* [PATCH] x86/spec-ctrl: Disable retpolines with CET-IBT
@ 2022-02-28 22:51 Andrew Cooper
2022-03-01 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Cooper @ 2022-02-28 22:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Xen-devel; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu
CET-IBT depend on executing indirect branches for protections to apply.
Extend the clobber for CET-SS to all of CET.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
I can't decide if this wants a fixes tag or not. If I'd remembered during the
CET series, it would have been its own patch. Functionally, it depends on c/s
cdbe2b0a1aec which sets CR4.CET fairly early during boot.
---
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 2d4cf5c7ef80..12bf1c5722f9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -944,10 +944,11 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS));
/*
- * First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using shadow stacks, as
- * they are incompatible.
+ * First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using CET. Retpolines
+ * are a ROP gadget so incompatbile with Shadow Stacks, while IBT depends
+ * on executing indirect branches for the safety properties to apply.
*/
- if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk &&
+ if ( (read_cr4() & X86_CR4_CET) &&
(opt_thunk == THUNK_DEFAULT || opt_thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE) )
thunk = THUNK_JMP;
--
2.11.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] x86/spec-ctrl: Disable retpolines with CET-IBT
2022-02-28 22:51 [PATCH] x86/spec-ctrl: Disable retpolines with CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
@ 2022-03-01 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2022-03-01 7:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Cooper; +Cc: Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu, Xen-devel
On 28.02.2022 23:51, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> CET-IBT depend on executing indirect branches for protections to apply.
> Extend the clobber for CET-SS to all of CET.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> I can't decide if this wants a fixes tag or not. If I'd remembered during the
> CET series, it would have been its own patch.
On this basis I'd say no Fixes: tag.
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
> @@ -944,10 +944,11 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
> boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS));
>
> /*
> - * First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using shadow stacks, as
> - * they are incompatible.
> + * First, disable the use of retpolines if Xen is using CET. Retpolines
> + * are a ROP gadget so incompatbile with Shadow Stacks, while IBT depends
> + * on executing indirect branches for the safety properties to apply.
> */
> - if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk &&
> + if ( (read_cr4() & X86_CR4_CET) &&
> (opt_thunk == THUNK_DEFAULT || opt_thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE) )
> thunk = THUNK_JMP;
Just for my own understanding: Why unconditionally THUNK_JMP and not possibly
THUNK_LFENCE?
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2022-03-01 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
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