* [PATCH 4.19 1/4] bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data
2021-08-12 17:00 [PATCH 4.19 0/4] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-33624 Ovidiu Panait
@ 2021-08-12 17:00 ` Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 2/4] bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification Ovidiu Panait
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ovidiu Panait @ 2021-08-12 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: bpf
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
commit d203b0fd863a2261e5d00b97f3d060c4c2a6db71 upstream.
Instead of relying on current env->pass_cnt, use the seen count from the
old aux data in adjust_insn_aux_data(), and expand it to the new range of
patched instructions. This change is valid given we always expand 1:n
with n>=1, so what applies to the old/original instruction needs to apply
for the replacement as well.
Not relying on env->pass_cnt is a prerequisite for a later change where we
want to avoid marking an instruction seen when verified under speculative
execution path.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: - declare old_data as bool instead of u32 (struct bpf_insn_aux_data.seen
is bool in 5.4)
- adjusted context for 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4ce032c4acd0..70cadee591f3 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5690,6 +5690,7 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
+ bool old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
int i;
if (cnt == 1)
@@ -5701,8 +5702,10 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
- for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++)
- new_data[i].seen = true;
+ for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
+ /* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
+ new_data[i].seen = old_seen;
+ }
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.19 2/4] bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification
2021-08-12 17:00 [PATCH 4.19 0/4] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-33624 Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 1/4] bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data Ovidiu Panait
@ 2021-08-12 17:00 ` Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 3/4] bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches Ovidiu Panait
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ovidiu Panait @ 2021-08-12 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: bpf
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
commit fe9a5ca7e370e613a9a75a13008a3845ea759d6e upstream.
... in such circumstances, we do not want to mark the instruction as seen given
the goal is still to jmp-1 rewrite/sanitize dead code, if it is not reachable
from the non-speculative path verification. We do however want to verify it for
safety regardless.
With the patch as-is all the insns that have been marked as seen before the
patch will also be marked as seen after the patch (just with a potentially
different non-zero count). An upcoming patch will also verify paths that are
unreachable in the non-speculative domain, hence this extension is needed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: - env->pass_cnt is not used in 4.19, so adjust sanitize_mark_insn_seen()
to assign "true" instead
- drop sanitize_insn_aux_data() comment changes, as the function is not
present in 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 70cadee591f3..566eeee5e334 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2901,6 +2901,19 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
}
+static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+
+ /* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
+ * insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
+ * the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
+ * rewrite/sanitize them.
+ */
+ if (!vstate->speculative)
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
+}
+
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
@@ -5254,7 +5267,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
- env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
+ sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
@@ -5472,7 +5485,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return err;
env->insn_idx++;
- env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
+ sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
} else {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.19 3/4] bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches
2021-08-12 17:00 [PATCH 4.19 0/4] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-33624 Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 1/4] bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 2/4] bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification Ovidiu Panait
@ 2021-08-12 17:00 ` Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 4/4] bpf, selftests: Adjust few selftest outcomes wrt unreachable code Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-13 8:38 ` [PATCH 4.19 0/4] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-33624 Greg KH
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ovidiu Panait @ 2021-08-12 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: bpf
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
commit 9183671af6dbf60a1219371d4ed73e23f43b49db upstream.
The verifier only enumerates valid control-flow paths and skips paths that
are unreachable in the non-speculative domain. And so it can miss issues
under speculative execution on mispredicted branches.
For example, a type confusion has been demonstrated with the following
crafted program:
// r0 = pointer to a map array entry
// r6 = pointer to readable stack slot
// r9 = scalar controlled by attacker
1: r0 = *(u64 *)(r0) // cache miss
2: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 4
3: r6 = r9
4: if r0 != 0x1 goto line 6
5: r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
6: // leak r9
Since line 3 runs iff r0 == 0 and line 5 runs iff r0 == 1, the verifier
concludes that the pointer dereference on line 5 is safe. But: if the
attacker trains both the branches to fall-through, such that the following
is speculatively executed ...
r6 = r9
r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
// leak r9
... then the program will dereference an attacker-controlled value and could
leak its content under speculative execution via side-channel. This requires
to mistrain the branch predictor, which can be rather tricky, because the
branches are mutually exclusive. However such training can be done at
congruent addresses in user space using different branches that are not
mutually exclusive. That is, by training branches in user space ...
A: if r0 != 0x0 goto line C
B: ...
C: if r0 != 0x0 goto line D
D: ...
... such that addresses A and C collide to the same CPU branch prediction
entries in the PHT (pattern history table) as those of the BPF program's
lines 2 and 4, respectively. A non-privileged attacker could simply brute
force such collisions in the PHT until observing the attack succeeding.
Alternative methods to mistrain the branch predictor are also possible that
avoid brute forcing the collisions in the PHT. A reliable attack has been
demonstrated, for example, using the following crafted program:
// r0 = pointer to a [control] map array entry
// r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0), training/attack phase
// r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 8), oob address
// [...]
// r0 = pointer to a [data] map array entry
1: if r7 == 0x3 goto line 3
2: r8 = r0
// crafted sequence of conditional jumps to separate the conditional
// branch in line 193 from the current execution flow
3: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 5
4: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
5: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 7
6: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
[...]
187: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 189
188: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
// load any slowly-loaded value (due to cache miss in phase 3) ...
189: r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0x1200)
// ... and turn it into known zero for verifier, while preserving slowly-
// loaded dependency when executing:
190: r3 &= 1
191: r3 &= 2
// speculatively bypassed phase dependency
192: r7 += r3
193: if r7 == 0x3 goto exit
194: r4 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0)
// leak r4
As can be seen, in training phase (phase != 0x3), the condition in line 1
turns into false and therefore r8 with the oob address is overridden with
the valid map value address, which in line 194 we can read out without
issues. However, in attack phase, line 2 is skipped, and due to the cache
miss in line 189 where the map value is (zeroed and later) added to the
phase register, the condition in line 193 takes the fall-through path due
to prior branch predictor training, where under speculation, it'll load the
byte at oob address r8 (unknown scalar type at that point) which could then
be leaked via side-channel.
One way to mitigate these is to 'branch off' an unreachable path, meaning,
the current verification path keeps following the is_branch_taken() path
and we push the other branch to the verification stack. Given this is
unreachable from the non-speculative domain, this branch's vstate is
explicitly marked as speculative. This is needed for two reasons: i) if
this path is solely seen from speculative execution, then we later on still
want the dead code elimination to kick in in order to sanitize these
instructions with jmp-1s, and ii) to ensure that paths walked in the
non-speculative domain are not pruned from earlier walks of paths walked in
the speculative domain. Additionally, for robustness, we mark the registers
which have been part of the conditional as unknown in the speculative path
given there should be no assumptions made on their content.
The fix in here mitigates type confusion attacks described earlier due to
i) all code paths in the BPF program being explored and ii) existing
verifier logic already ensuring that given memory access instruction
references one specific data structure.
An alternative to this fix that has also been looked at in this scope was to
mark aux->alu_state at the jump instruction with a BPF_JMP_TAKEN state as
well as direction encoding (always-goto, always-fallthrough, unknown), such
that mixing of different always-* directions themselves as well as mixing of
always-* with unknown directions would cause a program rejection by the
verifier, e.g. programs with constructs like 'if ([...]) { x = 0; } else
{ x = 1; }' with subsequent 'if (x == 1) { [...] }'. For unprivileged, this
would result in only single direction always-* taken paths, and unknown taken
paths being allowed, such that the former could be patched from a conditional
jump to an unconditional jump (ja). Compared to this approach here, it would
have two downsides: i) valid programs that otherwise are not performing any
pointer arithmetic, etc, would potentially be rejected/broken, and ii) we are
required to turn off path pruning for unprivileged, where both can be avoided
in this work through pushing the invalid branch to the verification stack.
The issue was originally discovered by Adam and Ofek, and later independently
discovered and reported as a result of Benedict and Piotr's research work.
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Adam Morrison <mad@cs.tau.ac.il>
Reported-by: Ofek Kirzner <ofekkir@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: use allow_ptr_leaks instead of bypass_spec_v1]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 566eeee5e334..2bf83305e5ab 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2812,6 +2812,27 @@ struct bpf_sanitize_info {
bool mask_to_left;
};
+static struct bpf_verifier_state *
+sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
+
+ branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
+ if (branch && insn) {
+ regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
+ if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
+ } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
+ }
+ }
+ return branch;
+}
+
static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
@@ -2895,7 +2916,8 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
tmp = *dst_reg;
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
}
- ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
+ ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
+ env->insn_idx);
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
*dst_reg = tmp;
return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
@@ -4288,14 +4310,28 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off))
pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, src_reg->var_off.value,
opcode);
+
if (pred == 1) {
- /* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
+ /* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
+ * the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
+ * execution.
+ */
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
+ !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
+ *insn_idx))
+ return -EFAULT;
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else if (pred == 0) {
- /* only follow fall-through branch, since
- * that's where the program will go
+ /* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
+ * program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
+ * simulation under speculative execution.
*/
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
+ !sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
+ *insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
+ *insn_idx))
+ return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.19 4/4] bpf, selftests: Adjust few selftest outcomes wrt unreachable code
2021-08-12 17:00 [PATCH 4.19 0/4] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-33624 Ovidiu Panait
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-08-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 4.19 3/4] bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches Ovidiu Panait
@ 2021-08-12 17:00 ` Ovidiu Panait
2021-08-13 8:38 ` [PATCH 4.19 0/4] bpf: backport fixes for CVE-2021-33624 Greg KH
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Ovidiu Panait @ 2021-08-12 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: bpf
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
commit 973377ffe8148180b2651825b92ae91988141b05 upstream.
In almost all cases from test_verifier that have been changed in here, we've
had an unreachable path with a load from a register which has an invalid
address on purpose. This was basically to make sure that we never walk this
path and to have the verifier complain if it would otherwise. Change it to
match on the right error for unprivileged given we now test these paths
under speculative execution.
There's one case where we match on exact # of insns_processed. Due to the
extra path, this will of course mismatch on unprivileged. Thus, restrict the
test->insn_processed check to privileged-only.
In one other case, we result in a 'pointer comparison prohibited' error. This
is similarly due to verifying an 'invalid' branch where we end up with a value
pointer on one side of the comparison.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[OP: ignore changes to tests that do not exist in 4.19]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index b44324530948..c7d17781dbfe 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -2792,6 +2792,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R7 invalid mem access 'inv'",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 0,
},
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread