From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
dougmill@linux.vnet.ibm.com, gcwilson@linux.ibm.com,
gjoyce@ibm.com, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
mpe@ellerman.id.au, dja@axtens.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 06:54:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220202065443.GA9249@srcf.ucam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YfogOurPZb7+Yelo@kroah.com>
On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 07:10:02AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 04:01:57AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > We're talking about things that have massively different semantics.
>
> I see lots of different platforms trying to provide access to their
> "secure" firmware data to userspace in different ways. That feels to me
> like they are the same thing that userspace would care about in a
> unified way.
EFI variables are largely for the OS to provide information to the
firmware, while this patchset is to provide information from the
firmware to the OS. I don't see why we'd expect to use the same userland
tooling for both.
In the broader case - I don't think we *can* use the same userland
tooling for everything. For example, the patches to add support for
manipulating the Power secure boot keys originally attempted to make it
look like efivars, but the underlying firmware semantics are
sufficiently different that even exposing the same kernel interface
wouldn't be a sufficient abstraction and userland would still need to
behave differently. Exposing an interface that looks consistent but
isn't is arguably worse for userland than exposing explicitly distinct
interfaces.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
gcwilson@linux.ibm.com, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
dougmill@linux.vnet.ibm.com, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, gjoyce@ibm.com, dja@axtens.net,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 06:54:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220202065443.GA9249@srcf.ucam.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YfogOurPZb7+Yelo@kroah.com>
On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 07:10:02AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 02, 2022 at 04:01:57AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > We're talking about things that have massively different semantics.
>
> I see lots of different platforms trying to provide access to their
> "secure" firmware data to userspace in different ways. That feels to me
> like they are the same thing that userspace would care about in a
> unified way.
EFI variables are largely for the OS to provide information to the
firmware, while this patchset is to provide information from the
firmware to the OS. I don't see why we'd expect to use the same userland
tooling for both.
In the broader case - I don't think we *can* use the same userland
tooling for everything. For example, the patches to add support for
manipulating the Power secure boot keys originally attempted to make it
look like efivars, but the underlying firmware semantics are
sufficiently different that even exposing the same kernel interface
wouldn't be a sufficient abstraction and userland would still need to
behave differently. Exposing an interface that looks consistent but
isn't is arguably worse for userland than exposing explicitly distinct
interfaces.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-02 6:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-01 12:44 [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 1/5] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:38 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:41 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:13 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:45 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 10:55 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:47 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:08 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-02 14:31 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 15:09 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-03 6:16 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-03 11:03 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-03 12:11 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-01 12:44 ` [PATCH v7 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation Dov Murik
2022-02-02 8:49 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 11:19 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-01 13:50 ` [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Greg KH
2022-02-01 14:24 ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 14:24 ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 14:41 ` Greg KH
2022-02-01 14:41 ` Greg KH
2022-02-01 15:05 ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 15:05 ` James Bottomley
2022-02-01 18:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-01 18:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2022-02-02 4:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 4:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 6:10 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 6:10 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 6:54 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2022-02-02 6:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 7:05 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 7:05 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 7:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 7:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 7:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-02 7:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-02 8:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 8:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 8:25 ` Greg KH
2022-02-02 8:25 ` Greg KH
2022-02-09 0:19 ` Nayna
2022-02-09 0:25 ` Nayna
2022-02-09 0:25 ` Nayna
2022-02-02 8:36 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 8:36 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2022-02-02 8:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-02 8:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-02-07 18:50 ` Dov Murik
2022-02-07 18:50 ` Dov Murik
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