[Buildroot] [git commit] package/wpa_supplicant: bump version to 2.10

[Buildroot] [git commit] package/wpa_supplicant: bump version to 2.10

[Arnout Vandecappelle]

commit: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=39381a467cd2cfc15f77d3f9adbf329d2f92e312
branch: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

Update wpa_supplicant to the latest release v2.10. Drop all the patches
as they have already been upstreamed. Remove from .mk file all the
WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES records since those CVEs will not be
reported against the new version.

README's copyright year was updated.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Yegor Yefremov <yegorslists@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
---
 ...-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch |  77 --------------
 ...date-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch | 116 ---------------------
 ...de-stdbool.h-to-allow-C99-bool-to-be-used.patch |  32 ------
 ...elper-functions-for-recognizing-tag-value.patch |  37 -------
 package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash         |   6 +-
 package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk           |  14 +--
 6 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 279 deletions(-)

diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 959788c2e9..0000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
- address
-
-Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
-so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
-sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
-sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
-out a response to another device and that other device processing the
-unexpected response.
-
-In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
-where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
-connected station dropping its association.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-
-Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
-[Retrieved from:
-https://w1.fi/security/2019-7/0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch]
----
- src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
- src/ap/ieee802_11.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
-index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
---- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
-+++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
-@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
- 			   "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+
-+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
-+	    is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
-+	    os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
-+		/* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
-+		 * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
-+		 * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
-+			   " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
-+			   __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
- 
- 	hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
-diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
-@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
- 	fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
- 	stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
- 
-+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
-+	    is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
-+	    os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
-+		/* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
-+		 * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
-+		 * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
-+			   " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
-+			   MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
- 		handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
- 		return 1;
--- 
-2.20.1
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5dcfed9406..0000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters
-
-The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters.
-However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in
-addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did
-not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases,
-but did not reject any other unexpected information.
-
-Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any
-unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent
-potential forging attacks.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
----
- src/tls/pkcs1.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
- src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
-index bbdb0d72d..5761dfed0 100644
---- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
-+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
-@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
- 		os_free(decrypted);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo",
-+		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
- 
- 	pos = hdr.payload;
- 	end = pos + hdr.length;
-@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
- 		os_free(decrypted);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
-+		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
- 	da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
- 
- 	if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
-@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
- 		os_free(decrypted);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters",
-+		    next, da_end - next);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
-+	 * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
-+	 * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
-+	 */
-+	if (da_end > next &&
-+	    (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
-+	     !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
-+	     hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
-+		os_free(decrypted);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) {
- 		char txt[100], txt2[100];
-diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c
-index a8944dd2f..df337ec4d 100644
---- a/src/tls/x509v3.c
-+++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c
-@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
- 		os_free(data);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length);
- 
- 	pos = hdr.payload;
- 	end = pos + hdr.length;
-@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
- 		os_free(data);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
-+		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
- 	da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
- 
- 	if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
-@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
- 		os_free(data);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters",
-+		    next, da_end - next);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
-+	 * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
-+	 * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
-+	 */
-+	if (da_end > next &&
-+	    (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
-+	     !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
-+	     hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
-+		os_free(data);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) {
- 		if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) {
--- 
-2.20.1
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-Include-stdbool.h-to-allow-C99-bool-to-be-used.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-Include-stdbool.h-to-allow-C99-bool-to-be-used.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e52dbdb694..0000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-Include-stdbool.h-to-allow-C99-bool-to-be-used.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 99cf89555313056d3a8fa54b21d02dc880b363e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 20:29:31 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] Include stdbool.h to allow C99 bool to be used
-
-We have practically started requiring some C99 features, so might as
-well finally go ahead and bring in the C99 bool as well.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
-[geomatsi@gmail.com: backport from upstream]
-Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
-[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: keep upstream sha1 in header, drop numbering]
-Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
----
- src/utils/includes.h | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/utils/includes.h b/src/utils/includes.h
-index 75513fc8c..741fc9c14 100644
---- a/src/utils/includes.h
-+++ b/src/utils/includes.h
-@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
- 
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stddef.h>
-+#include <stdbool.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
--- 
-2.25.1
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-ASN.1-Add-helper-functions-for-recognizing-tag-value.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-ASN.1-Add-helper-functions-for-recognizing-tag-value.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a5415e7daf..0000000000
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-ASN.1-Add-helper-functions-for-recognizing-tag-value.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 9a990e8c4eb92dd64e0ec483599820e45c35ac23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 23:14:23 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: Add helper functions for recognizing tag values
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-[geomatsi@gmail.com: backport asn1_is_null() from upstream 9a990e8c4eb9]
-Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
-[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: 
-  - reformat, keep the upstream sha1 and title,
-  - drop numbering
-]
-Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
----
- src/tls/asn1.h | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/tls/asn1.h b/src/tls/asn1.h
-index de3430adb..a4d1be473 100644
---- a/src/tls/asn1.h
-+++ b/src/tls/asn1.h
-@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ struct wpabuf * asn1_build_alg_id(const struct asn1_oid *oid,
- unsigned long asn1_bit_string_to_long(const u8 *buf, size_t len);
- int asn1_oid_equal(const struct asn1_oid *a, const struct asn1_oid *b);
- 
-+static inline bool asn1_is_null(const struct asn1_hdr *hdr)
-+{
-+	return hdr->class == ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL &&
-+		hdr->tag == ASN1_TAG_NULL;
-+}
-+
- extern struct asn1_oid asn1_sha1_oid;
- extern struct asn1_oid asn1_sha256_oid;
- 
--- 
-2.25.1
-
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash
index 2387391a3c..fcaee0a30b 100644
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
 # Locally calculated
-sha256  fcbdee7b4a64bea8177973299c8c824419c413ec2e3a95db63dd6a5dc3541f17  wpa_supplicant-2.9.tar.gz
-sha256  9da5dd0776da266b180b915e460ff75c6ff729aca1196ab396529510f24f3761  README
-sha256  c4d65cc13863e0237d0644198558e2c47b4ed91e2b2be4516ff590724187c4a5  0001-P2P-Fix-copying-of-secondary-device-types-for-P2P-gr.patch
-sha256  7f40cfec5faf5e927ea9028ab9392cd118685bde7229ad24210caf0a8f6e9611  0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch
+sha256  20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f  wpa_supplicant-2.10.tar.gz
+sha256  af01e1d1ee065a1054d20ebe8a78a016f1fb1133b73e6a9d50801b165bb280c7  README
diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
index 3c0b0c1dfc..b414144774 100644
--- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
+++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk
@@ -4,11 +4,8 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_VERSION = 2.9
+WPA_SUPPLICANT_VERSION = 2.10
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_SITE = http://w1.fi/releases
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_PATCH = \
-	https://w1.fi/security/2020-2/0001-P2P-Fix-copying-of-secondary-device-types-for-P2P-gr.patch \
-	https://w1.fi/security/2021-1/0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_LICENSE = BSD-3-Clause
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_LICENSE_FILES = README
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_CPE_ID_VENDOR = w1.fi
@@ -19,15 +16,6 @@ WPA_SUPPLICANT_CFLAGS = $(TARGET_CFLAGS) -I$(STAGING_DIR)/usr/include/libnl3/
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_LDFLAGS = $(TARGET_LDFLAGS)
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_SELINUX_MODULES = networkmanager
 
-# 0001-AP-Silently-ignore-management-frame-from-unexpected-.patch
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-16275
-
-# 0001-P2P-Fix-a-corner-case-in-peer-addition-based-on-PD-R.patch
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-27803
-
-# 0002-ASN.1-Validate-DigestAlgorithmIdentifier-parameters.patch
-WPA_SUPPLICANT_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2021-30004
-
 # install the wpa_client library
 WPA_SUPPLICANT_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
 
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