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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	<brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com>, <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	<marcorr@google.com>,
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 29/43] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 11:17:50 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220128171804.569796-30-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220128171804.569796-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

While launching the encrypted guests, the hypervisor may need to provide
some additional information during the guest boot. When booting under the
EFI based BIOS, the EFI configuration table contains an entry for the
confidential computing blob that contains the required information.

To support booting encrypted guests on non-EFI VM, the hypervisor needs to
pass this additional information to the kernel with a different method.

For this purpose, introduce SETUP_CC_BLOB type in setup_data to hold the
physical address of the confidential computing blob location. The boot
loader or hypervisor may choose to use this method instead of EFI
configuration table. The CC blob location scanning should give preference
to setup_data data over the EFI configuration table.

In AMD SEV-SNP, the CC blob contains the address of the secrets and CPUID
pages. The secrets page includes information such as a VM to PSP
communication key and CPUID page contains PSP filtered CPUID values.
Define the AMD SEV confidential computing blob structure.

While at it, define the EFI GUID for the confidential computing blob.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h            | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h |  1 +
 include/linux/efi.h                   |  1 +
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index a3203b2caaca..1a7e21bb6eea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -42,6 +42,24 @@ struct es_em_ctxt {
 	struct es_fault_info fi;
 };
 
+/*
+ * AMD SEV Confidential computing blob structure. The structure is
+ * defined in OVMF UEFI firmware header:
+ * https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
+ */
+#define CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC	0x45444d41
+struct cc_blob_sev_info {
+	u32 magic;
+	u16 version;
+	u16 reserved;
+	u64 secrets_phys;
+	u32 secrets_len;
+	u32 rsvd1;
+	u64 cpuid_phys;
+	u32 cpuid_len;
+	u32 rsvd2;
+};
+
 void do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code);
 
 static inline u64 lower_bits(u64 val, unsigned int bits)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
index b25d3f82c2f3..1ac5acca72ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define SETUP_EFI			4
 #define SETUP_APPLE_PROPERTIES		5
 #define SETUP_JAILHOUSE			6
+#define SETUP_CC_BLOB			7
 
 #define SETUP_INDIRECT			(1<<31)
 
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index ccd4d3f91c98..984aa688997a 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
 #define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID			EFI_GUID(0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28)
 #define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID			EFI_GUID(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72)
 #define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID		EFI_GUID(0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed)
+#define EFI_CC_BLOB_GUID			EFI_GUID(0x067b1f5f, 0xcf26, 0x44c5, 0x85, 0x54, 0x93, 0xd7, 0x77, 0x91, 0x2d, 0x42)
 
 /*
  * This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-01-28 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 115+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-28 17:17 [PATCH v9 00/43] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 01/43] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 02/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 13:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-09 15:02     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 03/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 04/43] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 18:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-01 20:35     ` Michael Roth
2022-02-01 21:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-02  0:52         ` Michael Roth
2022-02-02  6:09           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-02 17:28             ` Michael Roth
2022-02-02 18:57               ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 06/43] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 07/43] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 08/43] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 09/43] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 10/43] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 19:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-02 14:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-02 15:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 11/43] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 12/43] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 13/43] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 14/43] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 15/43] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-02 10:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-02 14:29     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 16/43] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 17/43] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2022-02-02 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 18/43] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2022-02-02 15:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 19/43] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2022-02-02 16:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 20/43] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2022-02-03  6:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 21/43] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 22/43] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2022-02-03 13:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 23/43] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-03 15:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-03 16:44     ` Michael Roth
2022-02-05 12:58       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 24/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-03 14:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 25/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-03 14:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 26/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2022-02-03 15:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 27/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 28/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code Brijesh Singh
2022-02-04 16:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2022-02-04 16:21   ` [PATCH v9 29/43] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Borislav Petkov
2022-02-04 17:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2022-02-07 23:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-02-08 14:54     ` Michael Roth
2022-02-08 15:11     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2022-02-05 10:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-05 15:42     ` Michael Roth
2022-02-05 16:22     ` Michael Roth
2022-02-06 13:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-07 15:37         ` Michael Roth
2022-02-07 17:52           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 32/43] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2022-02-05 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-06 16:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-08 13:50     ` Michael Roth
2022-02-08 15:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 34/43] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 35/43] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map() Brijesh Singh
2022-02-06 19:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 36/43] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2022-02-06 19:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 37/43] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2022-02-06 19:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-08  5:25     ` Michael Roth
2022-01-28 17:17 ` [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2022-02-05 17:19   ` Michael Roth
2022-02-06 15:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-07 17:00       ` Michael Roth
2022-02-07 18:43         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-06 19:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:18 ` [PATCH v9 39/43] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 20:17   ` Peter Gonda
2022-03-03 14:53     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:18 ` [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 20:21   ` Peter Gonda
2022-02-02 16:27     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-06 20:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:18 ` [PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 20:33   ` Peter Gonda
2022-02-06 22:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-07 14:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-07 15:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-01-28 17:18 ` [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 20:39   ` Peter Gonda
2022-02-02 22:31     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-07  8:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-07 16:23     ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-07 19:09       ` Dov Murik
2022-02-07 20:08         ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-07 20:28           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-08  7:56           ` Dov Murik
2022-02-08 10:51             ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-08 14:14             ` Brijesh Singh
2022-01-28 17:18 ` [PATCH v9 43/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2022-02-01 20:43   ` Peter Gonda
2022-02-07  9:16   ` Borislav Petkov

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