[PATCH v4 00/15] KVM: SEV: allow customizing VMSA features

[PATCH v4 00/15] KVM: SEV: allow customizing VMSA features

[Paolo Bonzini]

[Dave: there is a small arch/x86/kernel/fpu change in patch 9;
 I am CCing you in the cover letter just for context. - Paolo]
 
The idea that no parameter would ever be necessary when enabling SEV or
SEV-ES for a VM was decidedly optimistic.  The first source of variability
that was encountered is the desired set of VMSA features, as that affects
the measurement of the VM's initial state and cannot be changed
arbitrarily by the hypervisor.

This series adds all the APIs that are needed to customize the features,
with room for future enhancements:

- a new /dev/kvm device attribute to retrieve the set of supported
  features (right now, only debug swap)

- a new sub-operation for KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OP that can take a struct,
  replacing the existing KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT

It then puts the new op to work by including the VMSA features as a field
of the The existing KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT use the full set of
supported VMSA features for backwards compatibility; but I am considering
also making them use zero as the feature mask, and will gladly adjust the
patches if so requested.

In order to avoid creating *two* new KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OPs, I decided that
I could as well make SEV and SEV-ES use VM types.  And then, why not make
a SEV-ES VM, when created with the new VM type instead of KVM_SEV_ES_INIT,
reject KVM_GET_REGS/KVM_SET_REGS and friends on the vCPU file descriptor
once the VMSA has been encrypted...  Which is how the API should have
always behaved.

Note: despite having the same number of patches as v3, #9 and #15 are new!
The series is structured as follows:

- patches 1 and 2 change sev.c so that it is compiled only if SEV is enabled
  in kconfig

- patches 3 to 6 introduce the new device attribute to retrieve supported
  VMSA features

- patches 7 and 8 introduce new infrastructure for VM types, replacing
  the similar code in the TDX patches

- patch 9 allows setting the FPU and AVX state prior to encryption of the
  VMSA

- patches 10 to 12 introduce the new VM types for SEV and
  SEV-ES, and KVM_SEV_INIT2 as a new sub-operation for KVM_MEM_ENCRYPT_OP.

- patch 13 reenables DebugSwap, now that there is an API that allows doing
  so without breaking backwards compatibility

- patches 14 and 15 test the new ioctl.

The idea is that SEV SNP will only ever support KVM_SEV_INIT2.  I have
placed patches for QEMU to support this new API at branch sevinit2 of
https://gitlab.com/bonzini/qemu.

I haven't fully tested patch 9 and it really deserves a selftest,
it is a bit tricky though without ucall infrastructure for SEV.
I will look at it tomorrow.

The series is at branch kvm-coco-queue of kvm.git, and I would like to
include it in kvm/next as soon as possible after the release of -rc1.

Thanks,

Paolo

v3->v4:
- moved patches 1 and 5 to separate "fixes" series for 6.9
- do not conditionalize prototypes for functions that are called by common
  SVM code
- rebased on top of SEV selftest infrastructure from 6.9 merge window;
  include new patch to drop the "subtype" concept
- rebased on top of SEV-SNP patches from 6.9 merge window
- rebased on top of patch to disable DebugSwap from 6.8 rc;
  drop "warn" once SEV_ES_INIT stops enabling VMSA features and
  finally re-enable DebugSwap
- simplified logic to return -EINVAL from ioctls
- also block KVM_GET/SET_FPU for protected-state guests
- move logic to set kvm_>arch.has_protected_state to svm_vm_init
- fix "struct struct" in documentation

Paolo Bonzini (14):
  KVM: SVM: Compile sev.c if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
  KVM: x86: use u64_to_user_addr()
  KVM: introduce new vendor op for KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR
  KVM: SEV: publish supported VMSA features
  KVM: SEV: store VMSA features in kvm_sev_info
  KVM: x86: add fields to struct kvm_arch for CoCo features
  KVM: x86: Add supported_vm_types to kvm_caps
  KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time
  KVM: SEV: introduce to_kvm_sev_info
  KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES
  KVM: SEV: introduce KVM_SEV_INIT2 operation
  KVM: SEV: allow SEV-ES DebugSwap again
  selftests: kvm: add tests for KVM_SEV_INIT2
  selftests: kvm: switch to using KVM_X86_*_VM

Sean Christopherson (1):
  KVM: SVM: Invert handling of SEV and SEV_ES feature flags

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                |   2 +
 .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst    |  52 +++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h                |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h            |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h               |  12 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h                  |   2 -
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile                         |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 172 ++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        |  27 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |  43 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            | 170 +++++++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h                            |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  11 +-
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  |   6 -
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        |  16 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    |   1 -
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      |  14 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  |  30 ++-
 .../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c    |   8 +-
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c    | 149 +++++++++++++++
 23 files changed, 569 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c

-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 01/15] KVM: SVM: Invert handling of SEV and SEV_ES feature flags

[Paolo Bonzini]

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Leave SEV and SEV_ES '0' in kvm_cpu_caps by default, and instead set them
in sev_set_cpu_caps() if SEV and SEV-ES support are fully enabled.  Aside
from the fact that sev_set_cpu_caps() is wildly misleading when it *clears*
capabilities, this will allow compiling out sev.c without falsely
advertising SEV/SEV-ES support in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index adba49afb5fe..bde4df13a7e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, 0);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_001F_EAX,
-		0 /* SME */ | F(SEV) | 0 /* VM_PAGE_FLUSH */ | F(SEV_ES) |
+		0 /* SME */ | 0 /* SEV */ | 0 /* VM_PAGE_FLUSH */ | 0 /* SEV_ES */ |
 		F(SME_COHERENT));
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index e5a4d9b0e79f..382c745b8ba9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2186,10 +2186,10 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
-	if (!sev_enabled)
-		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
-	if (!sev_es_enabled)
-		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+	if (sev_enabled)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+	if (sev_es_enabled)
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
 }
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 02/15] KVM: SVM: Compile sev.c if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y

[Paolo Bonzini]

Stop compiling sev.c when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n, as the number of #ifdefs
in sev.c is getting ridiculous, and having #ifdefs inside of SEV helpers
is quite confusing.

To minimize #ifdefs in code flows, #ifdef away only the kvm_x86_ops hooks
and the #VMGEXIT handler. Stubs are also restricted to functions that
check sev_enabled and to the destruction functions sev_free_cpu() and
sev_vm_destroy(), where the style of their callers is to leave checks
to the callers.  Most call sites instead rely on dead code elimination
to take care of functions that are guarded with sev_guest() or
sev_es_guest().

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile  |  7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 23 -----------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  5 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index 475b5fa917a6..744a1ea3ee5c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -25,9 +25,10 @@ kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
 kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
 kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV)	+= vmx/hyperv.o vmx/hyperv_evmcs.o
 
-kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o \
-			   svm/sev.o
-kvm-amd-$(CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV) += svm/hyperv.o
+kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o
+
+kvm-amd-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)	+= svm/sev.o
+kvm-amd-$(CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV)	+= svm/hyperv.o
 
 ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV
 kvm-y			+= kvm_onhyperv.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 382c745b8ba9..73fee5f08391 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -32,22 +32,6 @@
 #include "cpuid.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
-/*
- * When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
- * this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
- * module.
- *
- * We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
- * misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
- *
- * Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
- */
-#define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
-#define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
 static bool sev_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
@@ -59,11 +43,6 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
 static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
-#else
-#define sev_enabled false
-#define sev_es_enabled false
-#define sev_es_debug_swap_enabled false
-#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
@@ -2194,7 +2173,6 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
 	bool sev_es_supported = false;
 	bool sev_supported = false;
@@ -2294,7 +2272,6 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
 		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
-#endif
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index d1a9f9951635..e7f47a1f3eb1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3303,7 +3303,9 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
 	[SVM_EXIT_RSM]                          = rsm_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI]		= avic_incomplete_ipi_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS]	= avic_unaccelerated_access_interception,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 	[SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT]			= sev_handle_vmgexit,
+#endif
 };
 
 static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -5023,6 +5025,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.enable_smi_window = svm_enable_smi_window,
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 	.mem_enc_ioctl = sev_mem_enc_ioctl,
 	.mem_enc_register_region = sev_mem_enc_register_region,
 	.mem_enc_unregister_region = sev_mem_enc_unregister_region,
@@ -5030,7 +5033,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.vm_copy_enc_context_from = sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from,
 	.vm_move_enc_context_from = sev_vm_move_enc_context_from,
-
+#endif
 	.check_emulate_instruction = svm_check_emulate_instruction,
 
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 7f1fbd874c45..d20e48c31210 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -664,13 +664,10 @@ void avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 /* sev.c */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 #define GHCB_VERSION_MAX	1ULL
 #define GHCB_VERSION_MIN	1ULL
 
-
-extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
-
-void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
 int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 int sev_mem_enc_register_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 				struct kvm_enc_region *range);
@@ -681,20 +678,37 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
 void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm);
 
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
-void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
-void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
-void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
-int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
 void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
-void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
 void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
 void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+
+/* These symbols are used in common code and are stubbed below.  */
 struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
+void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
+void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
+void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
+extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+#else
+static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
+	return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+}
+
+static inline void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+static inline void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) {}
+static inline void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void) {}
+static inline void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) {}
+static inline void sev_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
+static inline int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { return 0; }
+#define max_sev_asid 0
+#endif
 
 /* vmenter.S */
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 03/15] KVM: x86: use u64_to_user_addr()

[Paolo Bonzini]

There is no danger to the kernel if 32-bit userspace provides a 64-bit
value that has the high bits set, but for whatever reason happens to
resolve to an address that has something mapped there.  KVM uses the
checked version of get_user() and put_user(), so any faults are caught
properly.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 24 +++---------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 47d9f03b7778..3d2029402513 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4842,25 +4842,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	return r;
 }
 
-static inline void __user *kvm_get_attr_addr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
-{
-	void __user *uaddr = (void __user*)(unsigned long)attr->addr;
-
-	if ((u64)(unsigned long)uaddr != attr->addr)
-		return ERR_PTR_USR(-EFAULT);
-	return uaddr;
-}
-
 static int kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
 {
-	u64 __user *uaddr = kvm_get_attr_addr(attr);
+	u64 __user *uaddr = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->addr);
 
 	if (attr->group)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(uaddr))
-		return PTR_ERR(uaddr);
-
 	switch (attr->attr) {
 	case KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP:
 		if (put_user(kvm_caps.supported_xcr0, uaddr))
@@ -5712,12 +5700,9 @@ static int kvm_arch_tsc_has_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 static int kvm_arch_tsc_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
 {
-	u64 __user *uaddr = kvm_get_attr_addr(attr);
+	u64 __user *uaddr = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->addr);
 	int r;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(uaddr))
-		return PTR_ERR(uaddr);
-
 	switch (attr->attr) {
 	case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET:
 		r = -EFAULT;
@@ -5735,13 +5720,10 @@ static int kvm_arch_tsc_get_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 static int kvm_arch_tsc_set_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
 {
-	u64 __user *uaddr = kvm_get_attr_addr(attr);
+	u64 __user *uaddr = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->addr);
 	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
 	int r;
 
-	if (IS_ERR(uaddr))
-		return PTR_ERR(uaddr);
-
 	switch (attr->attr) {
 	case KVM_VCPU_TSC_OFFSET: {
 		u64 offset, tsc, ns;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 04/15] KVM: introduce new vendor op for KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR

[Paolo Bonzini]

Allow vendor modules to provide their own attributes on /dev/kvm.
To avoid proliferation of vendor ops, implement KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR
and KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR in terms of the same function.  You're not
supposed to use KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR to do complicated computations,
especially on /dev/kvm.

Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 110d7f29ca9a..5187fcf4b610 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(enter_smm)
 KVM_X86_OP(leave_smm)
 KVM_X86_OP(enable_smi_window)
 #endif
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(dev_get_attr)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_ioctl)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_register_region)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(mem_enc_unregister_region)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 16e07a2eee19..f6cc7bfb5462 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1778,6 +1778,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #endif
 
+	int (*dev_get_attr)(u64 attr, u64 *val);
 	int (*mem_enc_ioctl)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
 	int (*mem_enc_register_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
 	int (*mem_enc_unregister_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 3d2029402513..e8253aa8ef5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4842,34 +4842,49 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+static int __kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr, u64 *val)
 {
-	u64 __user *uaddr = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->addr);
+	int r;
 
 	if (attr->group)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
 	switch (attr->attr) {
 	case KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP:
-		if (put_user(kvm_caps.supported_xcr0, uaddr))
-			return -EFAULT;
-		return 0;
+		r = 0;
+		*val = kvm_caps.supported_xcr0;
+		break;
 	default:
-		return -ENXIO;
+		r = -ENXIO;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops.dev_get_attr)
+			r = static_call(kvm_x86_dev_get_attr)(attr->attr, val);
+		break;
 	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
+{
+	u64 __user *uaddr = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->addr);
+	int r;
+	u64 val;
+
+	r = __kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(attr, &val);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (put_user(val, uaddr))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int kvm_x86_dev_has_attr(struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (attr->group)
-		return -ENXIO;
+	u64 val;
 
-	switch (attr->attr) {
-	case KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP:
-		return 0;
-	default:
-		return -ENXIO;
-	}
+	return __kvm_x86_dev_get_attr(attr, &val);
 }
 
 long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 05/15] KVM: SEV: publish supported VMSA features

[Paolo Bonzini]

Compute the set of features to be stored in the VMSA when KVM is
initialized; move it from there into kvm_sev_info when SEV is initialized,
and then into the initial VMSA.

The new variable can then be used to return the set of supported features
to userspace, via the KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst    | 12 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h               |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 21 +++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 84335d119ff1..fb41470c0310 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -425,6 +425,18 @@ issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution.
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
 
+Device attribute API
+====================
+
+Attributes of the SEV implementation can be retrieved through the
+``KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR`` and ``KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR`` ioctls on the ``/dev/kvm``
+device node.
+
+Currently only one attribute is implemented:
+
+* group 0, attribute ``KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES``: return the set of all
+  bits that are accepted in the ``vmsa_features`` of ``KVM_SEV_INIT2``.
+
 Firmware Management
 ===================
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index ef11aa4cab42..d0c1b459f7e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@ struct kvm_sync_regs {
 
 /* attributes for system fd (group 0) */
 #define KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP	0
+#define KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES	1
 
 struct kvm_vmx_nested_state_data {
 	__u8 vmcs12[KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS_SIZE];
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 73fee5f08391..22c35a39c25f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
 static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
+static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features;
 
 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
@@ -600,8 +601,8 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	save->xss  = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
 	save->dr6  = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
 
-	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
-		save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+	if (sev_supported_vmsa_features) {
+		save->sev_features = sev_supported_vmsa_features;
 		pr_warn_once("Enabling DebugSwap with KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. "
 			     "This will not work starting with Linux 6.10\n");
 	}
@@ -1840,6 +1841,18 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+int sev_dev_get_attr(u64 attr, u64 *val)
+{
+	switch (attr) {
+	case KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES:
+		*val = sev_supported_vmsa_features;
+		return 0;
+
+	default:
+		return -ENXIO;
+	}
+}
+
 int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -2272,6 +2285,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
 	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
 		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
+
+	sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
+	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
+		sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
 }
 
 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index e7f47a1f3eb1..450535d6757f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5026,6 +5026,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+	.dev_get_attr = sev_dev_get_attr,
 	.mem_enc_ioctl = sev_mem_enc_ioctl,
 	.mem_enc_register_region = sev_mem_enc_register_region,
 	.mem_enc_unregister_region = sev_mem_enc_unregister_region,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index d20e48c31210..864fac367424 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void);
 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
+int sev_dev_get_attr(u64 attr, u64 *val);
 extern unsigned int max_sev_asid;
 #else
 static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {
@@ -707,6 +708,7 @@ static inline void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void) {}
 static inline void __init sev_hardware_setup(void) {}
 static inline void sev_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
 static inline int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd) { return 0; }
+static inline int sev_dev_get_attr(u64 attr, u64 *val) { return -ENXIO; }
 #define max_sev_asid 0
 #endif
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 06/15] KVM: SEV: store VMSA features in kvm_sev_info

[Paolo Bonzini]

Right now, the set of features that are stored in the VMSA upon
initialization is fixed and depends on the module parameters for
kvm-amd.ko.  However, the hypervisor cannot really change it at will
because the feature word has to match between the hypervisor and whatever
computes a measurement of the VMSA for attestation purposes.

Add a field to kvm_sev_info that holds the set of features to be stored
in the VMSA; and query it instead of referring to the module parameters.

Because KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT accept no parameters, this
does not yet introduce any functional change, but it paves the way for
an API that allows customization of the features per-VM.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240209183743.22030-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 22c35a39c25f..a8300646a280 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -96,6 +96,14 @@ static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
 }
 
+static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	return sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+}
+
 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
 {
@@ -245,6 +253,11 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 	sev->active = true;
 	sev->es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
+	sev->vmsa_features = sev_supported_vmsa_features;
+	if (sev_supported_vmsa_features)
+		pr_warn_once("Enabling DebugSwap with KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. "
+			     "This will not work starting with Linux 6.10\n");
+
 	ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
 	if (ret)
 		goto e_no_asid;
@@ -266,6 +279,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	sev_asid_free(sev);
 	sev->asid = 0;
 e_no_asid:
+	sev->vmsa_features = 0;
 	sev->es_active = false;
 	sev->active = false;
 	return ret;
@@ -560,6 +574,8 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
 	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
 
 	/* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
@@ -601,11 +617,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	save->xss  = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
 	save->dr6  = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
 
-	if (sev_supported_vmsa_features) {
-		save->sev_features = sev_supported_vmsa_features;
-		pr_warn_once("Enabling DebugSwap with KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. "
-			     "This will not work starting with Linux 6.10\n");
-	}
+	save->sev_features = sev->vmsa_features;
 
 	pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
 	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
@@ -1685,6 +1697,7 @@ static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
 	dst->pages_locked = src->pages_locked;
 	dst->enc_context_owner = src->enc_context_owner;
 	dst->es_active = src->es_active;
+	dst->vmsa_features = src->vmsa_features;
 
 	src->asid = 0;
 	src->active = false;
@@ -3057,7 +3070,7 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
 
 	vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;
-	if (!sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+	if (!sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(svm)) {
 		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
 		vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);
 		recalc_intercepts(svm);
@@ -3112,7 +3125,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 					    sev_enc_bit));
 }
 
-void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
+void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
 {
 	/*
 	 * All host state for SEV-ES guests is categorized into three swap types
@@ -3140,7 +3153,7 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
 	 * the CPU (Type-B). If DebugSwap is disabled/unsupported, the CPU both
 	 * saves and loads debug registers (Type-A).
 	 */
-	if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled) {
+	if (sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(svm)) {
 		hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
 		hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
 		hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 450535d6757f..c22e87ebf0de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1523,7 +1523,7 @@ static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
 		hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
 
-		sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
+		sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(svm, hostsa);
 	}
 
 	if (tsc_scaling)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 864fac367424..b7707514d042 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
 	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
 	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
 	u64 ap_jump_table;	/* SEV-ES AP Jump Table address */
+	u64 vmsa_features;
 	struct kvm *enc_context_owner; /* Owner of copied encryption context */
 	struct list_head mirror_vms; /* List of VMs mirroring */
 	struct list_head mirror_entry; /* Use as a list entry of mirrors */
@@ -684,7 +685,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
 void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
-void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
+void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 
 /* These symbols are used in common code and are stubbed below.  */
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 07/15] KVM: x86: add fields to struct kvm_arch for CoCo features

[Paolo Bonzini]

Some VM types have characteristics in common; in fact, the only use
of VM types right now is kvm_arch_has_private_mem and it assumes that
_all_ nonzero VM types have private memory.

We will soon introduce a VM type for SEV and SEV-ES VMs, and at that
point we will have two special characteristics of confidential VMs
that depend on the VM type: not just if memory is private, but
also whether guest state is protected.  For the latter we have
kvm->arch.guest_state_protected, which is only set on a fully initialized
VM.

For VM types with protected guest state, we can actually fix a problem in
the SEV-ES implementation, where ioctls to set registers do not cause an
error even if the VM has been initialized and the guest state encrypted.
Make sure that when using VM types that will become an error.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20240209183743.22030-7-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  7 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index f6cc7bfb5462..7380877bc9b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1279,12 +1279,14 @@ enum kvm_apicv_inhibit {
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch {
-	unsigned long vm_type;
 	unsigned long n_used_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned long n_requested_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned long n_max_mmu_pages;
 	unsigned int indirect_shadow_pages;
 	u8 mmu_valid_gen;
+	u8 vm_type;
+	bool has_private_mem;
+	bool has_protected_state;
 	struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
 	struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
 	struct list_head zapped_obsolete_pages;
@@ -2153,8 +2155,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_new_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t new_pgd);
 void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
 		       int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level);
 
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
-#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM)
+#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
 #else
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index e8253aa8ef5e..98b7979b4698 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -5560,11 +5560,15 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					     struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					    struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	memset(dbgregs, 0, sizeof(*dbgregs));
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db) != ARRAY_SIZE(dbgregs->db));
@@ -5573,6 +5577,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 	dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
 	dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -5580,6 +5585,10 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (dbgregs->flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -5600,8 +5609,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 }
 
 
-static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					  u8 *state, unsigned int size)
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					 u8 *state, unsigned int size)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only copy state for features that are enabled for the guest.  The
@@ -5619,24 +5628,25 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			     XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
 
 	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
-		return;
+		return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL : 0;
 
 	fpu_copy_guest_fpstate_to_uabi(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, state, size,
 				       supported_xcr0, vcpu->arch.pkru);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					 struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
 {
-	kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, (void *)guest_xsave->region,
-				      sizeof(guest_xsave->region));
+	return kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, (void *)guest_xsave->region,
+					     sizeof(guest_xsave->region));
 }
 
 static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 					struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave)
 {
 	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
-		return 0;
+		return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL : 0;
 
 	return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu,
 					      guest_xsave->region,
@@ -5644,18 +5654,23 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 					      &vcpu->arch.pkru);
 }
 
-static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
+static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				       struct kvm_xcrs *guest_xcrs)
 {
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) {
 		guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs = 0;
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	guest_xcrs->nr_xcrs = 1;
 	guest_xcrs->flags = 0;
 	guest_xcrs->xcrs[0].xcr = XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK;
 	guest_xcrs->xcrs[0].value = vcpu->arch.xcr0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -5663,6 +5678,10 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xcrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	int i, r = 0;
 
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -6045,7 +6064,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS: {
 		struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs;
 
-		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs);
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(vcpu, &dbgregs);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
 
 		r = -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_to_user(argp, &dbgregs,
@@ -6075,7 +6096,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		if (!u.xsave)
 			break;
 
-		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(vcpu, u.xsave);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
 
 		r = -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, sizeof(struct kvm_xsave)))
@@ -6104,7 +6127,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		if (!u.xsave)
 			break;
 
-		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, u.buffer, size);
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave2(vcpu, u.buffer, size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
 
 		r = -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xsave, size))
@@ -6120,7 +6145,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		if (!u.xcrs)
 			break;
 
-		kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs);
+		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xcrs(vcpu, u.xcrs);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
 
 		r = -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_to_user(argp, u.xcrs,
@@ -6264,6 +6291,11 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	}
 #endif
 	case KVM_GET_SREGS2: {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+		    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+			goto out;
+
 		u.sregs2 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2), GFP_KERNEL);
 		r = -ENOMEM;
 		if (!u.sregs2)
@@ -6276,6 +6308,11 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		break;
 	}
 	case KVM_SET_SREGS2: {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+		    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+			goto out;
+
 		u.sregs2 = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sregs2));
 		if (IS_ERR(u.sregs2)) {
 			r = PTR_ERR(u.sregs2);
@@ -11483,6 +11520,10 @@ static void __get_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
 
 int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
 {
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
 	__get_regs(vcpu, regs);
 	vcpu_put(vcpu);
@@ -11524,6 +11565,10 @@ static void __set_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
 
 int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_regs *regs)
 {
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
 	__set_regs(vcpu, regs);
 	vcpu_put(vcpu);
@@ -11596,6 +11641,10 @@ static void __get_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2)
 int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				  struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
 {
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
 	__get_sregs(vcpu, sregs);
 	vcpu_put(vcpu);
@@ -11863,6 +11912,10 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	if (vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state &&
+	    vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
 	ret = __set_sregs(vcpu, sregs);
 	vcpu_put(vcpu);
@@ -11980,7 +12033,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
 	struct fxregs_state *fxsave;
 
 	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
-		return 0;
+		return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL : 0;
 
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
 
@@ -12003,7 +12056,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
 	struct fxregs_state *fxsave;
 
 	if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu))
-		return 0;
+		return vcpu->kvm->arch.has_protected_state ? -EINVAL : 0;
 
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
 
@@ -12529,6 +12582,8 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
+	kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
+		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
 
 	ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
 	if (ret)
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 08/15] KVM: x86: Add supported_vm_types to kvm_caps

[Paolo Bonzini]

This simplifies the implementation of KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES),
and also allows the vendor module to specify which VM types are supported.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 98b7979b4698..8c56bcf3feb7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
 
 struct kvm_caps kvm_caps __read_mostly = {
 	.supported_mce_cap = MCG_CTL_P | MCG_SER_P,
+	.supported_vm_types = BIT(KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM),
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_caps);
 
@@ -4629,9 +4630,7 @@ static int kvm_ioctl_get_supported_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 static bool kvm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)
 {
-	return type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM ||
-	       (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM &&
-		IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) && tdp_mmu_enabled);
+	return type < 32 && (kvm_caps.supported_vm_types & BIT(type));
 }
 
 int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
@@ -4832,9 +4831,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 		r = kvm_caps.has_notify_vmexit;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES:
-		r = BIT(KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM);
-		if (kvm_is_vm_type_supported(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM))
-			r |= BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+		r = kvm_caps.supported_vm_types;
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -9829,6 +9826,9 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
 
 	kvm_register_perf_callbacks(ops->handle_intel_pt_intr);
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) && tdp_mmu_enabled)
+		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+
 	if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
 		kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index a8b71803777b..d80a4c6b5a38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ struct kvm_caps {
 	bool has_bus_lock_exit;
 	/* notify VM exit supported? */
 	bool has_notify_vmexit;
+	/* bit mask of VM types */
+	u32 supported_vm_types;
 
 	u64 supported_mce_cap;
 	u64 supported_xcr0;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Paolo Bonzini]

SEV-ES allows passing custom contents for x87, SSE and AVX state into the VMSA.
Allow userspace to do that with the usual KVM_SET_XSAVE API and only mark
FPU contents as confidential after it has been copied and encrypted into
the VMSA.

Since the XSAVE state for AVX is the first, it does not need the
compacted-state handling of get_xsave_addr().  However, there are other
parts of XSAVE state in the VMSA that currently are not handled, and
the validation logic of get_xsave_addr() is pointless to duplicate
in KVM, so move get_xsave_addr() to public FPU API; it is really just
a facility to operate on XSAVE state and does not expose any internal
details of arch/x86/kernel/fpu.

Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h   |  2 --
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c         | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c         |  8 --------
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
index a2be3aefff9f..f86ad3335529 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
@@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ extern void fpstate_clear_xstate_component(struct fpstate *fps, unsigned int xfe
 
 extern u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void);
 
+extern void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr);
+
+
 /* KVM specific functions */
 extern bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
 extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
index 3518fb26d06b..4ff910545451 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ extern int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct task_struct *tsk, const void
 extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void);
 extern void fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size);
 
-extern void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr);
-
 static inline u64 xfeatures_mask_supervisor(void)
 {
 	return fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features & XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index a8300646a280..800e836a69fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <asm/pkru.h>
 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 
 #include "mmu.h"
@@ -577,6 +578,10 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
 	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
+	struct xregs_state *xsave;
+	const u8 *s;
+	u8 *d;
+	int i;
 
 	/* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
 	if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
@@ -619,6 +624,30 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 
 	save->sev_features = sev->vmsa_features;
 
+	xsave = &vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->regs.xsave;
+	save->x87_dp = xsave->i387.rdp;
+	save->mxcsr = xsave->i387.mxcsr;
+	save->x87_ftw = xsave->i387.twd;
+	save->x87_fsw = xsave->i387.swd;
+	save->x87_fcw = xsave->i387.cwd;
+	save->x87_fop = xsave->i387.fop;
+	save->x87_ds = 0;
+	save->x87_cs = 0;
+	save->x87_rip = xsave->i387.rip;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		d = save->fpreg_x87 + i * 10;
+		s = ((u8 *)xsave->i387.st_space) + i * 16;
+		memcpy(d, s, 10);
+	}
+	memcpy(save->fpreg_xmm, xsave->i387.xmm_space, 256);
+
+	s = get_xsave_addr(xsave, XFEATURE_YMM);
+	if (s)
+		memcpy(save->fpreg_ymm, s, 256);
+	else
+		memset(save->fpreg_ymm, 0, 256);
+
 	pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
 	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
 
@@ -657,6 +686,13 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	if (ret)
 	  return ret;
 
+	/*
+	 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
+	 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
+	 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
+	 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
+	 */
+	fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
 	vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index c22e87ebf0de..03108055a7b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1433,14 +1433,6 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
 		if (!vmsa_page)
 			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
-
-		/*
-		 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
-		 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
-		 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
-		 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
-		 */
-		fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
 	}
 
 	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 10/15] KVM: SEV: introduce to_kvm_sev_info

[Paolo Bonzini]

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 800e836a69fb..704cd42b4f1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int sev_flush_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
 
 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
+	return !!to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->enc_context_owner;
 }
 
 static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	vmsa.reserved = 0;
-	vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
+	vmsa.handle = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->handle;
 	vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
 	vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
 	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index b7707514d042..6313679d464b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static __always_inline struct kvm_svm *to_kvm_svm(struct kvm *kvm)
 	return container_of(kvm, struct kvm_svm, kvm);
 }
 
+static __always_inline struct kvm_sev_info *to_kvm_sev_info(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+}
+
 static __always_inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 11/15] KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES

[Paolo Bonzini]

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c          | 16 +++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h          |  1 +
 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 0b5a33ee71ee..f0b76ff5030d 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -8819,6 +8819,8 @@ means the VM type with value @n is supported.  Possible values of @n are::
 
   #define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM	0
   #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM	1
+  #define KVM_X86_SEV_VM	2
+  #define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM	3
 
 Note, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM is currently only for development and testing.
 Do not use KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM for "real" VMs, and especially not in
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index d0c1b459f7e9..9d950b0b64c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -857,5 +857,7 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
 
 #define KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM	0
 #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM	1
+#define KVM_X86_SEV_VM		2
+#define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM	3
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 704cd42b4f1b..7c2b0471b92c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	if (kvm->created_vcpus)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (unlikely(sev->active))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -270,6 +273,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->mirror_vms);
+	sev->need_init = false;
 
 	kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV);
 
@@ -1841,7 +1845,8 @@ int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_fput;
 
-	if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
+	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != source_kvm->arch.vm_type ||
+	    sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
@@ -2162,6 +2167,7 @@ int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
 	mirror_sev->asid = source_sev->asid;
 	mirror_sev->fd = source_sev->fd;
 	mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev->es_active;
+	mirror_sev->need_init = false;
 	mirror_sev->handle = source_sev->handle;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->regions_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->mirror_vms);
@@ -2227,10 +2233,14 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
-	if (sev_enabled)
+	if (sev_enabled) {
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
-	if (sev_es_enabled)
+		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
+	}
+	if (sev_es_enabled) {
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+	}
 }
 
 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 03108055a7b0..0f3b59da0d4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4078,6 +4078,9 @@ static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static int svm_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	if (to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm)->need_init)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -4883,6 +4886,14 @@ static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	int type = kvm->arch.vm_type;
+
+	if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM &&
+	    type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) {
+		kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+		to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
+	}
+
 	if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
 		kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 6313679d464b..c08eb6095e80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ enum {
 struct kvm_sev_info {
 	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
 	bool es_active;		/* SEV-ES enabled guest */
+	bool need_init;		/* waiting for SEV_INIT2 */
 	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
 	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
 	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 12/15] KVM: SEV: introduce KVM_SEV_INIT2 operation

[Paolo Bonzini]

The idea that no parameter would ever be necessary when enabling SEV or
SEV-ES for a VM was decidedly optimistic.  In fact, in some sense it's
already a parameter whether SEV or SEV-ES is desired.  Another possible
source of variability is the desired set of VMSA features, as that affects
the measurement of the VM's initial state and cannot be changed
arbitrarily by the hypervisor.

Create a new sub-operation for KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP that can take a struct,
and put the new op to work by including the VMSA features as a field of the
struct.  The existing KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT use the full set of
supported VMSA features for backwards compatibility.

The struct also includes the usual bells and whistles for future
extensibility: a flags field that must be zero for now, and some padding
at the end.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 .../virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst    | 40 ++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h               |  9 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 53 ++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index fb41470c0310..f7c007d34114 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -76,15 +76,49 @@ are defined in ``<linux/psp-dev.h>``.
 KVM implements the following commands to support common lifecycle events of SEV
 guests, such as launching, running, snapshotting, migrating and decommissioning.
 
-1. KVM_SEV_INIT
----------------
+1. KVM_SEV_INIT2
+----------------
 
-The KVM_SEV_INIT command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the SEV platform
+The KVM_SEV_INIT2 command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the SEV platform
 context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued.
 
+For this command to be accepted, either KVM_X86_SEV_VM or KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM
+must have been passed to the KVM_CREATE_VM ioctl.  A virtual machine created
+with those machine types in turn cannot be run until KVM_SEV_INIT2 is invoked.
+
+Parameters: struct kvm_sev_init (in)
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
 
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_init {
+                __u64 vmsa_features;  /* initial value of features field in VMSA */
+                __u32 flags;          /* must be 0 */
+                __u32 pad[9];
+        };
+
+It is an error if the hypervisor does not support any of the bits that
+are set in ``flags`` or ``vmsa_features``.  ``vmsa_features`` must be
+0 for SEV virtual machines, as they do not have a VMSA.
+
+This command replaces the deprecated KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT commands.
+The commands did not have any parameters (the ```data``` field was unused) and
+only work for the KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM machine type (0).
+
+They behave as if:
+
+* the VM type is KVM_X86_SEV_VM for KVM_SEV_INIT, or KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM for
+  KVM_SEV_ES_INIT
+
+* the ``flags`` and ``vmsa_features`` fields of ``struct kvm_sev_init`` are
+  set to zero
+
+If the ``KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES`` attribute does not exist, the hypervisor only
+supports KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT.  In that case, note that KVM_SEV_ES_INIT
+might set the debug swap VMSA feature (bit 5) depending on the value of the
+``debug_swap`` parameter of ``kvm-amd.ko``.
+
 2. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
 -----------------------
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 9d950b0b64c9..51b13080ed4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -690,6 +690,9 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {
 	/* Guest Migration Extension */
 	KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL,
 
+	/* Second time is the charm; improved versions of the above ioctls.  */
+	KVM_SEV_INIT2,
+
 	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
 };
 
@@ -701,6 +704,12 @@ struct kvm_sev_cmd {
 	__u32 sev_fd;
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_init {
+	__u64 vmsa_features;
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 pad[9];
+};
+
 struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
 	__u32 handle;
 	__u32 policy;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7c2b0471b92c..dc22b31faebd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -240,27 +240,31 @@ static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
 	sev_decommission(handle);
 }
 
-static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
+			    struct kvm_sev_init *data,
+			    unsigned long vm_type)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
 	struct sev_platform_init_args init_args = {0};
+	bool es_active = vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
+	u64 valid_vmsa_features = es_active ? sev_supported_vmsa_features : 0;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (kvm->created_vcpus)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM)
+	if (data->flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (unlikely(sev->active))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	sev->active = true;
-	sev->es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
-	sev->vmsa_features = sev_supported_vmsa_features;
-	if (sev_supported_vmsa_features)
-		pr_warn_once("Enabling DebugSwap with KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. "
-			     "This will not work starting with Linux 6.10\n");
+	sev->es_active = es_active;
+	sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features;
 
 	ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
 	if (ret)
@@ -290,6 +294,38 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_init data = {
+		.vmsa_features = 0,
+	};
+	unsigned long vm_type;
+
+	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vm_type = (argp->id == KVM_SEV_INIT ? KVM_X86_SEV_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+	return __sev_guest_init(kvm, argp, &data, vm_type);
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct kvm_sev_init data;
+
+	if (!sev->need_init)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM &&
+	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return __sev_guest_init(kvm, argp, &data, kvm->arch.vm_type);
+}
+
 static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
 {
 	unsigned int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
@@ -1940,6 +1976,9 @@ int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_INIT:
 		r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_INIT2:
+		r = sev_guest_init2(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
 		r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 13/15] KVM: SEV: allow SEV-ES DebugSwap again

[Paolo Bonzini]

The DebugSwap feature of SEV-ES provides a way for confidential guests
to use data breakpoints.  Its status is record in VMSA, and therefore
attestation signatures depend on whether it is enabled or not.  In order
to avoid invalidating the signatures depending on the host machine, it
was disabled by default (see commit 5abf6dceb066, "SEV: disable SEV-ES
DebugSwap by default", 2024-03-09).

However, we now have a new API to create SEV VMs that allows enabling
DebugSwap based on what the user tells KVM to do, and we also changed the
legacy KVM_SEV_ES_INIT API to never enable DebugSwap.  It is therefore
possible to re-enable the feature without breaking compatibility with
kernels that pre-date the introduction of DebugSwap, so go ahead.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index dc22b31faebd..1a11840facfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
-static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
+static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
 static u64 sev_supported_vmsa_features;
 

[PATCH v4 14/15] selftests: kvm: add tests for KVM_SEV_INIT2

[Paolo Bonzini]

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |   6 +-
 .../selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c    |   8 +-
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c    | 149 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index 741c7dc16afc..871e2de3eb05 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/tsc_msrs_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_pmu_caps_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_shinfo_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_init2_tests
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_migrate_tests
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_smoke_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/amx_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 3e0db283a46a..7c06ceb36643 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -890,17 +890,15 @@ static inline struct kvm_vm *vm_create_barebones(void)
 	return ____vm_create(VM_SHAPE_DEFAULT);
 }
 
-#ifdef __x86_64__
-static inline struct kvm_vm *vm_create_barebones_protected_vm(void)
+static inline struct kvm_vm *vm_create_barebones_type(unsigned long type)
 {
 	const struct vm_shape shape = {
 		.mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT,
-		.type = KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM,
+		.type = type,
 	};
 
 	return ____vm_create(shape);
 }
-#endif
 
 static inline struct kvm_vm *vm_create(uint32_t nr_runnable_vcpus)
 {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c
index 06b43ed23580..904d58793fc6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/set_memory_region_test.c
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void test_invalid_memory_region_flags(void)
 
 #ifdef __x86_64__
 	if (kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM))
-		vm = vm_create_barebones_protected_vm();
+		vm = vm_create_barebones_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
 	else
 #endif
 		vm = vm_create_barebones();
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static void test_add_private_memory_region(void)
 
 	pr_info("Testing ADD of KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memory regions\n");
 
-	vm = vm_create_barebones_protected_vm();
+	vm = vm_create_barebones_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
 
 	test_invalid_guest_memfd(vm, vm->kvm_fd, 0, "KVM fd should fail");
 	test_invalid_guest_memfd(vm, vm->fd, 0, "VM's fd should fail");
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static void test_add_private_memory_region(void)
 	test_invalid_guest_memfd(vm, memfd, 0, "Regular memfd() should fail");
 	close(memfd);
 
-	vm2 = vm_create_barebones_protected_vm();
+	vm2 = vm_create_barebones_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
 	memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm2, MEM_REGION_SIZE, 0);
 	test_invalid_guest_memfd(vm, memfd, 0, "Other VM's guest_memfd() should fail");
 
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static void test_add_overlapping_private_memory_regions(void)
 
 	pr_info("Testing ADD of overlapping KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memory regions\n");
 
-	vm = vm_create_barebones_protected_vm();
+	vm = vm_create_barebones_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
 
 	memfd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, MEM_REGION_SIZE * 4, 0);
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fe55aa5a1b04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_init2_tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/kvm.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+
+#include "test_util.h"
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "kselftest.h"
+
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP 32u
+
+/*
+ * Some features may have hidden dependencies, or may only work
+ * for certain VM types.  Err on the side of safety and don't
+ * expect that all supported features can be passed one by one
+ * to KVM_SEV_INIT2.
+ *
+ * (Well, right now there's only one...)
+ */
+#define KNOWN_FEATURES SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP
+
+int kvm_fd;
+u64 supported_vmsa_features;
+bool have_sev_es;
+
+static int __sev_ioctl(int vm_fd, int cmd_id, void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_cmd cmd = {
+		.id = cmd_id,
+		.data = (uint64_t)data,
+		.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit(),
+	};
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ioctl(vm_fd, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &cmd);
+	TEST_ASSERT(ret < 0 || cmd.error == SEV_RET_SUCCESS,
+		    "%d failed: fw error: %d\n",
+		    cmd_id, cmd.error);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void test_init2(unsigned long vm_type, struct kvm_sev_init *init)
+{
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	int ret;
+
+	vm = vm_create_barebones_type(vm_type);
+	ret = __sev_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_SEV_INIT2, init);
+	TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
+		    "KVM_SEV_INIT2 return code is %d (expected 0), errno: %d",
+		    ret, errno);
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+static void test_init2_invalid(unsigned long vm_type, struct kvm_sev_init *init, const char *msg)
+{
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	int ret;
+
+	vm = vm_create_barebones_type(vm_type);
+	ret = __sev_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_SEV_INIT2, init);
+	TEST_ASSERT(ret == -1 && errno == EINVAL,
+		    "KVM_SEV_INIT2 should fail, %s.",
+		    msg);
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+void test_vm_types(void)
+{
+	test_init2(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, &(struct kvm_sev_init){});
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: check that unsupported types cannot be created.  Probably
+	 * a separate selftest.
+	 */
+	if (have_sev_es)
+		test_init2(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, &(struct kvm_sev_init){});
+
+	test_init2_invalid(0, &(struct kvm_sev_init){},
+			   "VM type is KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM");
+	if (kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM))
+		test_init2_invalid(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, &(struct kvm_sev_init){},
+				   "VM type is KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM");
+}
+
+void test_flags(uint32_t vm_type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+		test_init2_invalid(vm_type,
+			&(struct kvm_sev_init){ .flags = BIT(i) },
+			"invalid flag");
+}
+
+void test_features(uint32_t vm_type, uint64_t supported_features)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+		if (!(supported_features & (1u << i)))
+			test_init2_invalid(vm_type,
+				&(struct kvm_sev_init){ .vmsa_features = BIT_ULL(i) },
+				"unknown feature");
+		else if (KNOWN_FEATURES & (1u << i))
+			test_init2(vm_type,
+				&(struct kvm_sev_init){ .vmsa_features = BIT_ULL(i) });
+	}
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int kvm_fd = open_kvm_dev_path_or_exit();
+	bool have_sev;
+
+	TEST_REQUIRE(__kvm_has_device_attr(kvm_fd, 0, KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES) == 0);
+	kvm_device_attr_get(kvm_fd, 0, KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES, &supported_vmsa_features);
+
+	have_sev = kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+	TEST_ASSERT(have_sev == !!(kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_VM)),
+		    "sev: KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES (%x) does not match cpuid (checking %x)",
+		    kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES), 1 << KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
+
+	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_VM));
+	have_sev_es = kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+
+	TEST_ASSERT(have_sev_es == !!(kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM)),
+		    "sev-es: KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES (%x) does not match cpuid (checking %x)",
+		    kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES), 1 << KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+
+	test_vm_types();
+
+	test_flags(KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
+	if (have_sev_es)
+		test_flags(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+
+	test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0);
+	if (have_sev_es)
+		test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, supported_vmsa_features);
+
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 15/15] selftests: kvm: switch to using KVM_X86_*_VM

[Paolo Bonzini]

This removes the concept of "subtypes", instead letting the tests use proper
VM types that were recently added.  While the sev_init_vm() and sev_es_init_vm()
are still able to operate with the legacy KVM_SEV_INIT and KVM_SEV_ES_INIT
ioctls, this is limited to VMs that are created manually with
vm_create_barebones().

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h     |  5 ++--
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h  |  6 ----
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h        | 16 ++--------
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c    |  1 -
 .../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c      | 14 +++++----
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c  | 30 +++++++++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 7c06ceb36643..8acca8237687 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ enum kvm_mem_region_type {
 struct kvm_vm {
 	int mode;
 	unsigned long type;
-	uint8_t subtype;
 	int kvm_fd;
 	int fd;
 	unsigned int pgtable_levels;
@@ -200,8 +199,8 @@ enum vm_guest_mode {
 struct vm_shape {
 	uint32_t type;
 	uint8_t  mode;
-	uint8_t  subtype;
-	uint16_t padding;
+	uint8_t  pad0;
+	uint16_t pad1;
 };
 
 kvm_static_assert(sizeof(struct vm_shape) == sizeof(uint64_t));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
index 3bd03b088dda..3c8dfd8180b1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/processor.h
@@ -23,12 +23,6 @@
 extern bool host_cpu_is_intel;
 extern bool host_cpu_is_amd;
 
-enum vm_guest_x86_subtype {
-	VM_SUBTYPE_NONE = 0,
-	VM_SUBTYPE_SEV,
-	VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES,
-};
-
 /* Forced emulation prefix, used to invoke the emulator unconditionally. */
 #define KVM_FEP "ud2; .byte 'k', 'v', 'm';"
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
index 8a1bf88474c9..0719f083351a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -67,20 +67,8 @@ kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
 	__TEST_ASSERT_VM_VCPU_IOCTL(!ret, #cmd,	ret, vm);		\
 })
 
-static inline void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
-{
-	vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
-
-	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
-}
-
-
-static inline void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
-{
-	vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
-
-	vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_ES_INIT, NULL);
-}
+void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
 static inline void sev_register_encrypted_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm,
 						 struct userspace_mem_region *region)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index b2262b5fad9e..9da388100f3a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ struct kvm_vm *____vm_create(struct vm_shape shape)
 
 	vm->mode = shape.mode;
 	vm->type = shape.type;
-	vm->subtype = shape.subtype;
 
 	vm->pa_bits = vm_guest_mode_params[vm->mode].pa_bits;
 	vm->va_bits = vm_guest_mode_params[vm->mode].va_bits;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
index 74a4c736c9ae..9f87ca8b7ab6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
@@ -578,10 +578,11 @@ void kvm_arch_vm_post_create(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_intel);
 	sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_amd);
 
-	if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV)
-		sev_vm_init(vm);
-	else if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES)
-		sev_es_vm_init(vm);
+	if (vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM || vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM) {
+		struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+	}
 }
 
 void vcpu_arch_set_entry_point(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *guest_code)
@@ -1081,9 +1082,12 @@ void kvm_get_cpu_address_width(unsigned int *pa_bits, unsigned int *va_bits)
 
 void kvm_init_vm_address_properties(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 {
-	if (vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV || vm->subtype == VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES) {
+	if (vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM || vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM) {
+		vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
 		vm->arch.c_bit = BIT_ULL(this_cpu_property(X86_PROPERTY_SEV_C_BIT));
 		vm->gpa_tag_mask = vm->arch.c_bit;
+	} else {
+		vm->arch.sev_fd = -1;
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
index e248d3364b9c..597994fa4f41 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -35,6 +35,32 @@ static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *regio
 	}
 }
 
+void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	if (vm->type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
+		assert(vm->arch.sev_fd == -1);
+		vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
+	} else {
+		struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+		assert(vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+	}
+}
+
+void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+	if (vm->type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
+		assert(vm->arch.sev_fd == -1);
+		vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_ES_INIT, NULL);
+	} else {
+		struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+		assert(vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+		vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+	}
+}
+
 void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
@@ -91,10 +117,8 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code,
 					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
 {
 	struct vm_shape shape = {
-		.type = VM_TYPE_DEFAULT,
 		.mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT,
-		.subtype = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? VM_SUBTYPE_SEV_ES :
-						    VM_SUBTYPE_SEV,
+		.type = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_VM,
 	};
 	struct kvm_vm *vm;
 	struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1];
-- 
2.43.0


-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v4 00/15] KVM: SEV: allow customizing VMSA features

[Michael Roth]

On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 07:33:37PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> 
> The idea is that SEV SNP will only ever support KVM_SEV_INIT2.  I have
> placed patches for QEMU to support this new API at branch sevinit2 of
> https://gitlab.com/bonzini/qemu.

I don't see any references to KVM_SEV_INIT2 in the sevinit2 branch. Has
everything been pushed already?

-Mike

Re: [PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Michael Roth]

On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 07:33:46PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> SEV-ES allows passing custom contents for x87, SSE and AVX state into the VMSA.
> Allow userspace to do that with the usual KVM_SET_XSAVE API and only mark
> FPU contents as confidential after it has been copied and encrypted into
> the VMSA.
> 
> Since the XSAVE state for AVX is the first, it does not need the
> compacted-state handling of get_xsave_addr().  However, there are other
> parts of XSAVE state in the VMSA that currently are not handled, and
> the validation logic of get_xsave_addr() is pointless to duplicate
> in KVM, so move get_xsave_addr() to public FPU API; it is really just
> a facility to operate on XSAVE state and does not expose any internal
> details of arch/x86/kernel/fpu.
> 
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  3 +++
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h   |  2 --
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c         | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c         |  8 --------
>  4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
> index a2be3aefff9f..f86ad3335529 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
> @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ extern void fpstate_clear_xstate_component(struct fpstate *fps, unsigned int xfe
>  
>  extern u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void);
>  
> +extern void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr);

I get a linker error if I don't add an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_xsave_addr)

-Mike

[PATCH v4 16/15] fixup! KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Paolo Bonzini]

A small change to add EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL, and especially to actually match
the format in which the processor expects x87 registers in the VMSA.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c       | 12 ++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 117e74c44e75..eeaf4ec9243d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -990,6 +990,7 @@ void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr)
 
 	return __raw_xsave_addr(xsave, xfeature_nr);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_xsave_addr);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index cee6beb2bf29..66fa852b48b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -679,9 +679,17 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	save->x87_rip = xsave->i387.rip;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-		d = save->fpreg_x87 + i * 10;
+		/*
+		 * The format of the x87 save area is totally undocumented,
+		 * and definitely not what you would expect.  It consists
+		 * of an 8*8 bytes area with bytes 0-7 and an 8*2 bytes area
+		 * with bytes 8-9 of each register.
+		 */
+		d = save->fpreg_x87 + i * 8;
 		s = ((u8 *)xsave->i387.st_space) + i * 16;
-		memcpy(d, s, 10);
+		memcpy(d, s, 8);
+		save->fpreg_x87[64 + i * 2] = s[8];
+		save->fpreg_x87[64 + i * 2 + 1] = s[9];
 	}
 	memcpy(save->fpreg_xmm, xsave->i387.xmm_space, 256);
 
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 17/15] selftests: kvm: split "launch" phase of SEV VM creation

[Paolo Bonzini]

Allow the caller to set the initial state of the VM.  Doing this
before sev_vm_launch() matters for SEV-ES, since that is the
place where the VMSA is updated and after which the guest state
becomes sealed.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h |  3 ++-
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c     | 16 ++++++++++------
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c        |  7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
index 0719f083351a..82c11c81a956 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
 void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
 void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
 
-struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code,
+struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
 					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu);
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
 
 kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
index 597994fa4f41..d482029b6004 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -113,26 +113,30 @@ void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
 }
 
-struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t policy, void *guest_code,
+struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
 					   struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
 {
 	struct vm_shape shape = {
 		.mode = VM_MODE_DEFAULT,
-		.type = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_VM,
+		.type = type,
 	};
 	struct kvm_vm *vm;
 	struct kvm_vcpu *cpus[1];
-	uint8_t measurement[512];
 
 	vm = __vm_create_with_vcpus(shape, 1, 0, guest_code, cpus);
 	*cpu = cpus[0];
 
+	return vm;
+}
+
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
+{
 	sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
 
-	/* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */
+	if (!measurement)
+		measurement = alloca(256);
+
 	sev_vm_launch_measure(vm, measurement);
 
 	sev_vm_launch_finish(vm);
-
-	return vm;
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
index 026779f3ed06..234c80dd344d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -41,7 +41,12 @@ static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
 	struct kvm_vm *vm;
 	struct ucall uc;
 
-	vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(policy, guest_code, &vcpu);
+	uint32_t type = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
+
+	vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(type, guest_code, &vcpu);
+
+	/* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */
+	vm_sev_launch(vm, policy, NULL);
 
 	for (;;) {
 		vcpu_run(vcpu);
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v4 18/15] selftests: kvm: add test for transferring FPU state into the VMSA

[Paolo Bonzini]

Test that CRn, XCR0 and FPU state are correctly moved from KVM's internal
state to the VMSA by SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c     | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
index 234c80dd344d..195150bc5013 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <math.h>
 
 #include "test_util.h"
 #include "kvm_util.h"
@@ -13,6 +14,8 @@
 #include "sev.h"
 
 
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM)
+
 static void guest_sev_es_code(void)
 {
 	/* TODO: Check CPUID after GHCB-based hypercall support is added. */
@@ -35,6 +38,84 @@ static void guest_sev_code(void)
 	GUEST_DONE();
 }
 
+/* Stash state passed via VMSA before any compiled code runs.  */
+extern void guest_code_xsave(void);
+asm("guest_code_xsave:\n"
+    "mov $-1, %eax\n"
+    "mov $-1, %edx\n"
+    "xsave (%rdi)\n"
+    "jmp guest_sev_es_code");
+
+static void compare_xsave(u8 *from_host, u8 *from_guest)
+{
+	int i;
+	bool bad = false;
+	for (i = 0; i < 4095; i++) {
+		if (from_host[i] != from_guest[i]) {
+			printf("mismatch at %02hhx | %02hhx %02hhx\n", i, from_host[i], from_guest[i]);
+			bad = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (bad)
+		abort();
+}
+
+static void test_sync_vmsa(uint32_t policy)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	vm_vaddr_t gva;
+	void *hva;
+
+	double x87val = M_PI;
+	struct kvm_xsave __attribute__((aligned(64))) xsave = { 0 };
+	struct kvm_sregs sregs;
+	struct kvm_xcrs xcrs = {
+		.nr_xcrs = 1,
+		.xcrs[0].xcr = 0,
+		.xcrs[0].value = XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX,
+	};
+
+	vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, guest_code_xsave, &vcpu);
+	gva = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, PAGE_SIZE, KVM_UTIL_MIN_VADDR,
+				    MEM_REGION_TEST_DATA);
+	hva = addr_gva2hva(vm, gva);
+
+	vcpu_args_set(vcpu, 1, gva);
+
+	vcpu_sregs_get(vcpu, &sregs);
+	sregs.cr4 |= X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE;
+	vcpu_sregs_set(vcpu, &sregs);
+
+	vcpu_xcrs_set(vcpu, &xcrs);
+	asm("fninit; fldl %3\n"
+	    "vpcmpeqb %%ymm4, %%ymm4, %%ymm4\n"
+	    "xsave (%2)"
+	    : "=m"(xsave)
+	    : "A"(XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX), "r"(&xsave), "m" (x87val)
+	    : "ymm4", "st", "st(1)", "st(2)", "st(3)", "st(4)", "st(5)", "st(6)", "st(7)");
+	vcpu_xsave_set(vcpu, &xsave);
+
+	vm_sev_launch(vm, SEV_POLICY_ES | policy, NULL);
+
+	/* This page is shared, so make it decrypted.  */
+	memset(hva, 0, 4096);
+
+	vcpu_run(vcpu);
+
+	TEST_ASSERT(vcpu->run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT,
+		    "Wanted SYSTEM_EVENT, got %s",
+		    exit_reason_str(vcpu->run->exit_reason));
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vcpu->run->system_event.type, KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vcpu->run->system_event.ndata, 1);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vcpu->run->system_event.data[0], GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ);
+
+	compare_xsave((u8 *)&xsave, (u8 *)hva);
+
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
 static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
@@ -87,6 +168,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES)) {
 		test_sev(guest_sev_es_code, SEV_POLICY_ES | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
 		test_sev(guest_sev_es_code, SEV_POLICY_ES);
+
+		if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_XCRS) &&
+		    (xgetbv(0) & XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX) == XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX) {
+			test_sync_vmsa(0);
+			test_sync_vmsa(SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Paolo Bonzini]

On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 2:42 PM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
> > Since the XSAVE state for AVX is the first, it does not need the
> > compacted-state handling of get_xsave_addr().  However, there are other
> > parts of XSAVE state in the VMSA that currently are not handled, and
> > the validation logic of get_xsave_addr() is pointless to duplicate
> > in KVM, so move get_xsave_addr() to public FPU API; it is really just
> > a facility to operate on XSAVE state and does not expose any internal
> > details of arch/x86/kernel/fpu.
> >
> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  3 +++
> >  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h   |  2 --
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c         | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c         |  8 --------
> >  4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
> > index a2be3aefff9f..f86ad3335529 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h
> > @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ extern void fpstate_clear_xstate_component(struct fpstate *fps, unsigned int xfe
> >
> >  extern u64 xstate_get_guest_group_perm(void);
> >
> > +extern void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr);
>
> I get a linker error if I don't add an EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_xsave_addr)

Indeed, and also the format for the 10-byte x87 registers is... unusual.

I sent a follow up at the end of this thread that includes a fixup for
this patch and the FPU/XSAVE test for SEV-ES.

Paolo

Re: [PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Dave Hansen]

On 3/18/24 16:33, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Since the XSAVE state for AVX is the first, it does not need the
> compacted-state handling of get_xsave_addr().  However, there are other
> parts of XSAVE state in the VMSA that currently are not handled, and
> the validation logic of get_xsave_addr() is pointless to duplicate
> in KVM, so move get_xsave_addr() to public FPU API; it is really just
> a facility to operate on XSAVE state and does not expose any internal
> details of arch/x86/kernel/fpu.

We don't want to grow _too_ many users of get_xsave_addr() since it's
hard to use it right.  But this seems to be a legitimate user.

Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

Re: [PATCH v4 02/15] KVM: SVM: Compile sev.c if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y

[kernel test robot]

Hi Paolo,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on kvm/queue]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master next-20240319]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core mst-vhost/linux-next kvm/linux-next v6.8]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Paolo-Bonzini/KVM-SVM-Invert-handling-of-SEV-and-SEV_ES-feature-flags/20240319-074252
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git queue
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240318233352.2728327-3-pbonzini%40redhat.com
patch subject: [PATCH v4 02/15] KVM: SVM: Compile sev.c if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
config: i386-allmodconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240320/202403200610.90F5Upvs-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240320/202403200610.90F5Upvs-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202403200610.90F5Upvs-lkp@intel.com/

All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'init_vmcb':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1367:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_init_vmcb'; did you mean 'init_vmcb'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    1367 |                 sev_init_vmcb(svm);
         |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |                 init_vmcb
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function '__svm_vcpu_reset':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1391:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_es_vcpu_reset'; did you mean 'kvm_vcpu_reset'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    1391 |                 sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
         |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |                 kvm_vcpu_reset
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'svm_prepare_switch_to_guest':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1512:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_es_unmap_ghcb' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    1512 |                 sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
         |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1526:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest'; did you mean 'svm_prepare_switch_to_guest'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    1526 |                 sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
         |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |                 svm_prepare_switch_to_guest
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'io_interception':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:2226:32: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_es_string_io'; did you mean 'kvm_sev_es_string_io'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    2226 |                         return sev_es_string_io(svm, size, port, in);
         |                                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |                                kvm_sev_es_string_io
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'pre_svm_run':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3549:24: error: implicit declaration of function 'pre_sev_run'; did you mean 'pre_svm_run'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    3549 |                 return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);
         |                        ^~~~~~~~~~~
         |                        pre_svm_run
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3549:24: warning: 'return' with a value, in function returning void [-Wreturn-type]
    3549 |                 return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);
         |                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3532:13: note: declared here
    3532 | static void pre_svm_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
         |             ^~~~~~~~~~~
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4356:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid'; did you mean 'svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    4356 |                 sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
         |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |                 svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c: In function 'svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector':
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4883:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector'; did you mean 'svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    4883 |         sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |         svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector
   cc1: some warnings being treated as errors


vim +1367 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

36e8194dcd749c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-09-23  1226  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1227  static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1228  {
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1229  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1230  	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1231  	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &vmcb->control;
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1232  	struct vmcb_save_area *save = &vmcb->save;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1233  
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1234  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1235  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1236  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1237  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1238  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1239  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1240  	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1241  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1242  
5315c716b69f47 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Paolo Bonzini         2014-03-03  1243  	set_dr_intercepts(svm);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1244  
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1245  	set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1246  	set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1247  	set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
54a20552e1eae0 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Eric Northup          2015-11-03  1248  	set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
cbdb967af3d549 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Paolo Bonzini         2015-11-10  1249  	set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1250  	/*
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1251  	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1252  	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1253  	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
29de732cc95cb5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Alexey Kardashevskiy  2023-06-15  1254  	 * as VMware does.
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1255  	 */
29de732cc95cb5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Alexey Kardashevskiy  2023-06-15  1256  	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1257  		set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1258  
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1259  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1260  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
4b639a9f82fcf1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-07-07  1261  
4b639a9f82fcf1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-07-07  1262  	if (intercept_smi)
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1263  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
4b639a9f82fcf1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-07-07  1264  
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1265  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1266  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1267  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1268  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1269  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1270  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1271  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1272  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1273  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1274  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1275  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1276  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1277  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1278  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1279  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1280  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1281  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1282  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1283  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1284  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPRU);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1285  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM);
668fffa3f838ed arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Michael S. Tsirkin    2017-04-21  1286  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1287  	if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1288  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1289  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
668fffa3f838ed arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Michael S. Tsirkin    2017-04-21  1290  	}
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1291  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1292  	if (!kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1293  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
caa057a2cad647 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Wanpeng Li            2018-03-12  1294  
d0ec49d4de9080 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Tom Lendacky          2017-07-17  1295  	control->iopm_base_pa = __sme_set(iopm_base);
d0ec49d4de9080 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Tom Lendacky          2017-07-17  1296  	control->msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->msrpm));
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1297  	control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1298  
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1299  	init_seg(&save->es);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1300  	init_seg(&save->ss);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1301  	init_seg(&save->ds);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1302  	init_seg(&save->fs);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1303  	init_seg(&save->gs);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1304  
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1305  	save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
04b66839d312d3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Paolo Bonzini         2013-03-19  1306  	save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1307  	/* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1308  	save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1309  		SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1310  	save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1311  
4f117ce4aefca0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-07-13  1312  	save->gdtr.base = 0;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1313  	save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
4f117ce4aefca0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-07-13  1314  	save->idtr.base = 0;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1315  	save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1316  
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1317  	init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1318  	init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1319  
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1320  	if (npt_enabled) {
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1321  		/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
cea3a19b007a69 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Tom Lendacky          2017-12-04  1322  		control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1323  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1324  		clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1325  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1326  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1327  		save->g_pat = vcpu->arch.pat;
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1328  		save->cr3 = 0;
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1329  	}
193015adf40d04 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-12  1330  	svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
7e8e6eed75e290 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2020-10-11  1331  	svm->asid = 0;
1371d90460189d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Alexander Graf        2008-11-25  1332  
c74ad08f3333db arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-05-03  1333  	svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
c74ad08f3333db arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-05-03  1334  	svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
2af9194d1b683f arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2009-08-07  1335  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1336  	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1337  		control->pause_filter_count = pause_filter_count;
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1338  		if (pause_filter_thresh)
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1339  			control->pause_filter_thresh = pause_filter_thresh;
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1340  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1341  	} else {
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1342  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
565d0998ecac83 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Mark Langsdorf        2009-10-06  1343  	}
565d0998ecac83 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Mark Langsdorf        2009-10-06  1344  
3b195ac9260235 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-05-04  1345  	svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
4407a797e9412a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1346  
89c8a4984fc98e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-07-06  1347  	/*
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1348  	 * If the host supports V_SPEC_CTRL then disable the interception
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1349  	 * of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
89c8a4984fc98e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-07-06  1350  	 */
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1351  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1352  		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1353  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1354  	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1355  		avic_init_vmcb(svm, vmcb);
89c8a4984fc98e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-07-06  1356  
fa4c027a7956f5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Santosh Shukla        2023-02-27  1357  	if (vnmi)
fa4c027a7956f5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Santosh Shukla        2023-02-27  1358  		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK;
fa4c027a7956f5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Santosh Shukla        2023-02-27  1359  
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1360  	if (vgif) {
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1361  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1362  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1363  		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1364  	}
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1365  
6defa24d3b12bb arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Peter Gonda           2022-06-23  1366  	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
6defa24d3b12bb arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Peter Gonda           2022-06-23 @1367  		sev_init_vmcb(svm);
1654efcbc431a3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Brijesh Singh         2017-12-04  1368  
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1369  	svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
36e8194dcd749c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-09-23  1370  	init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
1e0c7d40758bcd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Vineeth Pillai        2021-06-03  1371  
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1372  	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(vmcb);
8d28fec406e4d5 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Roedel, Joerg         2010-12-03  1373  
2af9194d1b683f arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2009-08-07  1374  	enable_gif(svm);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1375  }
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1376  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1377  static void __svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1378  {
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1379  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1380  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1381  	svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1382  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1383  	svm_init_osvw(vcpu);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1384  	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
938c8745bcf2f7 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-05-24  1385  	svm->tsc_ratio_msr = kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1386  
916b54a7688b0b arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2023-01-30  1387  	svm->nmi_masked = false;
916b54a7688b0b arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2023-01-30  1388  	svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
916b54a7688b0b arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2023-01-30  1389  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1390  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20 @1391  		sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1392  }
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1393  
d28bc9dd25ce02 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Nadav Amit            2015-04-13  1394  static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1395  {
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1396  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1397  
b2ac58f90540e3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     KarimAllah Ahmed      2018-02-03  1398  	svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
ccbcd2674472a9 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Thomas Gleixner       2018-05-09  1399  	svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
b2ac58f90540e3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     KarimAllah Ahmed      2018-02-03  1400  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1401  	init_vmcb(vcpu);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1402  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1403  	if (!init_event)
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1404  		__svm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1405  }
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1406  
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1407  void svm_switch_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_vmcb_info *target_vmcb)
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1408  {
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1409  	svm->current_vmcb = target_vmcb;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1410  	svm->vmcb = target_vmcb->ptr;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1411  }
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1412  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28  1413  static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1414  {
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1415  	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1416  	struct page *vmcb01_page;
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1417  	struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
fb3f0f51d92d14 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Rusty Russell         2007-07-27  1418  	int err;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1419  
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1420  	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1421  	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
fb3f0f51d92d14 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Rusty Russell         2007-07-27  1422  
fb3f0f51d92d14 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Rusty Russell         2007-07-27  1423  	err = -ENOMEM;
75253db41a467a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Brijesh Singh         2024-01-25  1424  	vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1425  	if (!vmcb01_page)
987b2594ed5d12 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1426  		goto out;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1427  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1428  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1429  		/*
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1430  		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1431  		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1432  		 */
75253db41a467a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Brijesh Singh         2024-01-25  1433  		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1434  		if (!vmsa_page)
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1435  			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1436  
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1437  		/*
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1438  		 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1439  		 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
d69c1382e1b73a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Thomas Gleixner       2021-10-22  1440  		 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
d69c1382e1b73a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Thomas Gleixner       2021-10-22  1441  		 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1442  		 */
d69c1382e1b73a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Thomas Gleixner       2021-10-22  1443  		fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1444  	}
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1445  
dfa20099e26e35 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2017-09-12  1446  	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1447  	if (err)
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1448  		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
411b44ba80ab00 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-08-23  1449  
476c9bd8e997b4 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Aaron Lewis           2020-09-25  1450  	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
054409ab253d9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Chen Zhou             2020-11-17  1451  	if (!svm->msrpm) {
054409ab253d9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Chen Zhou             2020-11-17  1452  		err = -ENOMEM;
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1453  		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
054409ab253d9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Chen Zhou             2020-11-17  1454  	}
b286d5d8b0836e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Alexander Graf        2008-11-25  1455  
091abbf578f926 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-05-19  1456  	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;
091abbf578f926 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-05-19  1457  
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1458  	svm->vmcb01.ptr = page_address(vmcb01_page);
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1459  	svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1460  	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1461  
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1462  	if (vmsa_page)
b67a4cc35c9f72 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Peter Gonda           2021-10-21  1463  		svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1464  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1465  	svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1466  
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1467  	return 0;
36241b8c7cbcc8 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-22  1468  
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1469  error_free_vmsa_page:
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1470  	if (vmsa_page)
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1471  		__free_page(vmsa_page);
8d22b90e942c26 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2020-08-27  1472  error_free_vmcb_page:
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1473  	__free_page(vmcb01_page);
987b2594ed5d12 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1474  out:
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1475  	return err;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1476  }
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1477  
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1478  static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1479  {
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1480  	int i;
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1481  
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1482  	for_each_online_cpu(i)
73412dfeea724e arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-11-09  1483  		cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data.current_vmcb, i), vmcb, NULL);
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1484  }
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1485  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28  1486  static void svm_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1487  {
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1488  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1489  
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1490  	/*
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1491  	 * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1492  	 * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1493  	 * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb.
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1494  	 */
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1495  	svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb);
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1496  
917401f26a6af5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-11-03  1497  	svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
2fcf4876ada8a2 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2020-10-01  1498  	svm_free_nested(svm);
2fcf4876ada8a2 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2020-10-01  1499  
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1500  	sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1501  
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1502  	__free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb01.pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
47903dc10e7ebb arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Krish Sadhukhan       2021-04-12  1503  	__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1504  }
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1505  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28  1506  static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1507  {
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1508  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
73412dfeea724e arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-11-09  1509  	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
0cc5064d335543 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-03-25  1510  
ce7ea0cfdc2e9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2021-05-06  1511  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
ce7ea0cfdc2e9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2021-05-06 @1512  		sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
ce7ea0cfdc2e9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2021-05-06  1513  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1514  	if (svm->guest_state_loaded)
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1515  		return;
94dfbdb3894eda drivers/kvm/svm.c      Anthony Liguori       2007-04-29  1516  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1517  	/*
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1518  	 * Save additional host state that will be restored on VMEXIT (sev-es)
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1519  	 * or subsequent vmload of host save area.
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1520  	 */
e287bd005ad9d8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-11-07  1521  	vmsave(sd->save_area_pa);
068f7ea61895ff arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-01-25  1522  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
3dd2775b74c9b1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2022-04-05  1523  		struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
3dd2775b74c9b1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2022-04-05  1524  		hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
068f7ea61895ff arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-01-25  1525  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28 @1526  		sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
861377730aa9db arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1527  	}
fbc0db76b77125 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2011-03-25  1528  
11d39e8cc43e1c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-06-06  1529  	if (tsc_scaling)
11d39e8cc43e1c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-06-06  1530  		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1531  
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1532  	/*
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1533  	 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1534  	 * available. The user return MSR support is not required in this case
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1535  	 * because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT from the host save area
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1536  	 * (which has been initialized in svm_hardware_enable()).
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1537  	 */
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1538  	if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0) &&
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1539  	    (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
0caa0a77c2f6fc arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-05-04  1540  		kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);
8221c13700561b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1541  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1542  	svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1543  }
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1544  

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [PATCH v4 02/15] KVM: SVM: Compile sev.c if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y

[kernel test robot]

Hi Paolo,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on kvm/queue]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master next-20240320]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core mst-vhost/linux-next kvm/linux-next v6.8]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Paolo-Bonzini/KVM-SVM-Invert-handling-of-SEV-and-SEV_ES-feature-flags/20240319-074252
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm.git queue
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240318233352.2728327-3-pbonzini%40redhat.com
patch subject: [PATCH v4 02/15] KVM: SVM: Compile sev.c if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-001-20240319 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240320/202403201614.EaivvQmz-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 17.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 6009708b4367171ccdbf4b5905cb6a803753fe18)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240320/202403201614.EaivvQmz-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202403201614.EaivvQmz-lkp@intel.com/

All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1367:3: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_init_vmcb'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    1367 |                 sev_init_vmcb(svm);
         |                 ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1391:3: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_es_vcpu_reset'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    1391 |                 sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
         |                 ^
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1391:3: note: did you mean 'kvm_vcpu_reset'?
   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:2222:6: note: 'kvm_vcpu_reset' declared here
    2222 | void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event);
         |      ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1512:3: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_es_unmap_ghcb'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    1512 |                 sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
         |                 ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1526:3: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    1526 |                 sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
         |                 ^
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1526:3: note: did you mean 'svm_prepare_switch_to_guest'?
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1506:13: note: 'svm_prepare_switch_to_guest' declared here
    1506 | static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
         |             ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:2226:11: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_es_string_io'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    2226 |                         return sev_es_string_io(svm, size, port, in);
         |                                ^
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:2226:11: note: did you mean 'kvm_sev_es_string_io'?
   arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:537:5: note: 'kvm_sev_es_string_io' declared here
     537 | int kvm_sev_es_string_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int size,
         |     ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3549:10: error: call to undeclared function 'pre_sev_run'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    3549 |                 return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);
         |                        ^
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3549:10: note: did you mean 'pre_svm_run'?
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3532:13: note: 'pre_svm_run' declared here
    3532 | static void pre_svm_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
         |             ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3549:3: warning: void function 'pre_svm_run' should not return a value [-Wreturn-type]
    3549 |                 return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);
         |                 ^      ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4356:3: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    4356 |                 sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
         |                 ^
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4356:3: note: did you mean 'svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid'?
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4309:13: note: 'svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid' declared here
    4309 | static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
         |             ^
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4883:2: error: call to undeclared function 'sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    4883 |         sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
         |         ^
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4883:2: note: did you mean 'svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector'?
   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:4878:13: note: 'svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector' declared here
    4878 | static void svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
         |             ^
    4879 | {
    4880 |         if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
    4881 |                 return kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
    4882 | 
    4883 |         sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
         |         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
         |         svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector
   1 warning and 8 errors generated.


vim +/sev_init_vmcb +1367 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

36e8194dcd749c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-09-23  1226  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1227  static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1228  {
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1229  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1230  	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1231  	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &vmcb->control;
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1232  	struct vmcb_save_area *save = &vmcb->save;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1233  
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1234  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1235  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1236  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1237  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1238  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1239  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1240  	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1241  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1242  
5315c716b69f47 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Paolo Bonzini         2014-03-03  1243  	set_dr_intercepts(svm);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1244  
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1245  	set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1246  	set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1247  	set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
54a20552e1eae0 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Eric Northup          2015-11-03  1248  	set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
cbdb967af3d549 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Paolo Bonzini         2015-11-10  1249  	set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1250  	/*
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1251  	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1252  	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1253  	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
29de732cc95cb5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Alexey Kardashevskiy  2023-06-15  1254  	 * as VMware does.
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1255  	 */
29de732cc95cb5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Alexey Kardashevskiy  2023-06-15  1256  	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
9718420e9fd462 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Liran Alon            2018-03-12  1257  		set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1258  
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1259  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1260  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
4b639a9f82fcf1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-07-07  1261  
4b639a9f82fcf1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-07-07  1262  	if (intercept_smi)
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1263  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);
4b639a9f82fcf1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-07-07  1264  
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1265  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1266  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1267  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1268  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1269  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1270  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1271  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1272  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1273  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1274  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1275  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1276  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1277  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1278  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1279  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1280  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1281  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1282  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1283  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1284  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPRU);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1285  	svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM);
668fffa3f838ed arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Michael S. Tsirkin    2017-04-21  1286  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1287  	if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1288  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1289  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
668fffa3f838ed arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Michael S. Tsirkin    2017-04-21  1290  	}
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1291  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1292  	if (!kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1293  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);
caa057a2cad647 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Wanpeng Li            2018-03-12  1294  
d0ec49d4de9080 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Tom Lendacky          2017-07-17  1295  	control->iopm_base_pa = __sme_set(iopm_base);
d0ec49d4de9080 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Tom Lendacky          2017-07-17  1296  	control->msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->msrpm));
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1297  	control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1298  
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1299  	init_seg(&save->es);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1300  	init_seg(&save->ss);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1301  	init_seg(&save->ds);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1302  	init_seg(&save->fs);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1303  	init_seg(&save->gs);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1304  
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1305  	save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
04b66839d312d3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Paolo Bonzini         2013-03-19  1306  	save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1307  	/* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1308  	save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1309  		SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1310  	save->cs.limit = 0xffff;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1311  
4f117ce4aefca0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-07-13  1312  	save->gdtr.base = 0;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1313  	save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
4f117ce4aefca0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-07-13  1314  	save->idtr.base = 0;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1315  	save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1316  
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1317  	init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1318  	init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1319  
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1320  	if (npt_enabled) {
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1321  		/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
cea3a19b007a69 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Tom Lendacky          2017-12-04  1322  		control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1323  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
18c918c5f59bc3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2010-11-30  1324  		clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1325  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
830bd71f2c0684 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1326  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1327  		save->g_pat = vcpu->arch.pat;
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1328  		save->cr3 = 0;
709ddebf81cb40 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2008-02-07  1329  	}
193015adf40d04 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-12  1330  	svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
7e8e6eed75e290 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2020-10-11  1331  	svm->asid = 0;
1371d90460189d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Alexander Graf        2008-11-25  1332  
c74ad08f3333db arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-05-03  1333  	svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
c74ad08f3333db arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2021-05-03  1334  	svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
2af9194d1b683f arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2009-08-07  1335  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1336  	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1337  		control->pause_filter_count = pause_filter_count;
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1338  		if (pause_filter_thresh)
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1339  			control->pause_filter_thresh = pause_filter_thresh;
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1340  		svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
8566ac8b8e7cac arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Babu Moger            2018-03-16  1341  	} else {
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1342  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
565d0998ecac83 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Mark Langsdorf        2009-10-06  1343  	}
565d0998ecac83 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Mark Langsdorf        2009-10-06  1344  
3b195ac9260235 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-05-04  1345  	svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);
4407a797e9412a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2020-09-11  1346  
89c8a4984fc98e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-07-06  1347  	/*
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1348  	 * If the host supports V_SPEC_CTRL then disable the interception
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1349  	 * of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
89c8a4984fc98e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-07-06  1350  	 */
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1351  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1352  		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
d00b99c514b33a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Babu Moger            2021-02-17  1353  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1354  	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1355  		avic_init_vmcb(svm, vmcb);
89c8a4984fc98e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-07-06  1356  
fa4c027a7956f5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Santosh Shukla        2023-02-27  1357  	if (vnmi)
fa4c027a7956f5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Santosh Shukla        2023-02-27  1358  		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK;
fa4c027a7956f5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Santosh Shukla        2023-02-27  1359  
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1360  	if (vgif) {
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1361  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
a284ba56a0a4b5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Joerg Roedel          2020-06-25  1362  		svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1363  		svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1364  	}
640bd6e5752274 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Janakarajan Natarajan 2017-08-23  1365  
6defa24d3b12bb arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Peter Gonda           2022-06-23  1366  	if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
6defa24d3b12bb arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Peter Gonda           2022-06-23 @1367  		sev_init_vmcb(svm);
1654efcbc431a3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Brijesh Singh         2017-12-04  1368  
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1369  	svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
36e8194dcd749c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-09-23  1370  	init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
1e0c7d40758bcd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Vineeth Pillai        2021-06-03  1371  
1ee73a332f80dd arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-03-22  1372  	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(vmcb);
8d28fec406e4d5 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Roedel, Joerg         2010-12-03  1373  
2af9194d1b683f arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2009-08-07  1374  	enable_gif(svm);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1375  }
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1376  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1377  static void __svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1378  {
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1379  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1380  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1381  	svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1382  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1383  	svm_init_osvw(vcpu);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1384  	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
938c8745bcf2f7 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-05-24  1385  	svm->tsc_ratio_msr = kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1386  
916b54a7688b0b arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2023-01-30  1387  	svm->nmi_masked = false;
916b54a7688b0b arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2023-01-30  1388  	svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
916b54a7688b0b arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2023-01-30  1389  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1390  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20 @1391  		sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1392  }
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1393  
d28bc9dd25ce02 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Nadav Amit            2015-04-13  1394  static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1395  {
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1396  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1397  
b2ac58f90540e3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     KarimAllah Ahmed      2018-02-03  1398  	svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
ccbcd2674472a9 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Thomas Gleixner       2018-05-09  1399  	svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
b2ac58f90540e3 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     KarimAllah Ahmed      2018-02-03  1400  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1401  	init_vmcb(vcpu);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1402  
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1403  	if (!init_event)
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1404  		__svm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1405  }
04d2cc7780d48a drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-09-10  1406  
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1407  void svm_switch_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_vmcb_info *target_vmcb)
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1408  {
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1409  	svm->current_vmcb = target_vmcb;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1410  	svm->vmcb = target_vmcb->ptr;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1411  }
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1412  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28  1413  static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1414  {
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1415  	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1416  	struct page *vmcb01_page;
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1417  	struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
fb3f0f51d92d14 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Rusty Russell         2007-07-27  1418  	int err;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1419  
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1420  	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1421  	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
fb3f0f51d92d14 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Rusty Russell         2007-07-27  1422  
fb3f0f51d92d14 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Rusty Russell         2007-07-27  1423  	err = -ENOMEM;
75253db41a467a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Brijesh Singh         2024-01-25  1424  	vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1425  	if (!vmcb01_page)
987b2594ed5d12 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1426  		goto out;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1427  
63129754178c55 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2021-03-02  1428  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1429  		/*
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1430  		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1431  		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1432  		 */
75253db41a467a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Brijesh Singh         2024-01-25  1433  		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1434  		if (!vmsa_page)
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1435  			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1436  
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1437  		/*
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1438  		 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1439  		 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
d69c1382e1b73a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Thomas Gleixner       2021-10-22  1440  		 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
d69c1382e1b73a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Thomas Gleixner       2021-10-22  1441  		 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
ed02b213098a90 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1442  		 */
d69c1382e1b73a arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Thomas Gleixner       2021-10-22  1443  		fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1444  	}
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1445  
dfa20099e26e35 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2017-09-12  1446  	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
44a95dae1d229a arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1447  	if (err)
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1448  		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
411b44ba80ab00 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-08-23  1449  
476c9bd8e997b4 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Aaron Lewis           2020-09-25  1450  	svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
054409ab253d9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Chen Zhou             2020-11-17  1451  	if (!svm->msrpm) {
054409ab253d9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Chen Zhou             2020-11-17  1452  		err = -ENOMEM;
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1453  		goto error_free_vmsa_page;
054409ab253d9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Chen Zhou             2020-11-17  1454  	}
b286d5d8b0836e arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Alexander Graf        2008-11-25  1455  
091abbf578f926 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-05-19  1456  	svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;
091abbf578f926 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-05-19  1457  
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1458  	svm->vmcb01.ptr = page_address(vmcb01_page);
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1459  	svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
9ebe530b9f5da8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-09-20  1460  	svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1461  
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1462  	if (vmsa_page)
b67a4cc35c9f72 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Peter Gonda           2021-10-21  1463  		svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1464  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1465  	svm->guest_state_loaded = false;
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1466  
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1467  	return 0;
36241b8c7cbcc8 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-22  1468  
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1469  error_free_vmsa_page:
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1470  	if (vmsa_page)
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1471  		__free_page(vmsa_page);
8d22b90e942c26 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2020-08-27  1472  error_free_vmcb_page:
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1473  	__free_page(vmcb01_page);
987b2594ed5d12 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1474  out:
a9dd6f09d7e54d arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Sean Christopherson   2019-12-18  1475  	return err;
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1476  }
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1477  
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1478  static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1479  {
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1480  	int i;
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1481  
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1482  	for_each_online_cpu(i)
73412dfeea724e arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-11-09  1483  		cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data.current_vmcb, i), vmcb, NULL);
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1484  }
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1485  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28  1486  static void svm_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1487  {
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1488  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1489  
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1490  	/*
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1491  	 * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1492  	 * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1493  	 * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb.
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1494  	 */
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1495  	svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb);
fd65d3142f734b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Jim Mattson           2018-05-22  1496  
917401f26a6af5 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-11-03  1497  	svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
2fcf4876ada8a2 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2020-10-01  1498  	svm_free_nested(svm);
2fcf4876ada8a2 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2020-10-01  1499  
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1500  	sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);
add5e2f0454145 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1501  
4995a3685f1b76 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Cathy Avery           2021-01-13  1502  	__free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb01.pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
47903dc10e7ebb arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Krish Sadhukhan       2021-04-12  1503  	__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1504  }
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1505  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28  1506  static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
6aa8b732ca01c3 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2006-12-10  1507  {
a2fa3e9f52d875 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Gregory Haskins       2007-07-27  1508  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
73412dfeea724e arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-11-09  1509  	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
0cc5064d335543 drivers/kvm/svm.c      Avi Kivity            2007-03-25  1510  
ce7ea0cfdc2e9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2021-05-06  1511  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
ce7ea0cfdc2e9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2021-05-06 @1512  		sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
ce7ea0cfdc2e9f arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2021-05-06  1513  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1514  	if (svm->guest_state_loaded)
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1515  		return;
94dfbdb3894eda drivers/kvm/svm.c      Anthony Liguori       2007-04-29  1516  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1517  	/*
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1518  	 * Save additional host state that will be restored on VMEXIT (sev-es)
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1519  	 * or subsequent vmload of host save area.
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1520  	 */
e287bd005ad9d8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-11-07  1521  	vmsave(sd->save_area_pa);
068f7ea61895ff arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-01-25  1522  	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
3dd2775b74c9b1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2022-04-05  1523  		struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
3dd2775b74c9b1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2022-04-05  1524  		hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
068f7ea61895ff arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Paolo Bonzini         2022-01-25  1525  
23e5092b6e2ad1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2022-01-28 @1526  		sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
861377730aa9db arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2020-12-10  1527  	}
fbc0db76b77125 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Joerg Roedel          2011-03-25  1528  
11d39e8cc43e1c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-06-06  1529  	if (tsc_scaling)
11d39e8cc43e1c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Maxim Levitsky        2022-06-06  1530  		__svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1531  
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1532  	/*
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1533  	 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1534  	 * available. The user return MSR support is not required in this case
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1535  	 * because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT from the host save area
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1536  	 * (which has been initialized in svm_hardware_enable()).
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1537  	 */
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1538  	if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0) &&
916e3e5f26abc1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Tom Lendacky          2023-09-15  1539  	    (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
0caa0a77c2f6fc arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Sean Christopherson   2021-05-04  1540  		kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);
8221c13700561b arch/x86/kvm/svm.c     Suravee Suthikulpanit 2016-05-04  1541  
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1542  	svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1543  }
a7fc06dd2f14f8 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c Michael Roth          2021-02-02  1544  

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Michael Roth]

On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 07:33:46PM -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> SEV-ES allows passing custom contents for x87, SSE and AVX state into the VMSA.
> Allow userspace to do that with the usual KVM_SET_XSAVE API and only mark
> FPU contents as confidential after it has been copied and encrypted into
> the VMSA.
> 
> Since the XSAVE state for AVX is the first, it does not need the
> compacted-state handling of get_xsave_addr().  However, there are other
> parts of XSAVE state in the VMSA that currently are not handled, and
> the validation logic of get_xsave_addr() is pointless to duplicate
> in KVM, so move get_xsave_addr() to public FPU API; it is really just
> a facility to operate on XSAVE state and does not expose any internal
> details of arch/x86/kernel/fpu.
> 
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h |  3 +++
>  arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h   |  2 --
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c         | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c         |  8 --------
>  4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index a8300646a280..800e836a69fb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +	xsave = &vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->regs.xsave;
> +	save->x87_dp = xsave->i387.rdp;
> +	save->mxcsr = xsave->i387.mxcsr;
> +	save->x87_ftw = xsave->i387.twd;
> +	save->x87_fsw = xsave->i387.swd;
> +	save->x87_fcw = xsave->i387.cwd;
> +	save->x87_fop = xsave->i387.fop;
> +	save->x87_ds = 0;
> +	save->x87_cs = 0;
> +	save->x87_rip = xsave->i387.rip;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
> +		d = save->fpreg_x87 + i * 10;
> +		s = ((u8 *)xsave->i387.st_space) + i * 16;
> +		memcpy(d, s, 10);
> +	}
> +	memcpy(save->fpreg_xmm, xsave->i387.xmm_space, 256);
> +
> +	s = get_xsave_addr(xsave, XFEATURE_YMM);
> +	if (s)
> +		memcpy(save->fpreg_ymm, s, 256);
> +	else
> +		memset(save->fpreg_ymm, 0, 256);
> +
>  	pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
>  	print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
>  
> @@ -657,6 +686,13 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	if (ret)
>  	  return ret;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
> +	 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
> +	 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
> +	 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
> +	 */
> +	fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
>  	vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index c22e87ebf0de..03108055a7b0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1433,14 +1433,6 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
>  		if (!vmsa_page)
>  			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
> -
> -		/*
> -		 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
> -		 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
> -		 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
> -		 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
> -		 */
> -		fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);

There may have be userspaces that previously relied on KVM_SET_XSAVE
being silently ignored when calculating the expected VMSA measurement.
Granted, that's sort of buggy behavior on the part of userspace, but QEMU
for instance does this. In that case, it just so happens that QEMU's reset
values don't appear to affect the VMSA measurement/contents, but there may
be userspaces where it would.

To avoid this, and have parity with the other interfaces where the new
behavior is gated on the new vm_type/KVM_SEV_INIT2 stuff (via
has_protected_state), maybe should limited XSAVE/FPU sync'ing to
has_protected_state as well?

-Mike

>  	}
>  
>  	err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 
> 

Re: [PATCH v4 05/15] KVM: SEV: publish supported VMSA features

[Isaku Yamahata]

On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 07:33:42PM -0400,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:

> Compute the set of features to be stored in the VMSA when KVM is
> initialized; move it from there into kvm_sev_info when SEV is initialized,
> and then into the initial VMSA.
> 
> The new variable can then be used to return the set of supported features
> to userspace, via the KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl.

Hi. The current TDX KVM introduces KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES and struct
kvm_tdx_capabilities for feature enumeration.  I'm wondering if TDX should also
use/switch to KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR with its own group.  What do you think?
Something like

#define KVM_DEVICE_ATTR_GROUP_SEV       1
#define KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES       1
#define KVM_X86_SEV_xxx                 ...

#define KVM_DEVICE_ATTR_GROUP_TDX       2
#define KVM_X86_TDX_xxx                 ...

Thanks,
-- 
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

Re: [PATCH v4 05/15] KVM: SEV: publish supported VMSA features

[Paolo Bonzini]

On Tue, Mar 26, 2024 at 1:04 AM Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 07:33:42PM -0400,
> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> > Compute the set of features to be stored in the VMSA when KVM is
> > initialized; move it from there into kvm_sev_info when SEV is initialized,
> > and then into the initial VMSA.
> >
> > The new variable can then be used to return the set of supported features
> > to userspace, via the KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl.
>
> Hi. The current TDX KVM introduces KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES and struct
> kvm_tdx_capabilities for feature enumeration.  I'm wondering if TDX should also
> use/switch to KVM_GET_DEVICE_ATTR with its own group.  What do you think?
> Something like
>
> #define KVM_DEVICE_ATTR_GROUP_SEV       1
> #define KVM_X86_SEV_VMSA_FEATURES       1
> #define KVM_X86_SEV_xxx                 ...
>
> #define KVM_DEVICE_ATTR_GROUP_TDX       2
> #define KVM_X86_TDX_xxx                 ...

Yes, that's a very good idea. I've added the group argument in v5.

Paolo

Re: [PATCH v4 09/15] KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time

[Paolo Bonzini]

On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 12:43 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
> There may have be userspaces that previously relied on KVM_SET_XSAVE
> being silently ignored when calculating the expected VMSA measurement.
> Granted, that's sort of buggy behavior on the part of userspace, but QEMU
> for instance does this. In that case, it just so happens that QEMU's reset
> values don't appear to affect the VMSA measurement/contents, but there may
> be userspaces where it would.
>
> To avoid this, and have parity with the other interfaces where the new
> behavior is gated on the new vm_type/KVM_SEV_INIT2 stuff (via
> has_protected_state), maybe should limited XSAVE/FPU sync'ing to
> has_protected_state as well?

Yes, in particular I am kinda surprised that MXCSR (whose default
value after reset is 0x1F80) does not affect the measurement.

Paolo