From: Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel <ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com> To: mark@fasheh.com, jlbec@evilplan.org, joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org, keescook@chromium.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>, reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com Subject: [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH v7 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 11:41:24 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20221201104125.919483-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20221201104125.919483-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Change the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM infrastructure. Keep the existing behavior of including in the HMAC calculation only the first xattr provided by LSMs. Changing the evm_inode_init_security() definition requires passing only the xattr array allocated by security_inode_init_security(), instead of the first LSM xattr and the place where the EVM xattr should be filled. In lieu of passing the EVM xattr, EVM must position itself after the last filled xattr (by checking the xattr name), since only the beginning of the xattr array is given. Finally, make evm_inode_init_security() return value compatible with the inode_init_security hook conventions, i.e. return -EOPNOTSUPP if it is not setting an xattr. EVM is a bit tricky, because xattrs is both an input and an output. If it was just output, EVM should have returned zero if xattrs is NULL. But, since xattrs is also input, EVM is unable to do its calculations, so return -EOPNOTSUPP and handle this error in security_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/evm.h | 12 ++++++------ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- security/security.c | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index aa63e0b3c0a2..3bb2ae9fe098 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm); +extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs); extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name); extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return; } -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm) +static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 23d484e05e6f..0a312cafb7de 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -845,23 +845,29 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ -int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, - struct xattr *evm_xattr) +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs) { struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; + struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr; int rc; - if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || - !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) - return 0; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs || + !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) + ; + + evm_xattr = xattr; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; - rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 36804609caaa..44ce579daec1 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1190,9 +1190,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (!num_filled_xattrs) goto out; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, - new_xattrs + num_filled_xattrs); - if (ret) + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs); + if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: -- 2.25.1 _______________________________________________ Ocfs2-devel mailing list Ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com https://oss.oracle.com/mailman/listinfo/ocfs2-devel
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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> To: mark@fasheh.com, jlbec@evilplan.org, joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com, reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Subject: [PATCH v7 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 11:41:24 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20221201104125.919483-6-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20221201104125.919483-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Change the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM infrastructure. Keep the existing behavior of including in the HMAC calculation only the first xattr provided by LSMs. Changing the evm_inode_init_security() definition requires passing only the xattr array allocated by security_inode_init_security(), instead of the first LSM xattr and the place where the EVM xattr should be filled. In lieu of passing the EVM xattr, EVM must position itself after the last filled xattr (by checking the xattr name), since only the beginning of the xattr array is given. Finally, make evm_inode_init_security() return value compatible with the inode_init_security hook conventions, i.e. return -EOPNOTSUPP if it is not setting an xattr. EVM is a bit tricky, because xattrs is both an input and an output. If it was just output, EVM should have returned zero if xattrs is NULL. But, since xattrs is also input, EVM is unable to do its calculations, so return -EOPNOTSUPP and handle this error in security_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- include/linux/evm.h | 12 ++++++------ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- security/security.c | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index aa63e0b3c0a2..3bb2ae9fe098 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm); +extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs); extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name); extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, @@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return; } -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm) +static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 23d484e05e6f..0a312cafb7de 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -845,23 +845,29 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ -int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, - struct xattr *evm_xattr) +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs) { struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; + struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr; int rc; - if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || - !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) - return 0; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs || + !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) + ; + + evm_xattr = xattr; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; - rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 36804609caaa..44ce579daec1 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1190,9 +1190,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (!num_filled_xattrs) goto out; - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, - new_xattrs + num_filled_xattrs); - if (ret) + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs); + if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: -- 2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-12-01 10:43 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2022-12-01 10:41 [PATCH v7 0/6] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Roberto Sassu 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [PATCH v7 1/6] reiserfs: Switch to security_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-17 19:47 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-17 19:47 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH v7 2/6] ocfs2: " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-01-10 8:55 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-01-10 8:55 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-01-12 17:21 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Paul Moore via Ocfs2-devel 2023-01-12 17:21 ` Paul Moore 2023-02-08 14:33 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-08 14:33 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-09 21:05 ` Paul Moore 2023-02-09 21:05 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Paul Moore via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-21 6:45 ` Joseph Qi 2023-02-21 6:45 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Joseph Qi via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-21 7:51 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-21 7:51 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-17 19:51 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-17 19:51 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-17 21:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-17 21:30 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 9:27 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-20 9:27 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 11:08 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-20 11:08 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 12:20 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-20 12:20 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 12:40 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-20 12:40 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 8:34 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-20 8:34 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH v7 3/6] security: Remove security_old_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-19 19:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-19 19:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH v7 4/6] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-20 12:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-20 12:43 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel [this message] 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [PATCH v7 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu 2023-02-19 19:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-19 19:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH v7 6/6] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2022-12-01 10:41 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-19 19:42 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-19 19:42 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 9:49 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-02-20 9:49 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-02-20 10:56 ` Mimi Zohar 2023-02-20 10:56 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Mimi Zohar via Ocfs2-devel 2023-01-12 17:15 ` [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH v7 0/6] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Paul Moore via Ocfs2-devel 2023-01-12 17:15 ` Paul Moore 2023-01-13 10:35 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-01-13 10:35 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-03-08 22:16 ` Paul Moore 2023-03-08 22:16 ` Paul Moore 2023-03-08 22:16 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Paul Moore via Ocfs2-devel 2023-03-09 7:53 ` Roberto Sassu via Ocfs2-devel 2023-03-09 7:53 ` Roberto Sassu 2023-03-09 7:53 ` Roberto Sassu
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