
 	if (rx->sta)
 		rx->sta->rx_stats.packets++;
 	return RX_CONTINUE;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 04/16] net: ethtool: clear heap allocations for ethtool function

[Sasha Levin]

From: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 80ec82e3d2c1fab42eeb730aaa7985494a963d3f ]

Several ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. This will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and
might copy the full contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/ethtool.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index 83028017c26d..4db9512feba8 100644
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -1594,7 +1594,7 @@ static int ethtool_get_any_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr,
 	if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	data = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ static int ethtool_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > ops->get_eeprom_len(dev))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	data = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1840,7 +1840,7 @@ static int ethtool_self_test(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	test.len = test_len;
-	data = kmalloc_array(test_len, sizeof(u64), GFP_USER);
+	data = kcalloc(test_len, sizeof(u64), GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -2372,7 +2372,7 @@ static int ethtool_get_tunable(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	ret = ethtool_tunable_valid(&tuna);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	data = kmalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	ret = ops->get_tunable(dev, &tuna, data);
@@ -2552,7 +2552,7 @@ static int get_phy_tunable(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	ret = ethtool_phy_tunable_valid(&tuna);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	data = kmalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	mutex_lock(&phydev->lock);
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 05/16] ping: Check return value of function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb'

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]

Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/ping.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index c59144502ee8..862744c28548 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
 	struct icmphdr *icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
+	bool rc = false;
 
 	/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_rcv */
 
@@ -982,14 +983,15 @@ bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 		struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 
 		pr_debug("rcv on socket %p\n", sk);
-		if (skb2)
-			ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2);
+		if (skb2 && !ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2))
+			rc = true;
 		sock_put(sk);
-		return true;
 	}
-	pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
 
-	return false;
+	if (!rc)
+		pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
+
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ping_rcv);
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 06/16] inet: annotate date races around sk->sk_txhash

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit b71eaed8c04f72a919a9c44e83e4ee254e69e7f3 ]

UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another
thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us.

There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
pair to document the race.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w

write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1:
 sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline]
 __ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75
 __ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189
 ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
 inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580
 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline]
 __sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0:
 skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline]
 skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359
 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373
 __ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621
 ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527
 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/sock.h | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index bc752237dff3..351749c694ce 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -1832,7 +1832,8 @@ static inline u32 net_tx_rndhash(void)
 
 static inline void sk_set_txhash(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	sk->sk_txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
+	/* This pairs with READ_ONCE() in skb_set_hash_from_sk() */
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_txhash, net_tx_rndhash());
 }
 
 static inline void sk_rethink_txhash(struct sock *sk)
@@ -2103,9 +2104,12 @@ static inline void sock_poll_wait(struct file *filp, struct socket *sock,
 
 static inline void skb_set_hash_from_sk(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 {
-	if (sk->sk_txhash) {
+	/* This pairs with WRITE_ONCE() in sk_set_txhash() */
+	u32 txhash = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_txhash);
+
+	if (txhash) {
 		skb->l4_hash = 1;
-		skb->hash = sk->sk_txhash;
+		skb->hash = txhash;
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 07/16] net: caif: fix memory leak in ldisc_open

[Sasha Levin]

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 58af3d3d54e87bfc1f936e16c04ade3369d34011 ]

Syzbot reported memory leak in tty_init_dev().
The problem was in unputted tty in ldisc_open()

static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
...
	ser->tty = tty_kref_get(tty);
...
	result = register_netdevice(dev);
	if (result) {
		rtnl_unlock();
		free_netdev(dev);
		return -ENODEV;
	}
...
}

Ser pointer is netdev private_data, so after free_netdev()
this pointer goes away with unputted tty reference. So, fix
it by adding tty_kref_put() before freeing netdev.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f303e045423e617d2cad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
index 94d5ce9419ca..81ec17b9c49c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	rtnl_lock();
 	result = register_netdevice(dev);
 	if (result) {
+		tty_kref_put(tty);
 		rtnl_unlock();
 		free_netdev(dev);
 		return -ENODEV;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 08/16] net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]

tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po->num at the same time.

KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.

[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg

write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 16b745d254fe..42299fa02038 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2656,7 +2656,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
 	}
 	if (likely(saddr == NULL)) {
 		dev	= packet_cached_dev_get(po);
-		proto	= po->num;
+		proto	= READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	} else {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
@@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 
 	if (likely(saddr == NULL)) {
 		dev	= packet_cached_dev_get(po);
-		proto	= po->num;
+		proto	= READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	} else {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
@@ -3141,7 +3141,7 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
 			/* prevents packet_notifier() from calling
 			 * register_prot_hook()
 			 */
-			po->num = 0;
+			WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0);
 			__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
 			rcu_read_lock();
 			dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
@@ -3151,7 +3151,7 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
 		}
 
 		BUG_ON(po->running);
-		po->num = proto;
+		WRITE_ONCE(po->num, proto);
 		po->prot_hook.type = proto;
 
 		if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
@@ -3497,7 +3497,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 
 	sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
 	sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex;
-	sll->sll_protocol = po->num;
+	sll->sll_protocol = READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	sll->sll_pkttype = 0;
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex);
@@ -4391,7 +4391,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
 	was_running = po->running;
 	num = po->num;
 	if (was_running) {
-		po->num = 0;
+		WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0);
 		__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
@@ -4426,7 +4426,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
 
 	spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
 	if (was_running) {
-		po->num = num;
+		WRITE_ONCE(po->num, num);
 		register_prot_hook(sk);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
@@ -4597,7 +4597,7 @@ static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 			   s,
 			   refcount_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
 			   s->sk_type,
-			   ntohs(po->num),
+			   ntohs(READ_ONCE(po->num)),
 			   po->ifindex,
 			   po->running,
 			   atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 09/16] net/packet: annotate accesses to po->ifindex

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]

Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po->ifindex.

KCSAN reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname

write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
 packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
 packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 42299fa02038..8d9005019ef7 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -3157,11 +3157,11 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
 		if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
 			dev_put(dev);
 			po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
-			po->ifindex = -1;
+			WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1);
 			packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
 		} else {
 			po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
-			po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
+			WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, dev ? dev->ifindex : 0);
 			packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
 		}
 	}
@@ -3476,7 +3476,7 @@ static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	uaddr->sa_family = AF_PACKET;
 	memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data));
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex);
+	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), READ_ONCE(pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex));
 	if (dev)
 		strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -3491,16 +3491,18 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
 	DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, sll, uaddr);
+	int ifindex;
 
 	if (peer)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	ifindex = READ_ONCE(po->ifindex);
 	sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
-	sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex;
+	sll->sll_ifindex = ifindex;
 	sll->sll_protocol = READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	sll->sll_pkttype = 0;
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex);
+	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
 	if (dev) {
 		sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
 		sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len;
@@ -4079,7 +4081,7 @@ static int packet_notifier(struct notifier_block *this,
 				}
 				if (msg == NETDEV_UNREGISTER) {
 					packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
-					po->ifindex = -1;
+					WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1);
 					if (po->prot_hook.dev)
 						dev_put(po->prot_hook.dev);
 					po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
@@ -4598,7 +4600,7 @@ static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 			   refcount_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
 			   s->sk_type,
 			   ntohs(READ_ONCE(po->num)),
-			   po->ifindex,
+			   READ_ONCE(po->ifindex),
 			   po->running,
 			   atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
 			   from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(s)),
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 10/16] r8152: Avoid memcpy() over-reading of ETH_SS_STATS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 99718abdc00e86e4f286dd836408e2834886c16e ]

In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.

The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
index a27ea04cfa6c..726fb5561a0f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
@@ -4649,7 +4649,7 @@ static void rtl8152_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
 {
 	switch (stringset) {
 	case ETH_SS_STATS:
-		memcpy(data, *rtl8152_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8152_gstrings));
+		memcpy(data, rtl8152_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8152_gstrings));
 		break;
 	}
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 11/16] sh_eth: Avoid memcpy() over-reading of ETH_SS_STATS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 224004fbb033600715dbd626bceec10bfd9c58bc ]

In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.

The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
index 24638cb157ca..394ab9cdfe2c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
@@ -2302,7 +2302,7 @@ static void sh_eth_get_strings(struct net_device *ndev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
 {
 	switch (stringset) {
 	case ETH_SS_STATS:
-		memcpy(data, *sh_eth_gstrings_stats,
+		memcpy(data, sh_eth_gstrings_stats,
 		       sizeof(sh_eth_gstrings_stats));
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 12/16] r8169: Avoid memcpy() over-reading of ETH_SS_STATS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit da5ac772cfe2a03058b0accfac03fad60c46c24d ]

In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.

The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
index 0c9e6cb0e341..523626f2ffbe 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c
@@ -1823,7 +1823,7 @@ static void rtl8169_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
 {
 	switch(stringset) {
 	case ETH_SS_STATS:
-		memcpy(data, *rtl8169_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8169_gstrings));
+		memcpy(data, rtl8169_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8169_gstrings));
 		break;
 	}
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 13/16] KVM: selftests: Fix kvm_check_cap() assertion

[Sasha Levin]

From: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>

[ Upstream commit d8ac05ea13d789d5491a5920d70a05659015441d ]

KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl can return any negative value on error,
and not necessarily -1. Change the assertion to reflect that.

Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210615150443.1183365-1-tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index fb5d2d1e0c04..b138fd5e4620 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int kvm_check_cap(long cap)
 		exit(KSFT_SKIP);
 
 	ret = ioctl(kvm_fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, cap);
-	TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION IOCTL failed,\n"
+	TEST_ASSERT(ret >= 0, "KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION IOCTL failed,\n"
 		"  rc: %i errno: %i", ret, errno);
 
 	close(kvm_fd);
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 14/16] net: qed: Fix memcpy() overflow of qed_dcbx_params()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 1c200f832e14420fa770193f9871f4ce2df00d07 ]

The source (&dcbx_info->operational.params) and dest
(&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params) are both struct qed_dcbx_params
(560 bytes), not struct qed_dcbx_admin_params (564 bytes), which is used
as the memcpy() size.

However it seems that struct qed_dcbx_operational_params
(dcbx_info->operational)'s layout matches struct qed_dcbx_admin_params
(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config)'s 4 byte difference (3 padding, 1 byte
for "valid").

On the assumption that the size is wrong (rather than the source structure
type), adjust the memcpy() size argument to be 4 bytes smaller and add
a BUILD_BUG_ON() to validate any changes to the structure sizes.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c
index 5900a506bf8d..ff8a7750d3c0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c
@@ -1294,9 +1294,11 @@ int qed_dcbx_get_config_params(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 		p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.ver_num |= DCBX_CONFIG_VERSION_STATIC;
 
 	p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.enabled = dcbx_info->operational.enabled;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dcbx_info->operational.params) !=
+		     sizeof(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params));
 	memcpy(&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params,
 	       &dcbx_info->operational.params,
-	       sizeof(struct qed_dcbx_admin_params));
+	       sizeof(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params));
 	p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.valid = true;
 
 	memcpy(params, &p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set, sizeof(struct qed_dcbx_set));
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 15/16] PCI: Add AMD RS690 quirk to enable 64-bit DMA

[Sasha Levin]

From: Mikel Rychliski <mikel@mikelr.com>

[ Upstream commit cacf994a91d3a55c0c2f853d6429cd7b86113915 ]

Although the AMD RS690 chipset has 64-bit DMA support, BIOS implementations
sometimes fail to configure the memory limit registers correctly.

The Acer F690GVM mainboard uses this chipset and a Marvell 88E8056 NIC. The
sky2 driver programs the NIC to use 64-bit DMA, which will not work:

  sky2 0000:02:00.0: error interrupt status=0x8
  sky2 0000:02:00.0 eth0: tx timeout
  sky2 0000:02:00.0 eth0: transmit ring 0 .. 22 report=0 done=0

Other drivers required by this mainboard either don't support 64-bit DMA,
or have it disabled using driver specific quirks. For example, the ahci
driver has quirks to enable or disable 64-bit DMA depending on the BIOS
version (see ahci_sb600_enable_64bit() in ahci.c). This ahci quirk matches
against the SB600 SATA controller, but the real issue is almost certainly
with the RS690 PCI host that it was commonly attached to.

To avoid this issue in all drivers with 64-bit DMA support, fix the
configuration of the PCI host. If the kernel is aware of physical memory
above 4GB, but the BIOS never configured the PCI host with this
information, update the registers with our values.

[bhelgaas: drop PCI_DEVICE_ID_ATI_RS690 definition]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210611214823.4898-1-mikel@mikelr.com
Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <mikel@mikelr.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/pci/fixup.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
index 0c67a5a94de3..76959a7d88c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
@@ -779,4 +779,48 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_RESUME(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x1571, pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar);
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_RESUME(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x15b1, pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar);
 DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_RESUME(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, 0x1601, pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar);
 
+#define RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2	0x30
+#define RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2_VALID	0x1
+#define RS690_UPPER_TOP_OF_DRAM2	0x31
+#define RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX		0xA8
+#define RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX_WR_ENABLE	0x100
+#define RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA		0xAC
+
+/*
+ * Some BIOS implementations support RAM above 4GB, but do not configure the
+ * PCI host to respond to bus master accesses for these addresses. These
+ * implementations set the TOP_OF_DRAM_SLOT1 register correctly, so PCI DMA
+ * works as expected for addresses below 4GB.
+ *
+ * Reference: "AMD RS690 ASIC Family Register Reference Guide" (pg. 2-57)
+ * https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/43372_rs690_rrg_3.00o.pdf
+ */
+static void rs690_fix_64bit_dma(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+{
+	u32 val = 0;
+	phys_addr_t top_of_dram = __pa(high_memory - 1) + 1;
+
+	if (top_of_dram <= (1ULL << 32))
+		return;
+
+	pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX,
+				RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2);
+	pci_read_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA, &val);
+
+	if (val)
+		return;
+
+	pci_info(pdev, "Adjusting top of DRAM to %pa for 64-bit DMA support\n", &top_of_dram);
+
+	pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX,
+		RS690_UPPER_TOP_OF_DRAM2 | RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX_WR_ENABLE);
+	pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA, top_of_dram >> 32);
+
+	pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX,
+		RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2 | RS690_HTIU_NB_INDEX_WR_ENABLE);
+	pci_write_config_dword(pdev, RS690_HTIU_NB_DATA,
+		top_of_dram | RS690_LOWER_TOP_OF_DRAM2_VALID);
+}
+DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x7910, rs690_fix_64bit_dma);
+
 #endif
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 16/16] net: ll_temac: Avoid ndo_start_xmit returning NETDEV_TX_BUSY

[Sasha Levin]

From: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>

[ Upstream commit f6396341194234e9b01cd7538bc2c6ac4501ab14 ]

As documented in Documentation/networking/driver.rst, the ndo_start_xmit
method must not return NETDEV_TX_BUSY under any normal circumstances, and
as recommended, we simply stop the tx queue in advance, when there is a
risk that the next xmit would cause a NETDEV_TX_BUSY return.

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
index 2241f9897092..939de185bc6b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
@@ -736,6 +736,11 @@ temac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 	/* Kick off the transfer */
 	lp->dma_out(lp, TX_TAILDESC_PTR, tail_p); /* DMA start */
 
+	if (temac_check_tx_bd_space(lp, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) {
+		netdev_info(ndev, "%s -> netif_stop_queue\n", __func__);
+		netif_stop_queue(ndev);
+	}
+
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 16/16] net: ll_temac: Avoid ndo_start_xmit returning NETDEV_TX_BUSY

[Sasha Levin]

From: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>

[ Upstream commit f6396341194234e9b01cd7538bc2c6ac4501ab14 ]

As documented in Documentation/networking/driver.rst, the ndo_start_xmit
method must not return NETDEV_TX_BUSY under any normal circumstances, and
as recommended, we simply stop the tx queue in advance, when there is a
risk that the next xmit would cause a NETDEV_TX_BUSY return.

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
index 2241f9897092..939de185bc6b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
@@ -736,6 +736,11 @@ temac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 	/* Kick off the transfer */
 	lp->dma_out(lp, TX_TAILDESC_PTR, tail_p); /* DMA start */
 
+	if (temac_check_tx_bd_space(lp, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) {
+		netdev_info(ndev, "%s -> netif_stop_queue\n", __func__);
+		netif_stop_queue(ndev);
+	}
+
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2


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