[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 01/29] crypto: qcom-rng - Fix qcom_rng_of_match unused warning

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 01/29] crypto: qcom-rng - Fix qcom_rng_of_match unused warning

[Sasha Levin]

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[ Upstream commit 882aa6525cabcfa0cea61e1a19c9af4c543118ac ]

Module device tables need to be declared as maybe_unused because
they will be unused when built-in and the corresponding option is
also disabled.

This patch adds the maybe_unused attributes to OF and ACPI.  This
also allows us to remove the ifdef around the ACPI data structure.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c b/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
index 031b5f701a0a..72dd1a4ebac4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/iopoll.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
@@ -201,15 +202,13 @@ static int qcom_rng_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ACPI)
-static const struct acpi_device_id qcom_rng_acpi_match[] = {
+static const struct acpi_device_id __maybe_unused qcom_rng_acpi_match[] = {
 	{ .id = "QCOM8160", .driver_data = 1 },
 	{}
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, qcom_rng_acpi_match);
-#endif
 
-static const struct of_device_id qcom_rng_of_match[] = {
+static const struct of_device_id __maybe_unused qcom_rng_of_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "qcom,prng", .data = (void *)0},
 	{ .compatible = "qcom,prng-ee", .data = (void *)1},
 	{}
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 02/29] crypto: ccp - Add a quirk to firmware update

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>

[ Upstream commit b3b9fdf1a9be4266b01a2063b1f37cdc20806e3b ]

A quirk for fixing the committed TCB version, when upgrading from a
firmware version earlier than 1.50. This is a known issue, and the
documented workaround is to load the firmware twice.

Currently, this issue requires the  following workaround:

sudo modprobe -r kvm_amd
sudo modprobe -r ccp
sudo modprobe ccp
sudo modprobe kvm_amd

Implement this workaround inside kernel by checking whether the API
version is less than 1.50, and if so, download the firmware twice.
This addresses the TCB version issue.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/de02389f-249d-f565-1136-4af3655fab2a@profian.com/
Reported-by: Harald Hoyer <harald@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 9f588c9728f8..b292641c8a99 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -744,6 +744,11 @@ static int sev_update_firmware(struct device *dev)
 	struct page *p;
 	u64 data_size;
 
+	if (!sev_version_greater_or_equal(0, 15)) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE not supported\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	if (sev_get_firmware(dev, &firmware) == -ENOENT) {
 		dev_dbg(dev, "No SEV firmware file present\n");
 		return -1;
@@ -776,6 +781,14 @@ static int sev_update_firmware(struct device *dev)
 	data->len = firmware->size;
 
 	ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE, data, &error);
+
+	/*
+	 * A quirk for fixing the committed TCB version, when upgrading from
+	 * earlier firmware version than 1.50.
+	 */
+	if (!ret && !sev_version_greater_or_equal(1, 50))
+		ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DOWNLOAD_FIRMWARE, data, &error);
+
 	if (ret)
 		dev_dbg(dev, "Failed to update SEV firmware: %#x\n", error);
 	else
@@ -1285,8 +1298,7 @@ void sev_pci_init(void)
 	if (sev_get_api_version())
 		goto err;
 
-	if (sev_version_greater_or_equal(0, 15) &&
-	    sev_update_firmware(sev->dev) == 0)
+	if (sev_update_firmware(sev->dev) == 0)
 		sev_get_api_version();
 
 	/* If an init_ex_path is provided rely on INIT_EX for PSP initialization
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 03/29] crypto: ccp - Initialize PSP when reading psp data file failed

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jacky Li <jackyli@google.com>

[ Upstream commit d8da2da21fdb1f5964c11c00f0cc84fb0edf31d0 ]

Currently the OS fails the PSP initialization when the file specified at
'init_ex_path' does not exist or has invalid content. However the SEV
spec just requires users to allocate 32KB of 0xFF in the file, which can
be taken care of by the OS easily.

To improve the robustness during the PSP init, leverage the retry
mechanism and continue the init process:

Before the first INIT_EX call, if the content is invalid or missing,
continue the process by feeding those contents into PSP instead of
aborting. PSP will then override it with 32KB 0xFF and return
SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID status code. In the second INIT_EX call,
this 32KB 0xFF content will then be fed and PSP will write the valid
data to the file.

In order to do this, sev_read_init_ex_file should only be called once
for the first INIT_EX call. Calling it again for the second INIT_EX call
will cause the invalid file content overwriting the valid 32KB 0xFF data
provided by PSP in the first INIT_EX call.

Co-developed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacky Li <jackyli@google.com>
Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst    |  5 ++-
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c                  | 36 +++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 2d307811978c..935aaeb97fe6 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -89,9 +89,8 @@ context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued.
 
 The firmware can be initialized either by using its own non-volatile storage or
 the OS can manage the NV storage for the firmware using the module parameter
-``init_ex_path``. The file specified by ``init_ex_path`` must exist. To create
-a new NV storage file allocate the file with 32KB bytes of 0xFF as required by
-the SEV spec.
+``init_ex_path``. If the file specified by ``init_ex_path`` does not exist or
+is invalid, the OS will create or override the file with output from PSP.
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index b292641c8a99..8512101f0bdf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -211,18 +211,24 @@ static int sev_read_init_ex_file(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(fp)) {
 		int ret = PTR_ERR(fp);
 
-		dev_err(sev->dev,
-			"SEV: could not open %s for read, error %d\n",
-			init_ex_path, ret);
+		if (ret == -ENOENT) {
+			dev_info(sev->dev,
+				"SEV: %s does not exist and will be created later.\n",
+				init_ex_path);
+			ret = 0;
+		} else {
+			dev_err(sev->dev,
+				"SEV: could not open %s for read, error %d\n",
+				init_ex_path, ret);
+		}
 		return ret;
 	}
 
 	nread = kernel_read(fp, sev_init_ex_buffer, NV_LENGTH, NULL);
 	if (nread != NV_LENGTH) {
-		dev_err(sev->dev,
-			"SEV: failed to read %u bytes to non volatile memory area, ret %ld\n",
+		dev_info(sev->dev,
+			"SEV: could not read %u bytes to non volatile memory area, ret %ld\n",
 			NV_LENGTH, nread);
-		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV: read %ld bytes from NV file\n", nread);
@@ -410,17 +416,12 @@ static int __sev_init_locked(int *error)
 static int __sev_init_ex_locked(int *error)
 {
 	struct sev_data_init_ex data;
-	int ret;
 
 	memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
 	data.length = sizeof(data);
 	data.nv_address = __psp_pa(sev_init_ex_buffer);
 	data.nv_len = NV_LENGTH;
 
-	ret = sev_read_init_ex_file();
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	if (sev_es_tmr) {
 		/*
 		 * Do not include the encryption mask on the physical
@@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
 {
 	struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
 	struct sev_device *sev;
-	int rc, psp_ret = -1;
+	int rc = 0, psp_ret = -1;
 	int (*init_function)(int *error);
 
 	if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
@@ -450,8 +451,15 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
 	if (sev->state == SEV_STATE_INIT)
 		return 0;
 
-	init_function = sev_init_ex_buffer ? __sev_init_ex_locked :
-			__sev_init_locked;
+	if (sev_init_ex_buffer) {
+		init_function = __sev_init_ex_locked;
+		rc = sev_read_init_ex_file();
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	} else {
+		init_function = __sev_init_locked;
+	}
+
 	rc = init_function(&psp_ret);
 	if (rc && psp_ret == SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID) {
 		/*
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 04/29] gfs2: Switch from strlcpy to strscpy

[Sasha Levin]

From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 204c0300c4e99707e9fb6e57840aa1127060e63f ]

Switch from strlcpy to strscpy and make sure that @count is the size of
the smaller of the source and destination buffers.  This prevents
reading beyond the end of the source buffer when the source string isn't
null terminated.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

Suggested-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
index c9b423c874a3..ba4dfef0c15d 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
@@ -383,8 +383,10 @@ static int init_names(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, int silent)
 	if (!table[0])
 		table = sdp->sd_vfs->s_id;
 
-	strlcpy(sdp->sd_proto_name, proto, GFS2_FSNAME_LEN);
-	strlcpy(sdp->sd_table_name, table, GFS2_FSNAME_LEN);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN > GFS2_FSNAME_LEN);
+
+	strscpy(sdp->sd_proto_name, proto, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+	strscpy(sdp->sd_table_name, table, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 
 	table = sdp->sd_table_name;
 	while ((table = strchr(table, '/')))
@@ -1441,13 +1443,13 @@ static int gfs2_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
 
 	switch (o) {
 	case Opt_lockproto:
-		strlcpy(args->ar_lockproto, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+		strscpy(args->ar_lockproto, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 		break;
 	case Opt_locktable:
-		strlcpy(args->ar_locktable, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+		strscpy(args->ar_locktable, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 		break;
 	case Opt_hostdata:
-		strlcpy(args->ar_hostdata, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+		strscpy(args->ar_hostdata, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 		break;
 	case Opt_spectator:
 		args->ar_spectator = 1;
-- 
2.35.1

[Cluster-devel] [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 04/29] gfs2: Switch from strlcpy to strscpy

[Sasha Levin]

From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 204c0300c4e99707e9fb6e57840aa1127060e63f ]

Switch from strlcpy to strscpy and make sure that @count is the size of
the smaller of the source and destination buffers.  This prevents
reading beyond the end of the source buffer when the source string isn't
null terminated.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

Suggested-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
index c9b423c874a3..ba4dfef0c15d 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
@@ -383,8 +383,10 @@ static int init_names(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, int silent)
 	if (!table[0])
 		table = sdp->sd_vfs->s_id;
 
-	strlcpy(sdp->sd_proto_name, proto, GFS2_FSNAME_LEN);
-	strlcpy(sdp->sd_table_name, table, GFS2_FSNAME_LEN);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN > GFS2_FSNAME_LEN);
+
+	strscpy(sdp->sd_proto_name, proto, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+	strscpy(sdp->sd_table_name, table, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 
 	table = sdp->sd_table_name;
 	while ((table = strchr(table, '/')))
@@ -1441,13 +1443,13 @@ static int gfs2_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
 
 	switch (o) {
 	case Opt_lockproto:
-		strlcpy(args->ar_lockproto, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+		strscpy(args->ar_lockproto, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 		break;
 	case Opt_locktable:
-		strlcpy(args->ar_locktable, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+		strscpy(args->ar_locktable, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 		break;
 	case Opt_hostdata:
-		strlcpy(args->ar_hostdata, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
+		strscpy(args->ar_hostdata, param->string, GFS2_LOCKNAME_LEN);
 		break;
 	case Opt_spectator:
 		args->ar_spectator = 1;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 05/29] powerpc/hw_breakpoint: Avoid relying on caller synchronization

[Sasha Levin]

From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

[ Upstream commit f95e5a3d59011eec1257d0e76de1e1f8969d426f ]

Internal data structures (cpu_bps, task_bps) of powerpc's hw_breakpoint
implementation have relied on nr_bp_mutex serializing access to them.

Before overhauling synchronization of kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c,
introduce 2 spinlocks to synchronize cpu_bps and task_bps respectively,
thus avoiding reliance on callers synchronizing powerpc's hw_breakpoint.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829124719.675715-10-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 2669f80b3a49..8db1a15d7acb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
@@ -129,7 +130,14 @@ struct breakpoint {
 	bool ptrace_bp;
 };
 
+/*
+ * While kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c does its own synchronization, we cannot
+ * rely on it safely synchronizing internals here; however, we can rely on it
+ * not requesting more breakpoints than available.
+ */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpu_bps_lock);
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct breakpoint *, cpu_bps[HBP_NUM_MAX]);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_bps_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(task_bps);
 
 static struct breakpoint *alloc_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp)
@@ -174,7 +182,9 @@ static int task_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
 	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
 		return PTR_ERR(tmp);
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_add(&tmp->list, &task_bps);
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -182,6 +192,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct list_head *pos, *q;
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &task_bps) {
 		struct breakpoint *tmp = list_entry(pos, struct breakpoint, list);
 
@@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -200,12 +212,17 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct breakpoint *tmp;
+	bool ret = false;
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
-		if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
-			return true;
+		if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	return false;
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -215,13 +232,18 @@ static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 static bool same_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct breakpoint *tmp;
+	bool ret = false;
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
 		if (tmp->bp->hw.target == bp->hw.target &&
-		    !can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
-			return true;
+		    !can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	return false;
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
@@ -234,6 +256,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
 	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
 		return PTR_ERR(tmp);
 
+	spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
 		if (!cpu_bp[i]) {
@@ -241,6 +264,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -249,6 +273,7 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 	struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
 	int i = 0;
 
+	spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
 		if (!cpu_bp[i])
@@ -260,19 +285,25 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 }
 
 static bool cpu_bps_check(int cpu, struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
+	bool ret = false;
 	int i;
 
+	spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, cpu);
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
-		if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp))
-			return true;
+		if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	return false;
+	spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
@@ -286,10 +317,6 @@ static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 	return false;
 }
 
-/*
- * We don't use any locks to serialize accesses to cpu_bps or task_bps
- * because are already inside nr_bp_mutex.
- */
 int arch_reserve_bp_slot(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	int ret;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 05/29] powerpc/hw_breakpoint: Avoid relying on caller synchronization

[Sasha Levin]

From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

[ Upstream commit f95e5a3d59011eec1257d0e76de1e1f8969d426f ]

Internal data structures (cpu_bps, task_bps) of powerpc's hw_breakpoint
implementation have relied on nr_bp_mutex serializing access to them.

Before overhauling synchronization of kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c,
introduce 2 spinlocks to synchronize cpu_bps and task_bps respectively,
thus avoiding reliance on callers synchronizing powerpc's hw_breakpoint.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829124719.675715-10-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 2669f80b3a49..8db1a15d7acb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
@@ -129,7 +130,14 @@ struct breakpoint {
 	bool ptrace_bp;
 };
 
+/*
+ * While kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c does its own synchronization, we cannot
+ * rely on it safely synchronizing internals here; however, we can rely on it
+ * not requesting more breakpoints than available.
+ */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpu_bps_lock);
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct breakpoint *, cpu_bps[HBP_NUM_MAX]);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_bps_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(task_bps);
 
 static struct breakpoint *alloc_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp)
@@ -174,7 +182,9 @@ static int task_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
 	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
 		return PTR_ERR(tmp);
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_add(&tmp->list, &task_bps);
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -182,6 +192,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct list_head *pos, *q;
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &task_bps) {
 		struct breakpoint *tmp = list_entry(pos, struct breakpoint, list);
 
@@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -200,12 +212,17 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct breakpoint *tmp;
+	bool ret = false;
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
-		if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
-			return true;
+		if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	return false;
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -215,13 +232,18 @@ static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 static bool same_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct breakpoint *tmp;
+	bool ret = false;
 
+	spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
 		if (tmp->bp->hw.target == bp->hw.target &&
-		    !can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
-			return true;
+		    !can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	return false;
+	spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
@@ -234,6 +256,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
 	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
 		return PTR_ERR(tmp);
 
+	spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
 		if (!cpu_bp[i]) {
@@ -241,6 +264,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -249,6 +273,7 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 	struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
 	int i = 0;
 
+	spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
 		if (!cpu_bp[i])
@@ -260,19 +285,25 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 }
 
 static bool cpu_bps_check(int cpu, struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
+	bool ret = false;
 	int i;
 
+	spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
 	cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, cpu);
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
-		if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp))
-			return true;
+		if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp)) {
+			ret = true;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	return false;
+	spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
@@ -286,10 +317,6 @@ static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
 	return false;
 }
 
-/*
- * We don't use any locks to serialize accesses to cpu_bps or task_bps
- * because are already inside nr_bp_mutex.
- */
 int arch_reserve_bp_slot(struct perf_event *bp)
 {
 	int ret;
-- 
2.35.1

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 05/29] powerpc/hw_breakpoint: Avoid relying on caller synchronization

[Marco Elver]

On Mon, 17 Oct 2022 at 17:08, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit f95e5a3d59011eec1257d0e76de1e1f8969d426f ]
>
> Internal data structures (cpu_bps, task_bps) of powerpc's hw_breakpoint
> implementation have relied on nr_bp_mutex serializing access to them.
>
> Before overhauling synchronization of kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c,
> introduce 2 spinlocks to synchronize cpu_bps and task_bps respectively,
> thus avoiding reliance on callers synchronizing powerpc's hw_breakpoint.
>
> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829124719.675715-10-elver@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Backporting this patch seems unnecessary if we're not backporting the
hw_breakpoint overhaul.

Without the overhaul, nothing will break without this patch.

Thanks,
-- Marco

> ---
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> index 2669f80b3a49..8db1a15d7acb 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/smp.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
>  #include <linux/debugfs.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
>
> @@ -129,7 +130,14 @@ struct breakpoint {
>         bool ptrace_bp;
>  };
>
> +/*
> + * While kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c does its own synchronization, we cannot
> + * rely on it safely synchronizing internals here; however, we can rely on it
> + * not requesting more breakpoints than available.
> + */
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpu_bps_lock);
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct breakpoint *, cpu_bps[HBP_NUM_MAX]);
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_bps_lock);
>  static LIST_HEAD(task_bps);
>
>  static struct breakpoint *alloc_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp)
> @@ -174,7 +182,9 @@ static int task_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
>         if (IS_ERR(tmp))
>                 return PTR_ERR(tmp);
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_add(&tmp->list, &task_bps);
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> @@ -182,6 +192,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct list_head *pos, *q;
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &task_bps) {
>                 struct breakpoint *tmp = list_entry(pos, struct breakpoint, list);
>
> @@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
>  }
>
>  /*
> @@ -200,12 +212,17 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>  static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct breakpoint *tmp;
> +       bool ret = false;
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
> -               if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
> -                       return true;
> +               if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
> +                       ret = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>         }
> -       return false;
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
> +       return ret;
>  }
>
>  /*
> @@ -215,13 +232,18 @@ static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>  static bool same_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct breakpoint *tmp;
> +       bool ret = false;
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
>                 if (tmp->bp->hw.target == bp->hw.target &&
> -                   !can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
> -                       return true;
> +                   !can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
> +                       ret = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>         }
> -       return false;
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
> +       return ret;
>  }
>
>  static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
> @@ -234,6 +256,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
>         if (IS_ERR(tmp))
>                 return PTR_ERR(tmp);
>
> +       spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
>         for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
>                 if (!cpu_bp[i]) {
> @@ -241,6 +264,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
> +       spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> @@ -249,6 +273,7 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>         struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
>         int i = 0;
>
> +       spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
>         for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
>                 if (!cpu_bp[i])
> @@ -260,19 +285,25 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
> +       spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>  }
>
>  static bool cpu_bps_check(int cpu, struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
> +       bool ret = false;
>         int i;
>
> +       spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, cpu);
>         for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
> -               if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp))
> -                       return true;
> +               if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp)) {
> +                       ret = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>         }
> -       return false;
> +       spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
> +       return ret;
>  }
>
>  static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
> @@ -286,10 +317,6 @@ static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>         return false;
>  }
>
> -/*
> - * We don't use any locks to serialize accesses to cpu_bps or task_bps
> - * because are already inside nr_bp_mutex.
> - */
>  int arch_reserve_bp_slot(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         int ret;
> --
> 2.35.1
>

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 05/29] powerpc/hw_breakpoint: Avoid relying on caller synchronization

[Marco Elver]

On Mon, 17 Oct 2022 at 17:08, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit f95e5a3d59011eec1257d0e76de1e1f8969d426f ]
>
> Internal data structures (cpu_bps, task_bps) of powerpc's hw_breakpoint
> implementation have relied on nr_bp_mutex serializing access to them.
>
> Before overhauling synchronization of kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c,
> introduce 2 spinlocks to synchronize cpu_bps and task_bps respectively,
> thus avoiding reliance on callers synchronizing powerpc's hw_breakpoint.
>
> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220829124719.675715-10-elver@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Backporting this patch seems unnecessary if we're not backporting the
hw_breakpoint overhaul.

Without the overhaul, nothing will break without this patch.

Thanks,
-- Marco

> ---
>  arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> index 2669f80b3a49..8db1a15d7acb 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/smp.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
>  #include <linux/debugfs.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
>
> @@ -129,7 +130,14 @@ struct breakpoint {
>         bool ptrace_bp;
>  };
>
> +/*
> + * While kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c does its own synchronization, we cannot
> + * rely on it safely synchronizing internals here; however, we can rely on it
> + * not requesting more breakpoints than available.
> + */
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpu_bps_lock);
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct breakpoint *, cpu_bps[HBP_NUM_MAX]);
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_bps_lock);
>  static LIST_HEAD(task_bps);
>
>  static struct breakpoint *alloc_breakpoint(struct perf_event *bp)
> @@ -174,7 +182,9 @@ static int task_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
>         if (IS_ERR(tmp))
>                 return PTR_ERR(tmp);
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_add(&tmp->list, &task_bps);
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> @@ -182,6 +192,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct list_head *pos, *q;
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &task_bps) {
>                 struct breakpoint *tmp = list_entry(pos, struct breakpoint, list);
>
> @@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
>  }
>
>  /*
> @@ -200,12 +212,17 @@ static void task_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>  static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct breakpoint *tmp;
> +       bool ret = false;
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
> -               if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
> -                       return true;
> +               if (!can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
> +                       ret = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>         }
> -       return false;
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
> +       return ret;
>  }
>
>  /*
> @@ -215,13 +232,18 @@ static bool all_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>  static bool same_task_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct breakpoint *tmp;
> +       bool ret = false;
>
> +       spin_lock(&task_bps_lock);
>         list_for_each_entry(tmp, &task_bps, list) {
>                 if (tmp->bp->hw.target == bp->hw.target &&
> -                   !can_co_exist(tmp, bp))
> -                       return true;
> +                   !can_co_exist(tmp, bp)) {
> +                       ret = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>         }
> -       return false;
> +       spin_unlock(&task_bps_lock);
> +       return ret;
>  }
>
>  static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
> @@ -234,6 +256,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
>         if (IS_ERR(tmp))
>                 return PTR_ERR(tmp);
>
> +       spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
>         for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
>                 if (!cpu_bp[i]) {
> @@ -241,6 +264,7 @@ static int cpu_bps_add(struct perf_event *bp)
>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
> +       spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> @@ -249,6 +273,7 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>         struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
>         int i = 0;
>
> +       spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, bp->cpu);
>         for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
>                 if (!cpu_bp[i])
> @@ -260,19 +285,25 @@ static void cpu_bps_remove(struct perf_event *bp)
>                         break;
>                 }
>         }
> +       spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>  }
>
>  static bool cpu_bps_check(int cpu, struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         struct breakpoint **cpu_bp;
> +       bool ret = false;
>         int i;
>
> +       spin_lock(&cpu_bps_lock);
>         cpu_bp = per_cpu_ptr(cpu_bps, cpu);
>         for (i = 0; i < nr_wp_slots(); i++) {
> -               if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp))
> -                       return true;
> +               if (cpu_bp[i] && !can_co_exist(cpu_bp[i], bp)) {
> +                       ret = true;
> +                       break;
> +               }
>         }
> -       return false;
> +       spin_unlock(&cpu_bps_lock);
> +       return ret;
>  }
>
>  static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
> @@ -286,10 +317,6 @@ static bool all_cpu_bps_check(struct perf_event *bp)
>         return false;
>  }
>
> -/*
> - * We don't use any locks to serialize accesses to cpu_bps or task_bps
> - * because are already inside nr_bp_mutex.
> - */
>  int arch_reserve_bp_slot(struct perf_event *bp)
>  {
>         int ret;
> --
> 2.35.1
>

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 06/29] cgroup: Remove data-race around cgrp_dfl_visible

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit dc79ec1b232ad2c165d381d3dd2626df4ef9b5a4 ]

There's a seemingly harmless data-race around cgrp_dfl_visible detected by
kernel concurrency sanitizer. Let's remove it by throwing WRITE/READ_ONCE at
it.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Abhishek Shah <abhishek.shah@columbia.edu>
Cc: Gabriel Ryan <gabe@cs.columbia.edu>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220819072256.fn7ctciefy4fc4cu@wittgenstein/
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
index 80c23f48f3b4..1969ba9b4090 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -2153,7 +2153,7 @@ static int cgroup_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
 	struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx = cgroup_fc2context(fc);
 	int ret;
 
-	cgrp_dfl_visible = true;
+	WRITE_ONCE(cgrp_dfl_visible, true);
 	cgroup_get_live(&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp);
 	ctx->root = &cgrp_dfl_root;
 
@@ -6068,7 +6068,7 @@ int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 		struct cgroup *cgrp;
 		int ssid, count = 0;
 
-		if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible)
+		if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !READ_ONCE(cgrp_dfl_visible))
 			continue;
 
 		seq_printf(m, "%d:", root->hierarchy_id);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 07/29] iommu/vt-d: Handle race between registration and device probe

[Sasha Levin]

From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit c919739ce4721ecf7b96b99253b032df30fcf19b ]

Currently we rely on registering all our instances before initially
allowing any .probe_device calls via bus_set_iommu(). In preparation for
phasing out the latter, make sure we won't inadvertently return success
for a device associated with a known but not yet registered instance,
otherwise we'll run straight into iommu_group_get_for_dev() trying to
use NULL ops.

That also highlights an issue with intel_iommu_get_resv_regions() taking
dmar_global_lock from within a section where intel_iommu_init() already
holds it, which already exists via probe_acpi_namespace_devices() when
an ANDD device is probed, but gets more obvious with the upcoming change
to iommu_device_register(). Since they are both read locks it manages
not to deadlock in practice, and a more in-depth rework of this locking
is underway, so no attempt is made to address it here.

Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/579f2692291bcbfc3ac64f7456fcff0d629af131.1660572783.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
index 3ed15e8ca677..690fad0d37f8 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
@@ -4586,7 +4586,7 @@ static struct iommu_device *intel_iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev)
 	u8 bus, devfn;
 
 	iommu = device_to_iommu(dev, &bus, &devfn);
-	if (!iommu)
+	if (!iommu || !iommu->iommu.ops)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
 
 	info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 08/29] of/fdt: Don't calculate initrd size from DT if start > end

[Sasha Levin]

From: Marek Bykowski <marek.bykowski@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit d5e3050c0feb8bf7b9a75482fafcc31b90257926 ]

If the properties 'linux,initrd-start' and 'linux,initrd-end' of
the chosen node populated from the bootloader, eg. U-Boot, are so that
start > end, then the phys_initrd_size calculated from end - start is
negative that subsequently gets converted to a high positive value for
being unsigned long long. Then, the memory region with the (invalid)
size is added to the bootmem and attempted being paged in paging_init()
that results in the kernel fault.

For example, on the FVP ARM64 system I'm running, the U-Boot populates
the 'linux,initrd-start' with 8800_0000 and 'linux,initrd-end' with 0.
The phys_initrd_size calculated is then ffff_ffff_7800_0000
(= 0 - 8800_0000 = -8800_0000 + ULLONG_MAX + 1). paging_init() then
attempts to map the address 8800_0000 + ffff_ffff_7800_0000 and oops'es
as below.

It should be stressed, it is generally a fault of the bootloader's with
the kernel relying on it, however we should not allow the bootloader's
misconfiguration to lead to the kernel oops. Not only the kernel should be
bullet proof against it but also finding the root cause of the paging
fault spanning over the bootloader, DT, and kernel may happen is not so
easy.

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffefe43c000
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x96000007
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
    CM = 0, WnR = 0
  swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000080e3d000
  [fffffffefe43c000] pgd=0000000080de9003, pud=0000000080de9003
  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff8000de9f90
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x96000005
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
    CM = 0, WnR = 0
  swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000080e3d000
  [ffffff8000de9f90] pgd=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
  Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.4.51-yocto-standard #1
  Hardware name: FVP Base (DT)
  pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO)
  pc : show_pte+0x12c/0x1b4
  lr : show_pte+0x100/0x1b4
  sp : ffffffc010ce3b30
  x29: ffffffc010ce3b30 x28: ffffffc010ceed80
  x27: fffffffefe43c000 x26: fffffffefe43a028
  x25: 0000000080bf0000 x24: 0000000000000025
  x23: ffffffc010b8d000 x22: ffffffc010e3d000
  x23: ffffffc010b8d000 x22: ffffffc010e3d000
  x21: 0000000080de9000 x20: ffffff7f80000f90
  x19: fffffffefe43c000 x18: 0000000000000030
  x17: 0000000000001400 x16: 0000000000001c00
  x15: ffffffc010cef1b8 x14: ffffffffffffffff
  x13: ffffffc010df1f40 x12: ffffffc010df1b70
  x11: ffffffc010ce3b30 x10: ffffffc010ce3b30
  x9 : 00000000ffffffc8 x8 : 0000000000000000
  x7 : 000000000000000f x6 : ffffffc010df16e8
  x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
  x3 : 00000000ffffffff x2 : 0000000000000000
  x1 : 0000008080000000 x0 : ffffffc010af1d68
  Call trace:
   show_pte+0x12c/0x1b4
   die_kernel_fault+0x54/0x78
   __do_kernel_fault+0x11c/0x128
   do_translation_fault+0x58/0xac
   do_mem_abort+0x50/0xb0
   el1_da+0x1c/0x90
   __create_pgd_mapping+0x348/0x598
   paging_init+0x3f0/0x70d0
   setup_arch+0x2c0/0x5d4
   start_kernel+0x94/0x49c
  Code: 92748eb5 900052a0 9135a000 cb010294 (f8756a96) 

Signed-off-by: Marek Bykowski <marek.bykowski@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220909023358.76881-1-marek.bykowski@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/of/fdt.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/of/fdt.c b/drivers/of/fdt.c
index 583ca847a39c..8b379ba7471b 100644
--- a/drivers/of/fdt.c
+++ b/drivers/of/fdt.c
@@ -937,6 +937,8 @@ static void __init early_init_dt_check_for_initrd(unsigned long node)
 	if (!prop)
 		return;
 	end = of_read_number(prop, len/4);
+	if (start > end)
+		return;
 
 	__early_init_dt_declare_initrd(start, end);
 	phys_initrd_start = start;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 09/29] objtool,x86: Teach decode about LOOP* instructions

[Sasha Levin]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit 7a7621dfa417aa3715d2a3bd1bdd6cf5018274d0 ]

When 'discussing' control flow Masami mentioned the LOOP* instructions
and I realized objtool doesn't decode them properly.

As it turns out, these instructions are somewhat inefficient and as
such unlikely to be emitted by the compiler (a few vmlinux.o checks
can't find a single one) so this isn't critical, but still, best to
decode them properly.

Reported-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yxhd4EMKyoFoH9y4@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
index c260006106be..1c253b4b7ce0 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -635,6 +635,12 @@ int arch_decode_instruction(struct objtool_file *file, const struct section *sec
 		*type = INSN_CONTEXT_SWITCH;
 		break;
 
+	case 0xe0: /* loopne */
+	case 0xe1: /* loope */
+	case 0xe2: /* loop */
+		*type = INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL;
+		break;
+
 	case 0xe8:
 		*type = INSN_CALL;
 		/*
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 10/29] locking/rwsem: Disable preemption while trying for rwsem lock

[Sasha Levin]

From: Gokul krishna Krishnakumar <quic_gokukris@quicinc.com>

[ Upstream commit 48dfb5d2560d36fb16c7d430c229d1604ea7d185 ]

Make the region inside the rwsem_write_trylock non preemptible.

We observe RT task is hogging CPU when trying to acquire rwsem lock
which was acquired by a kworker task but before the rwsem owner was set.

Here is the scenario:
1. CFS task (affined to a particular CPU) takes rwsem lock.

2. CFS task gets preempted by a RT task before setting owner.

3. RT task (FIFO) is trying to acquire the lock, but spinning until
RT throttling happens for the lock as the lock was taken by CFS task.

This patch attempts to fix the above issue by disabling preemption
until owner is set for the lock. While at it also fix the issues
at the places where rwsem_{set,clear}_owner() are called.

This also adds lockdep annotation of preemption disable in
rwsem_{set,clear}_owner() on Peter Z. suggestion.

Signed-off-by: Gokul krishna Krishnakumar <quic_gokukris@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1662661467-24203-1-git-send-email-quic_mojha@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/locking/rwsem.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c
index 65f0262f635e..44873594de03 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c
@@ -133,14 +133,19 @@
  * the owner value concurrently without lock. Read from owner, however,
  * may not need READ_ONCE() as long as the pointer value is only used
  * for comparison and isn't being dereferenced.
+ *
+ * Both rwsem_{set,clear}_owner() functions should be in the same
+ * preempt disable section as the atomic op that changes sem->count.
  */
 static inline void rwsem_set_owner(struct rw_semaphore *sem)
 {
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
 	atomic_long_set(&sem->owner, (long)current);
 }
 
 static inline void rwsem_clear_owner(struct rw_semaphore *sem)
 {
+	lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
 	atomic_long_set(&sem->owner, 0);
 }
 
@@ -251,13 +256,16 @@ static inline bool rwsem_read_trylock(struct rw_semaphore *sem, long *cntp)
 static inline bool rwsem_write_trylock(struct rw_semaphore *sem)
 {
 	long tmp = RWSEM_UNLOCKED_VALUE;
+	bool ret = false;
 
+	preempt_disable();
 	if (atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire(&sem->count, &tmp, RWSEM_WRITER_LOCKED)) {
 		rwsem_set_owner(sem);
-		return true;
+		ret = true;
 	}
 
-	return false;
+	preempt_enable();
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1352,8 +1360,10 @@ static inline void __up_write(struct rw_semaphore *sem)
 	DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) &&
 			    !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE), sem);
 
+	preempt_disable();
 	rwsem_clear_owner(sem);
 	tmp = atomic_long_fetch_add_release(-RWSEM_WRITER_LOCKED, &sem->count);
+	preempt_enable();
 	if (unlikely(tmp & RWSEM_FLAG_WAITERS))
 		rwsem_wake(sem);
 }
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 11/29] gfs2: Check sb_bsize_shift after reading superblock

[Sasha Levin]

From: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 670f8ce56dd0632dc29a0322e188cc73ce3c6b92 ]

Fuzzers like to scribble over sb_bsize_shift but in reality it's very
unlikely that this field would be corrupted on its own. Nevertheless it
should be checked to avoid the possibility of messy mount errors due to
bad calculations. It's always a fixed value based on the block size so
we can just check that it's the expected value.

Tested with:

    mkfs.gfs2 -O -p lock_nolock /dev/vdb
    for i in 0 -1 64 65 32 33; do
        gfs2_edit -p sb field sb_bsize_shift $i /dev/vdb
        mount /dev/vdb /mnt/test && umount /mnt/test
    done

Before this patch we get a withdraw after

[   76.413681] gfs2: fsid=loop0.0: fatal: invalid metadata block
[   76.413681]   bh = 19 (type: exp=5, found=4)
[   76.413681]   function = gfs2_meta_buffer, file = fs/gfs2/meta_io.c, line = 492

and with UBSAN configured we also get complaints like

[   76.373395] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:295:19
[   76.373815] shift exponent 4294967287 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'

After the patch, these complaints don't appear, mount fails immediately
and we get an explanation in dmesg.

Reported-by: syzbot+dcf33a7aae997956fe06@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
index ba4dfef0c15d..890d1b5fbace 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
@@ -180,7 +180,10 @@ static int gfs2_check_sb(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, int silent)
 		pr_warn("Invalid block size\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-
+	if (sb->sb_bsize_shift != ffs(sb->sb_bsize) - 1) {
+		pr_warn("Invalid block size shift\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.35.1

[Cluster-devel] [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 11/29] gfs2: Check sb_bsize_shift after reading superblock

[Sasha Levin]

From: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 670f8ce56dd0632dc29a0322e188cc73ce3c6b92 ]

Fuzzers like to scribble over sb_bsize_shift but in reality it's very
unlikely that this field would be corrupted on its own. Nevertheless it
should be checked to avoid the possibility of messy mount errors due to
bad calculations. It's always a fixed value based on the block size so
we can just check that it's the expected value.

Tested with:

    mkfs.gfs2 -O -p lock_nolock /dev/vdb
    for i in 0 -1 64 65 32 33; do
        gfs2_edit -p sb field sb_bsize_shift $i /dev/vdb
        mount /dev/vdb /mnt/test && umount /mnt/test
    done

Before this patch we get a withdraw after

[   76.413681] gfs2: fsid=loop0.0: fatal: invalid metadata block
[   76.413681]   bh = 19 (type: exp=5, found=4)
[   76.413681]   function = gfs2_meta_buffer, file = fs/gfs2/meta_io.c, line = 492

and with UBSAN configured we also get complaints like

[   76.373395] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c:295:19
[   76.373815] shift exponent 4294967287 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'

After the patch, these complaints don't appear, mount fails immediately
and we get an explanation in dmesg.

Reported-by: syzbot+dcf33a7aae997956fe06 at syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
index ba4dfef0c15d..890d1b5fbace 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c
@@ -180,7 +180,10 @@ static int gfs2_check_sb(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, int silent)
 		pr_warn("Invalid block size\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-
+	if (sb->sb_bsize_shift != ffs(sb->sb_bsize) - 1) {
+		pr_warn("Invalid block size shift\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 12/29] powerpc/64: don't refer nr_cpu_ids in asm code when it's undefined

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 546a073d628111e3338af689938407e77d5dc38f ]

generic_secondary_common_init() calls LOAD_REG_ADDR(r7, nr_cpu_ids)
conditionally on CONFIG_SMP. However, if 'NR_CPUS == 1', kernel doesn't
use the nr_cpu_ids, and in C code, it's just:
  #if NR_CPUS == 1
  #define nr_cpu_ids
  ...

This series makes declaration of nr_cpu_ids conditional on NR_CPUS == 1,
and that reveals the issue, because compiler can't link the
LOAD_REG_ADDR(r7, nr_cpu_ids) against nonexisting symbol.

Current code looks unsafe for those who build kernel with CONFIG_SMP=y and
NR_CPUS == 1. This is weird configuration, but not disallowed.

Fix the linker error by replacing LOAD_REG_ADDR() with LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE()
conditionally on NR_CPUS == 1.

As the following patch adds CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS option that has the
similar effect on nr_cpu_ids, make the generic_secondary_common_init()
conditional on it too.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
index d3eea633d11a..8408d3f7f61f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -400,8 +400,12 @@ generic_secondary_common_init:
 #else
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r8, paca_ptrs)	/* Load paca_ptrs pointe	 */
 	ld	r8,0(r8)		/* Get base vaddr of array	 */
+#if (NR_CPUS == 1) || defined(CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS)
+	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, NR_CPUS)
+#else
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r7, nr_cpu_ids)	/* Load nr_cpu_ids address       */
 	lwz	r7,0(r7)		/* also the max paca allocated 	 */
+#endif
 	li	r5,0			/* logical cpu id                */
 1:
 	sldi	r9,r5,3			/* get paca_ptrs[] index from cpu id */
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 12/29] powerpc/64: don't refer nr_cpu_ids in asm code when it's undefined

[Sasha Levin]

From: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 546a073d628111e3338af689938407e77d5dc38f ]

generic_secondary_common_init() calls LOAD_REG_ADDR(r7, nr_cpu_ids)
conditionally on CONFIG_SMP. However, if 'NR_CPUS == 1', kernel doesn't
use the nr_cpu_ids, and in C code, it's just:
  #if NR_CPUS == 1
  #define nr_cpu_ids
  ...

This series makes declaration of nr_cpu_ids conditional on NR_CPUS == 1,
and that reveals the issue, because compiler can't link the
LOAD_REG_ADDR(r7, nr_cpu_ids) against nonexisting symbol.

Current code looks unsafe for those who build kernel with CONFIG_SMP=y and
NR_CPUS == 1. This is weird configuration, but not disallowed.

Fix the linker error by replacing LOAD_REG_ADDR() with LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE()
conditionally on NR_CPUS == 1.

As the following patch adds CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS option that has the
similar effect on nr_cpu_ids, make the generic_secondary_common_init()
conditional on it too.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
index d3eea633d11a..8408d3f7f61f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -400,8 +400,12 @@ generic_secondary_common_init:
 #else
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r8, paca_ptrs)	/* Load paca_ptrs pointe	 */
 	ld	r8,0(r8)		/* Get base vaddr of array	 */
+#if (NR_CPUS == 1) || defined(CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS)
+	LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r7, NR_CPUS)
+#else
 	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r7, nr_cpu_ids)	/* Load nr_cpu_ids address       */
 	lwz	r7,0(r7)		/* also the max paca allocated 	 */
+#endif
 	li	r5,0			/* logical cpu id                */
 1:
 	sldi	r9,r5,3			/* get paca_ptrs[] index from cpu id */
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 13/29] m68knommu: fix non-specific 68328 choice interrupt build failure

[Sasha Levin]

From: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>

[ Upstream commit 750321ace9107e103f254bf46900629ff347eb7b ]

Compiling for a classic m68k non-MMU target with no specific CPU
selected fails with the following error:

   arch/m68k/68000/ints.c: In function 'process_int':
>> arch/m68k/68000/ints.c:82:30: error: 'ISR' undeclared (first use in this function)
      82 |         unsigned long pend = ISR;
         |                              ^~~

This interrupt handling code is specific to the 68328 family of 68000
parts. There is a couple of variants (68EZ328, 68VZ328) and the common
ancestor of them the strait 68328.

The code here includes a specific header for each variant type. But if
none is selected then nothing is included to supply the appropriate
register and bit flags defines.

Rearrange the includes so that at least one type is always included.
At the very least the 68328 base type should be the fallback, so make
that true.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/m68k/68000/ints.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/m68k/68000/ints.c b/arch/m68k/68000/ints.c
index cda49b12d7be..f9a5ec781408 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/68000/ints.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/68000/ints.c
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/machdep.h>
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_M68328)
-#include <asm/MC68328.h>
-#elif defined(CONFIG_M68EZ328)
+#if defined(CONFIG_M68EZ328)
 #include <asm/MC68EZ328.h>
 #elif defined(CONFIG_M68VZ328)
 #include <asm/MC68VZ328.h>
+#else
+#include <asm/MC68328.h>
 #endif
 
 /* assembler routines */
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 14/29] m68knommu: fix non-mmu classic 68000 legacy timer tick selection

[Sasha Levin]

From: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>

[ Upstream commit 18011e50c497f04a57a8e00122906f04922b30b4 ]

The family of classic 68000 parts supported when in non-mmu mode all
currently use the legacy timer support. Move the selection of that config
option, LEGACY_TIMER_TICK, into the core CPU configuration.

This fixes compilation if no specific CPU variant is selected, since
the LEGACY_TIMER_TICK option was only selected in the specific CPU
variant configurations.

Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu b/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu
index f3aa44156969..3fdca29422e2 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu
+++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig.cpu
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ config M68000
 	select GENERIC_CSUM
 	select CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_HASH
+	select LEGACY_TIMER_TICK
 	help
 	  The Freescale (was Motorola) 68000 CPU is the first generation of
 	  the well known M68K family of processors. The CPU core as well as
@@ -97,7 +98,6 @@ config M68060
 config M68328
 	bool
 	depends on !MMU
-	select LEGACY_TIMER_TICK
 	select M68000
 	help
 	  Motorola 68328 processor support.
@@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ config M68328
 config M68EZ328
 	bool
 	depends on !MMU
-	select LEGACY_TIMER_TICK
 	select M68000
 	help
 	  Motorola 68EX328 processor support.
@@ -113,7 +112,6 @@ config M68EZ328
 config M68VZ328
 	bool
 	depends on !MMU
-	select LEGACY_TIMER_TICK
 	select M68000
 	help
 	  Motorola 68VZ328 processor support.
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 15/29] kbuild: take into account DT_SCHEMA_FILES changes while checking dtbs

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>

[ Upstream commit d7c6ea024c08bbdb799768f51ffd9fdd6236d190 ]

It is useful to be able to recheck dtbs files against a limited set of
DT schema files. This can be accomplished by using differnt
DT_SCHEMA_FILES argument values while rerunning make dtbs_check. However
for some reason if_changed_rule doesn't pick up the rule_dtc changes
(and doesn't retrigger the build).

Fix this by changing if_changed_rule to if_changed_dep and squashing DTC
and dt-validate into a single new command. Then if_changed_dep triggers
on DT_SCHEMA_FILES changes and reruns the build/check.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915114422.79378-1-dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 scripts/Makefile.lib | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 3fb6a99e78c4..cec0560f6ac6 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -371,17 +371,15 @@ DT_CHECKER_FLAGS ?= $(if $(DT_SCHEMA_FILES),-l $(DT_SCHEMA_FILES),-m)
 DT_BINDING_DIR := Documentation/devicetree/bindings
 DT_TMP_SCHEMA := $(objtree)/$(DT_BINDING_DIR)/processed-schema.json
 
-quiet_cmd_dtb_check =	CHECK   $@
-      cmd_dtb_check =	$(DT_CHECKER) $(DT_CHECKER_FLAGS) -u $(srctree)/$(DT_BINDING_DIR) -p $(DT_TMP_SCHEMA) $@ || true
+quiet_cmd_dtb =	DTC_CHK $@
+      cmd_dtb =	$(cmd_dtc) ; $(DT_CHECKER) $(DT_CHECKER_FLAGS) -u $(srctree)/$(DT_BINDING_DIR) -p $(DT_TMP_SCHEMA) $@ || true
+else
+quiet_cmd_dtb = $(quiet_cmd_dtc)
+      cmd_dtb = $(cmd_dtc)
 endif
 
-define rule_dtc
-	$(call cmd_and_fixdep,dtc)
-	$(call cmd,dtb_check)
-endef
-
 $(obj)/%.dtb: $(src)/%.dts $(DTC) $(DT_TMP_SCHEMA) FORCE
-	$(call if_changed_rule,dtc)
+	$(call if_changed_dep,dtb)
 
 $(obj)/%.dtbo: $(src)/%.dts $(DTC) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_dep,dtc)
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 16/29] tracing/user_events: Use WRITE instead of READ for io vector import

[Sasha Levin]

From: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit 95f187603dbff69bef19b2ab3bb54d2c060f556d ]

import_single_range expects the direction/rw to be where it came from,
not the protection/limit. Since the import is in a write path use WRITE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220728233309.1896-3-beaub@linux.microsoft.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2059213643.196683.1648499088753.JavaMail.zimbra@efficios.com/

Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
index 706e1686b5eb..4c9f6c776618 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
@@ -1245,7 +1245,8 @@ static ssize_t user_events_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
 	if (unlikely(*ppos != 0))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (unlikely(import_single_range(READ, (char *)ubuf, count, &iov, &i)))
+	if (unlikely(import_single_range(WRITE, (char __user *)ubuf,
+					 count, &iov, &i)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	return user_events_write_core(file, &i);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 17/29] tracing/user_events: Ensure user provided strings are safely formatted

[Sasha Levin]

From: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit e6f89a149872ab0e03cfded97983df74dfb0ef21 ]

User processes can provide bad strings that may cause issues or leak
kernel details back out. Don't trust the content of these strings
when formatting strings for matching.

This also moves to a consistent dynamic length string creation model.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220728233309.1896-4-beaub@linux.microsoft.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/2059213643.196683.1648499088753.JavaMail.zimbra@efficios.com/

Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
index 4c9f6c776618..29e16e1e5f11 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@
 #define MAX_EVENT_DESC 512
 #define EVENT_NAME(user_event) ((user_event)->tracepoint.name)
 #define MAX_FIELD_ARRAY_SIZE 1024
-#define MAX_FIELD_ARG_NAME 256
 
 static char *register_page_data;
 
@@ -483,6 +482,48 @@ static bool user_field_is_dyn_string(const char *type, const char **str_func)
 }
 
 #define LEN_OR_ZERO (len ? len - pos : 0)
+static int user_dyn_field_set_string(int argc, const char **argv, int *iout,
+				     char *buf, int len, bool *colon)
+{
+	int pos = 0, i = *iout;
+
+	*colon = false;
+
+	for (; i < argc; ++i) {
+		if (i != *iout)
+			pos += snprintf(buf + pos, LEN_OR_ZERO, " ");
+
+		pos += snprintf(buf + pos, LEN_OR_ZERO, "%s", argv[i]);
+
+		if (strchr(argv[i], ';')) {
+			++i;
+			*colon = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Actual set, advance i */
+	if (len != 0)
+		*iout = i;
+
+	return pos + 1;
+}
+
+static int user_field_set_string(struct ftrace_event_field *field,
+				 char *buf, int len, bool colon)
+{
+	int pos = 0;
+
+	pos += snprintf(buf + pos, LEN_OR_ZERO, "%s", field->type);
+	pos += snprintf(buf + pos, LEN_OR_ZERO, " ");
+	pos += snprintf(buf + pos, LEN_OR_ZERO, "%s", field->name);
+
+	if (colon)
+		pos += snprintf(buf + pos, LEN_OR_ZERO, ";");
+
+	return pos + 1;
+}
+
 static int user_event_set_print_fmt(struct user_event *user, char *buf, int len)
 {
 	struct ftrace_event_field *field, *next;
@@ -926,49 +967,35 @@ static int user_event_free(struct dyn_event *ev)
 static bool user_field_match(struct ftrace_event_field *field, int argc,
 			     const char **argv, int *iout)
 {
-	char *field_name, *arg_name;
-	int len, pos, i = *iout;
+	char *field_name = NULL, *dyn_field_name = NULL;
 	bool colon = false, match = false;
+	int dyn_len, len;
 
-	if (i >= argc)
+	if (*iout >= argc)
 		return false;
 
-	len = MAX_FIELD_ARG_NAME;
-	field_name = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
-	arg_name = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	dyn_len = user_dyn_field_set_string(argc, argv, iout, dyn_field_name,
+					    0, &colon);
 
-	if (!arg_name || !field_name)
-		goto out;
-
-	pos = 0;
-
-	for (; i < argc; ++i) {
-		if (i != *iout)
-			pos += snprintf(arg_name + pos, len - pos, " ");
+	len = user_field_set_string(field, field_name, 0, colon);
 
-		pos += snprintf(arg_name + pos, len - pos, argv[i]);
-
-		if (strchr(argv[i], ';')) {
-			++i;
-			colon = true;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
+	if (dyn_len != len)
+		return false;
 
-	pos = 0;
+	dyn_field_name = kmalloc(dyn_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	field_name = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 
-	pos += snprintf(field_name + pos, len - pos, field->type);
-	pos += snprintf(field_name + pos, len - pos, " ");
-	pos += snprintf(field_name + pos, len - pos, field->name);
+	if (!dyn_field_name || !field_name)
+		goto out;
 
-	if (colon)
-		pos += snprintf(field_name + pos, len - pos, ";");
+	user_dyn_field_set_string(argc, argv, iout, dyn_field_name,
+				  dyn_len, &colon);
 
-	*iout = i;
+	user_field_set_string(field, field_name, len, colon);
 
-	match = strcmp(arg_name, field_name) == 0;
+	match = strcmp(dyn_field_name, field_name) == 0;
 out:
-	kfree(arg_name);
+	kfree(dyn_field_name);
 	kfree(field_name);
 
 	return match;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 18/29] of: Fix "dma-ranges" handling for bus controllers

[Sasha Levin]

From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit f1ad5338a4d57fe1fe6475003acb8c70bf9d1bdf ]

Commit 951d48855d86 ("of: Make of_dma_get_range() work on bus nodes")
relaxed the handling of "dma-ranges" for any leaf node on the assumption
that it would still represent a usage error for the property to be
present on a non-bus leaf node. However there turns out to be a fiddly
case where a bus also represents a DMA-capable device in its own right,
such as a PCIe root complex with an integrated DMA engine on its
platform side. In such cases, "dma-ranges" translation is entirely valid
for devices discovered behind the bus, but should not be erroneously
applied to the bus controller device itself which operates in its
parent's address space. Fix this by restoring the previous behaviour for
the specific case where a device is configured via its own OF node,
since it is logical to assume that a device should never represent its
own parent bus.

Reported-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru>
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/112e8f3d3e7c054ecf5e12b5ac0aa5596ec00681.1664455433.git.robin.murphy@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/of/address.c    | 4 +++-
 drivers/of/device.c     | 9 ++++++++-
 drivers/of/of_private.h | 5 +++++
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/of/address.c b/drivers/of/address.c
index 94f017d808c4..d6f5a427a329 100644
--- a/drivers/of/address.c
+++ b/drivers/of/address.c
@@ -579,7 +579,8 @@ u64 of_translate_address(struct device_node *dev, const __be32 *in_addr)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(of_translate_address);
 
-static struct device_node *__of_get_dma_parent(const struct device_node *np)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_DMA
+struct device_node *__of_get_dma_parent(const struct device_node *np)
 {
 	struct of_phandle_args args;
 	int ret, index;
@@ -596,6 +597,7 @@ static struct device_node *__of_get_dma_parent(const struct device_node *np)
 
 	return of_node_get(args.np);
 }
+#endif
 
 static struct device_node *of_get_next_dma_parent(struct device_node *np)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/of/device.c b/drivers/of/device.c
index 75b6cbffa755..8cefe5a7d04e 100644
--- a/drivers/of/device.c
+++ b/drivers/of/device.c
@@ -116,12 +116,19 @@ int of_dma_configure_id(struct device *dev, struct device_node *np,
 {
 	const struct iommu_ops *iommu;
 	const struct bus_dma_region *map = NULL;
+	struct device_node *bus_np;
 	u64 dma_start = 0;
 	u64 mask, end, size = 0;
 	bool coherent;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = of_dma_get_range(np, &map);
+	if (np == dev->of_node)
+		bus_np = __of_get_dma_parent(np);
+	else
+		bus_np = of_node_get(np);
+
+	ret = of_dma_get_range(bus_np, &map);
+	of_node_put(bus_np);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		/*
 		 * For legacy reasons, we have to assume some devices need
diff --git a/drivers/of/of_private.h b/drivers/of/of_private.h
index 9324483397f6..fb6792d381a6 100644
--- a/drivers/of/of_private.h
+++ b/drivers/of/of_private.h
@@ -155,12 +155,17 @@ struct bus_dma_region;
 #if defined(CONFIG_OF_ADDRESS) && defined(CONFIG_HAS_DMA)
 int of_dma_get_range(struct device_node *np,
 		const struct bus_dma_region **map);
+struct device_node *__of_get_dma_parent(const struct device_node *np);
 #else
 static inline int of_dma_get_range(struct device_node *np,
 		const struct bus_dma_region **map)
 {
 	return -ENODEV;
 }
+static inline struct device_node *__of_get_dma_parent(const struct device_node *np)
+{
+	return of_get_parent(np);
+}
 #endif
 
 void fdt_init_reserved_mem(void);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 19/29] x86/hyperv: Replace kmap() with kmap_local_page()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 154fb14df7a3c81dea82eca7c0c46590f5ffc3d2 ]

kmap() is being deprecated in favor of kmap_local_page()[1].

There are two main problems with kmap(): (1) It comes with an overhead as
mapping space is restricted and protected by a global lock for
synchronization and (2) it also requires global TLB invalidation when the
kmap's pool wraps and it might block when the mapping space is fully
utilized until a slot becomes available.

With kmap_local_page() the mappings are per thread, CPU local, can take
page faults, and can be called from any context (including interrupts).
It is faster than kmap() in kernels with HIGHMEM enabled. Furthermore,
the tasks can be preempted and, when they are scheduled to run again, the
kernel virtual addresses are restored and are still valid.

In the fuction hyperv_init() of hyperv/hv_init.c, the mapping is used in a
single thread and is short live. So, in this case, it's safe to simply use
kmap_local_page() to create mapping, and this avoids the wasted cost of
kmap() for global synchronization.

In addtion, the fuction hyperv_init() checks if kmap() fails by BUG_ON().
From the original discussion[2], the BUG_ON() here is just used to
explicitly panic NULL pointer. So still keep the BUG_ON() in place to check
if kmap_local_page() fails. Based on this consideration, memcpy_to_page()
is not selected here but only kmap_local_page() is used.

Therefore, replace kmap() with kmap_local_page() in hyperv/hv_init.c.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220813220034.806698-1-ira.weiny@intel.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915103710.cqmdvzh5lys4wsqo@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2/

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928095640.626350-1-zhao1.liu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
index 3de6d8b53367..72fe46eb183f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
@@ -459,13 +459,13 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)
 		wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL, hypercall_msr.as_uint64);
 
 		pg = vmalloc_to_page(hv_hypercall_pg);
-		dst = kmap(pg);
+		dst = kmap_local_page(pg);
 		src = memremap(hypercall_msr.guest_physical_address << PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_SIZE,
 				MEMREMAP_WB);
 		BUG_ON(!(src && dst));
 		memcpy(dst, src, HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
 		memunmap(src);
-		kunmap(pg);
+		kunmap_local(dst);
 	} else {
 		hypercall_msr.guest_physical_address = vmalloc_to_pfn(hv_hypercall_pg);
 		wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL, hypercall_msr.as_uint64);
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 20/29] kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported common kernel code

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 79dbd006a6d6f51777ba4948046561b6d9270504 ]

EFI stub cannot be linked with KMSAN runtime, so we disable
instrumentation for it.

Instrumenting kcov, stackdepot or lockdep leads to infinite recursion
caused by instrumentation hooks calling instrumented code again.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-13-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 1 +
 kernel/Makefile                       | 1 +
 kernel/locking/Makefile               | 3 ++-
 lib/Makefile                          | 3 +++
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index 2c67f71f2375..2c1eb1fb0f22 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ GCOV_PROFILE			:= n
 # Sanitizer runtimes are unavailable and cannot be linked here.
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 KCSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD	:= y
 
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index a7e1f49ab2b3..e47f0526c987 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kcov.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 KCSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
 CFLAGS_kcov.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack) -fno-stack-protector
 
 # Don't instrument error handlers
diff --git a/kernel/locking/Makefile b/kernel/locking/Makefile
index d51cabf28f38..ea925731fa40 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/locking/Makefile
@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT		:= n
 
 obj-y += mutex.o semaphore.o rwsem.o percpu-rwsem.o
 
-# Avoid recursion lockdep -> KCSAN -> ... -> lockdep.
+# Avoid recursion lockdep -> sanitizer -> ... -> lockdep.
 KCSAN_SANITIZE_lockdep.o := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE_lockdep.o := n
 
 ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_lockdep.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index f99bf61f8bbc..73fea85b7636 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_POLYNOMIAL) += polynomial.o
 CFLAGS_stackdepot.o += -fno-builtin
 obj-$(CONFIG_STACKDEPOT) += stackdepot.o
 KASAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n
+# In particular, instrumenting stackdepot.c with KMSAN will result in infinite
+# recursion.
+KMSAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackdepot.o := n
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_REF_TRACKER) += ref_tracker.o
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 21/29] kmsan: disable physical page merging in biovec

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

[ Upstream commit f630a5d0ca59a6e73b61e3f82c371dc230da99ff ]

KMSAN metadata for adjacent physical pages may not be adjacent, therefore
accessing such pages together may lead to metadata corruption.  We disable
merging pages in biovec to prevent such corruptions.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-28-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 block/blk.h | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/block/blk.h b/block/blk.h
index 0d6668663ab5..37d24fab1e30 100644
--- a/block/blk.h
+++ b/block/blk.h
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static inline bool biovec_phys_mergeable(struct request_queue *q,
 	phys_addr_t addr1 = page_to_phys(vec1->bv_page) + vec1->bv_offset;
 	phys_addr_t addr2 = page_to_phys(vec2->bv_page) + vec2->bv_offset;
 
+	/*
+	 * Merging adjacent physical pages may not work correctly under KMSAN
+	 * if their metadata pages aren't adjacent. Just disable merging.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KMSAN))
+		return false;
+
 	if (addr1 + vec1->bv_len != addr2)
 		return false;
 	if (xen_domain() && !xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(vec1, vec2->bv_page))
-- 
2.35.1

[f2fs-dev] [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 22/29] f2fs: fix wrong dirty page count when race between mmap and fallocate.

[Sasha Levin]

From: Shuqi Zhang <zhangshuqi3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b7eadd9bd3a0cc24533a23d83c46430a0ea60ff ]

This is a BUG_ON issue as follows when running xfstest-generic-503:
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 1385 at fs/f2fs/inode.c:762 f2fs_evict_inode+0x847/0xaa0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 21 PID: 1385 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5+ #73
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014

Call Trace:
evict+0x129/0x2d0
dispose_list+0x4f/0xb0
evict_inodes+0x204/0x230
generic_shutdown_super+0x5b/0x1e0
kill_block_super+0x29/0x80
kill_f2fs_super+0xe6/0x140
deactivate_locked_super+0x44/0xc0
deactivate_super+0x79/0x90
cleanup_mnt+0x114/0x1a0
__cleanup_mnt+0x16/0x20
task_work_run+0x98/0x100
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3d0/0x3e0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Function flow analysis when BUG occurs:
f2fs_fallocate                    mmap
                                  do_page_fault
                                    pte_spinlock  // ---lock_pte
                                    do_wp_page
                                      wp_page_shared
                                        pte_unmap_unlock   // unlock_pte
                                          do_page_mkwrite
                                          f2fs_vm_page_mkwrite
                                            down_read(invalidate_lock)
                                            lock_page
                                            if (PageMappedToDisk(page))
                                              goto out;
                                            // set_page_dirty  --NOT RUN
                                            out: up_read(invalidate_lock);
                                        finish_mkwrite_fault // unlock_pte
f2fs_collapse_range
  down_write(i_mmap_sem)
  truncate_pagecache
    unmap_mapping_pages
      i_mmap_lock_write // down_write(i_mmap_rwsem)
        ......
        zap_pte_range
          pte_offset_map_lock // ---lock_pte
           set_page_dirty
            f2fs_dirty_data_folio
              if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
                                        fault_dirty_shared_page
                                          set_page_dirty
                                            f2fs_dirty_data_folio
                                              if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
                                                filemap_dirty_folio
                                                f2fs_update_dirty_folio // ++
                                              }
                                            unlock_page
                filemap_dirty_folio
                f2fs_update_dirty_folio // page count++
              }
          pte_unmap_unlock  // --unlock_pte
      i_mmap_unlock_write  // up_write(i_mmap_rwsem)
  truncate_inode_pages
  up_write(i_mmap_sem)

When race happens between mmap-do_page_fault-wp_page_shared and
fallocate-truncate_pagecache-zap_pte_range, the zap_pte_range calls
function set_page_dirty without page lock. Besides, though
truncate_pagecache has immap and pte lock, wp_page_shared calls
fault_dirty_shared_page without any. In this case, two threads race
in f2fs_dirty_data_folio function. Page is set to dirty only ONCE,
but the count is added TWICE by calling filemap_dirty_folio.
Thus the count of dirty page cannot accord with the real dirty pages.

Following is the solution to in case of race happens without any lock.
Since folio_test_set_dirty in filemap_dirty_folio is atomic, judge return
value will not be at risk of race.

Signed-off-by: Shuqi Zhang <zhangshuqi3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 3 +--
 fs/f2fs/data.c       | 3 +--
 fs/f2fs/node.c       | 3 +--
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
index 6d8b2bf14de0..01d3eede0b29 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -448,8 +448,7 @@ static bool f2fs_dirty_meta_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
 
 	if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio))
 		folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
-	if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
-		filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio);
+	if (filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio)) {
 		inc_page_count(F2FS_M_SB(mapping), F2FS_DIRTY_META);
 		set_page_private_reference(&folio->page);
 		return true;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index f2a272613477..9157d09dde6d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -3681,8 +3681,7 @@ static bool f2fs_dirty_data_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
 		folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
 	BUG_ON(folio_test_swapcache(folio));
 
-	if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
-		filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio);
+	if (filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio)) {
 		f2fs_update_dirty_folio(inode, folio);
 		return true;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c
index 02e92a72511b..3f508b13cb61 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -2151,8 +2151,7 @@ static bool f2fs_dirty_node_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
 	if (IS_INODE(&folio->page))
 		f2fs_inode_chksum_set(F2FS_M_SB(mapping), &folio->page);
 #endif
-	if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
-		filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio);
+	if (filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio)) {
 		inc_page_count(F2FS_M_SB(mapping), F2FS_DIRTY_NODES);
 		set_page_private_reference(&folio->page);
 		return true;
-- 
2.35.1



_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 22/29] f2fs: fix wrong dirty page count when race between mmap and fallocate.

[Sasha Levin]

From: Shuqi Zhang <zhangshuqi3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 9b7eadd9bd3a0cc24533a23d83c46430a0ea60ff ]

This is a BUG_ON issue as follows when running xfstest-generic-503:
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 1385 at fs/f2fs/inode.c:762 f2fs_evict_inode+0x847/0xaa0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 21 PID: 1385 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.19.0-rc5+ #73
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014

Call Trace:
evict+0x129/0x2d0
dispose_list+0x4f/0xb0
evict_inodes+0x204/0x230
generic_shutdown_super+0x5b/0x1e0
kill_block_super+0x29/0x80
kill_f2fs_super+0xe6/0x140
deactivate_locked_super+0x44/0xc0
deactivate_super+0x79/0x90
cleanup_mnt+0x114/0x1a0
__cleanup_mnt+0x16/0x20
task_work_run+0x98/0x100
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3d0/0x3e0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x42/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Function flow analysis when BUG occurs:
f2fs_fallocate                    mmap
                                  do_page_fault
                                    pte_spinlock  // ---lock_pte
                                    do_wp_page
                                      wp_page_shared
                                        pte_unmap_unlock   // unlock_pte
                                          do_page_mkwrite
                                          f2fs_vm_page_mkwrite
                                            down_read(invalidate_lock)
                                            lock_page
                                            if (PageMappedToDisk(page))
                                              goto out;
                                            // set_page_dirty  --NOT RUN
                                            out: up_read(invalidate_lock);
                                        finish_mkwrite_fault // unlock_pte
f2fs_collapse_range
  down_write(i_mmap_sem)
  truncate_pagecache
    unmap_mapping_pages
      i_mmap_lock_write // down_write(i_mmap_rwsem)
        ......
        zap_pte_range
          pte_offset_map_lock // ---lock_pte
           set_page_dirty
            f2fs_dirty_data_folio
              if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
                                        fault_dirty_shared_page
                                          set_page_dirty
                                            f2fs_dirty_data_folio
                                              if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
                                                filemap_dirty_folio
                                                f2fs_update_dirty_folio // ++
                                              }
                                            unlock_page
                filemap_dirty_folio
                f2fs_update_dirty_folio // page count++
              }
          pte_unmap_unlock  // --unlock_pte
      i_mmap_unlock_write  // up_write(i_mmap_rwsem)
  truncate_inode_pages
  up_write(i_mmap_sem)

When race happens between mmap-do_page_fault-wp_page_shared and
fallocate-truncate_pagecache-zap_pte_range, the zap_pte_range calls
function set_page_dirty without page lock. Besides, though
truncate_pagecache has immap and pte lock, wp_page_shared calls
fault_dirty_shared_page without any. In this case, two threads race
in f2fs_dirty_data_folio function. Page is set to dirty only ONCE,
but the count is added TWICE by calling filemap_dirty_folio.
Thus the count of dirty page cannot accord with the real dirty pages.

Following is the solution to in case of race happens without any lock.
Since folio_test_set_dirty in filemap_dirty_folio is atomic, judge return
value will not be at risk of race.

Signed-off-by: Shuqi Zhang <zhangshuqi3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 3 +--
 fs/f2fs/data.c       | 3 +--
 fs/f2fs/node.c       | 3 +--
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
index 6d8b2bf14de0..01d3eede0b29 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -448,8 +448,7 @@ static bool f2fs_dirty_meta_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
 
 	if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio))
 		folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
-	if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
-		filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio);
+	if (filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio)) {
 		inc_page_count(F2FS_M_SB(mapping), F2FS_DIRTY_META);
 		set_page_private_reference(&folio->page);
 		return true;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index f2a272613477..9157d09dde6d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -3681,8 +3681,7 @@ static bool f2fs_dirty_data_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
 		folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
 	BUG_ON(folio_test_swapcache(folio));
 
-	if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
-		filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio);
+	if (filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio)) {
 		f2fs_update_dirty_folio(inode, folio);
 		return true;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c
index 02e92a72511b..3f508b13cb61 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -2151,8 +2151,7 @@ static bool f2fs_dirty_node_folio(struct address_space *mapping,
 	if (IS_INODE(&folio->page))
 		f2fs_inode_chksum_set(F2FS_M_SB(mapping), &folio->page);
 #endif
-	if (!folio_test_dirty(folio)) {
-		filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio);
+	if (filemap_dirty_folio(mapping, folio)) {
 		inc_page_count(F2FS_M_SB(mapping), F2FS_DIRTY_NODES);
 		set_page_private_reference(&folio->page);
 		return true;
-- 
2.35.1

[f2fs-dev] [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 23/29] f2fs: code clean and fix a type error

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 544b53dadc208278fd0796f2c22ea24a3fe16564 ]

ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
ERROR: spaces required around that ':'
ERROR: incorrect tab

Found serveral code type errors when review the code and fix it.
There is no function change.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/data.c         | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/debug.c        | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/file.c         | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/node.c         | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index 9157d09dde6d..cb8260b1cb4e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
 		wbc_account_cgroup_owner(fio->io_wbc, page, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	inc_page_count(fio->sbi, is_read_io(fio->op) ?
-			__read_io_type(page): WB_DATA_TYPE(fio->page));
+			__read_io_type(page) : WB_DATA_TYPE(fio->page));
 
 	__submit_bio(fio->sbi, bio, fio->type);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/debug.c b/fs/f2fs/debug.c
index c92625ef16d0..9bac409d31bd 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/debug.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/debug.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int stat_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 
 		seq_printf(s, "\n=====[ partition info(%pg). #%d, %s, CP: %s]=====\n",
 			si->sbi->sb->s_bdev, i++,
-			f2fs_readonly(si->sbi->sb) ? "RO": "RW",
+			f2fs_readonly(si->sbi->sb) ? "RO" : "RW",
 			is_set_ckpt_flags(si->sbi, CP_DISABLED_FLAG) ?
 			"Disabled" : (f2fs_cp_error(si->sbi) ? "Error" : "Good"));
 		if (si->sbi->s_flag) {
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
index 866e72b29bd5..d6b4a1c8ed2f 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static void f2fs_update_extent_tree_range(struct inode *inode,
 		org_end = dei.fofs + dei.len;
 		f2fs_bug_on(sbi, pos >= org_end);
 
-		if (pos > dei.fofs &&	pos - dei.fofs >= F2FS_MIN_EXTENT_LEN) {
+		if (pos > dei.fofs && pos - dei.fofs >= F2FS_MIN_EXTENT_LEN) {
 			en->ei.len = pos - en->ei.fofs;
 			prev_en = en;
 			parts = 1;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index ecd833ba35fc..36e2d0226be4 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -4627,7 +4627,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
 skip_write_trace:
 		/* Do the actual write. */
 		ret = dio ?
-			f2fs_dio_write_iter(iocb, from, &may_need_sync):
+			f2fs_dio_write_iter(iocb, from, &may_need_sync) :
 			f2fs_buffered_write_iter(iocb, from);
 
 		if (trace_f2fs_datawrite_end_enabled())
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c
index 3f508b13cb61..c9b10113fcb1 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int f2fs_get_node_info(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid,
 		ne = nat_in_journal(journal, i);
 		node_info_from_raw_nat(ni, &ne);
 	}
-        up_read(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
+	up_read(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
 	if (i >= 0) {
 		f2fs_up_read(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
 		goto cache;
-- 
2.35.1



_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 23/29] f2fs: code clean and fix a type error

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 544b53dadc208278fd0796f2c22ea24a3fe16564 ]

ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
ERROR: spaces required around that ':'
ERROR: incorrect tab

Found serveral code type errors when review the code and fix it.
There is no function change.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/data.c         | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/debug.c        | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/file.c         | 2 +-
 fs/f2fs/node.c         | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index 9157d09dde6d..cb8260b1cb4e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
 		wbc_account_cgroup_owner(fio->io_wbc, page, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	inc_page_count(fio->sbi, is_read_io(fio->op) ?
-			__read_io_type(page): WB_DATA_TYPE(fio->page));
+			__read_io_type(page) : WB_DATA_TYPE(fio->page));
 
 	__submit_bio(fio->sbi, bio, fio->type);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/debug.c b/fs/f2fs/debug.c
index c92625ef16d0..9bac409d31bd 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/debug.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/debug.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int stat_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 
 		seq_printf(s, "\n=====[ partition info(%pg). #%d, %s, CP: %s]=====\n",
 			si->sbi->sb->s_bdev, i++,
-			f2fs_readonly(si->sbi->sb) ? "RO": "RW",
+			f2fs_readonly(si->sbi->sb) ? "RO" : "RW",
 			is_set_ckpt_flags(si->sbi, CP_DISABLED_FLAG) ?
 			"Disabled" : (f2fs_cp_error(si->sbi) ? "Error" : "Good"));
 		if (si->sbi->s_flag) {
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
index 866e72b29bd5..d6b4a1c8ed2f 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static void f2fs_update_extent_tree_range(struct inode *inode,
 		org_end = dei.fofs + dei.len;
 		f2fs_bug_on(sbi, pos >= org_end);
 
-		if (pos > dei.fofs &&	pos - dei.fofs >= F2FS_MIN_EXTENT_LEN) {
+		if (pos > dei.fofs && pos - dei.fofs >= F2FS_MIN_EXTENT_LEN) {
 			en->ei.len = pos - en->ei.fofs;
 			prev_en = en;
 			parts = 1;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index ecd833ba35fc..36e2d0226be4 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -4627,7 +4627,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
 skip_write_trace:
 		/* Do the actual write. */
 		ret = dio ?
-			f2fs_dio_write_iter(iocb, from, &may_need_sync):
+			f2fs_dio_write_iter(iocb, from, &may_need_sync) :
 			f2fs_buffered_write_iter(iocb, from);
 
 		if (trace_f2fs_datawrite_end_enabled())
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c
index 3f508b13cb61..c9b10113fcb1 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/node.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int f2fs_get_node_info(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid,
 		ne = nat_in_journal(journal, i);
 		node_info_from_raw_nat(ni, &ne);
 	}
-        up_read(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
+	up_read(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
 	if (i >= 0) {
 		f2fs_up_read(&nm_i->nat_tree_lock);
 		goto cache;
-- 
2.35.1

[f2fs-dev] [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 24/29] f2fs: fix to detect corrupted meta ino

[Sasha Levin]

From: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit fcc2d8cc96b2f6141bbbe5b1e8953db990794b44 ]

It is possible that ino of dirent or orphan inode is corrupted in a
fuzzed image, occasionally, if corrupted ino is equal to meta ino:
meta_ino, node_ino or compress_ino, caller of f2fs_iget() from below
call paths will get meta inode directly, it's not allowed, let's
add sanity check to detect such cases.

case #1
- recover_dentry
 - __f2fs_find_entry
 - f2fs_iget_retry

case #2
- recover_orphan_inode
 - f2fs_iget_retry

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/inode.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
index fc55f5bd1fcc..e27968661bd7 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -480,6 +480,12 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool is_meta_ino(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int ino)
+{
+	return ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi) ||
+		ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi);
+}
+
 struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
@@ -491,16 +497,21 @@ struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW)) {
+		if (is_meta_ino(sbi, ino)) {
+			f2fs_err(sbi, "inaccessible inode: %lu, run fsck to repair", ino);
+			set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+			ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			trace_f2fs_iget_exit(inode, ret);
+			iput(inode);
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+		}
+
 		trace_f2fs_iget(inode);
 		return inode;
 	}
-	if (ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi))
-		goto make_now;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION
-	if (ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi))
+	if (is_meta_ino(sbi, ino))
 		goto make_now;
-#endif
 
 	ret = do_read_inode(inode);
 	if (ret)
-- 
2.35.1



_______________________________________________
Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list
Linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 24/29] f2fs: fix to detect corrupted meta ino

[Sasha Levin]

From: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit fcc2d8cc96b2f6141bbbe5b1e8953db990794b44 ]

It is possible that ino of dirent or orphan inode is corrupted in a
fuzzed image, occasionally, if corrupted ino is equal to meta ino:
meta_ino, node_ino or compress_ino, caller of f2fs_iget() from below
call paths will get meta inode directly, it's not allowed, let's
add sanity check to detect such cases.

case #1
- recover_dentry
 - __f2fs_find_entry
 - f2fs_iget_retry

case #2
- recover_orphan_inode
 - f2fs_iget_retry

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/inode.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
index fc55f5bd1fcc..e27968661bd7 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -480,6 +480,12 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool is_meta_ino(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int ino)
+{
+	return ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi) ||
+		ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi);
+}
+
 struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
@@ -491,16 +497,21 @@ struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW)) {
+		if (is_meta_ino(sbi, ino)) {
+			f2fs_err(sbi, "inaccessible inode: %lu, run fsck to repair", ino);
+			set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+			ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			trace_f2fs_iget_exit(inode, ret);
+			iput(inode);
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+		}
+
 		trace_f2fs_iget(inode);
 		return inode;
 	}
-	if (ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi))
-		goto make_now;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION
-	if (ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi))
+	if (is_meta_ino(sbi, ino))
 		goto make_now;
-#endif
 
 	ret = do_read_inode(inode);
 	if (ret)
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 25/29] 9p: trans_fd/p9_conn_cancel: drop client lock earlier

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>

[ Upstream commit 52f1c45dde9136f964d63a77d19826c8a74e2c7f ]

syzbot reported a double-lock here and we no longer need this
lock after requests have been moved off to local list:
just drop the lock earlier.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220904064028.1305220-1-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Reported-by: syzbot+50f7e8d06c3768dd97f3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Tested-by: Schspa Shi <schspa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/9p/trans_fd.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/9p/trans_fd.c b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
index e758978b44be..60fcc6b30b46 100644
--- a/net/9p/trans_fd.c
+++ b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ static void p9_conn_cancel(struct p9_conn *m, int err)
 		list_move(&req->req_list, &cancel_list);
 	}
 
+	spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(req, rtmp, &cancel_list, req_list) {
 		p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR, "call back req %p\n", req);
 		list_del(&req->req_list);
@@ -212,7 +214,6 @@ static void p9_conn_cancel(struct p9_conn *m, int err)
 			req->t_err = err;
 		p9_client_cb(m->client, req, REQ_STATUS_ERROR);
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
 }
 
 static __poll_t
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 26/29] 9p/trans_fd: always use O_NONBLOCK read/write

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

[ Upstream commit ef575281b21e9a34dfae544a187c6aac2ae424a9 ]

syzbot is reporting hung task at p9_fd_close() [1], for p9_mux_poll_stop()
 from p9_conn_destroy() from p9_fd_close() is failing to interrupt already
started kernel_read() from p9_fd_read() from p9_read_work() and/or
kernel_write() from p9_fd_write() from p9_write_work() requests.

Since p9_socket_open() sets O_NONBLOCK flag, p9_mux_poll_stop() does not
need to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write(). However, since p9_fd_open()
does not set O_NONBLOCK flag, but pipe blocks unless signal is pending,
p9_mux_poll_stop() needs to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write() when
the file descriptor refers to a pipe. In other words, pipe file descriptor
needs to be handled as if socket file descriptor.

We somehow need to interrupt kernel_read()/kernel_write() on pipes.

A minimal change, which this patch is doing, is to set O_NONBLOCK flag
 from p9_fd_open(), for O_NONBLOCK flag does not affect reading/writing
of regular files. But this approach changes O_NONBLOCK flag on userspace-
supplied file descriptors (which might break userspace programs), and
O_NONBLOCK flag could be changed by userspace. It would be possible to set
O_NONBLOCK flag every time p9_fd_read()/p9_fd_write() is invoked, but still
remains small race window for clearing O_NONBLOCK flag.

If we don't want to manipulate O_NONBLOCK flag, we might be able to
surround kernel_read()/kernel_write() with set_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING)
and recalc_sigpending(). Since p9_read_work()/p9_write_work() works are
processed by kernel threads which process global system_wq workqueue,
signals could not be delivered from remote threads when p9_mux_poll_stop()
 from p9_conn_destroy() from p9_fd_close() is called. Therefore, calling
set_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING)/recalc_sigpending() every time would be
needed if we count on signals for making kernel_read()/kernel_write()
non-blocking.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/345de429-a88b-7097-d177-adecf9fed342@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8b41a1365f1106fd0f33 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+8b41a1365f1106fd0f33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+8b41a1365f1106fd0f33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
[Dominique: add comment at Christian's suggestion]
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/9p/trans_fd.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/9p/trans_fd.c b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
index 60fcc6b30b46..90f8642a7cf3 100644
--- a/net/9p/trans_fd.c
+++ b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
@@ -822,11 +822,14 @@ static int p9_fd_open(struct p9_client *client, int rfd, int wfd)
 		goto out_free_ts;
 	if (!(ts->rd->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
 		goto out_put_rd;
+	/* prevent workers from hanging on IO when fd is a pipe */
+	ts->rd->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
 	ts->wr = fget(wfd);
 	if (!ts->wr)
 		goto out_put_rd;
 	if (!(ts->wr->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
 		goto out_put_wr;
+	ts->wr->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
 
 	client->trans = ts;
 	client->status = Connected;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 27/29] net/9p: use a dedicated spinlock for trans_fd

[Sasha Levin]

From: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>

[ Upstream commit 296ab4a813841ba1d5f40b03190fd1bd8f25aab0 ]

Shamelessly copying the explanation from Tetsuo Handa's suggested
patch[1] (slightly reworded):
syzbot is reporting inconsistent lock state in p9_req_put()[2],
for p9_tag_remove() from p9_req_put() from IRQ context is using
spin_lock_irqsave() on "struct p9_client"->lock but trans_fd
(not from IRQ context) is using spin_lock().

Since the locks actually protect different things in client.c and in
trans_fd.c, just replace trans_fd.c's lock by a new one specific to the
transport (client.c's protect the idr for fid/tag allocations,
while trans_fd.c's protects its own req list and request status field
that acts as the transport's state machine)

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220904112928.1308799-1-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2470e028-9b05-2013-7198-1fdad071d999@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp [1]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2f20b523930c32c160cc [2]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+2f20b523930c32c160cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/9p/trans_fd.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/9p/trans_fd.c b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
index 90f8642a7cf3..0191f22d1ec3 100644
--- a/net/9p/trans_fd.c
+++ b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ struct p9_poll_wait {
  * @mux_list: list link for mux to manage multiple connections (?)
  * @client: reference to client instance for this connection
  * @err: error state
+ * @req_lock: lock protecting req_list and requests statuses
  * @req_list: accounting for requests which have been sent
  * @unsent_req_list: accounting for requests that haven't been sent
  * @rreq: read request
@@ -114,6 +115,7 @@ struct p9_conn {
 	struct list_head mux_list;
 	struct p9_client *client;
 	int err;
+	spinlock_t req_lock;
 	struct list_head req_list;
 	struct list_head unsent_req_list;
 	struct p9_req_t *rreq;
@@ -189,10 +191,10 @@ static void p9_conn_cancel(struct p9_conn *m, int err)
 
 	p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR, "mux %p err %d\n", m, err);
 
-	spin_lock(&m->client->lock);
+	spin_lock(&m->req_lock);
 
 	if (m->err) {
-		spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+		spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -205,7 +207,7 @@ static void p9_conn_cancel(struct p9_conn *m, int err)
 		list_move(&req->req_list, &cancel_list);
 	}
 
-	spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+	spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(req, rtmp, &cancel_list, req_list) {
 		p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR, "call back req %p\n", req);
@@ -360,7 +362,7 @@ static void p9_read_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	if ((m->rreq) && (m->rc.offset == m->rc.capacity)) {
 		p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "got new packet\n");
 		m->rreq->rc.size = m->rc.offset;
-		spin_lock(&m->client->lock);
+		spin_lock(&m->req_lock);
 		if (m->rreq->status == REQ_STATUS_SENT) {
 			list_del(&m->rreq->req_list);
 			p9_client_cb(m->client, m->rreq, REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
@@ -369,14 +371,14 @@ static void p9_read_work(struct work_struct *work)
 			p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS,
 				 "Ignore replies associated with a cancelled request\n");
 		} else {
-			spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+			spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 			p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR,
 				 "Request tag %d errored out while we were reading the reply\n",
 				 m->rc.tag);
 			err = -EIO;
 			goto error;
 		}
-		spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+		spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 		m->rc.sdata = NULL;
 		m->rc.offset = 0;
 		m->rc.capacity = 0;
@@ -454,10 +456,10 @@ static void p9_write_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	}
 
 	if (!m->wsize) {
-		spin_lock(&m->client->lock);
+		spin_lock(&m->req_lock);
 		if (list_empty(&m->unsent_req_list)) {
 			clear_bit(Wworksched, &m->wsched);
-			spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+			spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 			return;
 		}
 
@@ -472,7 +474,7 @@ static void p9_write_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		m->wpos = 0;
 		p9_req_get(req);
 		m->wreq = req;
-		spin_unlock(&m->client->lock);
+		spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 	}
 
 	p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "mux %p pos %d size %d\n",
@@ -589,6 +591,7 @@ static void p9_conn_create(struct p9_client *client)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&m->mux_list);
 	m->client = client;
 
+	spin_lock_init(&m->req_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&m->req_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&m->unsent_req_list);
 	INIT_WORK(&m->rq, p9_read_work);
@@ -670,10 +673,10 @@ static int p9_fd_request(struct p9_client *client, struct p9_req_t *req)
 	if (m->err < 0)
 		return m->err;
 
-	spin_lock(&client->lock);
+	spin_lock(&m->req_lock);
 	req->status = REQ_STATUS_UNSENT;
 	list_add_tail(&req->req_list, &m->unsent_req_list);
-	spin_unlock(&client->lock);
+	spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(Wpending, &m->wsched))
 		n = EPOLLOUT;
@@ -688,11 +691,13 @@ static int p9_fd_request(struct p9_client *client, struct p9_req_t *req)
 
 static int p9_fd_cancel(struct p9_client *client, struct p9_req_t *req)
 {
+	struct p9_trans_fd *ts = client->trans;
+	struct p9_conn *m = &ts->conn;
 	int ret = 1;
 
 	p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "client %p req %p\n", client, req);
 
-	spin_lock(&client->lock);
+	spin_lock(&m->req_lock);
 
 	if (req->status == REQ_STATUS_UNSENT) {
 		list_del(&req->req_list);
@@ -700,21 +705,24 @@ static int p9_fd_cancel(struct p9_client *client, struct p9_req_t *req)
 		p9_req_put(client, req);
 		ret = 0;
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&client->lock);
+	spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
 static int p9_fd_cancelled(struct p9_client *client, struct p9_req_t *req)
 {
+	struct p9_trans_fd *ts = client->trans;
+	struct p9_conn *m = &ts->conn;
+
 	p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "client %p req %p\n", client, req);
 
-	spin_lock(&client->lock);
+	spin_lock(&m->req_lock);
 	/* Ignore cancelled request if message has been received
 	 * before lock.
 	 */
 	if (req->status == REQ_STATUS_RCVD) {
-		spin_unlock(&client->lock);
+		spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -723,7 +731,8 @@ static int p9_fd_cancelled(struct p9_client *client, struct p9_req_t *req)
 	 */
 	list_del(&req->req_list);
 	req->status = REQ_STATUS_FLSHD;
-	spin_unlock(&client->lock);
+	spin_unlock(&m->req_lock);
+
 	p9_req_put(client, req);
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 28/29] virtio_pci: don't try to use intxif pin is zero

[Sasha Levin]

From: Angus Chen <angus.chen@jaguarmicro.com>

[ Upstream commit 71491c54eafa318fdd24a1f26a1c82b28e1ac21d ]

The background is that we use dpu in cloud computing,the arch is x86,80
cores. We will have a lots of virtio devices,like 512 or more.
When we probe about 200 virtio_blk devices,it will fail and
the stack is printed as follows:

[25338.485128] virtio-pci 0000:b3:00.0: virtio_pci: leaving for legacy driver
[25338.496174] genirq: Flags mismatch irq 0. 00000080 (virtio418) vs. 00015a00 (timer)
[25338.503822] CPU: 20 PID: 5431 Comm: kworker/20:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE    --------- -  - 4.18.0-305.30.1.el8.x86_64
[25338.516403] Hardware name: Inspur NF5280M5/YZMB-00882-10E, BIOS 4.1.21 08/25/2021
[25338.523881] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[25338.528235] Call Trace:
[25338.530687]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
[25338.534000]  __setup_irq.cold.53+0x7c/0xd3
[25338.538098]  request_threaded_irq+0xf5/0x160
[25338.542371]  vp_find_vqs+0xc7/0x190
[25338.545866]  init_vq+0x17c/0x2e0 [virtio_blk]
[25338.550223]  ? ncpus_cmp_func+0x10/0x10
[25338.554061]  virtblk_probe+0xe6/0x8a0 [virtio_blk]
[25338.558846]  virtio_dev_probe+0x158/0x1f0
[25338.562861]  really_probe+0x255/0x4a0
[25338.566524]  ? __driver_attach_async_helper+0x90/0x90
[25338.571567]  driver_probe_device+0x49/0xc0
[25338.575660]  bus_for_each_drv+0x79/0xc0
[25338.579499]  __device_attach+0xdc/0x160
[25338.583337]  bus_probe_device+0x9d/0xb0
[25338.587167]  device_add+0x418/0x780
[25338.590654]  register_virtio_device+0x9e/0xe0
[25338.595011]  virtio_pci_probe+0xb3/0x140
[25338.598941]  local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90
[25338.602689]  work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
[25338.606443]  process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[25338.610456]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[25338.614381]  worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390
[25338.618132]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[25338.622051]  kthread+0x116/0x130
[25338.625283]  ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[25338.629731]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[25338.633395] virtio_blk: probe of virtio418 failed with error -16

The log :
"genirq: Flags mismatch irq 0. 00000080 (virtio418) vs. 00015a00 (timer)"
was printed because of the irq 0 is used by timer exclusive,and when
vp_find_vqs call vp_find_vqs_msix and returns false twice (for
whatever reason), then it will call vp_find_vqs_intx as a fallback.
Because vp_dev->pci_dev->irq is zero, we request irq 0 with
flag IRQF_SHARED, and get a backtrace like above.

According to PCI spec about "Interrupt Pin" Register (Offset 3Dh):
"The Interrupt Pin register is a read-only register that identifies the
 legacy interrupt Message(s) the Function uses. Valid values are 01h, 02h,
 03h, and 04h that map to legacy interrupt Messages for INTA,
 INTB, INTC, and INTD respectively. A value of 00h indicates that the
 Function uses no legacy interrupt Message(s)."

So if vp_dev->pci_dev->pin is zero, we should not request legacy
interrupt.

Signed-off-by: Angus Chen <angus.chen@jaguarmicro.com>
Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220930000915.548-1-angus.chen@jaguarmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
index ca51fcc9daab..8ffa906541e3 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
@@ -403,6 +403,9 @@ int vp_find_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev, unsigned int nvqs,
 	err = vp_find_vqs_msix(vdev, nvqs, vqs, callbacks, names, false, ctx, desc);
 	if (!err)
 		return 0;
+	/* Is there an interrupt pin? If not give up. */
+	if (!(to_vp_device(vdev)->pci_dev->pin))
+		return err;
 	/* Finally fall back to regular interrupts. */
 	return vp_find_vqs_intx(vdev, nvqs, vqs, callbacks, names, ctx);
 }
-- 
2.35.1

_______________________________________________
Virtualization mailing list
Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 28/29] virtio_pci: don't try to use intxif pin is zero

[Sasha Levin]

From: Angus Chen <angus.chen@jaguarmicro.com>

[ Upstream commit 71491c54eafa318fdd24a1f26a1c82b28e1ac21d ]

The background is that we use dpu in cloud computing,the arch is x86,80
cores. We will have a lots of virtio devices,like 512 or more.
When we probe about 200 virtio_blk devices,it will fail and
the stack is printed as follows:

[25338.485128] virtio-pci 0000:b3:00.0: virtio_pci: leaving for legacy driver
[25338.496174] genirq: Flags mismatch irq 0. 00000080 (virtio418) vs. 00015a00 (timer)
[25338.503822] CPU: 20 PID: 5431 Comm: kworker/20:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE    --------- -  - 4.18.0-305.30.1.el8.x86_64
[25338.516403] Hardware name: Inspur NF5280M5/YZMB-00882-10E, BIOS 4.1.21 08/25/2021
[25338.523881] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[25338.528235] Call Trace:
[25338.530687]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
[25338.534000]  __setup_irq.cold.53+0x7c/0xd3
[25338.538098]  request_threaded_irq+0xf5/0x160
[25338.542371]  vp_find_vqs+0xc7/0x190
[25338.545866]  init_vq+0x17c/0x2e0 [virtio_blk]
[25338.550223]  ? ncpus_cmp_func+0x10/0x10
[25338.554061]  virtblk_probe+0xe6/0x8a0 [virtio_blk]
[25338.558846]  virtio_dev_probe+0x158/0x1f0
[25338.562861]  really_probe+0x255/0x4a0
[25338.566524]  ? __driver_attach_async_helper+0x90/0x90
[25338.571567]  driver_probe_device+0x49/0xc0
[25338.575660]  bus_for_each_drv+0x79/0xc0
[25338.579499]  __device_attach+0xdc/0x160
[25338.583337]  bus_probe_device+0x9d/0xb0
[25338.587167]  device_add+0x418/0x780
[25338.590654]  register_virtio_device+0x9e/0xe0
[25338.595011]  virtio_pci_probe+0xb3/0x140
[25338.598941]  local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90
[25338.602689]  work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
[25338.606443]  process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
[25338.610456]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[25338.614381]  worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390
[25338.618132]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[25338.622051]  kthread+0x116/0x130
[25338.625283]  ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[25338.629731]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[25338.633395] virtio_blk: probe of virtio418 failed with error -16

The log :
"genirq: Flags mismatch irq 0. 00000080 (virtio418) vs. 00015a00 (timer)"
was printed because of the irq 0 is used by timer exclusive,and when
vp_find_vqs call vp_find_vqs_msix and returns false twice (for
whatever reason), then it will call vp_find_vqs_intx as a fallback.
Because vp_dev->pci_dev->irq is zero, we request irq 0 with
flag IRQF_SHARED, and get a backtrace like above.

According to PCI spec about "Interrupt Pin" Register (Offset 3Dh):
"The Interrupt Pin register is a read-only register that identifies the
 legacy interrupt Message(s) the Function uses. Valid values are 01h, 02h,
 03h, and 04h that map to legacy interrupt Messages for INTA,
 INTB, INTC, and INTD respectively. A value of 00h indicates that the
 Function uses no legacy interrupt Message(s)."

So if vp_dev->pci_dev->pin is zero, we should not request legacy
interrupt.

Signed-off-by: Angus Chen <angus.chen@jaguarmicro.com>
Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220930000915.548-1-angus.chen@jaguarmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
index ca51fcc9daab..8ffa906541e3 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
@@ -403,6 +403,9 @@ int vp_find_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev, unsigned int nvqs,
 	err = vp_find_vqs_msix(vdev, nvqs, vqs, callbacks, names, false, ctx, desc);
 	if (!err)
 		return 0;
+	/* Is there an interrupt pin? If not give up. */
+	if (!(to_vp_device(vdev)->pci_dev->pin))
+		return err;
 	/* Finally fall back to regular interrupts. */
 	return vp_find_vqs_intx(vdev, nvqs, vqs, callbacks, names, ctx);
 }
-- 
2.35.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.19 29/29] cifs: replace kfree() with kfree_sensitive() for sensitive data

[Sasha Levin]

From: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>

[ Upstream commit a4e430c8c8ba96be8c6ec4f2eb108bb8bcbee069 ]

Replace kfree with kfree_sensitive, or prepend memzero_explicit() in
other cases, when freeing sensitive material that could still be left
in memory.

Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202209201529.ec633796-oliver.sang@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 12 ++++++------
 fs/cifs/connect.c     |  6 +++---
 fs/cifs/fs_context.c  | 12 ++++++++++--
 fs/cifs/misc.c        |  2 +-
 fs/cifs/sess.c        | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c     |  6 +++---
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c     | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
index 663cb9db4908..419cbdadf248 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
 unlock:
 	cifs_server_unlock(ses->server);
 setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
-	kfree(tiblob);
+	kfree_sensitive(tiblob);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -754,14 +754,14 @@ cifs_crypto_secmech_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 		server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt = NULL;
 	}
 
-	kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
 	server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL;
-	kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
 	server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL;
-	kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
 	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL;
-	kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
 	server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL;
-	kfree(server->secmech.sdescsha512);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->secmech.sdescsha512);
 	server->secmech.sdescsha512 = NULL;
 }
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index bdc3efdb1221..901d9b232e2c 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ cifs_abort_connection(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 	}
 	server->sequence_number = 0;
 	server->session_estab = false;
-	kfree(server->session_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->session_key.response);
 	server->session_key.response = NULL;
 	server->session_key.len = 0;
 	server->lstrp = jiffies;
@@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ cifs_put_tcp_session(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int from_reconnect)
 
 	cifs_crypto_secmech_release(server);
 
-	kfree(server->session_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(server->session_key.response);
 	server->session_key.response = NULL;
 	server->session_key.len = 0;
 	kfree(server->hostname);
@@ -4059,7 +4059,7 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
 		if (ses->auth_key.response) {
 			cifs_dbg(FYI, "Free previous auth_key.response = %p\n",
 				 ses->auth_key.response);
-			kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+			kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
 			ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
 			ses->auth_key.len = 0;
 		}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c
index 8dc0d923ef6a..ff3ad09f2cd4 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/fs_context.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/fs_context.c
@@ -790,6 +790,13 @@ do {									\
 	cifs_sb->ctx->field = NULL;					\
 } while (0)
 
+#define STEAL_STRING_SENSITIVE(cifs_sb, ctx, field)			\
+do {									\
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->field);					\
+	ctx->field = cifs_sb->ctx->field;				\
+	cifs_sb->ctx->field = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
 static int smb3_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
 {
 	struct smb3_fs_context *ctx = smb3_fc2context(fc);
@@ -810,7 +817,7 @@ static int smb3_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
 	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, UNC);
 	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, source);
 	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, username);
-	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, password);
+	STEAL_STRING_SENSITIVE(cifs_sb, ctx, password);
 	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, domainname);
 	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, nodename);
 	STEAL_STRING(cifs_sb, ctx, iocharset);
@@ -1154,7 +1161,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
 		}
 		break;
 	case Opt_pass:
-		kfree(ctx->password);
+		kfree_sensitive(ctx->password);
 		ctx->password = NULL;
 		if (strlen(param->string) == 0)
 			break;
@@ -1462,6 +1469,7 @@ static int smb3_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
 	return 0;
 
  cifs_parse_mount_err:
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx->password);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/cifs/misc.c b/fs/cifs/misc.c
index 197f3c09d3f3..2baf23b3d572 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/misc.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/misc.c
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ cifs_alloc_hash(const char *name,
 void
 cifs_free_hash(struct crypto_shash **shash, struct sdesc **sdesc)
 {
-	kfree(*sdesc);
+	kfree_sensitive(*sdesc);
 	*sdesc = NULL;
 	if (*shash)
 		crypto_free_shash(*shash);
diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c
index 02c8b2906196..30143d3d0a34 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/sess.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c
@@ -1211,6 +1211,12 @@ sess_alloc_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data, int wct)
 static void
 sess_free_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 {
+	int i;
+
+	/* zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		if (sess_data->iov[i].iov_base)
+			memzero_explicit(sess_data->iov[i].iov_base, sess_data->iov[i].iov_len);
 
 	free_rsp_buf(sess_data->buf0_type, sess_data->iov[0].iov_base);
 	sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
@@ -1372,7 +1378,7 @@ sess_auth_ntlmv2(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 	sess_data->result = rc;
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
 	sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
-	kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
 	ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -1511,7 +1517,7 @@ sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 	sess_data->result = rc;
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
 	sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
-	kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
 	ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -1646,7 +1652,7 @@ sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 	rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(bcc_ptr, blob_len, ses);
 
 out_free_ntlmsspblob:
-	kfree(ntlmsspblob);
+	kfree_sensitive(ntlmsspblob);
 out:
 	sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
 
@@ -1656,9 +1662,9 @@ sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 	}
 
 	/* Else error. Cleanup */
-	kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
 	ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
-	kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->ntlmssp);
 	ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
 
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
@@ -1757,7 +1763,7 @@ sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 	}
 
 out_free_ntlmsspblob:
-	kfree(ntlmsspblob);
+	kfree_sensitive(ntlmsspblob);
 out:
 	sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
 
@@ -1765,9 +1771,9 @@ sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct sess_data *sess_data)
 		rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
 
 	/* Cleanup */
-	kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
 	ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
-	kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->ntlmssp);
 	ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
 
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
@@ -1843,6 +1849,6 @@ int CIFS_SessSetup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
 	rc = sess_data->result;
 
 out:
-	kfree(sess_data);
+	kfree_sensitive(sess_data);
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
index cc180d37b8ce..340ca57fa361 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -4691,11 +4691,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	if (!rc && enc)
 		memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
 
-	kfree(iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(iv);
 free_sg:
-	kfree(sg);
+	kfree_sensitive(sg);
 free_req:
-	kfree(req);
+	kfree_sensitive(req);
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
index 31d37afae741..f3032cfafedc 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -1344,6 +1344,13 @@ SMB2_sess_alloc_buffer(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
 static void
 SMB2_sess_free_buffer(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
 {
+	int i;
+
+	/* zero the session data before freeing, as it might contain sensitive info (keys, etc) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+		if (sess_data->iov[i].iov_base)
+			memzero_explicit(sess_data->iov[i].iov_base, sess_data->iov[i].iov_len);
+
 	free_rsp_buf(sess_data->buf0_type, sess_data->iov[0].iov_base);
 	sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
 }
@@ -1476,6 +1483,8 @@ SMB2_auth_kerberos(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
 out_put_spnego_key:
 	key_invalidate(spnego_key);
 	key_put(spnego_key);
+	if (rc)
+		kfree_sensitive(ses->auth_key.response);
 out:
 	sess_data->result = rc;
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
@@ -1572,7 +1581,7 @@ SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
 	}
 
 out:
-	kfree(ntlmssp_blob);
+	memzero_explicit(ntlmssp_blob, blob_length);
 	SMB2_sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
 	if (!rc) {
 		sess_data->result = 0;
@@ -1580,7 +1589,7 @@ SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
 		return;
 	}
 out_err:
-	kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->ntlmssp);
 	ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
 	sess_data->result = rc;
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
@@ -1656,9 +1665,9 @@ SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
 	}
 #endif
 out:
-	kfree(ntlmssp_blob);
+	memzero_explicit(ntlmssp_blob, blob_length);
 	SMB2_sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
-	kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
+	kfree_sensitive(ses->ntlmssp);
 	ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
 	sess_data->result = rc;
 	sess_data->func = NULL;
@@ -1736,7 +1745,7 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
 		cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "signing requested but authenticated as guest\n");
 	rc = sess_data->result;
 out:
-	kfree(sess_data);
+	kfree_sensitive(sess_data);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.35.1