From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v37 06/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:55:44 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20220628005611.13106-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com --- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++----- security/security.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 5b0b2a596cee..95ba8c223e0c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); @@ -1974,7 +1974,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, + u32 field, u32 op, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) { return 0; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + struct lsmblob blob; pid_t pid; u32 sid; @@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_str) { security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 9820f08fc47c..221196b0cde3 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio) @@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, - f->op, &f->lsm_rules); + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, + &f->lsm_rules); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: @@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_str) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, f->type, f->op, + &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules)) { ++result; break; @@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 141922732d10..ade59e3638e8 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) { struct security_hook_list *hp; @@ -2708,7 +2708,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, continue; if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.36.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v37 06/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:55:44 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20220628005611.13106-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com --- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++----- security/security.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 5b0b2a596cee..95ba8c223e0c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); @@ -1974,7 +1974,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) return 0; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, + u32 field, u32 op, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) { return 0; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; + struct lsmblob blob; pid_t pid; u32 sid; @@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_str) { security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, - f->type, f->op, + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match( + &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules); } break; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 9820f08fc47c..221196b0cde3 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio) @@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, - f->op, &f->lsm_rules); + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, + f->type, f->op, + &f->lsm_rules); } break; case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: @@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (f->lsm_str) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules); } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid); if (security_audit_rule_match( - n->osid, f->type, f->op, + &blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules)) { ++result; break; @@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, /* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) break; - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, &f->lsm_rules)) ++result; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 141922732d10..ade59e3638e8 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) } } -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) { struct security_hook_list *hp; @@ -2708,7 +2708,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, continue; if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) continue; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.36.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-28 1:02 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20220628005611.13106-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 00/33] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 02/33] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 03/33] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 04/33] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 05/33] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 06/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 07/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 08/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 09/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 10/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 12/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 13/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 14/33] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 15/33] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 16/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 17/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 18/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 5:36 ` kernel test robot 2022-06-28 5:36 ` kernel test robot 2022-06-28 8:44 ` kernel test robot 2022-06-28 8:44 ` kernel test robot 2022-06-28 11:24 ` kernel test robot 2022-06-28 11:24 ` kernel test robot 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 19/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 20/33] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` [PATCH v37 21/33] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 22/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx module selection Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 23/33] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 24/33] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 25/33] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 26/33] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 27/33] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 28/33] audit: multiple subject lsm values for netlabel Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 29/33] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 30/33] netlabel: Use a struct lsmblob in audit data Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 31/33] LSM: Removed scaffolding function lsmcontext_init Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 32/33] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` [PATCH v37 33/33] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2022-06-28 0:56 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-07-12 21:42 ` [PATCH v37 00/33] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor John Johansen 2022-07-12 21:42 ` John Johansen 2022-07-12 21:58 ` Casey Schaufler 2022-07-12 21:58 ` Casey Schaufler
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