[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 01/14] media: dvb-usb-v2: af9035: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9035_i2c_master_xfer

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 01/14] media: dvb-usb-v2: af9035: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9035_i2c_master_xfer

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 7bf744f2de0a848fb1d717f5831b03db96feae89 ]

In af9035_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach af9035_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c
index 1f6c1eefe3892..55c7e7348869b 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c
@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
 			   (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 3 || msg[1].len < 1)
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			/* demod access via firmware interface */
 			u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
 					msg[0].buf[2];
@@ -395,6 +397,8 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
 			   (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 3)
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			/* demod access via firmware interface */
 			u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
 					msg[0].buf[2];
@@ -402,10 +406,7 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 			if (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])
 				reg |= 0x100000;
 
-			ret = (msg[0].len >= 3) ? af9035_wr_regs(d, reg,
-							         &msg[0].buf[3],
-							         msg[0].len - 3)
-					        : -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			ret = af9035_wr_regs(d, reg, &msg[0].buf[3], msg[0].len - 3);
 		} else {
 			/* I2C write */
 			u8 buf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 02/14] media: dw2102: Fix null-ptr-deref in dw2102_i2c_transfer()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 5ae544d94abc8ff77b1b9bf8774def3fa5689b5b ]

In dw2102_i2c_transfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach dw2102_i2c_transfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 950e252cb469
("[media] dw2102: limit messages to buffer size")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c
index cd0566c0b3de7..a3c5261f9aa41 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c
@@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 
 	switch (num) {
 	case 2:
+		if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+			num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
 		/* read stv0299 register */
 		value = msg[0].buf[0];/* register */
 		for (i = 0; i < msg[1].len; i++) {
@@ -142,6 +146,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 	case 1:
 		switch (msg[0].addr) {
 		case 0x68:
+			if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+				num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				break;
+			}
 			/* write to stv0299 register */
 			buf6[0] = 0x2a;
 			buf6[1] = msg[0].buf[0];
@@ -151,6 +159,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			break;
 		case 0x60:
 			if (msg[0].flags == 0) {
+				if (msg[0].len < 4) {
+					num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 			/* write to tuner pll */
 				buf6[0] = 0x2c;
 				buf6[1] = 5;
@@ -162,6 +174,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 				dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb2, 0, 0,
 						buf6, 7, DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
 			} else {
+				if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+					num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 			/* read from tuner */
 				dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb5, 0, 0,
 						buf6, 1, DW210X_READ_MSG);
@@ -169,12 +185,20 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			}
 			break;
 		case (DW2102_RC_QUERY):
+			if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+				num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				break;
+			}
 			dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb8, 0, 0,
 					buf6, 2, DW210X_READ_MSG);
 			msg[0].buf[0] = buf6[0];
 			msg[0].buf[1] = buf6[1];
 			break;
 		case (DW2102_VOLTAGE_CTRL):
+			if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+				num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				break;
+			}
 			buf6[0] = 0x30;
 			buf6[1] = msg[0].buf[0];
 			dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb2, 0, 0,
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 03/14] media: af9005: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9005_i2c_xfer

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f4ee84f27625ce1fdf41e8483fa0561a1b837d10 ]

In af9005_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach af9005_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
index d2737460c9d3b..60acaaf8b892f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c
@@ -431,6 +431,10 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 		if (ret == 0)
 			ret = 2;
 	} else {
+		if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			goto unlock;
+		}
 		/* write one or more registers */
 		reg = msg[0].buf[0];
 		addr = msg[0].addr;
@@ -440,6 +444,7 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			ret = 1;
 	}
 
+unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 04/14] media: anysee: fix null-ptr-deref in anysee_master_xfer

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit c30411266fd67ea3c02a05c157231654d5a3bdc9 ]

In anysee_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach anysee_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
[hverkuil: add spaces around +]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
index 20ee7eea2a91e..83af86505363b 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int anysee_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg,
 
 	while (i < num) {
 		if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
-			if (msg[i].len > 2 || msg[i+1].len > 60) {
+			if (msg[i].len != 2 || msg[i + 1].len > 60) {
 				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 				break;
 			}
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 05/14] media: az6007: Fix null-ptr-deref in az6007_i2c_xfer()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 1047f9343011f2cedc73c64829686206a7e9fc3f ]

In az6007_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach az6007_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c
index 8e914be5b7c5e..2f40eb6bdbb83 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c
@@ -796,6 +796,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
 			if (az6007_xfer_debug)
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C W addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
 				       addr, msgs[i].len);
+			if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EIO;
+				goto err;
+			}
 			req = AZ6007_I2C_WR;
 			index = msgs[i].buf[0];
 			value = addr | (1 << 8);
@@ -810,6 +814,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
 			if (az6007_xfer_debug)
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C R addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
 				       addr, msgs[i].len);
+			if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EIO;
+				goto err;
+			}
 			req = AZ6007_I2C_RD;
 			index = msgs[i].buf[0];
 			value = addr;
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 06/14] iio: core: Use min() instead of min_t() to make code more robust

[Sasha Levin]

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit cb1d17535061ca295903f97f5cb0af9db719c02c ]

min() has strict type checking and preferred over min_t() for
unsigned types to avoid overflow. Here it's unclear why min_t()
was chosen since both variables are of the same type. In any
case update to use min().

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nuno Sa <nuno.sa@analog.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721170022.3461-5-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c b/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c
index 49d4b4f1a4574..ad9bd2001fbd2 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static ssize_t iio_debugfs_write_reg(struct file *file,
 	char buf[80];
 	int ret;
 
-	count = min_t(size_t, count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
+	count = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
 	if (copy_from_user(buf, userbuf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 07/14] media: tuners: qt1010: replace BUG_ON with a regular error

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>

[ Upstream commit ee630b29ea44d1851bb6c903f400956604834463 ]

BUG_ON is unnecessary here, and in addition it confuses smatch.
Replacing this with an error return help resolve this smatch
warning:

drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c:350 qt1010_init() error: buffer overflow 'i2c_data' 34 <= 34

Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c b/drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c
index 6d397cc85428d..ab4688f94d8ef 100644
--- a/drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c
+++ b/drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c
@@ -351,11 +351,12 @@ static int qt1010_init(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
 			else
 				valptr = &tmpval;
 
-			BUG_ON(i >= ARRAY_SIZE(i2c_data) - 1);
-
-			err = qt1010_init_meas1(priv, i2c_data[i+1].reg,
-						i2c_data[i].reg,
-						i2c_data[i].val, valptr);
+			if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(i2c_data) - 1)
+				err = -EIO;
+			else
+				err = qt1010_init_meas1(priv, i2c_data[i + 1].reg,
+							i2c_data[i].reg,
+							i2c_data[i].val, valptr);
 			i++;
 			break;
 		}
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 08/14] media: pci: cx23885: replace BUG with error return

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>

[ Upstream commit 2e1796fd4904fdd6062a8e4589778ea899ea0c8d ]

It was completely unnecessary to use BUG in buffer_prepare().
Just replace it with an error return. This also fixes a smatch warning:

drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c:422 buffer_prepare() error: uninitialized symbol 'ret'.

Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c b/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c
index 2a20c7165e1e8..16564899f1141 100644
--- a/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c
+++ b/drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static int buffer_prepare(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 				dev->height >> 1);
 		break;
 	default:
-		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL; /* should not happen */
 	}
 	dprintk(2, "[%p/%d] buffer_init - %dx%d %dbpp \"%s\" - dma=0x%08lx\n",
 		buf, buf->vb.vb2_buf.index,
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 09/14] usb: gadget: fsl_qe_udc: validate endpoint index for ch9 udc

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ma Ke <make_ruc2021@163.com>

[ Upstream commit ce9daa2efc0872a9a68ea51dc8000df05893ef2e ]

We should verify the bound of the array to assure that host
may not manipulate the index to point past endpoint array.

Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make_ruc2021@163.com>
Acked-by: Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230628081511.186850-1-make_ruc2021@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c
index 2707be6282988..63109c6e55068 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c
@@ -1950,6 +1950,8 @@ static void ch9getstatus(struct qe_udc *udc, u8 request_type, u16 value,
 	} else if ((request_type & USB_RECIP_MASK) == USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT) {
 		/* Get endpoint status */
 		int pipe = index & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+		if (pipe >= USB_MAX_ENDPOINTS)
+			goto stall;
 		struct qe_ep *target_ep = &udc->eps[pipe];
 		u16 usep;
 
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 09/14] usb: gadget: fsl_qe_udc: validate endpoint index for ch9 udc

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ma Ke <make_ruc2021@163.com>

[ Upstream commit ce9daa2efc0872a9a68ea51dc8000df05893ef2e ]

We should verify the bound of the array to assure that host
may not manipulate the index to point past endpoint array.

Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make_ruc2021@163.com>
Acked-by: Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230628081511.186850-1-make_ruc2021@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c
index 2707be6282988..63109c6e55068 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c
@@ -1950,6 +1950,8 @@ static void ch9getstatus(struct qe_udc *udc, u8 request_type, u16 value,
 	} else if ((request_type & USB_RECIP_MASK) == USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT) {
 		/* Get endpoint status */
 		int pipe = index & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+		if (pipe >= USB_MAX_ENDPOINTS)
+			goto stall;
 		struct qe_ep *target_ep = &udc->eps[pipe];
 		u16 usep;
 
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 10/14] scsi: target: iscsi: Fix buffer overflow in lio_target_nacl_info_show()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Konstantin Shelekhin <k.shelekhin@yadro.com>

[ Upstream commit 801f287c93ff95582b0a2d2163f12870a2f076d4 ]

The function lio_target_nacl_info_show() uses sprintf() in a loop to print
details for every iSCSI connection in a session without checking for the
buffer length. With enough iSCSI connections it's possible to overflow the
buffer provided by configfs and corrupt the memory.

This patch replaces sprintf() with sysfs_emit_at() that checks for buffer
boundries.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Shelekhin <k.shelekhin@yadro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230722152657.168859-2-k.shelekhin@yadro.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c | 54 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
index d25cadc4f4f11..ac071abae7e90 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c
@@ -516,102 +516,102 @@ static ssize_t lio_target_nacl_info_show(struct config_item *item, char *page)
 	spin_lock_bh(&se_nacl->nacl_sess_lock);
 	se_sess = se_nacl->nacl_sess;
 	if (!se_sess) {
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "No active iSCSI Session for Initiator"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "No active iSCSI Session for Initiator"
 			" Endpoint: %s\n", se_nacl->initiatorname);
 	} else {
 		sess = se_sess->fabric_sess_ptr;
 
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "InitiatorName: %s\n",
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "InitiatorName: %s\n",
 			sess->sess_ops->InitiatorName);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "InitiatorAlias: %s\n",
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "InitiatorAlias: %s\n",
 			sess->sess_ops->InitiatorAlias);
 
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 			      "LIO Session ID: %u   ISID: 0x%6ph  TSIH: %hu  ",
 			      sess->sid, sess->isid, sess->tsih);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "SessionType: %s\n",
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "SessionType: %s\n",
 				(sess->sess_ops->SessionType) ?
 				"Discovery" : "Normal");
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "Session State: ");
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "Session State: ");
 		switch (sess->session_state) {
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_FREE:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_FREE\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_FREE\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_ACTIVE:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_ACTIVE\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_ACTIVE\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_LOGGED_IN:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_LOGGED_IN\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_LOGGED_IN\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_FAILED:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_FAILED\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_FAILED\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_IN_CONTINUE:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_IN_CONTINUE\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_IN_CONTINUE\n");
 			break;
 		default:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "ERROR: Unknown Session"
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "ERROR: Unknown Session"
 					" State!\n");
 			break;
 		}
 
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "---------------------[iSCSI Session"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "---------------------[iSCSI Session"
 				" Values]-----------------------\n");
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "  CmdSN/WR  :  CmdSN/WC  :  ExpCmdSN"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "  CmdSN/WR  :  CmdSN/WC  :  ExpCmdSN"
 				"  :  MaxCmdSN  :     ITT    :     TTT\n");
 		max_cmd_sn = (u32) atomic_read(&sess->max_cmd_sn);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, " 0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, " 0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x"
 				"   0x%08x   0x%08x\n",
 			sess->cmdsn_window,
 			(max_cmd_sn - sess->exp_cmd_sn) + 1,
 			sess->exp_cmd_sn, max_cmd_sn,
 			sess->init_task_tag, sess->targ_xfer_tag);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "----------------------[iSCSI"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "----------------------[iSCSI"
 				" Connections]-------------------------\n");
 
 		spin_lock(&sess->conn_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry(conn, &sess->sess_conn_list, conn_list) {
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "CID: %hu  Connection"
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "CID: %hu  Connection"
 					" State: ", conn->cid);
 			switch (conn->conn_state) {
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_FREE:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_FREE\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_XPT_UP:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_XPT_UP\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGIN:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGIN\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGGED_IN:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGGED_IN\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGOUT:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGOUT\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGOUT_REQUESTED:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGOUT_REQUESTED\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_CLEANUP_WAIT:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_CLEANUP_WAIT\n");
 				break;
 			default:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"ERROR: Unknown Connection State!\n");
 				break;
 			}
 
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "   Address %pISc %s", &conn->login_sockaddr,
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "   Address %pISc %s", &conn->login_sockaddr,
 				(conn->network_transport == ISCSI_TCP) ?
 				"TCP" : "SCTP");
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "  StatSN: 0x%08x\n",
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "  StatSN: 0x%08x\n",
 				conn->stat_sn);
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&sess->conn_lock);
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 11/14] serial: cpm_uart: Avoid suspicious locking

[Sasha Levin]

From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>

[ Upstream commit 36ef11d311f405e55ad8e848c19b212ff71ef536 ]

  CHECK   drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c
drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c:1271:39: warning: context imbalance in 'cpm_uart_console_write' - unexpected unlock

Allthough 'nolock' is not expected to change, sparse find the following
form suspicious:

	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
		local_irq_save(flags);
	} else {
		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
	}

	cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);

	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
		local_irq_restore(flags);
	} else {
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
	}

Rewrite it a more obvious form:

	if (unlikely(oops_in_progress)) {
		local_irq_save(flags);
		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
		local_irq_restore(flags);
	} else {
		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
	}

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f7da5cdc9287960185829cfef681a7d8614efa1f.1691068700.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c | 13 ++++---------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c
index ad40c75bb58f8..375d4790e058b 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c
@@ -1269,19 +1269,14 @@ static void cpm_uart_console_write(struct console *co, const char *s,
 {
 	struct uart_cpm_port *pinfo = &cpm_uart_ports[co->index];
 	unsigned long flags;
-	int nolock = oops_in_progress;
 
-	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
+	if (unlikely(oops_in_progress)) {
 		local_irq_save(flags);
-	} else {
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
-	}
-
-	cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
-
-	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
+		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
 		local_irq_restore(flags);
 	} else {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
+		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
 	}
 }
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 12/14] workqueue: Call wq_update_unbound_numa() on all CPUs in NUMA node on CPU hotplug

[Sasha Levin]

From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 4cbfd3de737b9d00544ff0f673cb75fc37bffb6a ]

When a CPU went online or offline, wq_update_unbound_numa() was called only
on the CPU which was going up or down. This works fine because all CPUs on
the same NUMA node share the same pool_workqueue slot - one CPU updating it
updates it for everyone in the node.

However, future changes will make each CPU use a separate pool_workqueue
even when they're sharing the same worker_pool, which requires updating
pool_workqueue's for all CPUs which may be sharing the same pool_workqueue
on hotplug.

To accommodate the planned changes, this patch updates
workqueue_on/offline_cpu() so that they call wq_update_unbound_numa() for
all CPUs sharing the same NUMA node as the CPU going up or down. In the
current code, the second+ calls would be noops and there shouldn't be any
behavior changes.

* As wq_update_unbound_numa() is now called on multiple CPUs per each
  hotplug event, @cpu is renamed to @hotplug_cpu and another @cpu argument
  is added. The former indicates the CPU being hot[un]plugged and the latter
  the CPU whose pool_workqueue is being updated.

* In wq_update_unbound_numa(), cpu_off is renamed to off_cpu for consistency
  with the new @hotplug_cpu.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/workqueue.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
index 5533206cb6f48..c994b06f60f2f 100644
--- a/kernel/workqueue.c
+++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
@@ -3907,7 +3907,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(apply_workqueue_attrs);
 /**
  * wq_update_unbound_numa - update NUMA affinity of a wq for CPU hot[un]plug
  * @wq: the target workqueue
- * @cpu: the CPU coming up or going down
+ * @cpu: the CPU to update pool association for
+ * @hotplug_cpu: the CPU coming up or going down
  * @online: whether @cpu is coming up or going down
  *
  * This function is to be called from %CPU_DOWN_PREPARE, %CPU_ONLINE and
@@ -3927,10 +3928,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(apply_workqueue_attrs);
  * CPU_DOWN_PREPARE.
  */
 static void wq_update_unbound_numa(struct workqueue_struct *wq, int cpu,
-				   bool online)
+				   int hotplug_cpu, bool online)
 {
 	int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
-	int cpu_off = online ? -1 : cpu;
+	int off_cpu = online ? -1 : hotplug_cpu;
 	struct pool_workqueue *old_pwq = NULL, *pwq;
 	struct workqueue_attrs *target_attrs;
 	cpumask_t *cpumask;
@@ -3958,7 +3959,7 @@ static void wq_update_unbound_numa(struct workqueue_struct *wq, int cpu,
 	 * and create a new one if they don't match.  If the target cpumask
 	 * equals the default pwq's, the default pwq should be used.
 	 */
-	if (wq_calc_node_cpumask(wq->dfl_pwq->pool->attrs, node, cpu_off, cpumask)) {
+	if (wq_calc_node_cpumask(wq->dfl_pwq->pool->attrs, node, off_cpu, cpumask)) {
 		if (cpumask_equal(cpumask, pwq->pool->attrs->cpumask))
 			return;
 	} else {
@@ -4876,8 +4877,15 @@ int workqueue_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 	}
 
 	/* update NUMA affinity of unbound workqueues */
-	list_for_each_entry(wq, &workqueues, list)
-		wq_update_unbound_numa(wq, cpu, true);
+	list_for_each_entry(wq, &workqueues, list) {
+		int tcpu;
+
+		for_each_possible_cpu(tcpu) {
+			if (cpu_to_node(tcpu) == cpu_to_node(cpu)) {
+				wq_update_unbound_numa(wq, tcpu, cpu, true);
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&wq_pool_mutex);
 	return 0;
@@ -4895,8 +4903,15 @@ int workqueue_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 
 	/* update NUMA affinity of unbound workqueues */
 	mutex_lock(&wq_pool_mutex);
-	list_for_each_entry(wq, &workqueues, list)
-		wq_update_unbound_numa(wq, cpu, false);
+	list_for_each_entry(wq, &workqueues, list) {
+		int tcpu;
+
+		for_each_possible_cpu(tcpu) {
+			if (cpu_to_node(tcpu) == cpu_to_node(cpu)) {
+				wq_update_unbound_numa(wq, tcpu, cpu, false);
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	mutex_unlock(&wq_pool_mutex);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -5843,7 +5858,8 @@ int __init workqueue_init(void)
 	}
 
 	list_for_each_entry(wq, &workqueues, list) {
-		wq_update_unbound_numa(wq, smp_processor_id(), true);
+		wq_update_unbound_numa(wq, smp_processor_id(), smp_processor_id(),
+				       true);
 		WARN(init_rescuer(wq),
 		     "workqueue: failed to create early rescuer for %s",
 		     wq->name);
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 13/14] media: pci: ipu3-cio2: Initialise timing struct to avoid a compiler warning

[Sasha Levin]

From: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d7531be3085a8f013cf173ccc4e72e3cf493538 ]

Initialise timing struct in cio2_hw_init() to zero in order to avoid a
compiler warning. The warning was a false positive.

Reported-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c b/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c
index 070ddb52c8231..2c037538c7d8f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c
+++ b/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int cio2_hw_init(struct cio2_device *cio2, struct cio2_queue *q)
 	void __iomem *const base = cio2->base;
 	u8 lanes, csi2bus = q->csi2.port;
 	u8 sensor_vc = SENSOR_VIR_CH_DFLT;
-	struct cio2_csi2_timing timing;
+	struct cio2_csi2_timing timing = { 0 };
 	int i, r;
 
 	fmt = cio2_find_format(NULL, &q->subdev_fmt.code);
-- 
2.40.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 14/14] kobject: Add sanity check for kset->kobj.ktype in kset_register()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 4d0fe8c52bb3029d83e323c961221156ab98680b ]

When I register a kset in the following way:
	static struct kset my_kset;
	kobject_set_name(&my_kset.kobj, "my_kset");
        ret = kset_register(&my_kset);

A null pointer dereference exception is occurred:
[ 4453.568337] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at \
virtual address 0000000000000028
... ...
[ 4453.810361] Call trace:
[ 4453.813062]  kobject_get_ownership+0xc/0x34
[ 4453.817493]  kobject_add_internal+0x98/0x274
[ 4453.822005]  kset_register+0x5c/0xb4
[ 4453.825820]  my_kobj_init+0x44/0x1000 [my_kset]
... ...

Because I didn't initialize my_kset.kobj.ktype.

According to the description in Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst:
 - A ktype is the type of object that embeds a kobject.  Every structure
   that embeds a kobject needs a corresponding ktype.

So add sanity check to make sure kset->kobj.ktype is not NULL.

Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230805084114.1298-2-thunder.leizhen@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 lib/kobject.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
index 97d86dc17c42b..2bab65232925a 100644
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -829,6 +829,11 @@ int kset_register(struct kset *k)
 	if (!k)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!k->kobj.ktype) {
+		pr_err("must have a ktype to be initialized properly!\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	kset_init(k);
 	err = kobject_add_internal(&k->kobj);
 	if (err)
-- 
2.40.1

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 12/14] workqueue: Call wq_update_unbound_numa() on all CPUs in NUMA node on CPU hotplug

[Pavel Machek]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 785 bytes --]

Hi!

> When a CPU went online or offline, wq_update_unbound_numa() was called only
> on the CPU which was going up or down. This works fine because all CPUs on
> the same NUMA node share the same pool_workqueue slot - one CPU updating it
> updates it for everyone in the node.
> 
> However, future changes will make each CPU use a separate pool_workqueue
> even when they're sharing the same worker_pool, which requires updating
> pool_workqueue's for all CPUs which may be sharing the same pool_workqueue
> on hotplug.

Yes, but we are not porting those future changes to stable, right?
Please drop.

BR,
									Pavel
-- 
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,        Managing Director: Erika Unter
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany

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