[PATCH 0/3] KEYS: fixes for asym_tpm keys

[PATCH 0/3] KEYS: fixes for asym_tpm keys

[Eric Biggers]

This series fixes some bugs in asym_tpm.c.

Eric Biggers (3):
  KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()
  KEYS: asym_tpm: fix incorrect comment
  KEYS: asym_tpm: rename derive_pub_key()

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)


base-commit: feb7a43de5ef625ad74097d8fd3481d5dbc06a59
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Eric Biggers]

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

extract_key_parameters() can read past the end of the input buffer due
to buggy and missing bounds checks.  Fix it as follows:

- Before reading each key length field, verify that there are at least 4
  bytes remaining.

- Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
  '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.

- Before saving the pointer to the public key, check that it doesn't run
  past the end of the buffer.

Fixes: f8c54e1ac4b8 ("KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
index 0959613560b9..60d20d44c885 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
@@ -814,7 +814,6 @@ static int extract_key_parameters(struct tpm_key *tk)
 {
 	const void *cur = tk->blob;
 	uint32_t len = tk->blob_len;
-	const void *pub_key;
 	uint32_t sz;
 	uint32_t key_len;
 
@@ -845,14 +844,14 @@ static int extract_key_parameters(struct tpm_key *tk)
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
 	sz = get_unaligned_be32(cur + 8);
-	if (len < sz + 12)
-		return -EBADMSG;
 
 	/* Move to TPM_RSA_KEY_PARMS */
-	len -= 12;
 	cur += 12;
+	len -= 12;
 
 	/* Grab the RSA key length */
+	if (len < 4)
+		return -EBADMSG;
 	key_len = get_unaligned_be32(cur);
 
 	switch (key_len) {
@@ -866,29 +865,36 @@ static int extract_key_parameters(struct tpm_key *tk)
 	}
 
 	/* Move just past TPM_KEY_PARMS */
+	if (len < sz)
+		return -EBADMSG;
 	cur += sz;
 	len -= sz;
 
 	if (len < 4)
 		return -EBADMSG;
-
 	sz = get_unaligned_be32(cur);
-	if (len < 4 + sz)
-		return -EBADMSG;
+	cur += 4;
+	len -= 4;
 
 	/* Move to TPM_STORE_PUBKEY */
-	cur += 4 + sz;
-	len -= 4 + sz;
+	if (len < sz)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	cur += sz;
+	len -= sz;
 
 	/* Grab the size of the public key, it should jive with the key size */
+	if (len < 4)
+		return -EBADMSG;
 	sz = get_unaligned_be32(cur);
+	cur += 4;
+	len -= 4;
 	if (sz > 256)
 		return -EINVAL;
-
-	pub_key = cur + 4;
+	if (len < sz)
+		return -EBADMSG;
 
 	tk->key_len = key_len;
-	tk->pub_key = pub_key;
+	tk->pub_key = cur;
 	tk->pub_key_len = sz;
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 2/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix incorrect comment

[Eric Biggers]

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

tpm_key_create() doesn't actually load the key into the TPM.  Fix the
comment to describe what the function does.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
index 60d20d44c885..2e365a221fbe 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
@@ -900,7 +900,11 @@ static int extract_key_parameters(struct tpm_key *tk)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Given the blob, parse it and load it into the TPM */
+/*
+ * Verify that a supported TPM is present, then parse the key blob.  We don't
+ * actually load the key into the TPM here; that happens only for the actual
+ * sign and decrypt operations.
+ */
 struct tpm_key *tpm_key_create(const void *blob, uint32_t blob_len)
 {
 	int r;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 3/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: rename derive_pub_key()

[Eric Biggers]

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

derive_pub_key() doesn't actually derive a key; it just formats one.
Rename it accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
index 2e365a221fbe..d2e0036d34a5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static inline uint8_t *encode_tag_length(uint8_t *buf, uint8_t tag,
 	return buf + 3;
 }
 
-static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf)
+static uint32_t format_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf)
 {
 	uint8_t *cur = buf;
 	uint32_t n_len = definite_length(len) + 1 + len + 1;
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int tpm_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
-	der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
+	der_pub_key_len = format_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
 					 der_pub_key);
 
 	ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len);
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static int tpm_key_encrypt(struct tpm_key *tk,
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
-	der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
+	der_pub_key_len = format_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
 					 der_pub_key);
 
 	ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len);
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
-	der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
+	der_pub_key_len = format_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len,
 					 der_pub_key);
 
 	ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len);
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH 0/3] KEYS: fixes for asym_tpm keys

[Denis Kenzior]

Hi Eric,

On 1/13/22 17:54, Eric Biggers wrote:
> This series fixes some bugs in asym_tpm.c.
> 
> Eric Biggers (3):
>    KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()
>    KEYS: asym_tpm: fix incorrect comment
>    KEYS: asym_tpm: rename derive_pub_key()
> 
>   crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++------------
>   1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: feb7a43de5ef625ad74097d8fd3481d5dbc06a59
> 

For the series:

Reviewed-By: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>

Regards,
-Denis

Re: [PATCH 3/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: rename derive_pub_key()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu, Jan 13, 2022 at 03:54:40PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> derive_pub_key() doesn't actually derive a key; it just formats one.
> Rename it accordingly.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

/Jarkko

Re: [PATCH 2/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix incorrect comment

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu, Jan 13, 2022 at 03:54:39PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> tpm_key_create() doesn't actually load the key into the TPM.  Fix the
> comment to describe what the function does.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

This asym_tpm has not been properly reviewed as far as I can tell.

For starters, I do not get who needed new TPM 1.x features in 2018...
It's long after SHA1 was declared as insecure and world was mostly
settled with TPM2.

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu, Jan 13, 2022 at 03:54:38PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> extract_key_parameters() can read past the end of the input buffer due
> to buggy and missing bounds checks.  Fix it as follows:
> 
> - Before reading each key length field, verify that there are at least 4
>   bytes remaining.

Maybe start with a "Key length is described as an unsigned 32-bit integer
in the TPM header". Just for clarity.

> 
> - Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
>   '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.

So we have a struct tpm_header in include/linux/tpm.h. It would be way
more informative to use sizeof(struct tpm_header) than number 12, even
if the patch does not otherwise use the struct. It tells what it is, 12
does not.

> - Before saving the pointer to the public key, check that it doesn't run
>   past the end of the buffer.
> 
> Fixes: f8c54e1ac4b8 ("KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]")
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH 0/3] KEYS: fixes for asym_tpm keys

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Thu, Jan 13, 2022 at 03:54:37PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> This series fixes some bugs in asym_tpm.c.
> 
> Eric Biggers (3):
>   KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()
>   KEYS: asym_tpm: fix incorrect comment
>   KEYS: asym_tpm: rename derive_pub_key()
> 
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++------------
>  1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: feb7a43de5ef625ad74097d8fd3481d5dbc06a59
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 

I really appreciate your effort to go and fix this key type. Thank you.

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Eric Biggers]

On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 11:40:48PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > 
> > - Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
> >   '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.
> 
> So we have a struct tpm_header in include/linux/tpm.h. It would be way
> more informative to use sizeof(struct tpm_header) than number 12, even
> if the patch does not otherwise use the struct. It tells what it is, 12
> does not.

I don't think that would be an improvement, given that the code is using
hard-coded offsets.  If it's reading 4 bytes from cur + 8, it's much easier to
understand that it needs 12 bytes than 'sizeof(struct tpm_header)' bytes.

I'd certainly encourage whoever is maintaining this code to change it to use
structs instead, but that's not what this patch is meant to do.

- Eric

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 04:59:47PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 11:40:48PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > 
> > > - Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
> > >   '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.
> > 
> > So we have a struct tpm_header in include/linux/tpm.h. It would be way
> > more informative to use sizeof(struct tpm_header) than number 12, even
> > if the patch does not otherwise use the struct. It tells what it is, 12
> > does not.
> 
> I don't think that would be an improvement, given that the code is using
> hard-coded offsets.  If it's reading 4 bytes from cur + 8, it's much easier to
> understand that it needs 12 bytes than 'sizeof(struct tpm_header)' bytes.
> 
> I'd certainly encourage whoever is maintaining this code to change it to use
> structs instead, but that's not what this patch is meant to do.

I would consider dropping asym_tpm as it has no practical use cases
existing.

/Jarkko

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 04:21:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 04:59:47PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 11:40:48PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > - Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
> > > >   '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.
> > > 
> > > So we have a struct tpm_header in include/linux/tpm.h. It would be way
> > > more informative to use sizeof(struct tpm_header) than number 12, even
> > > if the patch does not otherwise use the struct. It tells what it is, 12
> > > does not.
> > 
> > I don't think that would be an improvement, given that the code is using
> > hard-coded offsets.  If it's reading 4 bytes from cur + 8, it's much easier to
> > understand that it needs 12 bytes than 'sizeof(struct tpm_header)' bytes.
> > 
> > I'd certainly encourage whoever is maintaining this code to change it to use
> > structs instead, but that's not what this patch is meant to do.
> 
> I would consider dropping asym_tpm as it has no practical use cases
> existing.

At least I have zero motivation to maintain it as it does not meet
any quality standards and is based on insecure crypto algorithms.
I neither have participated to its review process.

/Jarkko

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Eric Biggers]

On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 04:22:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 04:21:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 04:59:47PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 11:40:48PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > - Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
> > > > >   '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.
> > > > 
> > > > So we have a struct tpm_header in include/linux/tpm.h. It would be way
> > > > more informative to use sizeof(struct tpm_header) than number 12, even
> > > > if the patch does not otherwise use the struct. It tells what it is, 12
> > > > does not.
> > > 
> > > I don't think that would be an improvement, given that the code is using
> > > hard-coded offsets.  If it's reading 4 bytes from cur + 8, it's much easier to
> > > understand that it needs 12 bytes than 'sizeof(struct tpm_header)' bytes.
> > > 
> > > I'd certainly encourage whoever is maintaining this code to change it to use
> > > structs instead, but that's not what this patch is meant to do.
> > 
> > I would consider dropping asym_tpm as it has no practical use cases
> > existing.
> 
> At least I have zero motivation to maintain it as it does not meet
> any quality standards and is based on insecure crypto algorithms.
> I neither have participated to its review process.

Fair enough, I'll send a patch to remove it then.

- Eric

Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: asym_tpm: fix buffer overreads in extract_key_parameters()

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 11:00:12AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 04:22:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 04:21:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jan 18, 2022 at 04:59:47PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > > On Sat, Jan 15, 2022 at 11:40:48PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > - Avoid integer overflows when validating size fields; 'sz + 12' and
> > > > > >   '4 + sz' overflowed if 'sz' is near U32_MAX.
> > > > > 
> > > > > So we have a struct tpm_header in include/linux/tpm.h. It would be way
> > > > > more informative to use sizeof(struct tpm_header) than number 12, even
> > > > > if the patch does not otherwise use the struct. It tells what it is, 12
> > > > > does not.
> > > > 
> > > > I don't think that would be an improvement, given that the code is using
> > > > hard-coded offsets.  If it's reading 4 bytes from cur + 8, it's much easier to
> > > > understand that it needs 12 bytes than 'sizeof(struct tpm_header)' bytes.
> > > > 
> > > > I'd certainly encourage whoever is maintaining this code to change it to use
> > > > structs instead, but that's not what this patch is meant to do.
> > > 
> > > I would consider dropping asym_tpm as it has no practical use cases
> > > existing.
> > 
> > At least I have zero motivation to maintain it as it does not meet
> > any quality standards and is based on insecure crypto algorithms.
> > I neither have participated to its review process.
> 
> Fair enough, I'll send a patch to remove it then.

It is IMHO. I mean having this advertising insecure ways to to do crypto.

Thank you.

PS. My latency is because I've been moving to a new job. It is temporary.

/Jarkko