Re: [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection

["Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>]

On 2/10/2021 11:33 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 09:56:40AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
>> corruption.  It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
>> CONFIG_X86_CET enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
>> This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.  When it is enabled, legacy
>> non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/Kconfig           | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  5 +++++
>>   2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> index 21f851179ff0..1138b5fa9b4f 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config X86_64
>>   	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>>   	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
>>   	select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
>> +	select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>>   	select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
>>   	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
>>   	select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
>> @@ -1951,6 +1952,28 @@ config X86_SGX
>>   
>>   	  If unsure, say N.
>>   
>> +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>> +	def_bool n
>> +
>> +config X86_CET
>> +	prompt "Intel Control-flow protection for user-mode"
>> +	def_bool n
>> +	depends on X86_64
> 
> This depends isn't needed any more. With that fixed:

Yes, that's right.  I will remove it.

> 
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 

Thanks!

--
Yu-cheng