From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org> Subject: [PATCH v1 1/2] x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 13:04:33 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <28648b23b9957506069e20bd985e3d7e8af94780.1501092102.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1501092102.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> After issuing successive kexecs it was found that the SHA hash failed verification when booting the kexec'd kernel. When SME is enabled, the change from using pages that were marked encrypted to now being marked as not encrypted (through new identify mapped page tables) results in memory corruption if there are any cache entries for the previously encrypted pages. This is because separate cache entries can exist for the same physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. To prevent this, issue a wbinvd before copying the pages from the source location to the destination location to clear any possible cache entry conflicts. Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index 98111b3..c11d8bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ identity_mapped: /* Flush the TLB (needed?) */ movq %r9, %cr3 + /* + * If SME is/was active, there could be old encrypted cache line + * entries that will conflict with the now unencrypted memory + * used by kexec. Flush the caches before copying the kernel. + */ + wbinvd + movq %rcx, %r11 call swap_pages -- 1.9.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Subject: [PATCH v1 1/2] x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 13:04:33 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <28648b23b9957506069e20bd985e3d7e8af94780.1501092102.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1501092102.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> After issuing successive kexecs it was found that the SHA hash failed verification when booting the kexec'd kernel. When SME is enabled, the change from using pages that were marked encrypted to now being marked as not encrypted (through new identify mapped page tables) results in memory corruption if there are any cache entries for the previously encrypted pages. This is because separate cache entries can exist for the same physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. To prevent this, issue a wbinvd before copying the pages from the source location to the destination location to clear any possible cache entry conflicts. Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S index 98111b3..c11d8bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S @@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ identity_mapped: /* Flush the TLB (needed?) */ movq %r9, %cr3 + /* + * If SME is/was active, there could be old encrypted cache line + * entries that will conflict with the now unencrypted memory + * used by kexec. Flush the caches before copying the kernel. + */ + wbinvd + movq %rcx, %r11 call swap_pages -- 1.9.1 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-26 18:05 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-07-26 18:04 [PATCH v1 0/2] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) fixes 2017-07-26 Tom Lendacky 2017-07-26 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-26 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky [this message] 2017-07-26 18:04 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 7:17 ` Ingo Molnar 2017-07-27 7:17 ` Ingo Molnar 2017-07-27 14:15 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 14:15 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-07-27 17:34 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-07-27 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-26 18:04 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] acpi, x86: Remove encryption mask from ACPI page protection type Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 7:39 ` Ingo Molnar 2017-07-27 14:53 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-27 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov 2017-07-27 14:57 ` Tom Lendacky 2017-07-28 6:28 ` Ingo Molnar
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