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From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
To: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <nvdimm@lists.linux.dev>,
	<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <bwidawsk@kernel.org>,
	<ira.weiny@intel.com>, <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
	<alison.schofield@intel.com>, <dave@stgolabs.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 00/15] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 18:03:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220803180355.00006042@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <165791918718.2491387.4203738301057301285.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com>

On Fri, 15 Jul 2022 14:08:32 -0700
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> wrote:

> This series is seeking comments on the implementation. It has not been fully
> tested yet.
> 
> This series adds the support for "Persistent Memory Data-at-rest Security"
> block of command set for the CXL Memory Devices. The enabling is done through
> the nvdimm_security_ops as the operations are very similar to the same
> operations that the persistent memory devices through NFIT provider support.
> This enabling does not include the security pass-through commands nor the
> Santize commands.
> 
> Under the nvdimm_security_ops, this patch series will enable get_flags(),
> freeze(), change_key(), unlock(), disable(), and erase(). The disable() API
> does not support disabling of the master passphrase. To maintain established
> user ABI through the sysfs attribute "security", the "disable" command is
> left untouched and a new "disable_master" command is introduced with a new
> disable_master() API call for the nvdimm_security_ops().
> 
> This series does not include plumbing to directly handle the security commands
> through cxl control util. The enabled security commands will still go through
> ndctl tool with this enabling.
> 
> For calls such as unlock() and erase(), the CPU caches must be invalidated
> post operation. Currently, the implementation resides in
> drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c with a comment that it should be implemented
> cross arch when more than just NFIT based device needs this operation.
> With the coming of CXL persistent memory devices this is now needed.
> Introduce ARCH_HAS_NVDIMM_INVAL_CACHE and implement similar to
> ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API where the arch can opt in with implementation.
> Currently only add x86_64 implementation where wbinvd_on_all_cpus()
> is called.
> 
Hi Dave,

Just curious.  What was reasoning behind this being a RFC?
What do you particular want comments on?

Thanks,

Jonathan

> ---
> 
> Dave Jiang (15):
>       cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation
>       tools/testing/cxl: Create context for cxl mock device
>       tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support
>       cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support
>       tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support
>       cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support
>       tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support
>       cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support
>       tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support
>       x86: add an arch helper function to invalidate all cache for nvdimm
>       cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support
>       tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support
>       cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support
>       tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support
>       nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command
> 
> 
>  arch/x86/Kconfig             |   1 +
>  arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c |   8 +
>  drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c    |  28 +--
>  drivers/cxl/Kconfig          |  16 ++
>  drivers/cxl/Makefile         |   1 +
>  drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h         |  41 +++++
>  drivers/cxl/pmem.c           |  10 +-
>  drivers/cxl/security.c       | 182 ++++++++++++++++++
>  drivers/nvdimm/security.c    |  33 +++-
>  include/linux/libnvdimm.h    |  10 +
>  lib/Kconfig                  |   3 +
>  tools/testing/cxl/Kbuild     |   1 +
>  tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c | 348 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  13 files changed, 644 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/cxl/security.c
> 
> --
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-03 17:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-15 21:08 [PATCH RFC 00/15] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:08 ` [PATCH RFC 01/15] cxl/pmem: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops with ->get_flags() operation Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:09   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-03 16:29     ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-18  5:34   ` [PATCH RFC 1/15] " Davidlohr Bueso
2022-07-15 21:08 ` [PATCH RFC 02/15] tools/testing/cxl: Create context for cxl mock device Dave Jiang
2022-07-18  6:29   ` [PATCH RFC 2/15] " Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-03 16:36   ` [PATCH RFC 02/15] " Jonathan Cameron
2022-08-09 20:30     ` Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:08 ` [PATCH RFC 03/15] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Get Security State" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 16:51   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-15 21:08 ` [PATCH RFC 04/15] cxl/pmem: Add "Set Passphrase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-07-18  6:36   ` [PATCH RFC 4/15] " Davidlohr Bueso
2022-07-19 18:55     ` Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:01   ` [PATCH RFC 04/15] " Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 05/15] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Set Passphrase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:15   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 06/15] cxl/pmem: Add Disable Passphrase security command support Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:21   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 07/15] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Disable" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:23   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 08/15] cxl/pmem: Add "Freeze Security State" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:23   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 09/15] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Freeze Security State" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 10/15] x86: add an arch helper function to invalidate all cache for nvdimm Dave Jiang
2022-07-18  5:30   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-07-19 19:07     ` Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:37       ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-08-03 17:37         ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-08-09 21:47         ` Dave Jiang
2022-08-09 21:47           ` Dave Jiang
2022-08-10 14:15           ` Mark Rutland
2022-08-10 14:15             ` Mark Rutland
2022-08-10 14:31             ` Eliot Moss
2022-08-10 14:31               ` Eliot Moss
2022-08-10 18:09               ` Mark Rutland
2022-08-10 18:09                 ` Mark Rutland
2022-08-10 18:11                 ` Eliot Moss
2022-08-10 18:11                   ` Eliot Moss
2022-08-10 20:06             ` Dan Williams
2022-08-10 20:06               ` Dan Williams
2022-08-10 21:13               ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-10 21:13                 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-10 21:30                 ` Dan Williams
2022-08-10 21:30                   ` Dan Williams
2022-08-10 21:31                   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-10 21:31                     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-15 16:07               ` [PATCH] arch/cacheflush: Introduce flush_all_caches() Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-15 16:07                 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-16  9:01                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-08-16  9:01                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-08-16 16:50                   ` Dan Williams
2022-08-16 16:50                     ` Dan Williams
2022-08-16 16:53                     ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-16 16:53                       ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-16 17:42                       ` Dan Williams
2022-08-16 17:42                         ` Dan Williams
2022-08-16 17:52                         ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-16 17:52                           ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-08-16 18:49                           ` Dan Williams
2022-08-16 18:49                             ` Dan Williams
2022-08-17  7:53                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-08-17  7:53                               ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-08-17  7:49                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-08-17  7:49                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 11/15] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-08-04 13:19   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-08-09 22:31     ` Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 12/15] tools/testing/cxl: Add "Unlock" security opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 13/15] cxl/pmem: Add "Passphrase Secure Erase" security command support Dave Jiang
2022-07-20  6:17   ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-07-20 17:38     ` Dave Jiang
2022-07-20 18:02       ` Davidlohr Bueso
2022-07-15 21:09 ` [PATCH RFC 14/15] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:10 ` [PATCH RFC 15/15] nvdimm/cxl/pmem: Add support for master passphrase disable security command Dave Jiang
2022-07-15 21:29 ` [PATCH RFC 00/15] Introduce security commands for CXL pmem device Davidlohr Bueso
2022-07-19 18:53   ` Dave Jiang
2022-08-03 17:03 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2022-08-08 22:18   ` Dave Jiang

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