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* [PATCH stable 4.4] af_unix: fix races in sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred accesses
@ 2021-10-07 17:05 Jann Horn
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Jann Horn @ 2021-10-07 17:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable
  Cc: Eric Dumazet, Eric W . Biederman, Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
	Marcel Holtmann, David S . Miller, Jann Horn

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b ]

Jann Horn reported that SO_PEERCRED and SO_PEERGROUPS implementations
are racy, as af_unix can concurrently change sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred.

In order to fix this issue, this patch adds a new spinlock that needs
to be used whenever these fields are read or written.

Jann also pointed out that l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb() is currently
reading sk->sk_peer_pid which makes no sense, as this field
is only possibly set by AF_UNIX sockets.
We will have to clean this in a separate patch.
This could be done by reverting b48596d1dc25 "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add get_peer_pid callback"
or implementing what was truly expected.

Fixes: 109f6e39fa07 ("af_unix: Allow SO_PEERCRED to work across namespaces.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[backport note: 4.4 and 4.9 don't have SO_PEERGROUPS, only SO_PEERCRED]
[backport note: got rid of sk_get_peer_cred(), no users in 4.4/4.9]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
---
 include/net/sock.h |  2 ++
 net/core/sock.c    | 12 +++++++++---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 1b657a3a30b5..3671bc7b7bc1 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -429,8 +429,10 @@ struct sock {
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO)
 	__u32			sk_cgrp_prioidx;
 #endif
+	spinlock_t		sk_peer_lock;
 	struct pid		*sk_peer_pid;
 	const struct cred	*sk_peer_cred;
+
 	long			sk_rcvtimeo;
 	long			sk_sndtimeo;
 	struct timer_list	sk_timer;
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 82f9a7dbea6f..5e9ff8d9f9e3 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1014,7 +1014,6 @@ set_rcvbuf:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_setsockopt);
 
-
 static void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred,
 			  struct ucred *ucred)
 {
@@ -1174,7 +1173,11 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 		struct ucred peercred;
 		if (len > sizeof(peercred))
 			len = sizeof(peercred);
+
+		spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
 		cred_to_ucred(sk->sk_peer_pid, sk->sk_peer_cred, &peercred);
+		spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
+
 		if (copy_to_user(optval, &peercred, len))
 			return -EFAULT;
 		goto lenout;
@@ -1467,9 +1470,10 @@ void sk_destruct(struct sock *sk)
 		sk->sk_frag.page = NULL;
 	}
 
-	if (sk->sk_peer_cred)
-		put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred);
+	/* We do not need to acquire sk->sk_peer_lock, we are the last user. */
+	put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred);
 	put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid);
+
 	if (likely(sk->sk_net_refcnt))
 		put_net(sock_net(sk));
 	sk_prot_free(sk->sk_prot_creator, sk);
@@ -2442,6 +2446,8 @@ void sock_init_data(struct socket *sock, struct sock *sk)
 
 	sk->sk_peer_pid 	=	NULL;
 	sk->sk_peer_cred	=	NULL;
+	spin_lock_init(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
+
 	sk->sk_write_pending	=	0;
 	sk->sk_rcvlowat		=	1;
 	sk->sk_rcvtimeo		=	MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index cb9911dcafdb..242d170991b4 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -594,20 +594,42 @@ static void unix_release_sock(struct sock *sk, int embrion)
 
 static void init_peercred(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid);
-	if (sk->sk_peer_cred)
-		put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred);
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct pid *old_pid;
+
+	spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
+	old_pid = sk->sk_peer_pid;
+	old_cred = sk->sk_peer_cred;
 	sk->sk_peer_pid  = get_pid(task_tgid(current));
 	sk->sk_peer_cred = get_current_cred();
+	spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
+
+	put_pid(old_pid);
+	put_cred(old_cred);
 }
 
 static void copy_peercred(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peersk)
 {
-	put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid);
-	if (sk->sk_peer_cred)
-		put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred);
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct pid *old_pid;
+
+	if (sk < peersk) {
+		spin_lock(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
+		spin_lock_nested(&peersk->sk_peer_lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+	} else {
+		spin_lock(&peersk->sk_peer_lock);
+		spin_lock_nested(&sk->sk_peer_lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+	}
+	old_pid = sk->sk_peer_pid;
+	old_cred = sk->sk_peer_cred;
 	sk->sk_peer_pid  = get_pid(peersk->sk_peer_pid);
 	sk->sk_peer_cred = get_cred(peersk->sk_peer_cred);
+
+	spin_unlock(&sk->sk_peer_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&peersk->sk_peer_lock);
+
+	put_pid(old_pid);
+	put_cred(old_cred);
 }
 
 static int unix_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)

base-commit: a123b2f4737a9f4e34e92e502972b6388f90133f
-- 
2.33.0.882.g93a45727a2-goog


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2021-10-07 17:05 [PATCH stable 4.4] af_unix: fix races in sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred accesses Jann Horn

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