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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"virtio-fs@redhat.com" <virtio-fs@redhat.com>,
	"berrange@redhat.com" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 09:10:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210701131030.GB159380@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YN2BYXv79PswrN2E@work-vm>

On Thu, Jul 01, 2021 at 09:48:33AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu) wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 04:01:42PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > 
> > > Even if you fix symlinks, I don't think it fixes device nodes or
> > > anything else where the permissions bitmap isn't purely used as the
> > > permissions on the inode.
> > 
> > I think we're making a mountain out of a molehill.  Again, very few
> > people are using quota these days.  And if you give someone write
> > access to a 8TB disk, do you really care if they can "steal" 32k worth
> > of space (which is the maximum size of an xattr, enforced by the VFS).
> > 
> > OK, but what about character mode devices?  First of all, most users
> > don't have access to huge number of devices, but let's assume
> > something absurd.  Let's say that a user has write access to *1024*
> > devices.  (My /dev has 233 character mode devices, and I have write
> > access to well under a dozen.)
> > 
> > An 8TB disk costs about $200.  So how much of the "stolen" quota space
> > are we talking about, assuming the user has access to 1024 devices,
> > and the file system actually supports a 32k xattr.
> > 
> >     32k * 1024 * $200 / 8TB / (1024*1024*1024) = $0.000763 = 0.0763 cents
> > 
> > A 2TB SSD is less around $180, so even if we calculate the prices
> > based on SSD space, we're still talking about a quarter of a penny.
> > 
> > Why are we worrying about this?
> 
> I'm not worrying about storage cost, but we would need to define what
> the rules are on who can write and change a user.* xattr on a device
> node.  It doesn't feel sane to make it anyone who can write to the
> device; then everyone can start leaving droppings on /dev/null.
> 
> The other evilness I can imagine, is if there's a 32k limit on xattrs on
> a node, an evil user could write almost 32k of junk to the node
> and then break the next login that tries to add an acl or breaks the
> next relabel.

I guess 64k is per xattr VFS size limit.

#define XATTR_SIZE_MAX 65536

I just wrote a simple program to write "user.<N>" xattrs of size 1K
each and could easily write 1M xattrs. So that 1G worth data right
there. I did not try to push it further.

So a user can write lot of data in the form of user.* xattrs on
symlinks and device nodes if were to open it unconditionally. Hence
permission semantics will probably will have to defined properly.

I am wondering will it be alright if owner of the file (or CAP_FOWNER),
is allowed to write user.* xattrs on symlinks and special files.

Vivek


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: "berrange@redhat.com" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"virtio-fs@redhat.com" <virtio-fs@redhat.com>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 09:10:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210701131030.GB159380@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YN2BYXv79PswrN2E@work-vm>

On Thu, Jul 01, 2021 at 09:48:33AM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu) wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 04:01:42PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > 
> > > Even if you fix symlinks, I don't think it fixes device nodes or
> > > anything else where the permissions bitmap isn't purely used as the
> > > permissions on the inode.
> > 
> > I think we're making a mountain out of a molehill.  Again, very few
> > people are using quota these days.  And if you give someone write
> > access to a 8TB disk, do you really care if they can "steal" 32k worth
> > of space (which is the maximum size of an xattr, enforced by the VFS).
> > 
> > OK, but what about character mode devices?  First of all, most users
> > don't have access to huge number of devices, but let's assume
> > something absurd.  Let's say that a user has write access to *1024*
> > devices.  (My /dev has 233 character mode devices, and I have write
> > access to well under a dozen.)
> > 
> > An 8TB disk costs about $200.  So how much of the "stolen" quota space
> > are we talking about, assuming the user has access to 1024 devices,
> > and the file system actually supports a 32k xattr.
> > 
> >     32k * 1024 * $200 / 8TB / (1024*1024*1024) = $0.000763 = 0.0763 cents
> > 
> > A 2TB SSD is less around $180, so even if we calculate the prices
> > based on SSD space, we're still talking about a quarter of a penny.
> > 
> > Why are we worrying about this?
> 
> I'm not worrying about storage cost, but we would need to define what
> the rules are on who can write and change a user.* xattr on a device
> node.  It doesn't feel sane to make it anyone who can write to the
> device; then everyone can start leaving droppings on /dev/null.
> 
> The other evilness I can imagine, is if there's a 32k limit on xattrs on
> a node, an evil user could write almost 32k of junk to the node
> and then break the next login that tries to add an acl or breaks the
> next relabel.

I guess 64k is per xattr VFS size limit.

#define XATTR_SIZE_MAX 65536

I just wrote a simple program to write "user.<N>" xattrs of size 1K
each and could easily write 1M xattrs. So that 1G worth data right
there. I did not try to push it further.

So a user can write lot of data in the form of user.* xattrs on
symlinks and device nodes if were to open it unconditionally. Hence
permission semantics will probably will have to defined properly.

I am wondering will it be alright if owner of the file (or CAP_FOWNER),
is allowed to write user.* xattrs on symlinks and special files.

Vivek


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-01 13:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-25 19:12 [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 19:12 ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 19:12 ` [PATCH 1/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 19:12   ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 12:33   ` Christian Brauner
2021-06-28 12:33     ` [Virtio-fs] " Christian Brauner
2021-06-28 15:00   ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 15:00     ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29  3:13   ` [xattr] 8d8cd767b6: ltp.setxattr02.fail kernel test robot
2021-06-29  3:13     ` [Virtio-fs] " kernel test robot
2021-06-29  3:13     ` kernel test robot
2021-06-29  3:13     ` [LTP] " kernel test robot
2021-06-29 12:59     ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 12:59       ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 12:59       ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 12:59       ` [LTP] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-25 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 0/1] xattr: Allow user.* xattr on symlink/special files if caller has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE Schaufler, Casey
2021-06-25 21:49   ` [Virtio-fs] " Schaufler, Casey
2021-06-28 11:58   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 11:58     ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 13:17   ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 13:17     ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 13:36     ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-28 13:36       ` [Virtio-fs] " Daniel Walsh
2021-06-28 16:04       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-28 16:04         ` [Virtio-fs] " Casey Schaufler
2021-06-28 16:28         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 16:28           ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-28 17:41           ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-28 17:41             ` [Virtio-fs] " Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29  9:00             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29  9:00               ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 14:38               ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 14:38                 ` [Virtio-fs] " Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 15:20                 ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 15:20                   ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 16:13                   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 16:13                     ` [Virtio-fs] " Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 16:35                     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 16:35                       ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-29 16:51                       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 16:51                         ` [Virtio-fs] " Casey Schaufler
2021-06-29 17:35                     ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 17:35                       ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 20:28                       ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-29 20:28                         ` [Virtio-fs] " Daniel Walsh
2021-06-30  4:12                         ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30  4:12                           ` [Virtio-fs] " Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30  8:07                           ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30  8:07                             ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30 14:47                             ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 14:47                               ` [Virtio-fs] " Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 15:01                               ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30 15:01                                 ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-30 19:59                                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 19:59                                   ` [Virtio-fs] " Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-30 20:32                                   ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-30 20:32                                     ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01  8:48                                   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-01  8:48                                     ` [Virtio-fs] " Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-01 12:21                                     ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 12:21                                       ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 13:10                                     ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2021-07-01 13:10                                       ` Vivek Goyal
2021-07-01 16:58                                       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-07-01 16:58                                         ` [Virtio-fs] " Casey Schaufler
2021-06-30 16:09                               ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-30 16:09                                 ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-30 14:27                           ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-30 14:27                             ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-29 16:25                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-29 16:25                   ` [Virtio-fs] " Theodore Ts'o
2021-06-28 17:22         ` Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 17:22           ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2021-06-28 18:55         ` Daniel Walsh
2021-06-28 18:55           ` [Virtio-fs] " Daniel Walsh

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