* Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions
@ 2022-11-18 16:54 coverity-bot
2022-11-18 21:04 ` Johannes Berg
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: coverity-bot @ 2022-11-18 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg
Cc: Luca Coelho, Haim Dreyfuss, Miri Korenblit, Petr Stourac,
linux-kernel, Mordechay Goodstein, Jakub Kicinski, Eric Dumazet,
Nathan Errera, Paolo Abeni, Shaul Triebitz, netdev,
Gregory Greenman, Abhishek Naik, Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez,
Ayala Beker, David S. Miller, linux-wireless, Sriram R,
Kalle Valo, Mike Golant, Emmanuel Grumbach, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
linux-next, linux-hardening
Hello!
This is an experimental semi-automated report about issues detected by
Coverity from a scan of next-20221118 as part of the linux-next scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scan
You're getting this email because you were associated with the identified
lines of code (noted below) that were touched by commits:
Thu Nov 10 13:26:51 2022 +0200
5c75a208c244 ("wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: support new key API")
Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
117
118 if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
119 return -EINVAL;
120
121 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
122 keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
vvv CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
vvv Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
123 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
124 keyconf->keylen);
125 else
126 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
127
128 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1527370 ("Memory - corruptions")
Fixes: 5c75a208c244 ("wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: support new key API")
keyconf->keylen is only bounds-checked against sizeof(cmd.u.add.key),
but the memcpy() is starting a write at key + 3.
Thanks for your attention!
--
Coverity-bot
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions
2022-11-18 16:54 Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions coverity-bot
@ 2022-11-18 21:04 ` Johannes Berg
2022-11-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Johannes Berg @ 2022-11-18 21:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: coverity-bot
Cc: Luca Coelho, Haim Dreyfuss, Miri Korenblit, Petr Stourac,
linux-kernel, Mordechay Goodstein, Jakub Kicinski, Eric Dumazet,
Nathan Errera, Paolo Abeni, Shaul Triebitz, netdev,
Gregory Greenman, Abhishek Naik, Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez,
Ayala Beker, David S. Miller, linux-wireless, Sriram R,
Kalle Valo, Mike Golant, Emmanuel Grumbach, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
linux-next, linux-hardening
On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 08:54 -0800, coverity-bot wrote:
>
> *** CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
> 117
> 118 if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
> 119 return -EINVAL;
> 120
> 121 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
> 122 keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
> vvv CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> vvv Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
> 123 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
> 124 keyconf->keylen);
> 125 else
> 126 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
> 127
> 128 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
>
> If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
> such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
> sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
> include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
>
Well, I don't think you can teach coverity this easily, but the
WARN_ON() check there is not really meant to protect this - WEP keys
must have a length of either 5 or 13 bytes (40 or 104 bits!).
So there's no issue here, but I'm not surprised that coverity wouldn't
be able to figure that out through the stack.
johannes
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions
2022-11-18 21:04 ` Johannes Berg
@ 2022-11-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-22 16:46 ` Johannes Berg
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2022-11-18 22:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg
Cc: Luca Coelho, Haim Dreyfuss, Miri Korenblit, Petr Stourac,
linux-kernel, Mordechay Goodstein, Jakub Kicinski, Eric Dumazet,
Nathan Errera, Paolo Abeni, Shaul Triebitz, netdev,
Gregory Greenman, Abhishek Naik, Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez,
Ayala Beker, David S. Miller, linux-wireless, Sriram R,
Kalle Valo, Mike Golant, Emmanuel Grumbach, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
linux-next, linux-hardening
On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 10:04:38PM +0100, Johannes Berg wrote:
> On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 08:54 -0800, coverity-bot wrote:
> >
> > *** CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> > drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
> > 117
> > 118 if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
> > 119 return -EINVAL;
> > 120
> > 121 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
> > 122 keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
> > vvv CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> > vvv Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
> > 123 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
> > 124 keyconf->keylen);
> > 125 else
> > 126 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
> > 127
> > 128 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
> >
> > If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
> > such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
> > sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
> > include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
> >
>
> Well, I don't think you can teach coverity this easily, but the
> WARN_ON() check there is not really meant to protect this - WEP keys
> must have a length of either 5 or 13 bytes (40 or 104 bits!).
>
> So there's no issue here, but I'm not surprised that coverity wouldn't
> be able to figure that out through the stack.
Gotcha. And some other layer is doing the verification that cipher and
keylen are correctly matched?
--
Kees Cook
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions
2022-11-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook
@ 2022-11-22 16:46 ` Johannes Berg
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Johannes Berg @ 2022-11-22 16:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Luca Coelho, Haim Dreyfuss, Miri Korenblit, Petr Stourac,
linux-kernel, Mordechay Goodstein, Jakub Kicinski, Eric Dumazet,
Nathan Errera, Paolo Abeni, Shaul Triebitz, netdev,
Gregory Greenman, Abhishek Naik, Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez,
Ayala Beker, David S. Miller, linux-wireless, Sriram R,
Kalle Valo, Mike Golant, Emmanuel Grumbach, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
linux-next, linux-hardening
On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 14:25 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 10:04:38PM +0100, Johannes Berg wrote:
> > On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 08:54 -0800, coverity-bot wrote:
> > >
> > > *** CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> > > drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
> > > 117
> > > 118 if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
> > > 119 return -EINVAL;
> > > 120
> > > 121 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
> > > 122 keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
> > > vvv CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> > > vvv Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
> > > 123 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
> > > 124 keyconf->keylen);
> > > 125 else
> > > 126 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
> > > 127
> > > 128 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
> > >
> > > If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
> > > such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
> > > sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
> > > include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
> > >
> >
> > Well, I don't think you can teach coverity this easily, but the
> > WARN_ON() check there is not really meant to protect this - WEP keys
> > must have a length of either 5 or 13 bytes (40 or 104 bits!).
> >
> > So there's no issue here, but I'm not surprised that coverity wouldn't
> > be able to figure that out through the stack.
>
> Gotcha. And some other layer is doing the verification that cipher and
> keylen are correctly matched?
Yes, the key must come through cfg80211_validate_key_settings() at some
point.
johannes
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2022-11-22 16:46 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2022-11-18 16:54 Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions coverity-bot
2022-11-18 21:04 ` Johannes Berg
2022-11-18 22:25 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-22 16:46 ` Johannes Berg
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