Re: [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2022 21:05:11 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YgAp9yat6M7f1THf@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220128171804.569796-41-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Fri, Jan 28, 2022 at 11:18:01AM -0600, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Version 2 of GHCB specification provides Non Automatic Exit (NAE) that can
	      ^				  ^			   ^
	      the			  a			   event type

> be used by the SEV-SNP guest to communicate with the PSP without risk from
> a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the
> messages sent.
> 
> SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE can insert two special pages into the guest’s memory:
> the secrets page and the CPUID page. The PSP firmware populate the contents

"populates"

> of the secrets page. The secrets page contains encryption keys used by the
> guest to interact with the firmware. Because the secrets page is encrypted
> with the guest’s memory encryption key, the hypervisor cannot read the
> keys. See SEV-SNP firmware spec for further details on the secrets page
> format.
> 
> Create a platform device that the SEV-SNP guest driver can bind to get the
> platform resources such as encryption key and message id to use to
> communicate with the PSP. The SEV-SNP guest driver provides a userspace
> interface to get the attestation report, key derivation, extended
> attestation report etc.

...

> +static int __init init_snp_platform_device(void)

snp_init_platform_device()

> +{
> +	struct snp_guest_platform_data data;
> +	u64 gpa;
> +
> +	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	gpa = get_secrets_page();
> +	if (!gpa)
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	data.secrets_gpa = gpa;
> +	if (platform_device_add_data(&guest_req_device, &data, sizeof(data)))
> +		goto e_fail;
> +
> +	if (platform_device_register(&guest_req_device))
> +		goto e_fail;
> +
> +	pr_info("SNP guest platform device initialized.\n");
> +	return 0;
> +
> +e_fail:
> +	pr_err("Failed to initialize SNP guest device\n");
> +	return -ENODEV;

So when someone tries to debug why the platform device doesn't register
properly, this error message is ambiguous and two of the error paths
don't even issue one.

Either issue a different error message before you return each time or
remove it completely and let someone who really needs it, add it.

I'd vote for former...

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette