[PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.120-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 5.10.120-rc1

Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
    bpf: Enlarge offset check value to INT_MAX in bpf_skb_{load,store}_bytes

Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
    bpf: Fix potential array overflow in bpf_trampoline_get_progs()

Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
    NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()

Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
    NFS: Memory allocation failures are not server fatal errors

Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>
    docs: submitting-patches: Fix crossref to 'The canonical patch format'

Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
    tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()

Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
    tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()

Tao Jin <tao-j@outlook.com>
    HID: multitouch: add quirks to enable Lenovo X12 trackpoint

Marek Maślanka <mm@semihalf.com>
    HID: multitouch: Add support for Google Whiskers Touchpad

Mariusz Tkaczyk <mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com>
    raid5: introduce MD_BROKEN

Sarthak Kukreti <sarthakkukreti@google.com>
    dm verity: set DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE feature flag

Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
    dm stats: add cond_resched when looping over entries

Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
    dm crypt: make printing of the key constant-time

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    dm integrity: fix error code in dm_integrity_ctr()

Jonathan Bakker <xc-racer2@live.ca>
    ARM: dts: s5pv210: Correct interrupt name for bluetooth in Aries

Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    Bluetooth: hci_qca: Use del_timer_sync() before freeing

Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
    zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration

Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
    crypto: ecrdsa - Fix incorrect use of vli_cmp

Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
    crypto: caam - fix i.MX6SX entropy delay value

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
    KVM: x86: avoid calling x86 emulator without a decoded instruction

Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
    x86, kvm: use correct GFP flags for preemption disabled

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
    x86/kvm: Alloc dummy async #PF token outside of raw spinlock

Xiaomeng Tong <xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: fix incorrect NULL check on list iterator

Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
    netfilter: conntrack: re-fetch conntrack after insertion

Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
    netfilter: nf_tables: sanitize nft_set_desc_concat_parse()

Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous

Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed()

Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized()

Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state

Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
    lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries

Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
    exfat: fix referencing wrong parent directory information after renaming

Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
    exfat: check if cluster num is valid

Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
    drm/i915: Fix -Wstringop-overflow warning in call to intel_read_wm_latency()

Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
    xfs: Fix CIL throttle hang when CIL space used going backwards

Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
    xfs: fix an ABBA deadlock in xfs_rename

Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
    xfs: fix the forward progress assertion in xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks

Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
    xfs: show the proper user quota options

Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
    xfs: detect overflows in bmbt records

Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
    net: ipa: compute proper aggregation limit

Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
    io_uring: fix using under-expanded iters

Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
    io_uring: don't re-import iovecs from callbacks

Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
    assoc_array: Fix BUG_ON during garbage collect

Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
    cfg80211: set custom regdomain after wiphy registration

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    pipe: Fix missing lock in pipe_resize_ring()

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>
    pipe: make poll_usage boolean and annotate its access

Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
    netfilter: nf_tables: disallow non-stateful expression in sets earlier

Piyush Malgujar <pmalgujar@marvell.com>
    drivers: i2c: thunderx: Allow driver to work with ACPI defined TWSI controllers

Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
    i2c: ismt: Provide a DMA buffer for Interrupt Cause Logging

Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
    net: ftgmac100: Disable hardware checksum on AST2600

Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
    nfc: pn533: Fix buggy cleanup order

Thomas Bartschies <thomas.bartschies@cvk.de>
    net: af_key: check encryption module availability consistency

Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
    percpu_ref_init(): clean ->percpu_count_ref on failure

IotaHydrae <writeforever@foxmail.com>
    pinctrl: sunxi: fix f1c100s uart2 function


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst  |   2 +-
 Makefile                                      |   4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi          |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c            |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                         |  41 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            |  31 +++++---
 crypto/Kconfig                                |   2 -
 crypto/drbg.c                                 | 110 +++++++++++---------------
 crypto/ecrdsa.c                               |   8 +-
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c                   |   4 +-
 drivers/char/random.c                         |   2 -
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c                   |  11 ++-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c                |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c                    |  18 +++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c               |   2 +-
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h                         |   1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c                  |   9 +++
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c                 |  14 ++++
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c      |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                         |  14 +++-
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c                     |   2 -
 drivers/md/dm-stats.c                         |   8 ++
 drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c                 |   1 +
 drivers/md/raid5.c                            |  47 ++++++-----
 drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c      |   5 ++
 drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c                |   4 +-
 drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c                     |   5 +-
 drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-suniv-f1c100s.c |   2 +-
 fs/exfat/balloc.c                             |   8 +-
 fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h                           |   8 ++
 fs/exfat/fatent.c                             |   8 --
 fs/exfat/namei.c                              |  27 +------
 fs/io_uring.c                                 |  47 ++---------
 fs/nfs/internal.h                             |   1 +
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c                           |  12 +--
 fs/pipe.c                                     |  33 ++++----
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c                      |   5 ++
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h                      |   2 -
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_sf.c                   |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c                         |  37 +++++----
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c                            |  42 ++++++----
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c                       |  14 ++++
 fs/xfs/xfs_iwalk.c                            |   2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_cil.c                          |  22 ++++--
 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c                            |  10 ++-
 include/crypto/drbg.h                         |  10 ++-
 include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h                     |   2 +-
 include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h     |   7 +-
 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c                       |  18 +++--
 lib/Kconfig                                   |   2 +
 lib/assoc_array.c                             |   8 ++
 lib/crypto/Kconfig                            |  17 ++--
 lib/percpu-refcount.c                         |   1 +
 mm/zsmalloc.c                                 |  37 ++++++++-
 net/core/filter.c                             |   4 +-
 net/key/af_key.c                              |   6 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c                 |  36 ++++++---
 net/wireless/core.c                           |   8 +-
 net/wireless/reg.c                            |   1 +
 59 files changed, 461 insertions(+), 335 deletions(-)

[PATCH 5.10 01/53] pinctrl: sunxi: fix f1c100s uart2 function

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: IotaHydrae <writeforever@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit fa8785e5931367e2b43f2c507f26bcf3e281c0ca ]

Change suniv f1c100s pinctrl,PD14 multiplexing function lvds1 to uart2

When the pin PD13 and PD14 is setting up to uart2 function in dts,
there's an error occurred:
1c20800.pinctrl: unsupported function uart2 on pin PD14

Because 'uart2' is not any one multiplexing option of PD14,
and pinctrl don't know how to configure it.

So change the pin PD14 lvds1 function to uart2.

Signed-off-by: IotaHydrae <writeforever@foxmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_70C1308DDA794C81CAEF389049055BACEC09@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-suniv-f1c100s.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-suniv-f1c100s.c b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-suniv-f1c100s.c
index 2801ca706273..68a5b627fb9b 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-suniv-f1c100s.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/sunxi/pinctrl-suniv-f1c100s.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static const struct sunxi_desc_pin suniv_f1c100s_pins[] = {
 		  SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"),
 		  SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x1, "gpio_out"),
 		  SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x2, "lcd"),		/* D20 */
-		  SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x3, "lvds1"),		/* RX */
+		  SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x3, "uart2"),		/* RX */
 		  SUNXI_FUNCTION_IRQ_BANK(0x6, 0, 14)),
 	SUNXI_PIN(SUNXI_PINCTRL_PIN(D, 15),
 		  SUNXI_FUNCTION(0x0, "gpio_in"),
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 02/53] percpu_ref_init(): clean ->percpu_count_ref on failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

[ Upstream commit a91714312eb16f9ecd1f7f8b3efe1380075f28d4 ]

That way percpu_ref_exit() is safe after failing percpu_ref_init().
At least one user (cgroup_create()) had a double-free that way;
there might be other similar bugs.  Easier to fix in percpu_ref_init(),
rather than playing whack-a-mole in sloppy users...

Usual symptoms look like a messed refcounting in one of subsystems
that use percpu allocations (might be percpu-refcount, might be
something else).  Having refcounts for two different objects share
memory is Not Nice(tm)...

Reported-by: syzbot+5b1e53987f858500ec00@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 lib/percpu-refcount.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/lib/percpu-refcount.c b/lib/percpu-refcount.c
index e59eda07305e..493093b97093 100644
--- a/lib/percpu-refcount.c
+++ b/lib/percpu-refcount.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ int percpu_ref_init(struct percpu_ref *ref, percpu_ref_func_t *release,
 	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*ref->data), gfp);
 	if (!data) {
 		free_percpu((void __percpu *)ref->percpu_count_ptr);
+		ref->percpu_count_ptr = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 03/53] net: af_key: check encryption module availability consistency

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thomas Bartschies <thomas.bartschies@cvk.de>

[ Upstream commit 015c44d7bff3f44d569716117becd570c179ca32 ]

Since the recent introduction supporting the SM3 and SM4 hash algos for IPsec, the kernel
produces invalid pfkey acquire messages, when these encryption modules are disabled. This
happens because the availability of the algos wasn't checked in all necessary functions.
This patch adds these checks.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Bartschies <thomas.bartschies@cvk.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/key/af_key.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 61505b0df57d..6b7ed5568c09 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@ static int count_ah_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
 			break;
 		if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)
 			continue;
-		if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg))
+		if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available)
 			sz += sizeof(struct sadb_comb);
 	}
 	return sz + sizeof(struct sadb_prop);
@@ -2922,7 +2922,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
 		if (!ealg->pfkey_supported)
 			continue;
 
-		if (!(ealg_tmpl_set(t, ealg)))
+		if (!(ealg_tmpl_set(t, ealg) && ealg->available))
 			continue;
 
 		for (k = 1; ; k++) {
@@ -2933,7 +2933,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
 			if (!aalg->pfkey_supported)
 				continue;
 
-			if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg))
+			if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available)
 				sz += sizeof(struct sadb_comb);
 		}
 	}
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 04/53] nfc: pn533: Fix buggy cleanup order

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

[ Upstream commit b8cedb7093b2d1394cae9b86494cba4b62d3a30a ]

When removing the pn533 device (i2c or USB), there is a logic error. The
original code first cancels the worker (flush_delayed_work) and then
destroys the workqueue (destroy_workqueue), leaving the timer the last
one to be deleted (del_timer). This result in a possible race condition
in a multi-core preempt-able kernel. That is, if the cleanup
(pn53x_common_clean) is concurrently run with the timer handler
(pn533_listen_mode_timer), the timer can queue the poll_work to the
already destroyed workqueue, causing use-after-free.

This patch reorder the cleanup: it uses the del_timer_sync to make sure
the handler is finished before the routine will destroy the workqueue.
Note that the timer cannot be activated by the worker again.

static void pn533_wq_poll(struct work_struct *work)
...
 rc = pn533_send_poll_frame(dev);
 if (rc)
   return;

 if (cur_mod->len == 0 && dev->poll_mod_count > 1)
   mod_timer(&dev->listen_timer, ...);

That is, the mod_timer can be called only when pn533_send_poll_frame()
returns no error, which is impossible because the device is detaching
and the lower driver should return ENODEV code.

Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c b/drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c
index d2c011615775..8d7e29d953b7 100644
--- a/drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c
@@ -2844,13 +2844,14 @@ void pn53x_common_clean(struct pn533 *priv)
 {
 	struct pn533_cmd *cmd, *n;
 
+	/* delete the timer before cleanup the worker */
+	del_timer_sync(&priv->listen_timer);
+
 	flush_delayed_work(&priv->poll_work);
 	destroy_workqueue(priv->wq);
 
 	skb_queue_purge(&priv->resp_q);
 
-	del_timer(&priv->listen_timer);
-
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, &priv->cmd_queue, queue) {
 		list_del(&cmd->queue);
 		kfree(cmd);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 05/53] net: ftgmac100: Disable hardware checksum on AST2600

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>

[ Upstream commit 6fd45e79e8b93b8d22fb8fe22c32fbad7e9190bd ]

The AST2600 when using the i210 NIC over NC-SI has been observed to
produce incorrect checksum results with specific MTU values. This was
first observed when sending data across a long distance set of networks.

On a local network, the following test was performed using a 1MB file of
random data.

On the receiver run this script:

 #!/bin/bash
 while [ 1 ]; do
        # Zero the stats
        nstat -r  > /dev/null
        nc -l 9899 > test-file
        # Check for checksum errors
        TcpInCsumErrors=$(nstat | grep TcpInCsumErrors)
        if [ -z "$TcpInCsumErrors" ]; then
                echo No TcpInCsumErrors
        else
                echo TcpInCsumErrors = $TcpInCsumErrors
        fi
 done

On an AST2600 system:

 # nc <IP of  receiver host> 9899 < test-file

The test was repeated with various MTU values:

 # ip link set mtu 1410 dev eth0

The observed results:

 1500 - good
 1434 - bad
 1400 - good
 1410 - bad
 1420 - good

The test was repeated after disabling tx checksumming:

 # ethtool -K eth0 tx-checksumming off

And all MTU values tested resulted in transfers without error.

An issue with the driver cannot be ruled out, however there has been no
bug discovered so far.

David has done the work to take the original bug report of slow data
transfer between long distance connections and triaged it down to this
test case.

The vendor suspects this this is a hardware issue when using NC-SI. The
fixes line refers to the patch that introduced AST2600 support.

Reported-by: David Wilder <wilder@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dylan Hung <dylan_hung@aspeedtech.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c
index 5bc11d1bb9df..eea4bd3116e8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c
@@ -1893,6 +1893,11 @@ static int ftgmac100_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* AST2400  doesn't have working HW checksum generation */
 	if (np && (of_device_is_compatible(np, "aspeed,ast2400-mac")))
 		netdev->hw_features &= ~NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
+
+	/* AST2600 tx checksum with NCSI is broken */
+	if (priv->use_ncsi && of_device_is_compatible(np, "aspeed,ast2600-mac"))
+		netdev->hw_features &= ~NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
+
 	if (np && of_get_property(np, "no-hw-checksum", NULL))
 		netdev->hw_features &= ~(NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM);
 	netdev->features |= netdev->hw_features;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 06/53] i2c: ismt: Provide a DMA buffer for Interrupt Cause Logging

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 17a0f3acdc6ec8b89ad40f6e22165a4beee25663 ]

Before sending a MSI the hardware writes information pertinent to the
interrupt cause to a memory location pointed by SMTICL register. This
memory holds three double words where the least significant bit tells
whether the interrupt cause of master/target/error is valid. The driver
does not use this but we need to set it up because otherwise it will
perform DMA write to the default address (0) and this will cause an
IOMMU fault such as below:

  DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 2
  DMAR: [DMA Write] Request device [00:12.0] PASID ffffffff fault addr 0
        [fault reason 05] PTE Write access is not set

To prevent this from happening, provide a proper DMA buffer for this
that then gets mapped by the IOMMU accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
index a35a27c320e7..3d2d92640651 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
 
 #define ISMT_DESC_ENTRIES	2	/* number of descriptor entries */
 #define ISMT_MAX_RETRIES	3	/* number of SMBus retries to attempt */
+#define ISMT_LOG_ENTRIES	3	/* number of interrupt cause log entries */
 
 /* Hardware Descriptor Constants - Control Field */
 #define ISMT_DESC_CWRL	0x01	/* Command/Write Length */
@@ -175,6 +176,8 @@ struct ismt_priv {
 	u8 head;				/* ring buffer head pointer */
 	struct completion cmp;			/* interrupt completion */
 	u8 buffer[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 16];	/* temp R/W data buffer */
+	dma_addr_t log_dma;
+	u32 *log;
 };
 
 static const struct pci_device_id ismt_ids[] = {
@@ -409,6 +412,9 @@ static int ismt_access(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr,
 	memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ismt_desc));
 	desc->tgtaddr_rw = ISMT_DESC_ADDR_RW(addr, read_write);
 
+	/* Always clear the log entries */
+	memset(priv->log, 0, ISMT_LOG_ENTRIES * sizeof(u32));
+
 	/* Initialize common control bits */
 	if (likely(pci_dev_msi_enabled(priv->pci_dev)))
 		desc->control = ISMT_DESC_INT | ISMT_DESC_FAIR;
@@ -693,6 +699,8 @@ static void ismt_hw_init(struct ismt_priv *priv)
 	/* initialize the Master Descriptor Base Address (MDBA) */
 	writeq(priv->io_rng_dma, priv->smba + ISMT_MSTR_MDBA);
 
+	writeq(priv->log_dma, priv->smba + ISMT_GR_SMTICL);
+
 	/* initialize the Master Control Register (MCTRL) */
 	writel(ISMT_MCTRL_MEIE, priv->smba + ISMT_MSTR_MCTRL);
 
@@ -780,6 +788,12 @@ static int ismt_dev_init(struct ismt_priv *priv)
 	priv->head = 0;
 	init_completion(&priv->cmp);
 
+	priv->log = dmam_alloc_coherent(&priv->pci_dev->dev,
+					ISMT_LOG_ENTRIES * sizeof(u32),
+					&priv->log_dma, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!priv->log)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 07/53] drivers: i2c: thunderx: Allow driver to work with ACPI defined TWSI controllers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Piyush Malgujar <pmalgujar@marvell.com>

[ Upstream commit 03a35bc856ddc09f2cc1f4701adecfbf3b464cb3 ]

Due to i2c->adap.dev.fwnode not being set, ACPI_COMPANION() wasn't properly
found for TWSI controllers.

Signed-off-by: Szymon Balcerak <sbalcerak@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Piyush Malgujar <pmalgujar@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c
index 12c90aa0900e..a77cd86fe75e 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ static int thunder_i2c_probe_pci(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	i2c->adap.bus_recovery_info = &octeon_i2c_recovery_info;
 	i2c->adap.dev.parent = dev;
 	i2c->adap.dev.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node;
+	i2c->adap.dev.fwnode = dev->fwnode;
 	snprintf(i2c->adap.name, sizeof(i2c->adap.name),
 		 "Cavium ThunderX i2c adapter at %s", dev_name(dev));
 	i2c_set_adapdata(&i2c->adap, i2c);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH 5.10 08/53] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow non-stateful expression in sets earlier

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

commit 520778042ccca019f3ffa136dd0ca565c486cedd upstream.

Since 3e135cd499bf ("netfilter: nft_dynset: dynamic stateful expression
instantiation"), it is possible to attach stateful expressions to set
elements.

cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate
and destroy phase") introduces conditional destruction on the object to
accomodate transaction semantics.

nft_expr_init() calls expr->ops->init() first, then check for
NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR, this stills allows to initialize a non-stateful
lookup expressions which points to a set, which might lead to UAF since
the set is not properly detached from the set->binding for this case.
Anyway, this combination is non-sense from nf_tables perspective.

This patch fixes this problem by checking for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR before
expr->ops->init() is called.

The reporter provides a KASAN splat and a poc reproducer (similar to
those autogenerated by syzbot to report use-after-free errors). It is
unknown to me if they are using syzbot or if they use similar automated
tool to locate the bug that they are reporting.

For the record, this is the KASAN splat.

[   85.431824] ==================================================================
[   85.432901] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_tables_bind_set+0x81b/0xa20
[   85.433825] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880286f0e98 by task poc/776
[   85.434756]
[   85.434999] CPU: 1 PID: 776 Comm: poc Tainted: G        W         5.18.0+ #2
[   85.436023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014

Fixes: 0b2d8a7b638b ("netfilter: nf_tables: add helper functions for expression handling")
Reported-and-tested-by: Aaron Adams <edg-e@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c |   19 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -2679,27 +2679,31 @@ static struct nft_expr *nft_expr_init(co
 
 	err = nf_tables_expr_parse(ctx, nla, &info);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto err1;
+		goto err_expr_parse;
+
+	err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (!(info.ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_STATEFUL))
+		goto err_expr_stateful;
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	expr = kzalloc(info.ops->size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (expr == NULL)
-		goto err2;
+		goto err_expr_stateful;
 
 	err = nf_tables_newexpr(ctx, &info, expr);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto err3;
+		goto err_expr_new;
 
 	return expr;
-err3:
+err_expr_new:
 	kfree(expr);
-err2:
+err_expr_stateful:
 	owner = info.ops->type->owner;
 	if (info.ops->type->release_ops)
 		info.ops->type->release_ops(info.ops);
 
 	module_put(owner);
-err1:
+err_expr_parse:
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
@@ -5055,9 +5059,6 @@ struct nft_expr *nft_set_elem_expr_alloc
 		return expr;
 
 	err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	if (!(expr->ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_STATEFUL))
-		goto err_set_elem_expr;
-
 	if (expr->ops->type->flags & NFT_EXPR_GC) {
 		if (set->flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)
 			goto err_set_elem_expr;

[PATCH 5.10 09/53] pipe: make poll_usage boolean and annotate its access

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>

commit f485922d8fe4e44f6d52a5bb95a603b7c65554bb upstream.

Patch series "Fix data-races around epoll reported by KCSAN."

This series suppresses a false positive KCSAN's message and fixes a real
data-race.


This patch (of 2):

pipe_poll() runs locklessly and assigns 1 to poll_usage.  Once poll_usage
is set to 1, it never changes in other places.  However, concurrent writes
of a value trigger KCSAN, so let's make KCSAN happy.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in pipe_poll / pipe_poll

write to 0xffff8880042f6678 of 4 bytes by task 174 on cpu 3:
 pipe_poll (fs/pipe.c:656)
 ep_item_poll.isra.0 (./include/linux/poll.h:88 fs/eventpoll.c:853)
 do_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:1692 fs/eventpoll.c:1806 fs/eventpoll.c:2234)
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:2246 fs/eventpoll.c:2241 fs/eventpoll.c:2241)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

write to 0xffff8880042f6678 of 4 bytes by task 177 on cpu 1:
 pipe_poll (fs/pipe.c:656)
 ep_item_poll.isra.0 (./include/linux/poll.h:88 fs/eventpoll.c:853)
 do_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:1692 fs/eventpoll.c:1806 fs/eventpoll.c:2234)
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait (fs/eventpoll.c:2246 fs/eventpoll.c:2241 fs/eventpoll.c:2241)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 177 Comm: epoll_race Not tainted 5.17.0-58927-gf443e374ae13 #6
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.amzn2 04/01/2014

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220322002653.33865-1-kuniyu@amazon.co.jp
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220322002653.33865-2-kuniyu@amazon.co.jp
Fixes: 3b844826b6c6 ("pipe: avoid unnecessary EPOLLET wakeups under normal loads")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com>
Cc: "Soheil Hassas Yeganeh" <soheil@google.com>
Cc: "Sridhar Samudrala" <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/pipe.c                 |    2 +-
 include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ pipe_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table
 	unsigned int head, tail;
 
 	/* Epoll has some historical nasty semantics, this enables them */
-	pipe->poll_usage = 1;
+	WRITE_ONCE(pipe->poll_usage, true);
 
 	/*
 	 * Reading pipe state only -- no need for acquiring the semaphore.
--- a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
+++ b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info {
 	unsigned int files;
 	unsigned int r_counter;
 	unsigned int w_counter;
-	unsigned int poll_usage;
+	bool poll_usage;
 	struct page *tmp_page;
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_readers;
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_writers;

[PATCH 5.10 10/53] pipe: Fix missing lock in pipe_resize_ring()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 189b0ddc245139af81198d1a3637cac74f96e13a upstream.

pipe_resize_ring() needs to take the pipe->rd_wait.lock spinlock to
prevent post_one_notification() from trying to insert into the ring
whilst the ring is being replaced.

The occupancy check must be done after the lock is taken, and the lock
must be taken after the new ring is allocated.

The bug can lead to an oops looking something like:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in post_one_notification.isra.0+0x62e/0x840
 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801cc72a70 by task poc/27196
 ...
 Call Trace:
  post_one_notification.isra.0+0x62e/0x840
  __post_watch_notification+0x3b7/0x650
  key_create_or_update+0xb8b/0xd20
  __do_sys_add_key+0x175/0x340
  __x64_sys_add_key+0xbe/0x140
  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Reported by Selim Enes Karaduman @Enesdex working with Trend Micro Zero
Day Initiative.

Fixes: c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add general notification queue support")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-17291
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/pipe.c |   31 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -1244,30 +1244,33 @@ unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned lo
 
 /*
  * Resize the pipe ring to a number of slots.
+ *
+ * Note the pipe can be reduced in capacity, but only if the current
+ * occupancy doesn't exceed nr_slots; if it does, EBUSY will be
+ * returned instead.
  */
 int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots)
 {
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
 	unsigned int head, tail, mask, n;
 
-	/*
-	 * We can shrink the pipe, if arg is greater than the ring occupancy.
-	 * Since we don't expect a lot of shrink+grow operations, just free and
-	 * allocate again like we would do for growing.  If the pipe currently
-	 * contains more buffers than arg, then return busy.
-	 */
-	mask = pipe->ring_size - 1;
-	head = pipe->head;
-	tail = pipe->tail;
-	n = pipe_occupancy(pipe->head, pipe->tail);
-	if (nr_slots < n)
-		return -EBUSY;
-
 	bufs = kcalloc(nr_slots, sizeof(*bufs),
 		       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (unlikely(!bufs))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	spin_lock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
+	mask = pipe->ring_size - 1;
+	head = pipe->head;
+	tail = pipe->tail;
+
+	n = pipe_occupancy(head, tail);
+	if (nr_slots < n) {
+		spin_unlock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
+		kfree(bufs);
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The pipe array wraps around, so just start the new one at zero
 	 * and adjust the indices.
@@ -1299,6 +1302,8 @@ int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_i
 	pipe->tail = tail;
 	pipe->head = head;
 
+	spin_unlock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock);
+
 	/* This might have made more room for writers */
 	wake_up_interruptible(&pipe->wr_wait);
 	return 0;

[PATCH 5.10 11/53] cfg80211: set custom regdomain after wiphy registration

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>

commit 1b7b3ac8ff3317cdcf07a1c413de9bdb68019c2b upstream.

We used to set regulatory info before the registration of
the device and then the regulatory info didn't get set, because
the device isn't registered so there isn't a device to set the
regulatory info for. So set the regulatory info after the device
registration.
Call reg_process_self_managed_hints() once again after the device
registration because it does nothing before it.

Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.c96eadcffe80.I86799c2c866b5610b4cf91115c21d8ceb525c5aa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/wireless/core.c |    8 ++++----
 net/wireless/reg.c  |    1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/wireless/core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/core.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * Copyright 2006-2010		Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
  * Copyright 2013-2014  Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
  * Copyright 2015-2017	Intel Deutschland GmbH
- * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
@@ -918,9 +918,6 @@ int wiphy_register(struct wiphy *wiphy)
 		return res;
 	}
 
-	/* set up regulatory info */
-	wiphy_regulatory_register(wiphy);
-
 	list_add_rcu(&rdev->list, &cfg80211_rdev_list);
 	cfg80211_rdev_list_generation++;
 
@@ -931,6 +928,9 @@ int wiphy_register(struct wiphy *wiphy)
 	cfg80211_debugfs_rdev_add(rdev);
 	nl80211_notify_wiphy(rdev, NL80211_CMD_NEW_WIPHY);
 
+	/* set up regulatory info */
+	wiphy_regulatory_register(wiphy);
+
 	if (wiphy->regulatory_flags & REGULATORY_CUSTOM_REG) {
 		struct regulatory_request request;
 
--- a/net/wireless/reg.c
+++ b/net/wireless/reg.c
@@ -4001,6 +4001,7 @@ void wiphy_regulatory_register(struct wi
 
 	wiphy_update_regulatory(wiphy, lr->initiator);
 	wiphy_all_share_dfs_chan_state(wiphy);
+	reg_process_self_managed_hints();
 }
 
 void wiphy_regulatory_deregister(struct wiphy *wiphy)

[PATCH 5.10 12/53] assoc_array: Fix BUG_ON during garbage collect

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>

commit d1dc87763f406d4e67caf16dbe438a5647692395 upstream.

A rare BUG_ON triggered in assoc_array_gc:

    [3430308.818153] kernel BUG at lib/assoc_array.c:1609!

Which corresponded to the statement currently at line 1593 upstream:

    BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));

Using the data from the core dump, I was able to generate a userspace
reproducer[1] and determine the cause of the bug.

[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/assoc_array_gc

After running the iterator on the entire branch, an internal tree node
looked like the following:

    NODE (nr_leaves_on_branch: 3)
      SLOT [0] NODE (2 leaves)
      SLOT [1] NODE (1 leaf)
      SLOT [2..f] NODE (empty)

In the userspace reproducer, the pr_devel output when compressing this
node was:

    -- compress node 0x5607cc089380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    after: 3

At slot 0, an internal node with 2 leaves could not be folded into the
node, because there was only one available slot (slot 0). Thus, the
internal node was retained. At slot 1, the node had one leaf, and was
able to be folded in successfully. The remaining nodes had no leaves,
and so were removed. By the end of the compression stage, there were 14
free slots, and only 3 leaf nodes. The tree was ascended and then its
parent node was compressed. When this node was seen, it could not be
folded, due to the internal node it contained.

The invariant for compression in this function is: whenever
nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT, the node should contain all
leaf nodes. The compression step currently cannot guarantee this, given
the corner case shown above.

To fix this issue, retry compression whenever we have retained a node,
and yet nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT. This second
compression will then allow the node in slot 1 to be folded in,
satisfying the invariant. Below is the output of the reproducer once the
fix is applied:

    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying
    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=14, leaves=1
    [0] fold node 2/15 [nx 0]
    after: 3

Changes
=======
DH:
 - Use false instead of 0.
 - Reorder the inserted lines in a couple of places to put retained before
   next_slot.

ver #2)
 - Fix typo in pr_devel, correct comparison to "<="

Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511225517.407935-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512215045.489140-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v2
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 lib/assoc_array.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/lib/assoc_array.c
+++ b/lib/assoc_array.c
@@ -1462,6 +1462,7 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *a
 	struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
 	struct assoc_array_ptr *new_root, *new_parent, **new_ptr_pp;
 	unsigned long nr_leaves_on_tree;
+	bool retained;
 	int keylen, slot, nr_free, next_slot, i;
 
 	pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
@@ -1538,6 +1539,7 @@ continue_node:
 		goto descend;
 	}
 
+retry_compress:
 	pr_devel("-- compress node %p --\n", new_n);
 
 	/* Count up the number of empty slots in this node and work out the
@@ -1555,6 +1557,7 @@ continue_node:
 	pr_devel("free=%d, leaves=%lu\n", nr_free, new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
 
 	/* See what we can fold in */
+	retained = false;
 	next_slot = 0;
 	for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
 		struct assoc_array_shortcut *s;
@@ -1604,9 +1607,14 @@ continue_node:
 			pr_devel("[%d] retain node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n",
 				 slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1,
 				 next_slot);
+			retained = true;
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (retained && new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) {
+		pr_devel("internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying\n");
+		goto retry_compress;
+	}
 	pr_devel("after: %lu\n", new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
 
 	nr_leaves_on_tree = new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch;

[PATCH 5.10 13/53] io_uring: dont re-import iovecs from callbacks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>

We can't re-import or modify iterators from iocb callbacks, it's not
safe as it might be reverted and/or reexpanded while unwinding stack.
It's also not safe to resubmit as io-wq thread will race with stack
undwinding for the iterator and other data.

Disallow resubmission from callbacks, it can fail some cases that were
handled before, but the possibility of such a failure was a part of the
API from the beginning and so it should be fine.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/io_uring.c |   39 ---------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/io_uring.c
+++ b/fs/io_uring.c
@@ -2579,45 +2579,6 @@ static void io_complete_rw_common(struct
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
 static bool io_resubmit_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, int error)
 {
-	struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
-	ssize_t ret = -ECANCELED;
-	struct iov_iter iter;
-	int rw;
-
-	if (error) {
-		ret = error;
-		goto end_req;
-	}
-
-	switch (req->opcode) {
-	case IORING_OP_READV:
-	case IORING_OP_READ_FIXED:
-	case IORING_OP_READ:
-		rw = READ;
-		break;
-	case IORING_OP_WRITEV:
-	case IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED:
-	case IORING_OP_WRITE:
-		rw = WRITE;
-		break;
-	default:
-		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "io_uring: bad opcode in resubmit %d\n",
-				req->opcode);
-		goto end_req;
-	}
-
-	if (!req->async_data) {
-		ret = io_import_iovec(rw, req, &iovec, &iter, false);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto end_req;
-		ret = io_setup_async_rw(req, iovec, inline_vecs, &iter, false);
-		if (!ret)
-			return true;
-		kfree(iovec);
-	} else {
-		return true;
-	}
-end_req:
 	req_set_fail_links(req);
 	return false;
 }

[PATCH 5.10 14/53] io_uring: fix using under-expanded iters

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>

[ upstream commit cd65869512ab5668a5d16f789bc4da1319c435c4 ]

The issue was first described and addressed in
89c2b3b7491820 ("io_uring: reexpand under-reexpanded iters"), but
shortly after reimplemented as.
cd65869512ab56 ("io_uring: use iov_iter state save/restore helpers").

Here we follow the approach from the second patch but without in-callback
resubmissions, fixups for not yet supported in 5.10 short read retries
and replacing iov_iter_state with iter copies to not pull even more
dependencies, and because it's just much simpler.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/io_uring.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/io_uring.c
+++ b/fs/io_uring.c
@@ -3389,6 +3389,7 @@ static int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req,
 	struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
 	struct kiocb *kiocb = &req->rw.kiocb;
 	struct iov_iter __iter, *iter = &__iter;
+	struct iov_iter iter_cp;
 	struct io_async_rw *rw = req->async_data;
 	ssize_t io_size, ret, ret2;
 	bool no_async;
@@ -3399,6 +3400,7 @@ static int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req,
 	ret = io_import_iovec(READ, req, &iovec, iter, !force_nonblock);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
+	iter_cp = *iter;
 	io_size = iov_iter_count(iter);
 	req->result = io_size;
 	ret = 0;
@@ -3434,7 +3436,7 @@ static int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req,
 		if (req->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
 			goto done;
 		/* some cases will consume bytes even on error returns */
-		iov_iter_revert(iter, io_size - iov_iter_count(iter));
+		*iter = iter_cp;
 		ret = 0;
 		goto copy_iov;
 	} else if (ret < 0) {
@@ -3517,6 +3519,7 @@ static int io_write(struct io_kiocb *req
 	struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
 	struct kiocb *kiocb = &req->rw.kiocb;
 	struct iov_iter __iter, *iter = &__iter;
+	struct iov_iter iter_cp;
 	struct io_async_rw *rw = req->async_data;
 	ssize_t ret, ret2, io_size;
 
@@ -3526,6 +3529,7 @@ static int io_write(struct io_kiocb *req
 	ret = io_import_iovec(WRITE, req, &iovec, iter, !force_nonblock);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
+	iter_cp = *iter;
 	io_size = iov_iter_count(iter);
 	req->result = io_size;
 
@@ -3587,7 +3591,7 @@ done:
 	} else {
 copy_iov:
 		/* some cases will consume bytes even on error returns */
-		iov_iter_revert(iter, io_size - iov_iter_count(iter));
+		*iter = iter_cp;
 		ret = io_setup_async_rw(req, iovec, inline_vecs, iter, false);
 		if (!ret)
 			return -EAGAIN;

[PATCH 5.10 15/53] net: ipa: compute proper aggregation limit

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

commit c5794097b269f15961ed78f7f27b50e51766dec9 upstream.

The aggregation byte limit for an endpoint is currently computed
based on the endpoint's receive buffer size.

However, some bytes at the front of each receive buffer are reserved
on the assumption that--as with SKBs--it might be useful to insert
data (such as headers) before what lands in the buffer.

The aggregation byte limit currently doesn't take into account that
reserved space, and as a result, aggregation could require space
past that which is available in the buffer.

Fix this by reducing the size used to compute the aggregation byte
limit by the NET_SKB_PAD offset reserved for each receive buffer.

Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ipa/ipa_endpoint.c
@@ -610,12 +610,14 @@ static void ipa_endpoint_init_aggr(struc
 
 	if (endpoint->data->aggregation) {
 		if (!endpoint->toward_ipa) {
+			u32 buffer_size;
 			u32 limit;
 
 			val |= u32_encode_bits(IPA_ENABLE_AGGR, AGGR_EN_FMASK);
 			val |= u32_encode_bits(IPA_GENERIC, AGGR_TYPE_FMASK);
 
-			limit = ipa_aggr_size_kb(IPA_RX_BUFFER_SIZE);
+			buffer_size = IPA_RX_BUFFER_SIZE - NET_SKB_PAD;
+			limit = ipa_aggr_size_kb(buffer_size);
 			val |= u32_encode_bits(limit, AGGR_BYTE_LIMIT_FMASK);
 
 			limit = IPA_AGGR_TIME_LIMIT_DEFAULT;

[PATCH 5.10 16/53] xfs: detect overflows in bmbt records

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

commit acf104c2331c1ba2a667e65dd36139d1555b1432 upstream.

Detect file block mappings with a blockcount that's either so large that
integer overflows occur or are zero, because neither are valid in the
filesystem.  Worse yet, attempting directory modifications causes the
iext code to trip over the bmbt key handling and takes the filesystem
down.  We can fix most of this by preventing the bad metadata from
entering the incore structures in the first place.

Found by setting blockcount=0 in a directory data fork mapping and
watching the fireworks.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c
@@ -6229,6 +6229,11 @@ xfs_bmap_validate_extent(
 	xfs_fsblock_t		endfsb;
 	bool			isrt;
 
+	if (irec->br_startblock + irec->br_blockcount <= irec->br_startblock)
+		return __this_address;
+	if (irec->br_startoff + irec->br_blockcount <= irec->br_startoff)
+		return __this_address;
+
 	isrt = XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip);
 	endfsb = irec->br_startblock + irec->br_blockcount - 1;
 	if (isrt && whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) {

[PATCH 5.10 17/53] xfs: show the proper user quota options

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>

commit 237d7887ae723af7d978e8b9a385fdff416f357b upstream.

The quota option 'usrquota' should be shown if both the XFS_UQUOTA_ACCT
and XFS_UQUOTA_ENFD flags are set. The option 'uqnoenforce' should be
shown when only the XFS_UQUOTA_ACCT flag is set. The current code logic
seems wrong, Fix it and show proper options.

Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_super.c
@@ -199,10 +199,12 @@ xfs_fs_show_options(
 		seq_printf(m, ",swidth=%d",
 				(int)XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, mp->m_swidth));
 
-	if (mp->m_qflags & (XFS_UQUOTA_ACCT|XFS_UQUOTA_ENFD))
-		seq_puts(m, ",usrquota");
-	else if (mp->m_qflags & XFS_UQUOTA_ACCT)
-		seq_puts(m, ",uqnoenforce");
+	if (mp->m_qflags & XFS_UQUOTA_ACCT) {
+		if (mp->m_qflags & XFS_UQUOTA_ENFD)
+			seq_puts(m, ",usrquota");
+		else
+			seq_puts(m, ",uqnoenforce");
+	}
 
 	if (mp->m_qflags & XFS_PQUOTA_ACCT) {
 		if (mp->m_qflags & XFS_PQUOTA_ENFD)

[PATCH 5.10 18/53] xfs: fix the forward progress assertion in xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

commit a5336d6bb2d02d0e9d4d3c8be04b80b8b68d56c8 upstream.

In commit 27c14b5daa82 we started tracking the last inode seen during an
inode walk to avoid infinite loops if a corrupt inobt record happens to
have a lower ir_startino than the record preceeding it.  Unfortunately,
the assertion trips over the case where there are completely empty inobt
records (which can happen quite easily on 64k page filesystems) because
we advance the tracking cursor without actually putting the empty record
into the processing buffer.  Fix the assert to allow for this case.

Reported-by: zlang@redhat.com
Fixes: 27c14b5daa82 ("xfs: ensure inobt record walks always make forward progress")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_iwalk.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iwalk.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iwalk.c
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ xfs_iwalk_run_callbacks(
 	/* Delete cursor but remember the last record we cached... */
 	xfs_iwalk_del_inobt(tp, curpp, agi_bpp, 0);
 	irec = &iwag->recs[iwag->nr_recs - 1];
-	ASSERT(next_agino == irec->ir_startino + XFS_INODES_PER_CHUNK);
+	ASSERT(next_agino >= irec->ir_startino + XFS_INODES_PER_CHUNK);
 
 	error = xfs_iwalk_ag_recs(iwag);
 	if (error)

[PATCH 5.10 19/53] xfs: fix an ABBA deadlock in xfs_rename

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>

commit 6da1b4b1ab36d80a3994fd4811c8381de10af604 upstream.

When overlayfs is running on top of xfs and the user unlinks a file in
the overlay, overlayfs will create a whiteout inode and ask xfs to
"rename" the whiteout file atop the one being unlinked.  If the file
being unlinked loses its one nlink, we then have to put the inode on the
unlinked list.

This requires us to grab the AGI buffer of the whiteout inode to take it
off the unlinked list (which is where whiteouts are created) and to grab
the AGI buffer of the file being deleted.  If the whiteout was created
in a higher numbered AG than the file being deleted, we'll lock the AGIs
in the wrong order and deadlock.

Therefore, grab all the AGI locks we think we'll need ahead of time, and
in order of increasing AG number per the locking rules.

Reported-by: wenli xie <wlxie7296@gmail.com>
Fixes: 93597ae8dac0 ("xfs: Fix deadlock between AGI and AGF when target_ip exists in xfs_rename()")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h    |    2 --
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_sf.c |    2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c          |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.h
@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@ extern int xfs_dir_lookup(struct xfs_tra
 extern int xfs_dir_removename(struct xfs_trans *tp, struct xfs_inode *dp,
 				struct xfs_name *name, xfs_ino_t ino,
 				xfs_extlen_t tot);
-extern bool xfs_dir2_sf_replace_needblock(struct xfs_inode *dp,
-				xfs_ino_t inum);
 extern int xfs_dir_replace(struct xfs_trans *tp, struct xfs_inode *dp,
 				struct xfs_name *name, xfs_ino_t inum,
 				xfs_extlen_t tot);
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_sf.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2_sf.c
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ xfs_dir2_sf_removename(
 /*
  * Check whether the sf dir replace operation need more blocks.
  */
-bool
+static bool
 xfs_dir2_sf_replace_needblock(
 	struct xfs_inode	*dp,
 	xfs_ino_t		inum)
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
@@ -3152,7 +3152,7 @@ xfs_rename(
 	struct xfs_trans	*tp;
 	struct xfs_inode	*wip = NULL;		/* whiteout inode */
 	struct xfs_inode	*inodes[__XFS_SORT_INODES];
-	struct xfs_buf		*agibp;
+	int			i;
 	int			num_inodes = __XFS_SORT_INODES;
 	bool			new_parent = (src_dp != target_dp);
 	bool			src_is_directory = S_ISDIR(VFS_I(src_ip)->i_mode);
@@ -3266,6 +3266,30 @@ xfs_rename(
 	}
 
 	/*
+	 * Lock the AGI buffers we need to handle bumping the nlink of the
+	 * whiteout inode off the unlinked list and to handle dropping the
+	 * nlink of the target inode.  Per locking order rules, do this in
+	 * increasing AG order and before directory block allocation tries to
+	 * grab AGFs because we grab AGIs before AGFs.
+	 *
+	 * The (vfs) caller must ensure that if src is a directory then
+	 * target_ip is either null or an empty directory.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_inodes && inodes[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (inodes[i] == wip ||
+		    (inodes[i] == target_ip &&
+		     (VFS_I(target_ip)->i_nlink == 1 || src_is_directory))) {
+			struct xfs_buf	*bp;
+			xfs_agnumber_t	agno;
+
+			agno = XFS_INO_TO_AGNO(mp, inodes[i]->i_ino);
+			error = xfs_read_agi(mp, tp, agno, &bp);
+			if (error)
+				goto out_trans_cancel;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * Directory entry creation below may acquire the AGF. Remove
 	 * the whiteout from the unlinked list first to preserve correct
 	 * AGI/AGF locking order. This dirties the transaction so failures
@@ -3317,22 +3341,6 @@ xfs_rename(
 		 * In case there is already an entry with the same
 		 * name at the destination directory, remove it first.
 		 */
-
-		/*
-		 * Check whether the replace operation will need to allocate
-		 * blocks.  This happens when the shortform directory lacks
-		 * space and we have to convert it to a block format directory.
-		 * When more blocks are necessary, we must lock the AGI first
-		 * to preserve locking order (AGI -> AGF).
-		 */
-		if (xfs_dir2_sf_replace_needblock(target_dp, src_ip->i_ino)) {
-			error = xfs_read_agi(mp, tp,
-					XFS_INO_TO_AGNO(mp, target_ip->i_ino),
-					&agibp);
-			if (error)
-				goto out_trans_cancel;
-		}
-
 		error = xfs_dir_replace(tp, target_dp, target_name,
 					src_ip->i_ino, spaceres);
 		if (error)

[PATCH 5.10 20/53] xfs: Fix CIL throttle hang when CIL space used going backwards

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>

commit 19f4e7cc819771812a7f527d7897c2deffbf7a00 upstream.

A hang with tasks stuck on the CIL hard throttle was reported and
largely diagnosed by Donald Buczek, who discovered that it was a
result of the CIL context space usage decrementing in committed
transactions once the hard throttle limit had been hit and processes
were already blocked.  This resulted in the CIL push not waking up
those waiters because the CIL context was no longer over the hard
throttle limit.

The surprising aspect of this was the CIL space usage going
backwards regularly enough to trigger this situation. Assumptions
had been made in design that the relogging process would only
increase the size of the objects in the CIL, and so that space would
only increase.

This change and commit message fixes the issue and documents the
result of an audit of the triggers that can cause the CIL space to
go backwards, how large the backwards steps tend to be, the
frequency in which they occur, and what the impact on the CIL
accounting code is.

Even though the CIL ctx->space_used can go backwards, it will only
do so if the log item is already logged to the CIL and contains a
space reservation for it's entire logged state. This is tracked by
the shadow buffer state on the log item. If the item is not
previously logged in the CIL it has no shadow buffer nor log vector,
and hence the entire size of the logged item copied to the log
vector is accounted to the CIL space usage. i.e.  it will always go
up in this case.

If the item has a log vector (i.e. already in the CIL) and the size
decreases, then the existing log vector will be overwritten and the
space usage will go down. This is the only condition where the space
usage reduces, and it can only occur when an item is already tracked
in the CIL. Hence we are safe from CIL space usage underruns as a
result of log items decreasing in size when they are relogged.

Typically this reduction in CIL usage occurs from metadata blocks
being free, such as when a btree block merge occurs or a directory
enter/xattr entry is removed and the da-tree is reduced in size.
This generally results in a reduction in size of around a single
block in the CIL, but also tends to increase the number of log
vectors because the parent and sibling nodes in the tree needs to be
updated when a btree block is removed. If a multi-level merge
occurs, then we see reduction in size of 2+ blocks, but again the
log vector count goes up.

The other vector is inode fork size changes, which only log the
current size of the fork and ignore the previously logged size when
the fork is relogged. Hence if we are removing items from the inode
fork (dir/xattr removal in shortform, extent record removal in
extent form, etc) the relogged size of the inode for can decrease.

No other log items can decrease in size either because they are a
fixed size (e.g. dquots) or they cannot be relogged (e.g. relogging
an intent actually creates a new intent log item and doesn't relog
the old item at all.) Hence the only two vectors for CIL context
size reduction are relogging inode forks and marking buffers active
in the CIL as stale.

Long story short: the majority of the code does the right thing and
handles the reduction in log item size correctly, and only the CIL
hard throttle implementation is problematic and needs fixing. This
patch makes that fix, as well as adds comments in the log item code
that result in items shrinking in size when they are relogged as a
clear reminder that this can and does happen frequently.

The throttle fix is based upon the change Donald proposed, though it
goes further to ensure that once the throttle is activated, it
captures all tasks until the CIL push issues a wakeup, regardless of
whether the CIL space used has gone back under the throttle
threshold.

This ensures that we prevent tasks reducing the CIL slightly under
the throttle threshold and then making more changes that push it
well over the throttle limit. This is acheived by checking if the
throttle wait queue is already active as a condition of throttling.
Hence once we start throttling, we continue to apply the throttle
until the CIL context push wakes everything on the wait queue.

We can use waitqueue_active() for the waitqueue manipulations and
checks as they are all done under the ctx->xc_push_lock. Hence the
waitqueue has external serialisation and we can safely peek inside
the wait queue without holding the internal waitqueue locks.

Many thanks to Donald for his diagnostic and analysis work to
isolate the cause of this hang.

Reported-and-tested-by: Donald Buczek <buczek@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Henderson <allison.henderson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c   |   37 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 fs/xfs/xfs_log_cil.c    |   22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c
@@ -56,14 +56,12 @@ xfs_buf_log_format_size(
 }
 
 /*
- * This returns the number of log iovecs needed to log the
- * given buf log item.
+ * Return the number of log iovecs and space needed to log the given buf log
+ * item segment.
  *
- * It calculates this as 1 iovec for the buf log format structure
- * and 1 for each stretch of non-contiguous chunks to be logged.
- * Contiguous chunks are logged in a single iovec.
- *
- * If the XFS_BLI_STALE flag has been set, then log nothing.
+ * It calculates this as 1 iovec for the buf log format structure and 1 for each
+ * stretch of non-contiguous chunks to be logged.  Contiguous chunks are logged
+ * in a single iovec.
  */
 STATIC void
 xfs_buf_item_size_segment(
@@ -119,11 +117,8 @@ xfs_buf_item_size_segment(
 }
 
 /*
- * This returns the number of log iovecs needed to log the given buf log item.
- *
- * It calculates this as 1 iovec for the buf log format structure and 1 for each
- * stretch of non-contiguous chunks to be logged.  Contiguous chunks are logged
- * in a single iovec.
+ * Return the number of log iovecs and space needed to log the given buf log
+ * item.
  *
  * Discontiguous buffers need a format structure per region that is being
  * logged. This makes the changes in the buffer appear to log recovery as though
@@ -133,7 +128,11 @@ xfs_buf_item_size_segment(
  * what ends up on disk.
  *
  * If the XFS_BLI_STALE flag has been set, then log nothing but the buf log
- * format structures.
+ * format structures. If the item has previously been logged and has dirty
+ * regions, we do not relog them in stale buffers. This has the effect of
+ * reducing the size of the relogged item by the amount of dirty data tracked
+ * by the log item. This can result in the committing transaction reducing the
+ * amount of space being consumed by the CIL.
  */
 STATIC void
 xfs_buf_item_size(
@@ -147,9 +146,9 @@ xfs_buf_item_size(
 	ASSERT(atomic_read(&bip->bli_refcount) > 0);
 	if (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_STALE) {
 		/*
-		 * The buffer is stale, so all we need to log
-		 * is the buf log format structure with the
-		 * cancel flag in it.
+		 * The buffer is stale, so all we need to log is the buf log
+		 * format structure with the cancel flag in it as we are never
+		 * going to replay the changes tracked in the log item.
 		 */
 		trace_xfs_buf_item_size_stale(bip);
 		ASSERT(bip->__bli_format.blf_flags & XFS_BLF_CANCEL);
@@ -164,9 +163,9 @@ xfs_buf_item_size(
 
 	if (bip->bli_flags & XFS_BLI_ORDERED) {
 		/*
-		 * The buffer has been logged just to order it.
-		 * It is not being included in the transaction
-		 * commit, so no vectors are used at all.
+		 * The buffer has been logged just to order it. It is not being
+		 * included in the transaction commit, so no vectors are used at
+		 * all.
 		 */
 		trace_xfs_buf_item_size_ordered(bip);
 		*nvecs = XFS_LOG_VEC_ORDERED;
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c
@@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ static inline struct xfs_inode_log_item
 	return container_of(lip, struct xfs_inode_log_item, ili_item);
 }
 
+/*
+ * The logged size of an inode fork is always the current size of the inode
+ * fork. This means that when an inode fork is relogged, the size of the logged
+ * region is determined by the current state, not the combination of the
+ * previously logged state + the current state. This is different relogging
+ * behaviour to most other log items which will retain the size of the
+ * previously logged changes when smaller regions are relogged.
+ *
+ * Hence operations that remove data from the inode fork (e.g. shortform
+ * dir/attr remove, extent form extent removal, etc), the size of the relogged
+ * inode gets -smaller- rather than stays the same size as the previously logged
+ * size and this can result in the committing transaction reducing the amount of
+ * space being consumed by the CIL.
+ */
 STATIC void
 xfs_inode_item_data_fork_size(
 	struct xfs_inode_log_item *iip,
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_cil.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_cil.c
@@ -668,9 +668,14 @@ xlog_cil_push_work(
 	ASSERT(push_seq <= ctx->sequence);
 
 	/*
-	 * Wake up any background push waiters now this context is being pushed.
+	 * As we are about to switch to a new, empty CIL context, we no longer
+	 * need to throttle tasks on CIL space overruns. Wake any waiters that
+	 * the hard push throttle may have caught so they can start committing
+	 * to the new context. The ctx->xc_push_lock provides the serialisation
+	 * necessary for safely using the lockless waitqueue_active() check in
+	 * this context.
 	 */
-	if (ctx->space_used >= XLOG_CIL_BLOCKING_SPACE_LIMIT(log))
+	if (waitqueue_active(&cil->xc_push_wait))
 		wake_up_all(&cil->xc_push_wait);
 
 	/*
@@ -907,7 +912,7 @@ xlog_cil_push_background(
 	ASSERT(!list_empty(&cil->xc_cil));
 
 	/*
-	 * don't do a background push if we haven't used up all the
+	 * Don't do a background push if we haven't used up all the
 	 * space available yet.
 	 */
 	if (cil->xc_ctx->space_used < XLOG_CIL_SPACE_LIMIT(log)) {
@@ -931,9 +936,16 @@ xlog_cil_push_background(
 
 	/*
 	 * If we are well over the space limit, throttle the work that is being
-	 * done until the push work on this context has begun.
+	 * done until the push work on this context has begun. Enforce the hard
+	 * throttle on all transaction commits once it has been activated, even
+	 * if the committing transactions have resulted in the space usage
+	 * dipping back down under the hard limit.
+	 *
+	 * The ctx->xc_push_lock provides the serialisation necessary for safely
+	 * using the lockless waitqueue_active() check in this context.
 	 */
-	if (cil->xc_ctx->space_used >= XLOG_CIL_BLOCKING_SPACE_LIMIT(log)) {
+	if (cil->xc_ctx->space_used >= XLOG_CIL_BLOCKING_SPACE_LIMIT(log) ||
+	    waitqueue_active(&cil->xc_push_wait)) {
 		trace_xfs_log_cil_wait(log, cil->xc_ctx->ticket);
 		ASSERT(cil->xc_ctx->space_used < log->l_logsize);
 		xlog_wait(&cil->xc_push_wait, &cil->xc_push_lock);

[PATCH 5.10 21/53] drm/i915: Fix -Wstringop-overflow warning in call to intel_read_wm_latency()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>

commit 336feb502a715909a8136eb6a62a83d7268a353b upstream.

Fix the following -Wstringop-overflow warnings when building with GCC-11:

drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3106:9: warning: ‘intel_read_wm_latency’ accessing 16 bytes in a region of size 10 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
 3106 |         intel_read_wm_latency(dev_priv, dev_priv->wm.pri_latency);
      |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3106:9: note: referencing argument 2 of type ‘u16 *’ {aka ‘short unsigned int *’}
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:2861:13: note: in a call to function ‘intel_read_wm_latency’
 2861 | static void intel_read_wm_latency(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,
      |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

by removing the over-specified array size from the argument declarations.

It seems that this code is actually safe because the size of the
array depends on the hardware generation, and the function checks
for that.

Notice that wm can be an array of 5 elements:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3109:   intel_read_wm_latency(dev_priv, dev_priv->wm.pri_latency);

or an array of 8 elements:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3131:   intel_read_wm_latency(dev_priv, dev_priv->wm.skl_latency);

and the compiler legitimately complains about that.

This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable
-Wstringop-overflow.

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/181
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c
@@ -2846,7 +2846,7 @@ static void ilk_compute_wm_level(const s
 }
 
 static void intel_read_wm_latency(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv,
-				  u16 wm[8])
+				  u16 wm[])
 {
 	struct intel_uncore *uncore = &dev_priv->uncore;
 

[PATCH 5.10 22/53] exfat: check if cluster num is valid

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>

commit 64ba4b15e5c045f8b746c6da5fc9be9a6b00b61d upstream.

Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in exfat_clear_bitmap.
This was triggered by reproducer calling truncute with size 0,
which causes the following trace:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in exfat_clear_bitmap+0x147/0x490 fs/exfat/balloc.c:174
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888115aa9508 by task syz-executor251/365

Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1e2/0x24b lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description+0x81/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:233
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
 kasan_report+0x1a4/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:436
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:309
 exfat_clear_bitmap+0x147/0x490 fs/exfat/balloc.c:174
 exfat_free_cluster+0x25a/0x4a0 fs/exfat/fatent.c:181
 __exfat_truncate+0x99e/0xe00 fs/exfat/file.c:217
 exfat_truncate+0x11b/0x4f0 fs/exfat/file.c:243
 exfat_setattr+0xa03/0xd40 fs/exfat/file.c:339
 notify_change+0xb76/0xe10 fs/attr.c:336
 do_truncate+0x1ea/0x2d0 fs/open.c:65

Move the is_valid_cluster() helper from fatent.c to a common
header to make it reusable in other *.c files. And add is_valid_cluster()
to validate if cluster number is within valid range in exfat_clear_bitmap()
and exfat_set_bitmap().

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=50381fc73821ecae743b8cf24b4c9a04776f767c
Reported-by: syzbot+a4087e40b9c13aad7892@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1e49a94cf707 ("exfat: add bitmap operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/exfat/balloc.c   |    8 ++++++--
 fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h |    8 ++++++++
 fs/exfat/fatent.c   |    8 --------
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/exfat/balloc.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/balloc.c
@@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ int exfat_set_bitmap(struct inode *inode
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = EXFAT_SB(sb);
 
-	WARN_ON(clu < EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER);
+	if (!is_valid_cluster(sbi, clu))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ent_idx = CLUSTER_TO_BITMAP_ENT(clu);
 	i = BITMAP_OFFSET_SECTOR_INDEX(sb, ent_idx);
 	b = BITMAP_OFFSET_BIT_IN_SECTOR(sb, ent_idx);
@@ -166,7 +168,9 @@ void exfat_clear_bitmap(struct inode *in
 	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = EXFAT_SB(sb);
 	struct exfat_mount_options *opts = &sbi->options;
 
-	WARN_ON(clu < EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER);
+	if (!is_valid_cluster(sbi, clu))
+		return;
+
 	ent_idx = CLUSTER_TO_BITMAP_ENT(clu);
 	i = BITMAP_OFFSET_SECTOR_INDEX(sb, ent_idx);
 	b = BITMAP_OFFSET_BIT_IN_SECTOR(sb, ent_idx);
--- a/fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h
+++ b/fs/exfat/exfat_fs.h
@@ -380,6 +380,14 @@ static inline int exfat_sector_to_cluste
 		EXFAT_RESERVED_CLUSTERS;
 }
 
+static inline bool is_valid_cluster(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi,
+		unsigned int clus)
+{
+	if (clus < EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER || sbi->num_clusters <= clus)
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
 /* super.c */
 int exfat_set_volume_dirty(struct super_block *sb);
 int exfat_clear_volume_dirty(struct super_block *sb);
--- a/fs/exfat/fatent.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/fatent.c
@@ -81,14 +81,6 @@ int exfat_ent_set(struct super_block *sb
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline bool is_valid_cluster(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi,
-		unsigned int clus)
-{
-	if (clus < EXFAT_FIRST_CLUSTER || sbi->num_clusters <= clus)
-		return false;
-	return true;
-}
-
 int exfat_ent_get(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int loc,
 		unsigned int *content)
 {

[PATCH 5.10 23/53] exfat: fix referencing wrong parent directory information after renaming

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>

commit d8dad2588addd1d861ce19e7df3b702330f0c7e3 upstream.

During renaming, the parent directory information maybe
updated. But the file/directory still references to the
old parent directory information.

This bug will cause 2 problems.

(1) The renamed file can not be written.

    [10768.175172] exFAT-fs (sda1): error, failed to bmap (inode : 7afd50e4 iblock : 0, err : -5)
    [10768.184285] exFAT-fs (sda1): Filesystem has been set read-only
    ash: write error: Input/output error

(2) Some dentries of the renamed file/directory are not set
    to deleted after removing the file/directory.

exfat_update_parent_info() is a workaround for the wrong parent
directory information being used after renaming. Now that bug is
fixed, this is no longer needed, so remove it.

Fixes: 5f2aa075070c ("exfat: add inode operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Wu <Andy.Wu@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Aoyama Wataru <wataru.aoyama@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Palmer <daniel.palmer@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/exfat/namei.c |   27 +--------------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/exfat/namei.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/namei.c
@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@ static int exfat_rename_file(struct inod
 
 		exfat_remove_entries(inode, p_dir, oldentry, 0,
 			num_old_entries);
+		ei->dir = *p_dir;
 		ei->entry = newentry;
 	} else {
 		if (exfat_get_entry_type(epold) == TYPE_FILE) {
@@ -1151,28 +1152,6 @@ static int exfat_move_file(struct inode
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void exfat_update_parent_info(struct exfat_inode_info *ei,
-		struct inode *parent_inode)
-{
-	struct exfat_sb_info *sbi = EXFAT_SB(parent_inode->i_sb);
-	struct exfat_inode_info *parent_ei = EXFAT_I(parent_inode);
-	loff_t parent_isize = i_size_read(parent_inode);
-
-	/*
-	 * the problem that struct exfat_inode_info caches wrong parent info.
-	 *
-	 * because of flag-mismatch of ei->dir,
-	 * there is abnormal traversing cluster chain.
-	 */
-	if (unlikely(parent_ei->flags != ei->dir.flags ||
-		     parent_isize != EXFAT_CLU_TO_B(ei->dir.size, sbi) ||
-		     parent_ei->start_clu != ei->dir.dir)) {
-		exfat_chain_set(&ei->dir, parent_ei->start_clu,
-			EXFAT_B_TO_CLU_ROUND_UP(parent_isize, sbi),
-			parent_ei->flags);
-	}
-}
-
 /* rename or move a old file into a new file */
 static int __exfat_rename(struct inode *old_parent_inode,
 		struct exfat_inode_info *ei, struct inode *new_parent_inode,
@@ -1203,8 +1182,6 @@ static int __exfat_rename(struct inode *
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	exfat_update_parent_info(ei, old_parent_inode);
-
 	exfat_chain_dup(&olddir, &ei->dir);
 	dentry = ei->entry;
 
@@ -1225,8 +1202,6 @@ static int __exfat_rename(struct inode *
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		exfat_update_parent_info(new_ei, new_parent_inode);
-
 		p_dir = &(new_ei->dir);
 		new_entry = new_ei->entry;
 		ep = exfat_get_dentry(sb, p_dir, new_entry, &new_bh, NULL);

[PATCH 5.10 24/53] lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: "Justin M. Forbes" <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>

commit e56e18985596617ae426ed5997fb2e737cffb58b upstream.

Commit 6048fdcc5f269 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in") took
away a number of prompt texts from other crypto libraries. This makes
values flip from built-in to module when oldconfig runs, and causes
problems when these crypto libs need to be built in for thingslike
BIG_KEYS.

Fixes: 6048fdcc5f269 ("lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in")
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
[Jason: - moved menu into submenu of lib/ instead of root menu
        - fixed chacha sub-dependencies for CONFIG_CRYPTO]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig     |    2 --
 lib/Kconfig        |    2 ++
 lib/crypto/Kconfig |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1941,5 +1941,3 @@ source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
 source "certs/Kconfig"
 
 endif	# if CRYPTO
-
-source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ config INDIRECT_PIO
 
 	  When in doubt, say N.
 
+source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
+
 config CRC_CCITT
 	tristate "CRC-CCITT functions"
 	help
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
+menu "Crypto library routines"
+
 config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
 	tristate
 
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
 	tristate
-	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+	select XOR_BLOCKS
 	help
 	  This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
 	  ChaCha library interface that require the generic code as a
@@ -40,7 +42,8 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
-	tristate
+	tristate "ChaCha library interface"
+	depends on CRYPTO
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
 	help
@@ -65,7 +68,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
-	tristate
+	tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
 	help
@@ -100,7 +103,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
-	tristate
+	tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
 	help
@@ -109,11 +112,15 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
 	  is available and enabled.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
-	tristate
+	tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
+	depends on CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
+	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
 	tristate
+
+endmenu

[PATCH 5.10 25/53] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>

commit ce8ce31b2c5c8b18667784b8c515650c65d57b4e upstream.

There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded
from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes().
At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have
collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG
implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once
that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG
instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered
during their lifetime.

Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive
operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work
restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense
amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full
(estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes()
once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself.

With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing
the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a
subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related
logic already present in drbg_generate().

However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy
source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes()
would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded
member must become a tristate value.

Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change
struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type.

For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain
two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true
resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A
third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy
only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch.

There is no change in behaviour at this point.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/drbg.c         |   19 ++++++++++---------
 include/crypto/drbg.h |    7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drb
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	drbg->seeded = true;
+	drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
 	/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
 
@@ -1087,14 +1087,14 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_
 	if (ret)
 		goto unlock;
 
-	/* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the
-	 * next generate call will trigger a reseed.
+	/* Reset ->seeded so that if __drbg_seed fails the next
+	 * generate call will trigger a reseed.
 	 */
-	drbg->seeded = false;
+	drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 
 	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
 
-	if (drbg->seeded)
+	if (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL)
 		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
 
 unlock:
@@ -1385,13 +1385,14 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_sta
 	 * here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
 	 */
 	if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr)
-		drbg->seeded = false;
+		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 
-	if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
+	if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) {
 		pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
 			 "resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
 			 drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
-			 drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
+			 (drbg->seeded ==  DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ?
+			  "seeded" : "unseeded"));
 		/* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
 		len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
 		if (len)
@@ -1576,7 +1577,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_
 	if (!drbg->core) {
 		drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
 		drbg->pr = pr;
-		drbg->seeded = false;
+		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
 
 		ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ struct drbg_test_data {
 	struct drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */
 };
 
+enum drbg_seed_state {
+	DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
+	DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
+};
+
 struct drbg_state {
 	struct mutex drbg_mutex;	/* lock around DRBG */
 	unsigned char *V;	/* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */
@@ -127,7 +132,7 @@ struct drbg_state {
 	struct crypto_wait ctr_wait;		/* CTR mode async wait obj */
 	struct scatterlist sg_in, sg_out;	/* CTR mode SGLs */
 
-	bool seeded;		/* DRBG fully seeded? */
+	enum drbg_seed_state seeded;		/* DRBG fully seeded? */
 	bool pr;		/* Prediction resistance enabled? */
 	bool fips_primed;	/* Continuous test primed? */
 	unsigned char *prev;	/* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */

[PATCH 5.10 26/53] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>

commit 2bcd25443868aa8863779a6ebc6c9319633025d2 upstream.

Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from
random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from
get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available.

However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by
means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this
asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple
by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate()
once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true.

Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which
it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since
the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not
the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when
rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false.

As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation
of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full
reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as
well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL
state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a
!->pr DRBG variant.

Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for
representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when
rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state
implies that
- the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy
  source (if enabled)
- and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes()
  *only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true.

Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's
->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument
allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead.
Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate
value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller,
drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized()
is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new
argument to __drbg_seed().

There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in
drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which
had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to
false.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/drbg.c         |   12 ++++++++----
 include/crypto/drbg.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1035,14 +1035,14 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_
  ******************************************************************/
 
 static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
-			      int reseed)
+			      int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state)
 {
 	int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
+	drbg->seeded = new_seed_state;
 	/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
 
@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_
 	 */
 	drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 
-	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
+	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
 
 	if (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL)
 		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *
 	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
 	struct drbg_string data1;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+	enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
 
 	/* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
 	if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
@@ -1149,6 +1150,9 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *
 		BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
 
 		/* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
+		if (!rng_is_initialized())
+			new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
+
 		ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
@@ -1205,7 +1209,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *
 		memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
 	}
 
-	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
 
 out:
 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ struct drbg_test_data {
 
 enum drbg_seed_state {
 	DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
+	DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */
 	DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
 };
 

[PATCH 5.10 27/53] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>

commit 262d83a4290c331cd4f617a457408bdb82fbb738 upstream.

Since commit 42ea507fae1a ("crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is
degraded"), the maximum seed lifetime represented by ->reseed_threshold
gets temporarily lowered if the get_random_bytes() source cannot provide
sufficient entropy yet, as is common during boot, and restored back to
the original value again once that has changed.

More specifically, if the add_random_ready_callback() invoked from
drbg_prepare_hrng() in the course of DRBG instantiation does not return
-EALREADY, that is, if get_random_bytes() has not been fully initialized
at this point yet, drbg_prepare_hrng() will lower ->reseed_threshold
to a value of 50. The drbg_async_seed() scheduled from said
random_ready_callback will eventually restore the original value.

A future patch will replace the random_ready_callback based notification
mechanism and thus, there will be no add_random_ready_callback() return
value anymore which could get compared to -EALREADY.

However, there's __drbg_seed() which gets invoked in the course of both,
the DRBG instantiation as well as the eventual reseeding from
get_random_bytes() in aforementioned drbg_async_seed(), if any. Moreover,
it knows about the get_random_bytes() initialization state by the time the
seed data had been obtained from it: the new_seed_state argument introduced
with the previous patch would get set to DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL in case
get_random_bytes() had not been fully initialized yet and to
DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL otherwise. Thus, __drbg_seed() provides a convenient
alternative for managing that ->reseed_threshold lowering and restoring at
a central place.

Move all ->reseed_threshold adjustment code from drbg_prepare_hrng() and
drbg_async_seed() respectively to __drbg_seed(). Make __drbg_seed()
lower the ->reseed_threshold to 50 in case its new_seed_state argument
equals DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL and let it restore the original value
otherwise.

There is no change in behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/drbg.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1046,6 +1046,27 @@ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drb
 	/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
 
+	switch (drbg->seeded) {
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED:
+		/* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */
+		fallthrough;
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL:
+		/*
+		 * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is
+		 * fully initialized.
+		 */
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
+		break;
+
+	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
+		/*
+		 * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
+		 * reseeds no longer required.
+		 */
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1094,9 +1115,6 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_
 
 	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
 
-	if (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL)
-		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
-
 unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
 
@@ -1532,12 +1550,6 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully
-	 * initialized.
-	 */
-	drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
-
 	return err;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 28/53] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>

commit 074bcd4000e0d812bc253f86fedc40f81ed59ccc upstream.

get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG
instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG
implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn
schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has
sufficient entropy available.

For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in
the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is:

  commit 16b369a91d0d ("random: Blocking API for accessing
                        nonblocking_pool")
  commit 4c7879907edd ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation")

  commit 205a525c3342 ("random: Add callback API for random pool
                        readiness")
  commit 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random
                        readiness")
  commit c2719503f5e1 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API")

However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes()
has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit
9a47249d444d ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now
allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by
replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from
random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in
drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart
from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG
users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial
seeding has completed, if desired.

The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to
record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when
rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by
->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL.

All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this
condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in
the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so.

Make this move:
- rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge
  of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to
  "drbg_seed_from_random()",
- change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct
  drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from
  "void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from
  e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers,
- make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it
  encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by
  the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and
- prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based
  mechanism.

As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with
the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it
once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now
drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now
report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily
switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a
failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to
drbg_generate(). Don't do it then.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/drbg.c         |   61 +++++++++-----------------------------------------
 drivers/char/random.c |    2 -
 include/crypto/drbg.h |    2 -
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1086,12 +1086,10 @@ static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
+static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	struct drbg_string data;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
-					       seed_work);
 	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
 	unsigned char entropy[32];
 	int ret;
@@ -1102,23 +1100,15 @@ static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_
 	drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
 	list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
 
-	mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
-
 	ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
 	if (ret)
-		goto unlock;
-
-	/* Reset ->seeded so that if __drbg_seed fails the next
-	 * generate call will trigger a reseed.
-	 */
-	drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
+		goto out;
 
-	__drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
-
-unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
 
+out:
 	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1421,6 +1411,11 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_sta
 			goto err;
 		/* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
 		addtl = NULL;
+	} else if (rng_is_initialized() &&
+		   drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) {
+		len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg);
+		if (len)
+			goto err;
 	}
 
 	if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
@@ -1513,44 +1508,15 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drb
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data)
-{
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state,
-					       random_ready);
-
-	schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	int err;
-
 	/* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */
 	if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
 		return 0;
 
 	drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
 
-	INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
-
-	drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-	err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
-
-	switch (err) {
-	case 0:
-		break;
-
-	case -EALREADY:
-		err = 0;
-		fallthrough;
-
-	default:
-		drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL;
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1644,11 +1610,6 @@ free_everything:
  */
 static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) {
-		unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
-		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
-	}
-
 	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
 		crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
 	drbg->jent = NULL;
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ int __cold register_random_ready_notifie
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
 	return ret;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_random_ready_notifier);
 
 /*
  * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
@@ -178,7 +177,6 @@ int __cold unregister_random_ready_notif
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
 	return ret;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_random_ready_notifier);
 
 static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
 {
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -137,12 +137,10 @@ struct drbg_state {
 	bool pr;		/* Prediction resistance enabled? */
 	bool fips_primed;	/* Continuous test primed? */
 	unsigned char *prev;	/* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */
-	struct work_struct seed_work;	/* asynchronous seeding support */
 	struct crypto_rng *jent;
 	const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
 	const struct drbg_core *core;
 	struct drbg_string test_data;
-	struct notifier_block random_ready;
 };
 
 static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)

[PATCH 5.10 29/53] netfilter: nf_tables: sanitize nft_set_desc_concat_parse()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

commit fecf31ee395b0295f2d7260aa29946b7605f7c85 upstream.

Add several sanity checks for nft_set_desc_concat_parse():

- validate desc->field_count not larger than desc->field_len array.
- field length cannot be larger than desc->field_len (ie. U8_MAX)
- total length of the concatenation cannot be larger than register array.

Joint work with Florian Westphal.

Fixes: f3a2181e16f1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Support for sets with multiple ranged fields")
Reported-by: <zhangziming.zzm@antgroup.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -4051,6 +4051,9 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat_parse(con
 	u32 len;
 	int err;
 
+	if (desc->field_count >= ARRAY_SIZE(desc->field_len))
+		return -E2BIG;
+
 	err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, NFTA_SET_FIELD_MAX, attr,
 					  nft_concat_policy, NULL);
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -4060,9 +4063,8 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat_parse(con
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	len = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_SET_FIELD_LEN]));
-
-	if (len * BITS_PER_BYTE / 32 > NFT_REG32_COUNT)
-		return -E2BIG;
+	if (!len || len > U8_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	desc->field_len[desc->field_count++] = len;
 
@@ -4073,7 +4075,8 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat(struct nf
 			       const struct nlattr *nla)
 {
 	struct nlattr *attr;
-	int rem, err;
+	u32 num_regs = 0;
+	int rem, err, i;
 
 	nla_for_each_nested(attr, nla, rem) {
 		if (nla_type(attr) != NFTA_LIST_ELEM)
@@ -4084,6 +4087,12 @@ static int nft_set_desc_concat(struct nf
 			return err;
 	}
 
+	for (i = 0; i < desc->field_count; i++)
+		num_regs += DIV_ROUND_UP(desc->field_len[i], sizeof(u32));
+
+	if (num_regs > NFT_REG32_COUNT)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 30/53] netfilter: conntrack: re-fetch conntrack after insertion

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

commit 56b14ecec97f39118bf85c9ac2438c5a949509ed upstream.

In case the conntrack is clashing, insertion can free skb->_nfct and
set skb->_nfct to the already-confirmed entry.

This wasn't found before because the conntrack entry and the extension
space used to free'd after an rcu grace period, plus the race needs
events enabled to trigger.

Reported-by: <syzbot+793a590957d9c1b96620@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 71d8c47fc653 ("netfilter: conntrack: introduce clash resolution on insertion race")
Fixes: 2ad9d7747c10 ("netfilter: conntrack: free extension area immediately")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h
@@ -59,8 +59,13 @@ static inline int nf_conntrack_confirm(s
 	int ret = NF_ACCEPT;
 
 	if (ct) {
-		if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct))
+		if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) {
 			ret = __nf_conntrack_confirm(skb);
+
+			if (ret == NF_ACCEPT)
+				ct = (struct nf_conn *)skb_nfct(skb);
+		}
+
 		if (likely(ret == NF_ACCEPT))
 			nf_ct_deliver_cached_events(ct);
 	}

[PATCH 5.10 31/53] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: fix incorrect NULL check on list iterator

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Xiaomeng Tong <xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com>

commit 300981abddcb13f8f06ad58f52358b53a8096775 upstream.

The bug is here:
	if (!p)
                return ret;

The list iterator value 'p' will *always* be set and non-NULL by
list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator
value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element is found.

To fix the bug, Use a new value 'iter' as the list iterator, while use
the old value 'p' as a dedicated variable to point to the found element.

Fixes: dfaa973ae960 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: In H_SVM_INIT_DONE, migrate remaining normal-GFNs to secure-GFNs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.9+
Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong <xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414062103.8153-1-xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
@@ -359,13 +359,15 @@ static bool kvmppc_gfn_is_uvmem_pfn(unsi
 static bool kvmppc_next_nontransitioned_gfn(const struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
 		struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long *gfn)
 {
-	struct kvmppc_uvmem_slot *p;
+	struct kvmppc_uvmem_slot *p = NULL, *iter;
 	bool ret = false;
 	unsigned long i;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(p, &kvm->arch.uvmem_pfns, list)
-		if (*gfn >= p->base_pfn && *gfn < p->base_pfn + p->nr_pfns)
+	list_for_each_entry(iter, &kvm->arch.uvmem_pfns, list)
+		if (*gfn >= iter->base_pfn && *gfn < iter->base_pfn + iter->nr_pfns) {
+			p = iter;
 			break;
+		}
 	if (!p)
 		return ret;
 	/*

[PATCH 5.10 32/53] x86/kvm: Alloc dummy async #PF token outside of raw spinlock

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

commit 0547758a6de3cc71a0cfdd031a3621a30db6a68b upstream.

Drop the raw spinlock in kvm_async_pf_task_wake() before allocating the
the dummy async #PF token, the allocator is preemptible on PREEMPT_RT
kernels and must not be called from truly atomic contexts.

Opportunistically document why it's ok to loop on allocation failure,
i.e. why the function won't get stuck in an infinite loop.

Reported-by: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c |   41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ void kvm_async_pf_task_wake(u32 token)
 {
 	u32 key = hash_32(token, KVM_TASK_SLEEP_HASHBITS);
 	struct kvm_task_sleep_head *b = &async_pf_sleepers[key];
-	struct kvm_task_sleep_node *n;
+	struct kvm_task_sleep_node *n, *dummy = NULL;
 
 	if (token == ~0) {
 		apf_task_wake_all();
@@ -200,28 +200,41 @@ again:
 	n = _find_apf_task(b, token);
 	if (!n) {
 		/*
-		 * async PF was not yet handled.
-		 * Add dummy entry for the token.
+		 * Async #PF not yet handled, add a dummy entry for the token.
+		 * Allocating the token must be down outside of the raw lock
+		 * as the allocator is preemptible on PREEMPT_RT kernels.
 		 */
-		n = kzalloc(sizeof(*n), GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (!n) {
+		if (!dummy) {
+			raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
+			dummy = kzalloc(sizeof(*dummy), GFP_KERNEL);
+
 			/*
-			 * Allocation failed! Busy wait while other cpu
-			 * handles async PF.
+			 * Continue looping on allocation failure, eventually
+			 * the async #PF will be handled and allocating a new
+			 * node will be unnecessary.
+			 */
+			if (!dummy)
+				cpu_relax();
+
+			/*
+			 * Recheck for async #PF completion before enqueueing
+			 * the dummy token to avoid duplicate list entries.
 			 */
-			raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
-			cpu_relax();
 			goto again;
 		}
-		n->token = token;
-		n->cpu = smp_processor_id();
-		init_swait_queue_head(&n->wq);
-		hlist_add_head(&n->link, &b->list);
+		dummy->token = token;
+		dummy->cpu = smp_processor_id();
+		init_swait_queue_head(&dummy->wq);
+		hlist_add_head(&dummy->link, &b->list);
+		dummy = NULL;
 	} else {
 		apf_task_wake_one(n);
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
-	return;
+
+	/* A dummy token might be allocated and ultimately not used.  */
+	if (dummy)
+		kfree(dummy);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_async_pf_task_wake);
 

[PATCH 5.10 33/53] x86, kvm: use correct GFP flags for preemption disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

commit baec4f5a018fe2d708fc1022330dba04b38b5fe3 upstream.

Commit ddd7ed842627 ("x86/kvm: Alloc dummy async #PF token outside of
raw spinlock") leads to the following Smatch static checker warning:

	arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c:212 kvm_async_pf_task_wake()
	warn: sleeping in atomic context

arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
    202         raw_spin_lock(&b->lock);
    203         n = _find_apf_task(b, token);
    204         if (!n) {
    205                 /*
    206                  * Async #PF not yet handled, add a dummy entry for the token.
    207                  * Allocating the token must be down outside of the raw lock
    208                  * as the allocator is preemptible on PREEMPT_RT kernels.
    209                  */
    210                 if (!dummy) {
    211                         raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
--> 212                         dummy = kzalloc(sizeof(*dummy), GFP_KERNEL);
                                                                ^^^^^^^^^^
Smatch thinks the caller has preempt disabled.  The `smdb.py preempt
kvm_async_pf_task_wake` output call tree is:

sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt() <- disables preempt
-> __sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt()
   -> kvm_async_pf_task_wake()

The caller is this:

arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
   290        DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt)
   291        {
   292                struct pt_regs *old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
   293                u32 token;
   294
   295                ack_APIC_irq();
   296
   297                inc_irq_stat(irq_hv_callback_count);
   298
   299                if (__this_cpu_read(apf_reason.enabled)) {
   300                        token = __this_cpu_read(apf_reason.token);
   301                        kvm_async_pf_task_wake(token);
   302                        __this_cpu_write(apf_reason.token, 0);
   303                        wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK, 1);
   304                }
   305
   306                set_irq_regs(old_regs);
   307        }

The DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC() is a wrapper that calls this function
from the call_on_irqstack_cond().  It's inside the call_on_irqstack_cond()
where preempt is disabled (unless it's already disabled).  The
irq_enter/exit_rcu() functions disable/enable preempt.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ again:
 		 */
 		if (!dummy) {
 			raw_spin_unlock(&b->lock);
-			dummy = kzalloc(sizeof(*dummy), GFP_KERNEL);
+			dummy = kzalloc(sizeof(*dummy), GFP_ATOMIC);
 
 			/*
 			 * Continue looping on allocation failure, eventually

[PATCH 5.10 34/53] KVM: x86: avoid calling x86 emulator without a decoded instruction

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

commit fee060cd52d69c114b62d1a2948ea9648b5131f9 upstream.

Whenever x86_decode_emulated_instruction() detects a breakpoint, it
returns the value that kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() writes into its
pass-by-reference second argument.  Unfortunately this is completely
bogus because the expected outcome of x86_decode_emulated_instruction
is an EMULATION_* value.

Then, if kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() does "*r = 0" (corresponding to
a KVM_EXIT_DEBUG userspace exit), it is misunderstood as EMULATION_OK
and x86_emulate_instruction() is called without having decoded the
instruction.  This causes various havoc from running with a stale
emulation context.

The fix is to move the call to kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint() where it was
before commit 4aa2691dcbd3 ("KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction
emulation with decoding") introduced x86_decode_emulated_instruction().
The other caller of the function does not need breakpoint checks,
because it is invoked as part of a vmexit and the processor has already
checked those before executing the instruction that #GP'd.

This fixes CVE-2022-1852.

Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <qiuhao@sysec.org>
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: 4aa2691dcbd3 ("KVM: x86: Factor out x86 instruction emulation with decoding")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220311032801.3467418-2-seanjc@google.com>
[Rewrote commit message according to Qiuhao's report, since a patch
 already existed to fix the bug. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c |   31 +++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7295,7 +7295,7 @@ int kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_skip_emulated_instruction);
 
-static bool kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *r)
+static bool kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *r)
 {
 	if (unlikely(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) &&
 	    (vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 & DR7_BP_EN_MASK)) {
@@ -7364,25 +7364,23 @@ static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(st
 }
 
 /*
- * Decode to be emulated instruction. Return EMULATION_OK if success.
+ * Decode an instruction for emulation.  The caller is responsible for handling
+ * code breakpoints.  Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary
+ * (and wrong) when emulating on an intercepted fault-like exception[*], as
+ * code breakpoints have higher priority and thus have already been done by
+ * hardware.
+ *
+ * [*] Except #MC, which is higher priority, but KVM should never emulate in
+ *     response to a machine check.
  */
 int x86_decode_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type,
 				    void *insn, int insn_len)
 {
-	int r = EMULATION_OK;
 	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+	int r;
 
 	init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
 
-	/*
-	 * We will reenter on the same instruction since we do not set
-	 * complete_userspace_io. This does not handle watchpoints yet,
-	 * those would be handled in the emulate_ops.
-	 */
-	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) &&
-	    kvm_vcpu_check_breakpoint(vcpu, &r))
-		return r;
-
 	ctxt->ud = emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD;
 
 	r = x86_decode_insn(ctxt, insn, insn_len);
@@ -7417,6 +7415,15 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_v
 	if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)) {
 		kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
 
+		/*
+		 * Return immediately if RIP hits a code breakpoint, such #DBs
+		 * are fault-like and are higher priority than any faults on
+		 * the code fetch itself.
+		 */
+		if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) &&
+		    kvm_vcpu_check_code_breakpoint(vcpu, &r))
+			return r;
+
 		r = x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emulation_type,
 						    insn, insn_len);
 		if (r != EMULATION_OK)  {

[PATCH 5.10 35/53] crypto: caam - fix i.MX6SX entropy delay value

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>

commit 4ee4cdad368a26de3967f2975806a9ee2fa245df upstream.

Since commit 358ba762d9f1 ("crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance
in HRWNG") the following CAAM errors can be seen on i.MX6SX:

caam_jr 2101000.jr: 20003c5b: CCB: desc idx 60: RNG: Hardware error
hwrng: no data available

This error is due to an incorrect entropy delay for i.MX6SX.

Fix it by increasing the minimum entropy delay for i.MX6SX
as done in U-Boot:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/uboot/patch/20220415111049.2565744-1-gaurav.jain@nxp.com/

As explained in the U-Boot patch:

"RNG self tests are run to determine the correct entropy delay.
Such tests are executed with different voltages and temperatures to identify
the worst case value for the entropy delay. For i.MX6SX, it was determined
that after adding a margin value of 1000 the minimum entropy delay should be
at least 12000."

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 358ba762d9f1 ("crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG")
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Vabhav Sharma <vabhav.sharma@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Gaurav Jain <gaurav.jain@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -609,6 +609,13 @@ static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_
 }
 #endif
 
+static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
+{
+	if (of_machine_is_compatible("fsl,imx6sx"))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
 static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
@@ -855,6 +862,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_de
 			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
 			 * the TRNG parameters.
 			 */
+			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+				ent_delay = 12000;
 			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
 				dev_info(dev,
 					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
@@ -871,6 +880,15 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_de
 			 */
 			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
 					      gen_sk);
+			/*
+			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
+			 * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
+			 * and temperatures.
+			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
+			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
+			 */
+			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+				break;
 			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
 				/*
 				 * if here, the loop will rerun,

[PATCH 5.10 36/53] crypto: ecrdsa - Fix incorrect use of vli_cmp

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>

commit 7cc7ab73f83ee6d50dc9536bc3355495d8600fad upstream.

Correctly compare values that shall be greater-or-equal and not just
greater.

Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/ecrdsa.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/ecrdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
@@ -113,15 +113,15 @@ static int ecrdsa_verify(struct akcipher
 
 	/* Step 1: verify that 0 < r < q, 0 < s < q */
 	if (vli_is_zero(r, ndigits) ||
-	    vli_cmp(r, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1 ||
+	    vli_cmp(r, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0 ||
 	    vli_is_zero(s, ndigits) ||
-	    vli_cmp(s, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	    vli_cmp(s, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 
 	/* Step 2: calculate hash (h) of the message (passed as input) */
 	/* Step 3: calculate e = h \mod q */
 	vli_from_le64(e, digest, ndigits);
-	if (vli_cmp(e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	if (vli_cmp(e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		vli_sub(e, e, ctx->curve->n, ndigits);
 	if (vli_is_zero(e, ndigits))
 		e[0] = 1;
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int ecrdsa_verify(struct akcipher
 	/* Step 6: calculate point C = z_1P + z_2Q, and R = x_c \mod q */
 	ecc_point_mult_shamir(&cc, z1, &ctx->curve->g, z2, &ctx->pub_key,
 			      ctx->curve);
-	if (vli_cmp(cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) == 1)
+	if (vli_cmp(cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits) >= 0)
 		vli_sub(cc.x, cc.x, ctx->curve->n, ndigits);
 
 	/* Step 7: if R == r signature is valid */

[PATCH 5.10 37/53] zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>

commit 2505a981114dcb715f8977b8433f7540854851d8 upstream.

The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page
list without defending against page migration.  Since pages which haven't
yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while
lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different
lethal races.

It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely
dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to
the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious
NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages
(since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and
create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the
process).

Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize
with page migration.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509024703.243847-1-sultan@kerneltoast.com
Fixes: 77ff465799c602 ("zsmalloc: zs_page_migrate: skip unnecessary loops but not return -EBUSY if zspage is not inuse")
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 mm/zsmalloc.c |   37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/zsmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/zsmalloc.c
@@ -1748,11 +1748,40 @@ static enum fullness_group putback_zspag
  */
 static void lock_zspage(struct zspage *zspage)
 {
-	struct page *page = get_first_page(zspage);
+	struct page *curr_page, *page;
 
-	do {
-		lock_page(page);
-	} while ((page = get_next_page(page)) != NULL);
+	/*
+	 * Pages we haven't locked yet can be migrated off the list while we're
+	 * trying to lock them, so we need to be careful and only attempt to
+	 * lock each page under migrate_read_lock(). Otherwise, the page we lock
+	 * may no longer belong to the zspage. This means that we may wait for
+	 * the wrong page to unlock, so we must take a reference to the page
+	 * prior to waiting for it to unlock outside migrate_read_lock().
+	 */
+	while (1) {
+		migrate_read_lock(zspage);
+		page = get_first_page(zspage);
+		if (trylock_page(page))
+			break;
+		get_page(page);
+		migrate_read_unlock(zspage);
+		wait_on_page_locked(page);
+		put_page(page);
+	}
+
+	curr_page = page;
+	while ((page = get_next_page(curr_page))) {
+		if (trylock_page(page)) {
+			curr_page = page;
+		} else {
+			get_page(page);
+			migrate_read_unlock(zspage);
+			wait_on_page_locked(page);
+			put_page(page);
+			migrate_read_lock(zspage);
+		}
+	}
+	migrate_read_unlock(zspage);
 }
 
 static int zs_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)

[PATCH 5.10 38/53] Bluetooth: hci_qca: Use del_timer_sync() before freeing

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 72ef98445aca568a81c2da050532500a8345ad3a upstream.

While looking at a crash report on a timer list being corrupted, which
usually happens when a timer is freed while still active. This is
commonly triggered by code calling del_timer() instead of
del_timer_sync() just before freeing.

One possible culprit is the hci_qca driver, which does exactly that.

Eric mentioned that wake_retrans_timer could be rearmed via the work
queue, so also move the destruction of the work queue before
del_timer_sync().

Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0ff252c1976da ("Bluetooth: hciuart: Add support QCA chipset for UART")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c
@@ -689,9 +689,9 @@ static int qca_close(struct hci_uart *hu
 	skb_queue_purge(&qca->tx_wait_q);
 	skb_queue_purge(&qca->txq);
 	skb_queue_purge(&qca->rx_memdump_q);
-	del_timer(&qca->tx_idle_timer);
-	del_timer(&qca->wake_retrans_timer);
 	destroy_workqueue(qca->workqueue);
+	del_timer_sync(&qca->tx_idle_timer);
+	del_timer_sync(&qca->wake_retrans_timer);
 	qca->hu = NULL;
 
 	kfree_skb(qca->rx_skb);

[PATCH 5.10 39/53] ARM: dts: s5pv210: Correct interrupt name for bluetooth in Aries

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jonathan Bakker <xc-racer2@live.ca>

commit 3f5e3d3a8b895c8a11da8b0063ba2022dd9e2045 upstream.

Correct the name of the bluetooth interrupt from host-wake to
host-wakeup.

Fixes: 1c65b6184441b ("ARM: dts: s5pv210: Correct BCM4329 bluetooth node")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bakker <xc-racer2@live.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CY4PR04MB0567495CFCBDC8D408D44199CB1C9@CY4PR04MB0567.namprd04.prod.outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/s5pv210-aries.dtsi
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@
 		device-wakeup-gpios = <&gpg3 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		interrupt-parent = <&gph2>;
 		interrupts = <5 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
-		interrupt-names = "host-wake";
+		interrupt-names = "host-wakeup";
 	};
 };
 

[PATCH 5.10 40/53] dm integrity: fix error code in dm_integrity_ctr()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

commit d3f2a14b8906df913cb04a706367b012db94a6e8 upstream.

The "r" variable shadows an earlier "r" that has function scope.  It
means that we accidentally return success instead of an error code.
Smatch has a warning for this:

	drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:4503 dm_integrity_ctr()
	warn: missing error code 'r'

Fixes: 7eada909bfd7 ("dm: add integrity target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-integrity.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c
@@ -4327,8 +4327,6 @@ try_smaller_buffer:
 	}
 
 	if (should_write_sb) {
-		int r;
-
 		init_journal(ic, 0, ic->journal_sections, 0);
 		r = dm_integrity_failed(ic);
 		if (unlikely(r)) {

[PATCH 5.10 41/53] dm crypt: make printing of the key constant-time

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>

commit 567dd8f34560fa221a6343729474536aa7ede4fd upstream.

The device mapper dm-crypt target is using scnprintf("%02x", cc->key[i]) to
report the current key to userspace. However, this is not a constant-time
operation and it may leak information about the key via timing, via cache
access patterns or via the branch predictor.

Change dm-crypt's key printing to use "%c" instead of "%02x". Also
introduce hex2asc() that carefully avoids any branching or memory
accesses when converting a number in the range 0 ... 15 to an ascii
character.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -3404,6 +3404,11 @@ static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *t
 	return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
 }
 
+static char hex2asc(unsigned char c)
+{
+	return c + '0' + ((unsigned)(9 - c) >> 4 & 0x27);
+}
+
 static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
 			 unsigned status_flags, char *result, unsigned maxlen)
 {
@@ -3422,9 +3427,12 @@ static void crypt_status(struct dm_targe
 		if (cc->key_size > 0) {
 			if (cc->key_string)
 				DMEMIT(":%u:%s", cc->key_size, cc->key_string);
-			else
-				for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++)
-					DMEMIT("%02x", cc->key[i]);
+			else {
+				for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++) {
+					DMEMIT("%c%c", hex2asc(cc->key[i] >> 4),
+					       hex2asc(cc->key[i] & 0xf));
+				}
+			}
 		} else
 			DMEMIT("-");
 

[PATCH 5.10 42/53] dm stats: add cond_resched when looping over entries

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>

commit bfe2b0146c4d0230b68f5c71a64380ff8d361f8b upstream.

dm-stats can be used with a very large number of entries (it is only
limited by 1/4 of total system memory), so add rescheduling points to
the loops that iterate over the entries.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-stats.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-stats.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-stats.c
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void dm_stats_cleanup(struct dm_stats *s
 				       atomic_read(&shared->in_flight[READ]),
 				       atomic_read(&shared->in_flight[WRITE]));
 			}
+			cond_resched();
 		}
 		dm_stat_free(&s->rcu_head);
 	}
@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_sta
 	for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) {
 		atomic_set(&s->stat_shared[ni].in_flight[READ], 0);
 		atomic_set(&s->stat_shared[ni].in_flight[WRITE], 0);
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 
 	if (s->n_histogram_entries) {
@@ -325,6 +327,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_sta
 		for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) {
 			s->stat_shared[ni].tmp.histogram = hi;
 			hi += s->n_histogram_entries + 1;
+			cond_resched();
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -345,6 +348,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_sta
 			for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) {
 				p[ni].histogram = hi;
 				hi += s->n_histogram_entries + 1;
+				cond_resched();
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -474,6 +478,7 @@ static int dm_stats_list(struct dm_stats
 			}
 			DMEMIT("\n");
 		}
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&stats->mutex);
 
@@ -750,6 +755,7 @@ static void __dm_stat_clear(struct dm_st
 				local_irq_enable();
 			}
 		}
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 }
 
@@ -865,6 +871,8 @@ static int dm_stats_print(struct dm_stat
 
 		if (unlikely(sz + 1 >= maxlen))
 			goto buffer_overflow;
+
+		cond_resched();
 	}
 
 	if (clear)

[PATCH 5.10 43/53] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE feature flag

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sarthak Kukreti <sarthakkukreti@google.com>

commit 4caae58406f8ceb741603eee460d79bacca9b1b5 upstream.

The device-mapper framework provides a mechanism to mark targets as
immutable (and hence fail table reloads that try to change the target
type). Add the DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE flag to the dm-verity target's
feature flags to prevent switching the verity target with a different
target type.

Fixes: a4ffc152198e ("dm: add verity target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sarthak Kukreti <sarthakkukreti@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
@@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ bad:
 
 static struct target_type verity_target = {
 	.name		= "verity",
+	.features	= DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE,
 	.version	= {1, 7, 0},
 	.module		= THIS_MODULE,
 	.ctr		= verity_ctr,

[PATCH 5.10 44/53] raid5: introduce MD_BROKEN

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mariusz Tkaczyk <mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com>

commit 57668f0a4cc4083a120cc8c517ca0055c4543b59 upstream.

Raid456 module had allowed to achieve failed state. It was fixed by
fb73b357fb9 ("raid5: block failing device if raid will be failed").
This fix introduces a bug, now if raid5 fails during IO, it may result
with a hung task without completion. Faulty flag on the device is
necessary to process all requests and is checked many times, mainly in
analyze_stripe().
Allow to set faulty on drive again and set MD_BROKEN if raid is failed.

As a result, this level is allowed to achieve failed state again, but
communication with userspace (via -EBUSY status) will be preserved.

This restores possibility to fail array via #mdadm --set-faulty command
and will be fixed by additional verification on mdadm side.

Reproduction steps:
 mdadm -CR imsm -e imsm -n 3 /dev/nvme[0-2]n1
 mdadm -CR r5 -e imsm -l5 -n3 /dev/nvme[0-2]n1 --assume-clean
 mkfs.xfs /dev/md126 -f
 mount /dev/md126 /mnt/root/

 fio --filename=/mnt/root/file --size=5GB --direct=1 --rw=randrw
--bs=64k --ioengine=libaio --iodepth=64 --runtime=240 --numjobs=4
--time_based --group_reporting --name=throughput-test-job
--eta-newline=1 &

 echo 1 > /sys/block/nvme2n1/device/device/remove
 echo 1 > /sys/block/nvme1n1/device/device/remove

 [ 1475.787779] Call Trace:
 [ 1475.793111] __schedule+0x2a6/0x700
 [ 1475.799460] schedule+0x38/0xa0
 [ 1475.805454] raid5_get_active_stripe+0x469/0x5f0 [raid456]
 [ 1475.813856] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
 [ 1475.820332] raid5_make_request+0x180/0xb40 [raid456]
 [ 1475.828281] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
 [ 1475.834727] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
 [ 1475.841127] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
 [ 1475.847480] md_handle_request+0x119/0x190
 [ 1475.854390] md_make_request+0x8a/0x190
 [ 1475.861041] generic_make_request+0xcf/0x310
 [ 1475.868145] submit_bio+0x3c/0x160
 [ 1475.874355] iomap_dio_submit_bio.isra.20+0x51/0x60
 [ 1475.882070] iomap_dio_bio_actor+0x175/0x390
 [ 1475.889149] iomap_apply+0xff/0x310
 [ 1475.895447] ? iomap_dio_bio_actor+0x390/0x390
 [ 1475.902736] ? iomap_dio_bio_actor+0x390/0x390
 [ 1475.909974] iomap_dio_rw+0x2f2/0x490
 [ 1475.916415] ? iomap_dio_bio_actor+0x390/0x390
 [ 1475.923680] ? atime_needs_update+0x77/0xe0
 [ 1475.930674] ? xfs_file_dio_aio_read+0x6b/0xe0 [xfs]
 [ 1475.938455] xfs_file_dio_aio_read+0x6b/0xe0 [xfs]
 [ 1475.946084] xfs_file_read_iter+0xba/0xd0 [xfs]
 [ 1475.953403] aio_read+0xd5/0x180
 [ 1475.959395] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
 [ 1475.965907] io_submit_one+0x20b/0x3c0
 [ 1475.972398] __x64_sys_io_submit+0xa2/0x180
 [ 1475.979335] ? do_io_getevents+0x7c/0xc0
 [ 1475.986009] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1a0
 [ 1475.992419] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
 [ 1476.000255] RIP: 0033:0x7f11fc27978d
 [ 1476.006631] Code: Bad RIP value.
 [ 1476.073251] INFO: task fio:3877 blocked for more than 120 seconds.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fb73b357fb9 ("raid5: block failing device if raid will be failed")
Reviewd-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Tkaczyk <mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/md/raid5.c |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
@@ -686,17 +686,17 @@ int raid5_calc_degraded(struct r5conf *c
 	return degraded;
 }
 
-static int has_failed(struct r5conf *conf)
+static bool has_failed(struct r5conf *conf)
 {
-	int degraded;
+	int degraded = conf->mddev->degraded;
 
-	if (conf->mddev->reshape_position == MaxSector)
-		return conf->mddev->degraded > conf->max_degraded;
+	if (test_bit(MD_BROKEN, &conf->mddev->flags))
+		return true;
 
-	degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
-	if (degraded > conf->max_degraded)
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
+	if (conf->mddev->reshape_position != MaxSector)
+		degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
+
+	return degraded > conf->max_degraded;
 }
 
 struct stripe_head *
@@ -2877,34 +2877,31 @@ static void raid5_error(struct mddev *md
 	unsigned long flags;
 	pr_debug("raid456: error called\n");
 
+	pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Disk failure on %s, disabling device.\n",
+		mdname(mddev), bdevname(rdev->bdev, b));
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&conf->device_lock, flags);
+	set_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
+	clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
+	mddev->degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
 
-	if (test_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags) &&
-	    mddev->degraded == conf->max_degraded) {
-		/*
-		 * Don't allow to achieve failed state
-		 * Don't try to recover this device
-		 */
+	if (has_failed(conf)) {
+		set_bit(MD_BROKEN, &conf->mddev->flags);
 		conf->recovery_disabled = mddev->recovery_disabled;
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conf->device_lock, flags);
-		return;
+
+		pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Cannot continue operation (%d/%d failed).\n",
+			mdname(mddev), mddev->degraded, conf->raid_disks);
+	} else {
+		pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Operation continuing on %d devices.\n",
+			mdname(mddev), conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded);
 	}
 
-	set_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags);
-	clear_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags);
-	mddev->degraded = raid5_calc_degraded(conf);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conf->device_lock, flags);
 	set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
 
 	set_bit(Blocked, &rdev->flags);
 	set_mask_bits(&mddev->sb_flags, 0,
 		      BIT(MD_SB_CHANGE_DEVS) | BIT(MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING));
-	pr_crit("md/raid:%s: Disk failure on %s, disabling device.\n"
-		"md/raid:%s: Operation continuing on %d devices.\n",
-		mdname(mddev),
-		bdevname(rdev->bdev, b),
-		mdname(mddev),
-		conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded);
 	r5c_update_on_rdev_error(mddev, rdev);
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 45/53] HID: multitouch: Add support for Google Whiskers Touchpad

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Marek Maślanka <mm@semihalf.com>

commit 1d07cef7fd7599450b3d03e1915efc2a96e1f03f upstream.

The Google Whiskers touchpad does not work properly with the default
multitouch configuration. Instead, use the same configuration as Google
Rose.

Signed-off-by: Marek Maslanka <mm@semihalf.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
@@ -2129,6 +2129,9 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_dev
 	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_GOOGLE,
 		HID_DEVICE(HID_BUS_ANY, HID_GROUP_ANY, USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE,
 			USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_TOUCH_ROSE) },
+	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_GOOGLE,
+		HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8, USB_VENDOR_ID_GOOGLE,
+			USB_DEVICE_ID_GOOGLE_WHISKERS) },
 
 	/* Generic MT device */
 	{ HID_DEVICE(HID_BUS_ANY, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH, HID_ANY_ID, HID_ANY_ID) },

[PATCH 5.10 46/53] HID: multitouch: add quirks to enable Lenovo X12 trackpoint

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tao Jin <tao-j@outlook.com>

commit 95cd2cdc88c755dcd0a58b951faeb77742c733a4 upstream.

This applies the similar quirks used by previous generation devices
such as X1 tablet for X12 tablet, so that the trackpoint and buttons
can work.

This patch was applied and tested working on 5.17.1 .

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8+ given that it relies on 40d5bb87377a
Signed-off-by: Tao Jin <tao-j@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CO6PR03MB6241CB276FCDC7F4CEDC34F6E1E29@CO6PR03MB6241.namprd03.prod.outlook.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h        |    1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c |    6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h
@@ -743,6 +743,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_COVER	0x6085
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB	0x60a3
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB3	0x60b5
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X12_TAB	0x60fe
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_OPTICAL_USB_MOUSE_600E	0x600e
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_608D	0x608d
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_6019	0x6019
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c
@@ -1990,6 +1990,12 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_dev
 			   USB_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO,
 			   USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB3) },
 
+	/* Lenovo X12 TAB Gen 1 */
+	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
+		HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
+			   USB_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO,
+			   USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X12_TAB) },
+
 	/* MosArt panels */
 	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_CONFIDENCE_MINUS_ONE,
 		MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ASUS,

[PATCH 5.10 47/53] tpm: Fix buffer access in tpm2_get_tpm_pt()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>

commit e57b2523bd37e6434f4e64c7a685e3715ad21e9a upstream.

Under certain conditions uninitialized memory will be accessed.
As described by TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Specification,
rev. 1.59 (Part 3: Commands), if a TPM2_GetCapability is received,
requesting a capability, the TPM in field upgrade mode may return a
zero length list.
Check the property count in tpm2_get_tpm_pt().

Fixes: 2ab3241161b3 ("tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Mahnke-Hartmann <stefan.mahnke-hartmann@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c |   11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -400,7 +400,16 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip
 	if (!rc) {
 		out = (struct tpm2_get_cap_out *)
 			&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
-		*value = be32_to_cpu(out->value);
+		/*
+		 * To prevent failing boot up of some systems, Infineon TPM2.0
+		 * returns SUCCESS on TPM2_Startup in field upgrade mode. Also
+		 * the TPM2_Getcapability command returns a zero length list
+		 * in field upgrade mode.
+		 */
+		if (be32_to_cpu(out->property_cnt) > 0)
+			*value = be32_to_cpu(out->value);
+		else
+			rc = -ENODATA;
 	}
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 	return rc;

[PATCH 5.10 48/53] tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>

commit d0dc1a7100f19121f6e7450f9cdda11926aa3838 upstream.

Currently it returns zero when CRQ response timed out, it should return
an error code instead.

Fixes: d8d74ea3c002 ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -683,6 +683,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_
 	if (!wait_event_timeout(ibmvtpm->crq_queue.wq,
 				ibmvtpm->rtce_buf != NULL,
 				HZ)) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
 		dev_err(dev, "CRQ response timed out\n");
 		goto init_irq_cleanup;
 	}

[PATCH 5.10 49/53] docs: submitting-patches: Fix crossref to The canonical patch format

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>

commit 6d5aa418b3bd42cdccc36e94ee199af423ef7c84 upstream.

The reference to `explicit_in_reply_to` is pointless as when the
reference was added in the form of "#15" [1], Section 15) was "The
canonical patch format".
The reference of "#15" had not been properly updated in a couple of
reorganizations during the plain-text SubmittingPatches era.

Fix it by using `the_canonical_patch_format`.

[1]: 2ae19acaa50a ("Documentation: Add "how to write a good patch summary" to SubmittingPatches")

Signed-off-by: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>
Fixes: 5903019b2a5e ("Documentation/SubmittingPatches: convert it to ReST markup")
Fixes: 9b2c76777acc ("Documentation/SubmittingPatches: enrich the Sphinx output")
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64e105a5-50be-23f2-6cae-903a2ea98e18@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ as you intend it to.
 
 The maintainer will thank you if you write your patch description in a
 form which can be easily pulled into Linux's source code management
-system, ``git``, as a "commit log".  See :ref:`explicit_in_reply_to`.
+system, ``git``, as a "commit log".  See :ref:`the_canonical_patch_format`.
 
 Solve only one problem per patch.  If your description starts to get
 long, that's a sign that you probably need to split up your patch.

[PATCH 5.10 50/53] NFS: Memory allocation failures are not server fatal errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

commit 452284407c18d8a522c3039339b1860afa0025a8 upstream.

We need to filter out ENOMEM in nfs_error_is_fatal_on_server(), because
running out of memory on our client is not a server error.

Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: 2dc23afffbca ("NFS: ENOMEM should also be a fatal error.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfs/internal.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/fs/nfs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/nfs/internal.h
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ static inline bool nfs_error_is_fatal_on
 	case 0:
 	case -ERESTARTSYS:
 	case -EINTR:
+	case -ENOMEM:
 		return false;
 	}
 	return nfs_error_is_fatal(err);

[PATCH 5.10 51/53] NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>

commit ce3c4ad7f4ce5db7b4f08a1e237d8dd94b39180b upstream.

nfsd4_release_lockowner() holds clp->cl_lock when it calls
check_for_locks(). However, check_for_locks() calls nfsd_file_get()
/ nfsd_file_put() to access the backing inode's flc_posix list, and
nfsd_file_put() can sleep if the inode was recently removed.

Let's instead rely on the stateowner's reference count to gate
whether the release is permitted. This should be a reliable
indication of locks-in-use since file lock operations and
->lm_get_owner take appropriate references, which are released
appropriately when file locks are removed.

Reported-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |   12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -7122,16 +7122,12 @@ nfsd4_release_lockowner(struct svc_rqst
 		if (sop->so_is_open_owner || !same_owner_str(sop, owner))
 			continue;
 
-		/* see if there are still any locks associated with it */
-		lo = lockowner(sop);
-		list_for_each_entry(stp, &sop->so_stateids, st_perstateowner) {
-			if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file, lo)) {
-				status = nfserr_locks_held;
-				spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
-				return status;
-			}
+		if (atomic_read(&sop->so_count) != 1) {
+			spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
+			return nfserr_locks_held;
 		}
 
+		lo = lockowner(sop);
 		nfs4_get_stateowner(sop);
 		break;
 	}

[PATCH 5.10 52/53] bpf: Fix potential array overflow in bpf_trampoline_get_progs()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>

commit a2aa95b71c9bbec793b5c5fa50f0a80d882b3e8d upstream.

The cnt value in the 'cnt >= BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS' check does not
include BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN bpf programs, so the number of
the attached BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN bpf programs in a trampoline
can exceed BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS.

When this happens, the assignment '*progs++ = aux->prog' in
bpf_trampoline_get_progs() will cause progs array overflow as the
progs field in the bpf_tramp_progs struct can only hold at most
BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS bpf programs.

Fixes: 88fd9e5352fe ("bpf: Refactor trampoline update code")
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220430130803.210624-1-ytcoode@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c |   18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_
 {
 	enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
 	int err = 0;
-	int cnt;
+	int cnt = 0, i;
 
 	kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(prog);
 	mutex_lock(&tr->mutex);
@@ -389,7 +389,10 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	cnt = tr->progs_cnt[BPF_TRAMP_FENTRY] + tr->progs_cnt[BPF_TRAMP_FEXIT];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BPF_TRAMP_MAX; i++)
+		cnt += tr->progs_cnt[i];
+
 	if (kind == BPF_TRAMP_REPLACE) {
 		/* Cannot attach extension if fentry/fexit are in use. */
 		if (cnt) {
@@ -467,16 +470,19 @@ out:
 
 void bpf_trampoline_put(struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
 {
+	int i;
+
 	if (!tr)
 		return;
 	mutex_lock(&trampoline_mutex);
 	if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&tr->refcnt))
 		goto out;
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(mutex_is_locked(&tr->mutex));
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&tr->progs_hlist[BPF_TRAMP_FENTRY])))
-		goto out;
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&tr->progs_hlist[BPF_TRAMP_FEXIT])))
-		goto out;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BPF_TRAMP_MAX; i++)
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&tr->progs_hlist[i])))
+			goto out;
+
 	/* This code will be executed even when the last bpf_tramp_image
 	 * is alive. All progs are detached from the trampoline and the
 	 * trampoline image is patched with jmp into epilogue to skip

[PATCH 5.10 53/53] bpf: Enlarge offset check value to INT_MAX in bpf_skb_{load,store}_bytes

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>

commit 45969b4152c1752089351cd6836a42a566d49bcf upstream.

The data length of skb frags + frag_list may be greater than 0xffff, and
skb_header_pointer can not handle negative offset. So, here INT_MAX is used
to check the validity of offset. Add the same change to the related function
skb_store_bytes.

Fixes: 05c74e5e53f6 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_load_bytes helper")
Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220416105801.88708-2-liujian56@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/filter.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_store_bytes, struct s
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_RECOMPUTE_CSUM | BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH)))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff))
+	if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	if (unlikely(bpf_try_make_writable(skb, offset + len)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_skb_load_bytes, const str
 {
 	void *ptr;
 
-	if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff))
+	if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX))
 		goto err_clear;
 
 	ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, len, to);

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Sudip Mukherjee]

Hi Greg,

On Fri, Jun 03, 2022 at 07:42:45PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build test:
mips (gcc version 11.3.1 20220531): 63 configs -> no failure
arm (gcc version 11.3.1 20220531): 104 configs -> no failure
arm64 (gcc version 11.3.1 20220531): 3 configs -> no failure
x86_64 (gcc version 11.3.1 20220531): 4 configs -> no failure

Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]
arm64: Booted on rpi4b (4GB model). No regression. [2]

[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1261
[2]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1267


Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk>

--
Regards
Sudip

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Fri, 3 Jun 2022 at 23:17, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.120-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>

## Build
* kernel: 5.10.120-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.10.y
* git commit: 22be67db7d5387c15529c9ea2b258d9ef440f324
* git describe: v5.10.118-218-g22be67db7d53
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.10.y/build/v5.10.118-218-g22be67db7d53

## Test Regressions (compared to v5.10.118-213-gd3ff52320f4a)
No test regressions found.

## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.10.118-213-gd3ff52320f4a)
No metric regressions found.

## Test Fixes (compared to v5.10.118-213-gd3ff52320f4a)
No test fixes found.

## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.10.118-213-gd3ff52320f4a)
No metric fixes found.

## Test result summary
total: 135496, pass: 122646, fail: 200, skip: 11946, xfail: 704

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 314 total, 314 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 58 total, 58 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 52 total, 49 passed, 3 failed
* mips: 37 total, 37 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 51 total, 51 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 21 total, 21 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 56 total, 55 passed, 1 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwt[
* fwts
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* perf/Zstd-perf.data-compression
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Fri, Jun 03, 2022 at 07:42:45PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 162 pass: 162 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 477 pass: 477 fail: 0

Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

Guenter

RE: [PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Fox Chen]

On Fri,  3 Jun 2022 19:42:45 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.120-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

5.10.120-rc1 Successfully Compiled and booted on my Raspberry PI 4b (8g) (bcm2711)
                
Tested-by: Fox Chen <foxhlchen@gmail.com>

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Samuel Zou]

On 2022/6/4 1:42, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.120-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Tested on arm64 and x86 for 5.10.120-rc1,

Kernel repo:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Branch: linux-5.10.y
Version: 5.10.120-rc1
Commit: 22be67db7d5387c15529c9ea2b258d9ef440f324
Compiler: gcc version 7.3.0 (GCC)

arm64:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 9033
passed: 9033
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------

x86:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 9033
passed: 9033
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Tested-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot@huawei.com>

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/53] 5.10.120-rc1 review

[Pavel Machek]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 661 bytes --]

Hi!

> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.120 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-5.10.y

Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de>

Best regards,
                                                                Pavel
-- 
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany

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