[PULL v2 00/19] migration queue

[PULL v2 00/19] migration queue

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>

The following changes since commit 711c0418c8c1ce3a24346f058b001c4c5a2f0f81:

  Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/philmd/tags/mips-20210702' into staging (2021-07-04 14:04:12 +0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://gitlab.com/dagrh/qemu.git tags/pull-migration-20210705a

for you to fetch changes up to e5f607913cee3f3b486eb024dbc7079b51f6da57:

  migration/rdma: Use error_report to suppress errno message (2021-07-05 10:51:26 +0100)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Migration and virtiofs pull 2021-07-01 v2

Dropped Peter Xu's migration-test fix to reenable
most of the migration tests when uffd isn't available;
we're seeing at least one seg in github CI (on qemu-system-i386)
and Peter Maydell is reporting a hang on Openbsd.

Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>

----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel P. Berrangé (2):
      virtiofsd: use GDateTime for formatting timestamp for debug messages
      docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping

Feng Lin (1):
      migration: fix the memory overwriting risk in add_to_iovec

Greg Kurz (1):
      virtiofsd: Don't allow file creation with FUSE_OPEN

Hyman Huang(黄勇) (2):
      tests/migration: parse the thread-id key of CpuInfoFast
      tests/migration: fix "downtime_limit" type when "migrate-set-parameters"

Laurent Vivier (2):
      migration: move wait-unplug loop to its own function
      migration: failover: continue to wait card unplug on error

Li Zhijian (1):
      migration/rdma: Use error_report to suppress errno message

Peter Xu (3):
      tests: migration-test: Add dirty ring test
      migration: Move yank outside qemu_start_incoming_migration()
      migration: Allow reset of postcopy_recover_triggered when failed

Vivek Goyal (7):
      virtiofsd: Fix fuse setxattr() API change issue
      virtiofsd: Fix xattr operations overwriting errno
      virtiofsd: Add support for extended setxattr
      virtiofsd: Add umask to seccom allow list
      virtiofsd: Add capability to change/restore umask
      virtiofsd: Switch creds, drop FSETID for system.posix_acl_access xattr
      virtiofsd: Add an option to enable/disable posix acls

 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst              |  58 +++++++-
 migration/migration.c                 |  89 +++++++-----
 migration/qemu-file.c                 |   5 +
 migration/rdma.c                      |   4 +-
 tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py   |   4 +-
 tests/qtest/migration-test.c          |  58 +++++++-
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h         |   5 +
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c       |  24 +++-
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h       |   3 +-
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c              |   1 +
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c      | 254 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c |   1 +
 12 files changed, 423 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)

[PULL 01/19] tests: migration-test: Add dirty ring test

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>

Add dirty ring test if kernel supports it.  Add the dirty ring parameter on
source should be mostly enough, but let's change the dest too to make them
match always.

Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210615175523.439830-3-peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tests/qtest/migration-test.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tests/qtest/migration-test.c b/tests/qtest/migration-test.c
index 2b028df687..328d6dbe97 100644
--- a/tests/qtest/migration-test.c
+++ b/tests/qtest/migration-test.c
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
 #include "migration-helpers.h"
 #include "tests/migration/migration-test.h"
 
+#if defined(__linux__)
+#include "linux/kvm.h"
+#endif
+
 /* TODO actually test the results and get rid of this */
 #define qtest_qmp_discard_response(...) qobject_unref(qtest_qmp(__VA_ARGS__))
 
@@ -467,6 +471,8 @@ typedef struct {
     bool use_shmem;
     /* only launch the target process */
     bool only_target;
+    /* Use dirty ring if true; dirty logging otherwise */
+    bool use_dirty_ring;
     char *opts_source;
     char *opts_target;
 } MigrateStart;
@@ -573,11 +579,13 @@ static int test_migrate_start(QTestState **from, QTestState **to,
         shmem_opts = g_strdup("");
     }
 
-    cmd_source = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm -accel tcg%s%s "
+    cmd_source = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm%s -accel tcg%s%s "
                                  "-name source,debug-threads=on "
                                  "-m %s "
                                  "-serial file:%s/src_serial "
                                  "%s %s %s %s",
+                                 args->use_dirty_ring ?
+                                 ",dirty-ring-size=4096" : "",
                                  machine_opts ? " -machine " : "",
                                  machine_opts ? machine_opts : "",
                                  memory_size, tmpfs,
@@ -587,12 +595,14 @@ static int test_migrate_start(QTestState **from, QTestState **to,
         *from = qtest_init(cmd_source);
     }
 
-    cmd_target = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm -accel tcg%s%s "
+    cmd_target = g_strdup_printf("-accel kvm%s -accel tcg%s%s "
                                  "-name target,debug-threads=on "
                                  "-m %s "
                                  "-serial file:%s/dest_serial "
                                  "-incoming %s "
                                  "%s %s %s %s",
+                                 args->use_dirty_ring ?
+                                 ",dirty-ring-size=4096" : "",
                                  machine_opts ? " -machine " : "",
                                  machine_opts ? machine_opts : "",
                                  memory_size, tmpfs, uri,
@@ -785,12 +795,14 @@ static void test_baddest(void)
     test_migrate_end(from, to, false);
 }
 
-static void test_precopy_unix(void)
+static void test_precopy_unix_common(bool dirty_ring)
 {
     g_autofree char *uri = g_strdup_printf("unix:%s/migsocket", tmpfs);
     MigrateStart *args = migrate_start_new();
     QTestState *from, *to;
 
+    args->use_dirty_ring = dirty_ring;
+
     if (test_migrate_start(&from, &to, uri, args)) {
         return;
     }
@@ -825,6 +837,18 @@ static void test_precopy_unix(void)
     test_migrate_end(from, to, true);
 }
 
+static void test_precopy_unix(void)
+{
+    /* Using default dirty logging */
+    test_precopy_unix_common(false);
+}
+
+static void test_precopy_unix_dirty_ring(void)
+{
+    /* Using dirty ring tracking */
+    test_precopy_unix_common(true);
+}
+
 #if 0
 /* Currently upset on aarch64 TCG */
 static void test_ignore_shared(void)
@@ -1369,6 +1393,29 @@ static void test_multifd_tcp_cancel(void)
     test_migrate_end(from, to2, true);
 }
 
+static bool kvm_dirty_ring_supported(void)
+{
+#if defined(__linux__)
+    int ret, kvm_fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDONLY);
+
+    if (kvm_fd < 0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    ret = ioctl(kvm_fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING);
+    close(kvm_fd);
+
+    /* We test with 4096 slots */
+    if (ret < 4096) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+#else
+    return false;
+#endif
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
     char template[] = "/tmp/migration-test-XXXXXX";
@@ -1439,6 +1486,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
     qtest_add_func("/migration/multifd/tcp/zstd", test_multifd_tcp_zstd);
 #endif
 
+    if (kvm_dirty_ring_supported()) {
+        qtest_add_func("/migration/dirty_ring",
+                       test_precopy_unix_dirty_ring);
+    }
+
     ret = g_test_run();
 
     g_assert_cmpint(ret, ==, 0);
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 02/19] migration: fix the memory overwriting risk in add_to_iovec

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Feng Lin <linfeng23@huawei.com>

When testing migration, a Segmentation fault qemu core is generated.
0  error_free (err=0x1)
1  0x00007f8b862df647 in qemu_fclose (f=f@entry=0x55e06c247640)
2  0x00007f8b8516d59a in migrate_fd_cleanup (s=s@entry=0x55e06c0e1ef0)
3  0x00007f8b8516d66c in migrate_fd_cleanup_bh (opaque=0x55e06c0e1ef0)
4  0x00007f8b8626a47f in aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55e06b5a16d0)
5  0x00007f8b8626e71f in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x55e06b5a16d0)
6  0x00007f8b8626a33d in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>)
7  0x00007f8b866bdba4 in g_main_context_dispatch ()
8  0x00007f8b8626cde9 in glib_pollfds_poll ()
9  0x00007f8b8626ce62 in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>)
10 0x00007f8b8626cffd in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=nonblocking@entry=0)
11 0x00007f8b862ef01f in main_loop ()
Using gdb print the struct QEMUFile f = {
  ...,
  iovcnt = 65, last_error = 21984,
  last_error_obj = 0x1, shutdown = true
}
Well iovcnt is overflow, because the max size of MAX_IOV_SIZE is 64.
struct QEMUFile {
    ...;
    struct iovec iov[MAX_IOV_SIZE];
    unsigned int iovcnt;
    int last_error;
    Error *last_error_obj;
    bool shutdown;
};
iovcnt and last_error is overwrited by add_to_iovec().
Right now, add_to_iovec() increase iovcnt before check the limit.
And it seems that add_to_iovec() assumes that iovcnt will set to zero
in qemu_fflush(). But qemu_fflush() will directly return when f->shutdown
is true.

The situation may occur when libvirtd restart during migration, after
f->shutdown is set, before calling qemu_file_set_error() in
qemu_file_shutdown().

So the safiest way is checking the iovcnt before increasing it.

Signed-off-by: Feng Lin <linfeng23@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20210625062138.1899-1-linfeng23@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
  Fix typo in 'writeable' which is actually misnamed 'writable'
---
 migration/qemu-file.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/migration/qemu-file.c b/migration/qemu-file.c
index d6e03dbc0e..1eacf9e831 100644
--- a/migration/qemu-file.c
+++ b/migration/qemu-file.c
@@ -416,6 +416,11 @@ static int add_to_iovec(QEMUFile *f, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size,
     {
         f->iov[f->iovcnt - 1].iov_len += size;
     } else {
+        if (f->iovcnt >= MAX_IOV_SIZE) {
+            /* Should only happen if a previous fflush failed */
+            assert(f->shutdown || !qemu_file_is_writable(f));
+            return 1;
+        }
         if (may_free) {
             set_bit(f->iovcnt, f->may_free);
         }
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 03/19] migration: Move yank outside qemu_start_incoming_migration()

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>

Starting from commit b5eea99ec2f5c, qmp_migrate_recover() calls unregister
before calling qemu_start_incoming_migration(). I believe it wanted to mitigate
the next call to yank_register_instance(), but I think that's wrong.

Firstly, if during recover, we should keep the yank instance there, not
"quickly removing and adding it back".

Meanwhile, calling qmp_migrate_recover() twice with b5eea99ec2f5c will directly
crash the dest qemu (right now it can't; but it'll start to work right after
the next patch) because the 1st call of qmp_migrate_recover() will unregister
permanently when the channel failed to establish, then the 2nd call of
qmp_migrate_recover() crashes at yank_unregister_instance().

This patch fixes it by moving yank ops out of qemu_start_incoming_migration()
into qmp_migrate_incoming.  For qmp_migrate_recover(), drop the unregister of
yank instance too since we keep it there during the recovery phase.

Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210629181356.217312-2-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 migration/migration.c | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/migration/migration.c b/migration/migration.c
index 4228635d18..1bb03d1eca 100644
--- a/migration/migration.c
+++ b/migration/migration.c
@@ -456,10 +456,6 @@ static void qemu_start_incoming_migration(const char *uri, Error **errp)
 {
     const char *p = NULL;
 
-    if (!yank_register_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE, errp)) {
-        return;
-    }
-
     qapi_event_send_migration(MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP);
     if (strstart(uri, "tcp:", &p) ||
         strstart(uri, "unix:", NULL) ||
@@ -474,7 +470,6 @@ static void qemu_start_incoming_migration(const char *uri, Error **errp)
     } else if (strstart(uri, "fd:", &p)) {
         fd_start_incoming_migration(p, errp);
     } else {
-        yank_unregister_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE);
         error_setg(errp, "unknown migration protocol: %s", uri);
     }
 }
@@ -2083,9 +2078,14 @@ void qmp_migrate_incoming(const char *uri, Error **errp)
         return;
     }
 
+    if (!yank_register_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE, errp)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
     qemu_start_incoming_migration(uri, &local_err);
 
     if (local_err) {
+        yank_unregister_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE);
         error_propagate(errp, local_err);
         return;
     }
@@ -2114,7 +2114,6 @@ void qmp_migrate_recover(const char *uri, Error **errp)
      * only re-setup the migration stream and poke existing migration
      * to continue using that newly established channel.
      */
-    yank_unregister_instance(MIGRATION_YANK_INSTANCE);
     qemu_start_incoming_migration(uri, errp);
 }
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 04/19] migration: Allow reset of postcopy_recover_triggered when failed

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>

It's possible qemu_start_incoming_migration() failed at any point, when it
happens we should reset postcopy_recover_triggered to false so that the user
can still retry with a saner incoming port.

Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210629181356.217312-3-peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 migration/migration.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/migration/migration.c b/migration/migration.c
index 1bb03d1eca..fcca289ef7 100644
--- a/migration/migration.c
+++ b/migration/migration.c
@@ -2097,6 +2097,13 @@ void qmp_migrate_recover(const char *uri, Error **errp)
 {
     MigrationIncomingState *mis = migration_incoming_get_current();
 
+    /*
+     * Don't even bother to use ERRP_GUARD() as it _must_ always be set by
+     * callers (no one should ignore a recover failure); if there is, it's a
+     * programming error.
+     */
+    assert(errp);
+
     if (mis->state != MIGRATION_STATUS_POSTCOPY_PAUSED) {
         error_setg(errp, "Migrate recover can only be run "
                    "when postcopy is paused.");
@@ -2115,6 +2122,12 @@ void qmp_migrate_recover(const char *uri, Error **errp)
      * to continue using that newly established channel.
      */
     qemu_start_incoming_migration(uri, errp);
+
+    /* Safe to dereference with the assert above */
+    if (*errp) {
+        /* Reset the flag so user could still retry */
+        qatomic_set(&mis->postcopy_recover_triggered, false);
+    }
 }
 
 void qmp_migrate_pause(Error **errp)
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 05/19] migration: move wait-unplug loop to its own function

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>

The loop is used in migration_thread() and bg_migration_thread(),
so we can move it to its own function and call it from these both places.

Moreover, in migration_thread() we have a wrong state transition from
SETUP to ACTIVE while state could be WAIT_UNPLUG. This is correctly
managed in bg_migration_thread() so use this code instead.

Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210629155007.629086-2-lvivier@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 migration/migration.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/migration/migration.c b/migration/migration.c
index fcca289ef7..dbc484c802 100644
--- a/migration/migration.c
+++ b/migration/migration.c
@@ -3676,6 +3676,28 @@ bool migration_rate_limit(void)
     return urgent;
 }
 
+/*
+ * if failover devices are present, wait they are completely
+ * unplugged
+ */
+
+static void qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(MigrationState *s, int old_state,
+                                    int new_state)
+{
+    if (qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
+        migrate_set_state(&s->state, old_state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG);
+
+        while (s->state == MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG &&
+               qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
+            qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
+        }
+
+        migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG, new_state);
+    } else {
+        migrate_set_state(&s->state, old_state, new_state);
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Master migration thread on the source VM.
  * It drives the migration and pumps the data down the outgoing channel.
@@ -3722,22 +3744,10 @@ static void *migration_thread(void *opaque)
 
     qemu_savevm_state_setup(s->to_dst_file);
 
-    if (qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
-        migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
-                          MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG);
-
-        while (s->state == MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG &&
-               qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
-            qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
-        }
-
-        migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG,
-                MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
-    }
+    qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(s, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
+                               MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
 
     s->setup_time = qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_HOST) - setup_start;
-    migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
-                      MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
 
     trace_migration_thread_setup_complete();
 
@@ -3845,21 +3855,9 @@ static void *bg_migration_thread(void *opaque)
     qemu_savevm_state_header(s->to_dst_file);
     qemu_savevm_state_setup(s->to_dst_file);
 
-    if (qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
-        migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
-                          MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG);
-
-        while (s->state == MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG &&
-               qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
-            qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
-        }
+    qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(s, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
+                               MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
 
-        migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG,
-                          MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
-    } else {
-        migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_SETUP,
-                MIGRATION_STATUS_ACTIVE);
-    }
     s->setup_time = qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_HOST) - setup_start;
 
     trace_migration_thread_setup_complete();
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 06/19] migration: failover: continue to wait card unplug on error

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>

If the user cancels the migration in the unplug-wait state,
QEMU will try to plug back the card and this fails because the card
is partially unplugged.
To avoid the problem, continue to wait the card unplug, but to
allow the migration to be canceled if the card never finishes to unplug
use a timeout.

Bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976852
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210629155007.629086-3-lvivier@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 migration/migration.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/migration/migration.c b/migration/migration.c
index dbc484c802..5ff7ba9d5c 100644
--- a/migration/migration.c
+++ b/migration/migration.c
@@ -3691,6 +3691,17 @@ static void qemu_savevm_wait_unplug(MigrationState *s, int old_state,
                qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
             qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
         }
+        if (s->state != MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG) {
+            int timeout = 120; /* 30 seconds */
+            /*
+             * migration has been canceled
+             * but as we have started an unplug we must wait the end
+             * to be able to plug back the card
+             */
+            while (timeout-- && qemu_savevm_state_guest_unplug_pending()) {
+                qemu_sem_timedwait(&s->wait_unplug_sem, 250);
+            }
+        }
 
         migrate_set_state(&s->state, MIGRATION_STATUS_WAIT_UNPLUG, new_state);
     } else {
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 07/19] virtiofsd: use GDateTime for formatting timestamp for debug messages

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

The GDateTime APIs provided by GLib avoid portability pitfalls, such
as some platforms where 'struct timeval.tv_sec' field is still 'long'
instead of 'time_t'. When combined with automatic cleanup, GDateTime
often results in simpler code too.

Localtime is changed to UTC to avoid the need to grant extra seccomp
permissions for GLib's access of the timezone database.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210611164319.67762-1-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 25 ++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 49c21fd855..9858e961d9 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -3559,10 +3559,6 @@ static void setup_nofile_rlimit(unsigned long rlimit_nofile)
 static void log_func(enum fuse_log_level level, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
 {
     g_autofree char *localfmt = NULL;
-    struct timespec ts;
-    struct tm tm;
-    char sec_fmt[sizeof "2020-12-07 18:17:54"];
-    char zone_fmt[sizeof "+0100"];
 
     if (current_log_level < level) {
         return;
@@ -3574,23 +3570,10 @@ static void log_func(enum fuse_log_level level, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
             localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[ID: %08ld] %s", syscall(__NR_gettid),
                                        fmt);
         } else {
-            /* try formatting a broken-down timestamp */
-            if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) != -1 &&
-                localtime_r(&ts.tv_sec, &tm) != NULL &&
-                strftime(sec_fmt, sizeof sec_fmt, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
-                         &tm) != 0 &&
-                strftime(zone_fmt, sizeof zone_fmt, "%z", &tm) != 0) {
-                localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[%s.%02ld%s] [ID: %08ld] %s",
-                                           sec_fmt,
-                                           ts.tv_nsec / (10L * 1000 * 1000),
-                                           zone_fmt, syscall(__NR_gettid),
-                                           fmt);
-            } else {
-                /* fall back to a flat timestamp */
-                localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[%" PRId64 "] [ID: %08ld] %s",
-                                           get_clock(), syscall(__NR_gettid),
-                                           fmt);
-            }
+            g_autoptr(GDateTime) now = g_date_time_new_now_utc();
+            g_autofree char *nowstr = g_date_time_format(now, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f%z");
+            localfmt = g_strdup_printf("[%s] [ID: %08ld] %s",
+                                       nowstr, syscall(__NR_gettid), fmt);
         }
         fmt = localfmt;
     }
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 08/19] docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied
by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the
remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access
control rules.

For example if 'trusted.*' which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN is remapped
to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can
write to 'user.*' can bypass the CAP_SYS_ADMIN control. Thus the
target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes
by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.

The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right
thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting
this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins
and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210611120427.49736-1-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
index 4911e797cb..a6c3502710 100644
--- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
+++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options
   timeout.  ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency.
   The default is ``auto``.
 
-xattr-mapping
--------------
+Extended attribute (xattr) mapping
+----------------------------------
 
 By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server
 file system.  This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used
@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the
 virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot
 access some attributes.
 
+Mapping syntax
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
 A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping``
 string consists of a series of rules.
 
@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do
 extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally
 does itself.
 
-xattr-mapping Examples
-----------------------
+Security considerations
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using
+well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different
+access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple
+partitions
+
+ * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem
+ * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+ * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership
+
+While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes
+and access control rules.
+
+When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to
+ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to
+evade the guest access control rules.
+
+Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to
+``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged
+user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs
+under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access
+control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing
+to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``.
+
+As noted above, the partitions used and access controls
+applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to
+try to predict what the guest OS will use.
+
+The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is
+to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.
+This is shown in example (1) below.
+
+If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes,
+then rules must be added to explicitly block direct
+access to the target of the remapping. This is shown
+in example (2) below.
+
+Mapping examples
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.'
 
@@ -271,7 +314,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'.
 The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes
 on the host.
 The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting
-the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly.
+the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access
+control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix
+remapping.
 Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes
 through.
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 09/19] virtiofsd: Don't allow file creation with FUSE_OPEN

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>

A well behaved FUSE client uses FUSE_CREATE to create files. It isn't
supposed to pass O_CREAT along a FUSE_OPEN request, as documented in
the "fuse_lowlevel.h" header :

    /**
     * Open a file
     *
     * Open flags are available in fi->flags. The following rules
     * apply.
     *
     *  - Creation (O_CREAT, O_EXCL, O_NOCTTY) flags will be
     *    filtered out / handled by the kernel.

But if the client happens to do it anyway, the server ends up passing
this flag to open() without the mandatory mode_t 4th argument. Since
open() is a variadic function, glibc will happily pass whatever it
finds on the stack to the syscall. If this file is compiled with
-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2, glibc will even detect that and abort:

*** invalid openat64 call: O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE without mode ***: terminated

Specifying O_CREAT with FUSE_OPEN is a protocol violation. Check this
in do_open(), print out a message and return an error to the client,
EINVAL like we already do when fuse_mbuf_iter_advance() fails.

The FUSE filesystem doesn't currently support O_TMPFILE, but the very
same would happen if O_TMPFILE was passed in a FUSE_OPEN request. Check
that as well.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <20210624101809.48032-1-groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
index 7fe2cef1eb..3d725bcba2 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
@@ -1084,6 +1084,12 @@ static void do_open(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
         return;
     }
 
+    /* File creation is handled by do_create() or do_mknod() */
+    if (arg->flags & (O_CREAT | O_TMPFILE)) {
+        fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
+        return;
+    }
+
     memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi));
     fi.flags = arg->flags;
     fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID;
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 10/19] virtiofsd: Fix fuse setxattr() API change issue

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

With kernel header updates fuse_setxattr_in struct has grown in size.
But this new struct size only takes affect if user has opted in
for fuse feature FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT otherwise fuse continues to
send "fuse_setxattr_in" of older size. Older size is determined
by FUSE_COMPAT_SETXATTR_IN_SIZE.

Fix this. If we have not opted in for FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT, then
expect that we will get fuse_setxattr_in of size FUSE_COMPAT_SETXATTR_IN_SIZE
and not sizeof(struct fuse_sexattr_in).

Fixes: 278f064e4524 ("Update Linux headers to 5.13-rc4")
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-2-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h   | 5 +++++
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
index fa9671872e..0c2665b977 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ struct fuse_file_info {
  */
 #define FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2 (1 << 28)
 
+/**
+ * Indicates that file server supports extended struct fuse_setxattr_in
+ */
+#define FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29)
+
 /**
  * Ioctl flags
  *
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
index 3d725bcba2..2028677907 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
@@ -1425,8 +1425,13 @@ static void do_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
     struct fuse_setxattr_in *arg;
     const char *name;
     const char *value;
+    bool setxattr_ext = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
 
-    arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg));
+    if (setxattr_ext) {
+        arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg));
+    } else {
+        arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, FUSE_COMPAT_SETXATTR_IN_SIZE);
+    }
     name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter);
     if (!arg || !name) {
         fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL);
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 11/19] virtiofsd: Fix xattr operations overwriting errno

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

getxattr/setxattr/removexattr/listxattr operations handle regualar
and non-regular files differently. For the case of non-regular files
we do fchdir(/proc/self/fd) and the xattr operation and then revert
back to original working directory. After this we are saving errno
and that's buggy because fchdir() will overwrite the errno.

FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
ret = getxattr(procname, name, value, size);
FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);

if (ret == -1)
    saverr = errno

In above example, if getxattr() failed, we will still return 0 to caller
as errno must have been written by FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd) call.
Fix all such instances and capture "errno" early and save in "saverr"
variable.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-3-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 16 ++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 9858e961d9..ccbda98c5a 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -2791,15 +2791,17 @@ static void lo_getxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
             goto out_err;
         }
         ret = fgetxattr(fd, name, value, size);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
     } else {
         /* fchdir should not fail here */
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
         ret = getxattr(procname, name, value, size);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
     }
 
     if (ret == -1) {
-        goto out_err;
+        goto out;
     }
     if (size) {
         saverr = 0;
@@ -2864,15 +2866,17 @@ static void lo_listxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, size_t size)
             goto out_err;
         }
         ret = flistxattr(fd, value, size);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
     } else {
         /* fchdir should not fail here */
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
         ret = listxattr(procname, value, size);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
     }
 
     if (ret == -1) {
-        goto out_err;
+        goto out;
     }
     if (size) {
         saverr = 0;
@@ -2998,15 +3002,15 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
             goto out;
         }
         ret = fsetxattr(fd, name, value, size, flags);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
     } else {
         /* fchdir should not fail here */
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
         ret = setxattr(procname, name, value, size, flags);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
     }
 
-    saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
-
 out:
     if (fd >= 0) {
         close(fd);
@@ -3064,15 +3068,15 @@ static void lo_removexattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name)
             goto out;
         }
         ret = fremovexattr(fd, name);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
     } else {
         /* fchdir should not fail here */
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
         ret = removexattr(procname, name);
+        saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
     }
 
-    saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
-
 out:
     if (fd >= 0) {
         close(fd);
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 12/19] virtiofsd: Add support for extended setxattr

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Add the bits to enable support for setxattr_ext if fuse offers it. Do not
enable it by default yet. Let passthrough_ll opt-in. Enabling it by deafult
kind of automatically means that you are taking responsibility of clearing
SGID if ACL is set.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-4-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
  Fixed up double def in fuse_common.h
---
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
 tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h  |  3 ++-
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
index 2028677907..e4679c73ab 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c
@@ -1445,7 +1445,9 @@ static void do_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
     }
 
     if (req->se->op.setxattr) {
-        req->se->op.setxattr(req, nodeid, name, value, arg->size, arg->flags);
+        uint32_t setxattr_flags = setxattr_ext ? arg->setxattr_flags : 0;
+        req->se->op.setxattr(req, nodeid, name, value, arg->size, arg->flags,
+                             setxattr_flags);
     } else {
         fuse_reply_err(req, ENOSYS);
     }
@@ -1992,6 +1994,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
     if (arg->flags & FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2) {
         se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2;
     }
+    if (arg->flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) {
+        se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
+    }
 #ifdef HAVE_SPLICE
 #ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE
     se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE;
@@ -2127,6 +2132,10 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid,
         outarg.flags |= FUSE_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2;
     }
 
+    if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT) {
+        outarg.flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT;
+    }
+
     fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor);
     fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags);
     fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "   max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead);
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h
index 3bf786b034..4b4e8c9724 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.h
@@ -798,7 +798,8 @@ struct fuse_lowlevel_ops {
      *   fuse_reply_err
      */
     void (*setxattr)(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *name,
-                     const char *value, size_t size, int flags);
+                     const char *value, size_t size, int flags,
+                     uint32_t setxattr_flags);
 
     /**
      * Get an extended attribute
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index ccbda98c5a..4dec087bd4 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -2955,7 +2955,8 @@ out:
 }
 
 static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
-                        const char *value, size_t size, int flags)
+                        const char *value, size_t size, int flags,
+                        uint32_t extra_flags)
 {
     char procname[64];
     const char *name;
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 13/19] virtiofsd: Add umask to seccom allow list

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

Patches in this series  are going to make use of "umask" syscall.
So allow it.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-5-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c
index 62441cfcdb..f49ed94b5e 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_seccomp.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static const int syscall_allowlist[] = {
     SCMP_SYS(utimensat),
     SCMP_SYS(write),
     SCMP_SYS(writev),
+    SCMP_SYS(umask),
 };
 
 /* Syscalls used when --syslog is enabled */
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 14/19] virtiofsd: Add capability to change/restore umask

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

When parent directory has default acl and a file is created in that
directory, then umask is ignored and final file permissions are
determined using default acl instead. (man 2 umask).

Currently, fuse applies the umask and sends modified mode in create
request accordingly. fuse server can set FUSE_DONT_MASK and tell
fuse client to not apply umask and fuse server will take care of
it as needed.

With posix acls enabled, requirement will be that we want umask
to determine final file mode if parent directory does not have
default acl.

So if posix acls are enabled, opt in for FUSE_DONT_MASK. virtiofsd
will set umask of the thread doing file creation. And host kernel
should use that umask if parent directory does not have default
acls, otherwise umask does not take affect.

Miklos mentioned that we already call unshare(CLONE_FS) for
every thread. That means umask has now become property of per
thread and it should be ok to manipulate it in file creation path.

This patch only adds capability to change umask and restore it. It
does not enable it yet. Next few patches will add capability to enable it
based on if user enabled posix_acl or not.

This should fix fstest generic/099.

Reported-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-6-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 4dec087bd4..65b2c6fd74 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct lo_inode {
 struct lo_cred {
     uid_t euid;
     gid_t egid;
+    mode_t umask;
 };
 
 enum {
@@ -172,6 +173,8 @@ struct lo_data {
     /* An O_PATH file descriptor to /proc/self/fd/ */
     int proc_self_fd;
     int user_killpriv_v2, killpriv_v2;
+    /* If set, virtiofsd is responsible for setting umask during creation */
+    bool change_umask;
 };
 
 static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
@@ -1134,7 +1137,8 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name)
  * ownership of caller.
  * TODO: What about selinux context?
  */
-static int lo_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old)
+static int lo_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old,
+                          bool change_umask)
 {
     int res;
 
@@ -1154,11 +1158,14 @@ static int lo_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old)
         return errno_save;
     }
 
+    if (change_umask) {
+        old->umask = umask(req->ctx.umask);
+    }
     return 0;
 }
 
 /* Regain Privileges */
-static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old)
+static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old, bool restore_umask)
 {
     int res;
 
@@ -1173,6 +1180,9 @@ static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old)
         fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "setegid(%u): %m\n", old->egid);
         exit(1);
     }
+
+    if (restore_umask)
+        umask(old->umask);
 }
 
 static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
@@ -1202,7 +1212,7 @@ static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
         return;
     }
 
-    saverr = lo_change_cred(req, &old);
+    saverr = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
     if (saverr) {
         goto out;
     }
@@ -1211,7 +1221,7 @@ static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
 
     saverr = errno;
 
-    lo_restore_cred(&old);
+    lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask && !S_ISLNK(mode));
 
     if (res == -1) {
         goto out;
@@ -1917,7 +1927,7 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
         return;
     }
 
-    err = lo_change_cred(req, &old);
+    err = lo_change_cred(req, &old, lo->change_umask);
     if (err) {
         goto out;
     }
@@ -1928,7 +1938,7 @@ static void lo_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name,
     fd = openat(parent_inode->fd, name, fi->flags | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode);
     err = fd == -1 ? errno : 0;
 
-    lo_restore_cred(&old);
+    lo_restore_cred(&old, lo->change_umask);
 
     /* Ignore the error if file exists and O_EXCL was not given */
     if (err && (err != EEXIST || (fi->flags & O_EXCL))) {
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 15/19] virtiofsd: Switch creds, drop FSETID for system.posix_acl_access xattr

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

When posix access acls are set on a file, it can lead to adjusting file
permissions (mode) as well. If caller does not have CAP_FSETID and it
also does not have membership of owner group, this will lead to clearing
SGID bit in mode.

Current fuse code is written in such a way that it expects file server
to take care of chaning file mode (permission), if there is a need.
Right now, host kernel does not clear SGID bit because virtiofsd is
running as root and has CAP_FSETID. For host kernel to clear SGID,
virtiofsd need to switch to gid of caller in guest and also drop
CAP_FSETID (if caller did not have it to begin with).

If SGID needs to be cleared, client will set the flag
FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID in setxattr request. In that case server
should kill sgid.

Currently just switch to uid/gid of the caller and drop CAP_FSETID
and that should do it.

This should fix the xfstest generic/375 test case.

We don't have to switch uid for this to work. That could be one optimization
that pass a parameter to lo_change_cred() to only switch gid and not uid.

Also this will not work whenever (if ever) we support idmapped mounts. In
that case it is possible that uid/gid in request are 0/0 but still we
need to clear SGID. So we will have to pick a non-root sgid and switch
to that instead. That's an TODO item for future when idmapped mount
support is introduced.

This patch only adds the capability to switch creds and drop FSETID
when acl xattr is set. This does not take affect yet. It can take
affect when next patch adds the capability to enable posix_acl.

Reported-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-7-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 65b2c6fd74..6e30fd9113 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct lo_data {
     int user_killpriv_v2, killpriv_v2;
     /* If set, virtiofsd is responsible for setting umask during creation */
     bool change_umask;
+    int posix_acl;
 };
 
 static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
@@ -1185,6 +1186,51 @@ static void lo_restore_cred(struct lo_cred *old, bool restore_umask)
         umask(old->umask);
 }
 
+/*
+ * A helper to change cred and drop capability. Returns 0 on success and
+ * errno on error
+ */
+static int lo_drop_cap_change_cred(fuse_req_t req, struct lo_cred *old,
+                                   bool change_umask, const char *cap_name,
+                                   bool *cap_dropped)
+{
+    int ret;
+    bool __cap_dropped;
+
+    assert(cap_name);
+
+    ret = drop_effective_cap(cap_name, &__cap_dropped);
+    if (ret) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = lo_change_cred(req, old, change_umask);
+    if (ret) {
+        if (__cap_dropped) {
+            if (gain_effective_cap(cap_name)) {
+                fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to gain CAP_%s\n", cap_name);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (cap_dropped) {
+        *cap_dropped = __cap_dropped;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void lo_restore_cred_gain_cap(struct lo_cred *old, bool restore_umask,
+                                     const char *cap_name)
+{
+    assert(cap_name);
+
+    lo_restore_cred(old, restore_umask);
+
+    if (gain_effective_cap(cap_name)) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Failed to gain CAP_%s\n", cap_name);
+    }
+}
+
 static void lo_mknod_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent,
                              const char *name, mode_t mode, dev_t rdev,
                              const char *link)
@@ -2976,6 +3022,9 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
     ssize_t ret;
     int saverr;
     int fd = -1;
+    bool switched_creds = false;
+    bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false;
+    struct lo_cred old = {};
 
     mapped_name = NULL;
     name = in_name;
@@ -3006,6 +3055,26 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
              ", name=%s value=%s size=%zd)\n", ino, name, value, size);
 
     sprintf(procname, "%i", inode->fd);
+    /*
+     * If we are setting posix access acl and if SGID needs to be
+     * cleared, then switch to caller's gid and drop CAP_FSETID
+     * and that should make sure host kernel clears SGID.
+     *
+     * This probably will not work when we support idmapped mounts.
+     * In that case we will need to find a non-root gid and switch
+     * to it. (Instead of gid in request). Fix it when we support
+     * idmapped mounts.
+     */
+    if (lo->posix_acl && !strcmp(name, "system.posix_acl_access")
+        && (extra_flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID)) {
+        ret = lo_drop_cap_change_cred(req, &old, false, "FSETID",
+                                      &cap_fsetid_dropped);
+        if (ret) {
+            saverr = ret;
+            goto out;
+        }
+        switched_creds = true;
+    }
     if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
         fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
         if (fd < 0) {
@@ -3021,6 +3090,12 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
         saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
         FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
     }
+    if (switched_creds) {
+        if (cap_fsetid_dropped)
+            lo_restore_cred_gain_cap(&old, false, "FSETID");
+        else
+            lo_restore_cred(&old, false);
+    }
 
 out:
     if (fd >= 0) {
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 16/19] virtiofsd: Add an option to enable/disable posix acls

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>

fuse has an option FUSE_POSIX_ACL which needs to be opted in by fuse
server to enable posix acls. As of now we are not opting in for this,
so posix acls are disabled on virtiofs by default.

Add virtiofsd option "-o posix_acl/no_posix_acl" to let users enable/disable
posix acl support. By default it is disabled as of now due to performance
concerns with cache=none.

Currently even if file server has not opted in for FUSE_POSIX_ACL, user can
still query acl and set acl, and system.posix_acl_access and
system.posix_acl_default xattrs show up listxattr response.

Miklos said this is confusing. So he said lets block and filter
system.posix_acl_access and system.posix_acl_default xattrs in
getxattr/setxattr/listxattr if user has explicitly disabled
posix acls using -o no_posix_acl.

As of now continuing to keeping the existing behavior if user did not
specify any option to disable acl support due to concerns about backward
compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210622150852.1507204-8-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst         |   3 +
 tools/virtiofsd/helper.c         |   1 +
 tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
index a6c3502710..c4ac7fdf38 100644
--- a/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
+++ b/docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst
@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ Options
     Enable/disable extended attributes (xattr) on files and directories.  The
     default is ``no_xattr``.
 
+  * posix_acl|no_posix_acl -
+    Enable/disable posix acl support.  Posix ACLs are disabled by default`.
+
 .. option:: --socket-path=PATH
 
   Listen on vhost-user UNIX domain socket at PATH.
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
index 5e98ed702b..a8295d975a 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/helper.c
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ void fuse_cmdline_help(void)
            "                               to virtiofsd from guest applications.\n"
            "                               default: no_allow_direct_io\n"
            "    -o announce_submounts      Announce sub-mount points to the guest\n"
+           "    -o posix_acl/no_posix_acl  Enable/Disable posix_acl. (default: disabled)\n"
            );
 }
 
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 6e30fd9113..38b2af8599 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ struct lo_data {
     int user_killpriv_v2, killpriv_v2;
     /* If set, virtiofsd is responsible for setting umask during creation */
     bool change_umask;
-    int posix_acl;
+    int user_posix_acl, posix_acl;
 };
 
 static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ static const struct fuse_opt lo_opts[] = {
     { "announce_submounts", offsetof(struct lo_data, announce_submounts), 1 },
     { "killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 1 },
     { "no_killpriv_v2", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_killpriv_v2), 0 },
+    { "posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 1 },
+    { "no_posix_acl", offsetof(struct lo_data, user_posix_acl), 0 },
     FUSE_OPT_END
 };
 static bool use_syslog = false;
@@ -706,6 +708,32 @@ static void lo_init(void *userdata, struct fuse_conn_info *conn)
         conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_HANDLE_KILLPRIV_V2;
         lo->killpriv_v2 = 0;
     }
+
+    if (lo->user_posix_acl == 1) {
+        /*
+         * User explicitly asked for this option. Enable it unconditionally.
+         * If connection does not have this capability, print error message
+         * now. It will fail later in fuse_lowlevel.c
+         */
+        if (!(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL) ||
+            !(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_DONT_MASK) ||
+            !(conn->capable & FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT)) {
+            fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "lo_init: Can not enable posix acl."
+                     " kernel does not support FUSE_POSIX_ACL, FUSE_DONT_MASK"
+                     " or FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT capability.\n");
+        } else {
+            fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: enabling posix acl\n");
+        }
+
+        conn->want |= FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL | FUSE_CAP_DONT_MASK |
+                      FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT;
+        lo->change_umask = true;
+        lo->posix_acl = true;
+    } else {
+        /* User either did not specify anything or wants it disabled */
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, "lo_init: disabling posix_acl\n");
+        conn->want &= ~FUSE_CAP_POSIX_ACL;
+    }
 }
 
 static void lo_getattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino,
@@ -2783,6 +2811,63 @@ static int xattr_map_server(const struct lo_data *lo, const char *server_name,
         assert(fchdir_res == 0);                       \
     } while (0)
 
+static bool block_xattr(struct lo_data *lo, const char *name)
+{
+    /*
+     * If user explicitly enabled posix_acl or did not provide any option,
+     * do not block acl. Otherwise block system.posix_acl_access and
+     * system.posix_acl_default xattrs.
+     */
+    if (lo->user_posix_acl) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (!strcmp(name, "system.posix_acl_access") ||
+        !strcmp(name, "system.posix_acl_default"))
+            return true;
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns number of bytes in xattr_list after filtering on success. This
+ * could be zero as well if nothing is left after filtering.
+ *
+ * Returns negative error code on failure.
+ * xattr_list is modified in place.
+ */
+static int remove_blocked_xattrs(struct lo_data *lo, char *xattr_list,
+                                 unsigned in_size)
+{
+    size_t out_index, in_index;
+
+    /*
+     * As of now we only filter out acl xattrs. If acls are enabled or
+     * they have not been explicitly disabled, there is nothing to
+     * filter.
+     */
+    if (lo->user_posix_acl) {
+        return in_size;
+    }
+
+    out_index = 0;
+    in_index = 0;
+    while (in_index < in_size) {
+        char *in_ptr = xattr_list + in_index;
+
+        /* Length of current attribute name */
+        size_t in_len = strlen(xattr_list + in_index) + 1;
+
+        if (!block_xattr(lo, in_ptr)) {
+            if (in_index != out_index) {
+                memmove(xattr_list + out_index, xattr_list + in_index, in_len);
+            }
+            out_index += in_len;
+        }
+        in_index += in_len;
+     }
+    return out_index;
+}
+
 static void lo_getxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
                         size_t size)
 {
@@ -2796,6 +2881,11 @@ static void lo_getxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
     int saverr;
     int fd = -1;
 
+    if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
+        fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
+        return;
+    }
+
     mapped_name = NULL;
     name = in_name;
     if (lo->xattrmap) {
@@ -2986,6 +3076,12 @@ static void lo_listxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, size_t size)
                 goto out;
             }
         }
+
+        ret = remove_blocked_xattrs(lo, value, ret);
+        if (ret <= 0) {
+            saverr = -ret;
+            goto out;
+        }
         fuse_reply_buf(req, value, ret);
     } else {
         /*
@@ -3026,6 +3122,11 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
     bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false;
     struct lo_cred old = {};
 
+    if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
+        fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
+        return;
+    }
+
     mapped_name = NULL;
     name = in_name;
     if (lo->xattrmap) {
@@ -3118,6 +3219,11 @@ static void lo_removexattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name)
     int saverr;
     int fd = -1;
 
+    if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
+        fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
+        return;
+    }
+
     mapped_name = NULL;
     name = in_name;
     if (lo->xattrmap) {
@@ -3795,6 +3901,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
         .allow_direct_io = 0,
         .proc_self_fd = -1,
         .user_killpriv_v2 = -1,
+        .user_posix_acl = -1,
     };
     struct lo_map_elem *root_elem;
     struct lo_map_elem *reserve_elem;
@@ -3923,6 +4030,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
         exit(1);
     }
 
+    if (lo.user_posix_acl == 1 && !lo.xattr) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "Can't enable posix ACLs. xattrs are disabled."
+                 "\n");
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
     lo.use_statx = true;
 
     se = fuse_session_new(&args, &lo_oper, sizeof(lo_oper), &lo);
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 17/19] tests/migration: parse the thread-id key of CpuInfoFast

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Hyman Huang(黄勇) <huangy81@chinatelecom.cn>

thread_id in CpuInfoFast is deprecated, parse thread-id instead
after execute qmp query-cpus-fast. fix this so that test can
go smoothly.

Signed-off-by: Hyman Huang(黄勇) <huangy81@chinatelecom.cn>
Message-Id: <584578c0a0dd781cee45f72ddf517f6e6a41c504.1622729934.git.huangy81@chinatelecom.cn>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py b/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
index 208e095794..9e16fa92d2 100644
--- a/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
+++ b/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ def _migrate(self, hardware, scenario, src, dst, connect_uri):
         vcpus = src.command("query-cpus-fast")
         src_threads = []
         for vcpu in vcpus:
-            src_threads.append(vcpu["thread_id"])
+            src_threads.append(vcpu["thread-id"])
 
         # XXX how to get dst timings on remote host ?
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 18/19] tests/migration: fix "downtime_limit" type when "migrate-set-parameters"

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Hyman Huang(黄勇) <huangy81@chinatelecom.cn>

migrate-set-parameters parse "downtime_limit" as integer type when
execute "migrate-set-parameters" before migration, and, the unit
dowtime_limit is milliseconds, fix this two so that test can go
smoothly.

Signed-off-by: Hyman Huang(黄勇) <huangy81@chinatelecom.cn>
Message-Id: <31d82df24cc0c468dbe4d2d86730158ebf248071.1622729934.git.huangy81@chinatelecom.cn>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py b/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
index 9e16fa92d2..7c991c4407 100644
--- a/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
+++ b/tests/migration/guestperf/engine.py
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ def _migrate(self, hardware, scenario, src, dst, connect_uri):
                            max_bandwidth=scenario._bandwidth * 1024 * 1024)
 
         resp = src.command("migrate-set-parameters",
-                           downtime_limit=scenario._downtime / 1024.0)
+                           downtime_limit=scenario._downtime)
 
         if scenario._compression_mt:
             resp = src.command("migrate-set-capabilities",
-- 
2.31.1

[PULL 19/19] migration/rdma: Use error_report to suppress errno message

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)]

From: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>

Since the prior calls are successful, in this case a errno doesn't
indicate a real error which would just make us confused.

before:
(qemu) migrate -d rdma:192.168.22.23:8888
source_resolve_host RDMA Device opened: kernel name rxe_eth0 uverbs device name uverbs2, infiniband_verbs class device path /sys/class/infiniband_verbs/uverbs2, infiniband class device path /sys/class/infiniband/rxe_eth0, transport: (2) Ethernet
rdma_get_cm_event != EVENT_ESTABLISHED after rdma_connect: No space left on device

Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20210628071959.23455-1-lizhijian@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
---
 migration/rdma.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/migration/rdma.c b/migration/rdma.c
index d90b29a4b5..b6cc4bef4a 100644
--- a/migration/rdma.c
+++ b/migration/rdma.c
@@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ route:
     if (cm_event->event != RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED) {
         ERROR(errp, "result not equal to event_addr_resolved %s",
                 rdma_event_str(cm_event->event));
-        perror("rdma_resolve_addr");
+        error_report("rdma_resolve_addr");
         rdma_ack_cm_event(cm_event);
         ret = -EINVAL;
         goto err_resolve_get_addr;
@@ -2544,7 +2544,7 @@ static int qemu_rdma_connect(RDMAContext *rdma, Error **errp, bool return_path)
     }
 
     if (cm_event->event != RDMA_CM_EVENT_ESTABLISHED) {
-        perror("rdma_get_cm_event != EVENT_ESTABLISHED after rdma_connect");
+        error_report("rdma_get_cm_event != EVENT_ESTABLISHED after rdma_connect");
         ERROR(errp, "connecting to destination!");
         rdma_ack_cm_event(cm_event);
         goto err_rdma_source_connect;
-- 
2.31.1

Re: [PULL v2 00/19] migration queue

[Peter Maydell]

On Mon, 5 Jul 2021 at 11:05, Dr. David Alan Gilbert (git)
<dgilbert@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
>
> The following changes since commit 711c0418c8c1ce3a24346f058b001c4c5a2f0f81:
>
>   Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/philmd/tags/mips-20210702' into staging (2021-07-04 14:04:12 +0100)
>
> are available in the Git repository at:
>
>   https://gitlab.com/dagrh/qemu.git tags/pull-migration-20210705a
>
> for you to fetch changes up to e5f607913cee3f3b486eb024dbc7079b51f6da57:
>
>   migration/rdma: Use error_report to suppress errno message (2021-07-05 10:51:26 +0100)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Migration and virtiofs pull 2021-07-01 v2
>
> Dropped Peter Xu's migration-test fix to reenable
> most of the migration tests when uffd isn't available;
> we're seeing at least one seg in github CI (on qemu-system-i386)
> and Peter Maydell is reporting a hang on Openbsd.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>


Applied, thanks.

Please update the changelog at https://wiki.qemu.org/ChangeLog/6.1
for any user-visible changes.

-- PMM