[PATCH v2 1/8] pipe: relocate round_pipe_size() above pipe_set_size()

[PATCH v2 1/8] pipe: relocate round_pipe_size() above pipe_set_size()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

This is a minor preparatory patch. After subsequent patches,
round_pipe_size() will be called from pipe_set_size(), so place
round_pipe_size() above pipe_set_size().

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 4ebe6b2..7d7c21e 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -1011,6 +1011,18 @@ const struct file_operations pipefifo_fops = {
 };
 
 /*
+ * Currently we rely on the pipe array holding a power-of-2 number
+ * of pages.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned int size)
+{
+	unsigned long nr_pages;
+
+	nr_pages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	return roundup_pow_of_two(nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+/*
  * Allocate a new array of pipe buffers and copy the info over. Returns the
  * pipe size if successful, or return -ERROR on error.
  */
@@ -1062,18 +1074,6 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long nr_pages)
 }
 
 /*
- * Currently we rely on the pipe array holding a power-of-2 number
- * of pages.
- */
-static inline unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned int size)
-{
-	unsigned long nr_pages;
-
-	nr_pages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	return roundup_pow_of_two(nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
-}
-
-/*
  * This should work even if CONFIG_PROC_FS isn't set, as proc_dointvec_minmax
  * will return an error.
  */
-- 
2.5.5

[PATCH v2 2/8] pipe: move limit checking logic into pipe_set_size()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

This is a preparatory patch for following work. Move the F_SETPIPE_SZ
limit-checking logic from pipe_fcntl() into pipe_set_size().  This
simplifies the code a little, and allows for reworking required in
a later patch that fixes the limit checking in pipe_set_size()

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 7d7c21e..4b98fd0 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -1026,9 +1026,24 @@ static inline unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned int size)
  * Allocate a new array of pipe buffers and copy the info over. Returns the
  * pipe size if successful, or return -ERROR on error.
  */
-static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long nr_pages)
+static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
+	unsigned int size, nr_pages;
+
+	size = round_pipe_size(arg);
+	nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (!nr_pages)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
+			too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
 	 * We can shrink the pipe, if arg >= pipe->nrbufs. Since we don't
@@ -1112,28 +1127,9 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	__pipe_lock(pipe);
 
 	switch (cmd) {
-	case F_SETPIPE_SZ: {
-		unsigned int size, nr_pages;
-
-		size = round_pipe_size(arg);
-		nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		if (!nr_pages)
-			goto out;
-
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size) {
-			ret = -EPERM;
-			goto out;
-		} else if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
-			    too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
-		           !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
-			ret = -EPERM;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		ret = pipe_set_size(pipe, nr_pages);
+	case F_SETPIPE_SZ:
+		ret = pipe_set_size(pipe, arg);
 		break;
-		}
 	case F_GETPIPE_SZ:
 		ret = pipe->buffers * PAGE_SIZE;
 		break;
@@ -1142,7 +1138,6 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		break;
 	}
 
-out:
 	__pipe_unlock(pipe);
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
2.5.5

Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] pipe: move limit checking logic into pipe_set_size()

[Vegard Nossum]

On 08/29/2016 02:21 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> This is a preparatory patch for following work. Move the F_SETPIPE_SZ
> limit-checking logic from pipe_fcntl() into pipe_set_size().  This
> simplifies the code a little, and allows for reworking required in
> a later patch that fixes the limit checking in pipe_set_size()

> +	if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
> +			too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
> +			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +		return -EPERM;

Some might say the indentation is off here. Not sure why checkpatch
didn't care.

Otherwise looks fine to me.


Vegard

Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] pipe: move limit checking logic into pipe_set_size()

[Joe Perches]

On Thu, 2016-09-29 at 13:26 +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote:
> On 08/29/2016 02:21 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> > This is a preparatory patch for following work. Move the F_SETPIPE_SZ
> > limit-checking logic from pipe_fcntl() into pipe_set_size().  This
> > simplifies the code a little, and allows for reworking required in
> > a later patch that fixes the limit checking in pipe_set_size()
> 
> > +	if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
> > +			too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
> > +			capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > +		return -EPERM;
> Some might say the indentation is off here. Not sure why checkpatch
> didn't care.

Parenthesis alignment is a CHECK not a WARNING.

It's only reported with --strict or if the code is
in drivers/staging, net/, or drivers/net/

[PATCH v2 3/8] pipe: refactor argument for account_pipe_buffers()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

This is a preparatory patch for following work. account_pipe_buffers()
performs accounting in the 'user_struct'. There is no need to pass a
pointer to a 'pipe_inode_info' struct (which is then dereferenced to
obtain a pointer to the 'user' field). Instead, pass a pointer directly
to the 'user_struct'. This change is needed in preparation for a
subsequent patch that the fixes the limit checking in alloc_pipe_info()
(and the resulting code is a little more logical).

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 4b98fd0..37b7f5e 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -604,10 +604,10 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 	return retval;
 }
 
-static void account_pipe_buffers(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
+static void account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user,
                                  unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
 {
-	atomic_long_add(new - old, &pipe->user->pipe_bufs);
+	atomic_long_add(new - old, &user->pipe_bufs);
 }
 
 static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user)
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 			pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
 			pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
 			pipe->user = user;
-			account_pipe_buffers(pipe, 0, pipe_bufs);
+			account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
 			mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
 			return pipe;
 		}
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, 0);
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, 0);
 	free_uid(pipe->user);
 	for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
 		struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
@@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 			memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
 	}
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
 	pipe->curbuf = 0;
 	kfree(pipe->bufs);
 	pipe->bufs = bufs;
-- 
2.5.5

[PATCH v2 4/8] pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

The limit checking in pipe_set_size() (used by fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ))
has the following problems:

(1) When increasing the pipe capacity, the checks against the limits in
    /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} are made against existing
    consumption, and exclude the memory required for the increased pipe
    capacity. The new increase in pipe capacity can then push the total
    memory used by the user for pipes (possibly far) over a limit. This
    can also trigger the problem described next.

(2) The limit checks are performed even when the new pipe capacity is
    less than the existing pipe capacity. This can lead to problems if a
    user sets a large pipe capacity, and then the limits are lowered,
    with the result that the user will no longer be able to decrease the
    pipe capacity.

(3) As currently implemented, accounting and checking against the
    limits is done as follows:

    (a) Test whether the user has exceeded the limit.
    (b) Make new pipe buffer allocation.
    (c) Account new allocation against the limits.

    This is racey. Multiple processes may pass point (a)
    simultaneously, and then allocate pipe buffers that are accounted
    for only in step (c).  The race means that the user's pipe buffer
    allocation could be pushed over the limit (by an arbitrary amount,
    depending on how unlucky we were in the race). [Thanks to Vegard
    Nossum for spotting this point, which I had missed.]

This patch addresses the above problems as follows:

* Perform checks against the limits only when increasing a pipe's
  capacity; an unprivileged user can always decrease a pipe's capacity.
* Alter the checks against limits to include the memory required for
  the new pipe capacity.
* Re-order the accounting step so that it precedes the buffer
  allocation. If the accounting step determines that a limit has
  been reached, revert the accounting and cause the operation to fail.

The program below can be used to demonstrate problems 1 and 2, and the
effect of the fix. The program takes one or more command-line arguments.
The first argument specifies the number of pipes that the program should
create. The remaining arguments are, alternately, pipe capacities that
should be set using fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ), and sleep intervals (in
seconds) between the fcntl() operations. (The sleep intervals allow the
possibility to change the limits between fcntl() operations.)

Problem 1
=========

Using the test program on an unpatched kernel, we first set some
limits:

    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard    # 40.96 MB

Then show that we can set a pipe with capacity (100MB) that is
over the hard limit

    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 134217728

Now set the capacity to 100MB twice. The second call fails (which is
probably surprising to most users, since it seems like a no-op):

    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000 0 100000000
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 134217728
        Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            Loop 2, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

With a patched kernel, setting a capacity over the limit fails at the
first attempt:

    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard
    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            Loop 1, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

There is a small chance that the change to fix this problem could
break user-space, since there are cases where fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ)
calls that previously succeeded might fail. However, the chances are
small, since (a) the pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} limits are new (in
4.5), and the default soft/hard limits are high/unlimited.  Therefore,
it seems warranted to make these limits operate more precisely (and
behave more like what users probably expect).

Problem 2
=========

Running the test program on an unpatched kernel, we first set some limits:

    # getconf PAGESIZE
    4096
    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard    # 40.96 MB

Now perform two fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ) operations on a single pipe,
first setting a pipe capacity (10MB), sleeping for a few seconds,
during which time the hard limit is lowered, and then set pipe
capacity to a smaller amount (5MB):

    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 10000000 15 5000000 &
    [1] 748
    # Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 10000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 16777216
            Sleeping 15 seconds

    # echo 1000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard      # 4.096 MB
    #     Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 5000000 bytes
            Loop 2, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

In this case, the user should be able to lower the limit.

With a kernel that has the patch below, the second fcntl()
succeeds:

    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard
    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 10000000 15 5000000 &
    [1] 3215
    # Initial pipe capacity: 65536
    #     Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 10000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 16777216
            Sleeping 15 seconds

    # echo 1000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard

    #     Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 5000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 8388608

8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---

/* test_F_SETPIPE_SZ.c

   (C) 2016, Michael Kerrisk; licensed under GNU GPL version 2 or later

   Test operation of fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ) for setting pipe capacity
   and interactions with limits defined by /proc/sys/fs/pipe-* files.
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int (*pfd)[2];
    int npipes;
    int pcap, rcap;
    int j, p, s, stime, loop;

    if (argc < 2) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s num-pipes "
                "[pipe-capacity sleep-time]...\n", argv[0]);
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    npipes = atoi(argv[1]);

    pfd = calloc(npipes, sizeof (int [2]));
    if (pfd == NULL) {
        perror("calloc");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    for (j = 0; j < npipes; j++) {
        if (pipe(pfd[j]) == -1) {
            fprintf(stderr, "Loop %d: pipe() failed: ", j);
            perror("pipe");
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }
    }

    printf("Initial pipe capacity: %d\n", fcntl(pfd[0][0], F_GETPIPE_SZ));

    for (j = 2; j < argc; j += 2 ) {
        loop = j / 2;
        pcap = atoi(argv[j]);
        printf("    Loop %d: set pipe capacity to %d bytes\n", loop, pcap);

        for (p = 0; p < npipes; p++) {
            s = fcntl(pfd[p][0], F_SETPIPE_SZ, pcap);
            if (s == -1) {
                fprintf(stderr, "        Loop %d, pipe %d: F_SETPIPE_SZ "
                        "failed: ", loop, p);
                perror("fcntl");
                exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
            }

            if (p == 0) {
                printf("        F_SETPIPE_SZ returned %d\n", s);
                rcap = s;
            } else {
                if (s != rcap) {
                    fprintf(stderr, "        Loop %d, pipe %d: F_SETPIPE_SZ "
                            "unexpected return: %d\n", loop, p, s);
                    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
                }
            }

            stime = (j + 1 < argc) ? atoi(argv[j + 1]) : 0;
            if (stime > 0) {
                printf("        Sleeping %d seconds\n", stime);
                sleep(stime);
            }
        }
    }

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}

8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---

Patch history:

v2
   * Switch order of test in 'if' statement to avoid function call
      (to capability()) in normal path. [This is a fix to a preexisting
      wart in the code. Thanks to Willy Tarreau]
    * Perform (size > pipe_max_size) check before calling
      account_pipe_buffers().  [Thanks to Vegard Nossum]
      Quoting Vegard:

        The potential problem happens if the user passes a very large number
        which will overflow pipe->user->pipe_bufs.

        On 32-bit, sizeof(int) == sizeof(long), so if they pass arg = INT_MAX
        then round_pipe_size() returns INT_MAX. Although it's true that the
        accounting is done in terms of pages and not bytes, so you'd need on
        the order of (1 << 13) = 8192 processes hitting the limit at the same
        time in order to make it overflow, which seems a bit unlikely.

        (See https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/215 for another discussion on the
        limit checking)

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 37b7f5e..f45a173 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -1030,6 +1030,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
 	unsigned int size, nr_pages;
+	long ret = 0;
 
 	size = round_pipe_size(arg);
 	nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -1037,13 +1038,26 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 	if (!nr_pages)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size)
+	/*
+	 * If trying to increase the pipe capacity, check that an
+	 * unprivileged user is not trying to exceed various limits
+	 * (soft limit check here, hard limit check just below).
+	 * Decreasing the pipe capacity is always permitted, even
+	 * if the user is currently over a limit.
+	 */
+	if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers &&
+			size > pipe_max_size && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
-			too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
-			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
+
+	if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers &&
+			(too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
+			 too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * We can shrink the pipe, if arg >= pipe->nrbufs. Since we don't
@@ -1051,13 +1065,17 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 	 * again like we would do for growing. If the pipe currently
 	 * contains more buffers than arg, then return busy.
 	 */
-	if (nr_pages < pipe->nrbufs)
-		return -EBUSY;
+	if (nr_pages < pipe->nrbufs) {
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+	}
 
 	bufs = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(*bufs),
 		       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
-	if (unlikely(!bufs))
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (unlikely(!bufs)) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * The pipe array wraps around, so just start the new one at zero
@@ -1080,12 +1098,15 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 			memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
 	}
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
 	pipe->curbuf = 0;
 	kfree(pipe->bufs);
 	pipe->bufs = bufs;
 	pipe->buffers = nr_pages;
 	return nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+out_revert_acct:
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, nr_pages, pipe->buffers);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.5.5

[PATCH v2 4/8] pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

The limit checking in pipe_set_size() (used by fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ))
has the following problems:

(1) When increasing the pipe capacity, the checks against the limits in
    /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} are made against existing
    consumption, and exclude the memory required for the increased pipe
    capacity. The new increase in pipe capacity can then push the total
    memory used by the user for pipes (possibly far) over a limit. This
    can also trigger the problem described next.

(2) The limit checks are performed even when the new pipe capacity is
    less than the existing pipe capacity. This can lead to problems if a
    user sets a large pipe capacity, and then the limits are lowered,
    with the result that the user will no longer be able to decrease the
    pipe capacity.

(3) As currently implemented, accounting and checking against the
    limits is done as follows:

    (a) Test whether the user has exceeded the limit.
    (b) Make new pipe buffer allocation.
    (c) Account new allocation against the limits.

    This is racey. Multiple processes may pass point (a)
    simultaneously, and then allocate pipe buffers that are accounted
    for only in step (c).  The race means that the user's pipe buffer
    allocation could be pushed over the limit (by an arbitrary amount,
    depending on how unlucky we were in the race). [Thanks to Vegard
    Nossum for spotting this point, which I had missed.]

This patch addresses the above problems as follows:

* Perform checks against the limits only when increasing a pipe's
  capacity; an unprivileged user can always decrease a pipe's capacity.
* Alter the checks against limits to include the memory required for
  the new pipe capacity.
* Re-order the accounting step so that it precedes the buffer
  allocation. If the accounting step determines that a limit has
  been reached, revert the accounting and cause the operation to fail.

The program below can be used to demonstrate problems 1 and 2, and the
effect of the fix. The program takes one or more command-line arguments.
The first argument specifies the number of pipes that the program should
create. The remaining arguments are, alternately, pipe capacities that
should be set using fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ), and sleep intervals (in
seconds) between the fcntl() operations. (The sleep intervals allow the
possibility to change the limits between fcntl() operations.)

Problem 1
=========

Using the test program on an unpatched kernel, we first set some
limits:

    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard    # 40.96 MB

Then show that we can set a pipe with capacity (100MB) that is
over the hard limit

    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 134217728

Now set the capacity to 100MB twice. The second call fails (which is
probably surprising to most users, since it seems like a no-op):

    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000 0 100000000
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 134217728
        Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            Loop 2, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

With a patched kernel, setting a capacity over the limit fails at the
first attempt:

    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard
    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 100000000
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 100000000 bytes
            Loop 1, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

There is a small chance that the change to fix this problem could
break user-space, since there are cases where fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ)
calls that previously succeeded might fail. However, the chances are
small, since (a) the pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} limits are new (in
4.5), and the default soft/hard limits are high/unlimited.  Therefore,
it seems warranted to make these limits operate more precisely (and
behave more like what users probably expect).

Problem 2
=========

Running the test program on an unpatched kernel, we first set some limits:

    # getconf PAGESIZE
    4096
    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard    # 40.96 MB

Now perform two fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ) operations on a single pipe,
first setting a pipe capacity (10MB), sleeping for a few seconds,
during which time the hard limit is lowered, and then set pipe
capacity to a smaller amount (5MB):

    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 10000000 15 5000000 &
    [1] 748
    # Initial pipe capacity: 65536
        Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 10000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 16777216
            Sleeping 15 seconds

    # echo 1000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard      # 4.096 MB
    #     Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 5000000 bytes
            Loop 2, pipe 0: F_SETPIPE_SZ failed: fcntl: Operation not permitted

In this case, the user should be able to lower the limit.

With a kernel that has the patch below, the second fcntl()
succeeds:

    # echo 0 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-soft
    # echo 1000000000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard
    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1 10000000 15 5000000 &
    [1] 3215
    # Initial pipe capacity: 65536
    #     Loop 1: set pipe capacity to 10000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 16777216
            Sleeping 15 seconds

    # echo 1000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-hard

    #     Loop 2: set pipe capacity to 5000000 bytes
            F_SETPIPE_SZ returned 8388608

8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---

/* test_F_SETPIPE_SZ.c

   (C) 2016, Michael Kerrisk; licensed under GNU GPL version 2 or later

   Test operation of fcntl(F_SETPIPE_SZ) for setting pipe capacity
   and interactions with limits defined by /proc/sys/fs/pipe-* files.
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int (*pfd)[2];
    int npipes;
    int pcap, rcap;
    int j, p, s, stime, loop;

    if (argc < 2) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s num-pipes "
                "[pipe-capacity sleep-time]...\n", argv[0]);
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    npipes = atoi(argv[1]);

    pfd = calloc(npipes, sizeof (int [2]));
    if (pfd == NULL) {
        perror("calloc");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    for (j = 0; j < npipes; j++) {
        if (pipe(pfd[j]) == -1) {
            fprintf(stderr, "Loop %d: pipe() failed: ", j);
            perror("pipe");
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
        }
    }

    printf("Initial pipe capacity: %d\n", fcntl(pfd[0][0], F_GETPIPE_SZ));

    for (j = 2; j < argc; j += 2 ) {
        loop = j / 2;
        pcap = atoi(argv[j]);
        printf("    Loop %d: set pipe capacity to %d bytes\n", loop, pcap);

        for (p = 0; p < npipes; p++) {
            s = fcntl(pfd[p][0], F_SETPIPE_SZ, pcap);
            if (s == -1) {
                fprintf(stderr, "        Loop %d, pipe %d: F_SETPIPE_SZ "
                        "failed: ", loop, p);
                perror("fcntl");
                exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
            }

            if (p == 0) {
                printf("        F_SETPIPE_SZ returned %d\n", s);
                rcap = s;
            } else {
                if (s != rcap) {
                    fprintf(stderr, "        Loop %d, pipe %d: F_SETPIPE_SZ "
                            "unexpected return: %d\n", loop, p, s);
                    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
                }
            }

            stime = (j + 1 < argc) ? atoi(argv[j + 1]) : 0;
            if (stime > 0) {
                printf("        Sleeping %d seconds\n", stime);
                sleep(stime);
            }
        }
    }

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}

8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---8x---

Patch history:

v2
   * Switch order of test in 'if' statement to avoid function call
      (to capability()) in normal path. [This is a fix to a preexisting
      wart in the code. Thanks to Willy Tarreau]
    * Perform (size > pipe_max_size) check before calling
      account_pipe_buffers().  [Thanks to Vegard Nossum]
      Quoting Vegard:

        The potential problem happens if the user passes a very large number
        which will overflow pipe->user->pipe_bufs.

        On 32-bit, sizeof(int) == sizeof(long), so if they pass arg = INT_MAX
        then round_pipe_size() returns INT_MAX. Although it's true that the
        accounting is done in terms of pages and not bytes, so you'd need on
        the order of (1 << 13) = 8192 processes hitting the limit at the same
        time in order to make it overflow, which seems a bit unlikely.

        (See https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/12/215 for another discussion on the
        limit checking)

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: socketpair-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel-JPay3/Yim36HaxMnTkn67Xf5DAMn2ifp@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 37b7f5e..f45a173 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -1030,6 +1030,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
 	unsigned int size, nr_pages;
+	long ret = 0;
 
 	size = round_pipe_size(arg);
 	nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -1037,13 +1038,26 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 	if (!nr_pages)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size)
+	/*
+	 * If trying to increase the pipe capacity, check that an
+	 * unprivileged user is not trying to exceed various limits
+	 * (soft limit check here, hard limit check just below).
+	 * Decreasing the pipe capacity is always permitted, even
+	 * if the user is currently over a limit.
+	 */
+	if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers &&
+			size > pipe_max_size && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
-			too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
-			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
+
+	if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers &&
+			(too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
+			 too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * We can shrink the pipe, if arg >= pipe->nrbufs. Since we don't
@@ -1051,13 +1065,17 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 	 * again like we would do for growing. If the pipe currently
 	 * contains more buffers than arg, then return busy.
 	 */
-	if (nr_pages < pipe->nrbufs)
-		return -EBUSY;
+	if (nr_pages < pipe->nrbufs) {
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+	}
 
 	bufs = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(*bufs),
 		       GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN);
-	if (unlikely(!bufs))
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (unlikely(!bufs)) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * The pipe array wraps around, so just start the new one at zero
@@ -1080,12 +1098,15 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 			memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
 	}
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
 	pipe->curbuf = 0;
 	kfree(pipe->bufs);
 	pipe->bufs = bufs;
 	pipe->buffers = nr_pages;
 	return nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+out_revert_acct:
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, nr_pages, pipe->buffers);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.5.5

[PATCH v2 5/8] pipe: simplify logic in alloc_pipe_info()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

Replace an 'if' block that covers most of the code in this function
with a 'goto'. This makes the code a little simpler to read, and also
simplifies the next patch (fix limit checking in alloc_pipe_info())

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index f45a173..256fc5a 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -625,33 +625,34 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
 struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 {
 	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
+	unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
+	struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
 
 	pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
-	if (pipe) {
-		unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
-		struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
-
-		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
-			if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
-				pipe_bufs = 1;
-			pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs,
-					     sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
-					     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
-		}
+	if (pipe == NULL)
+		goto out_free_uid;
+
+	if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
+		if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
+			pipe_bufs = 1;
+		pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs,
+				     sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
+				     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	}
 
-		if (pipe->bufs) {
-			init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
-			pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
-			pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
-			pipe->user = user;
-			account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
-			mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
-			return pipe;
-		}
-		free_uid(user);
-		kfree(pipe);
+	if (pipe->bufs) {
+		init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
+		pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
+		pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
+		pipe->user = user;
+		account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
+		mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
+		return pipe;
 	}
 
+	kfree(pipe);
+out_free_uid:
+	free_uid(user);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-- 
2.5.5

Re: [PATCH v2 5/8] pipe: simplify logic in alloc_pipe_info()

[Vegard Nossum]

On 08/29/2016 02:21 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> Replace an 'if' block that covers most of the code in this function
> with a 'goto'. This makes the code a little simpler to read, and also
> simplifies the next patch (fix limit checking in alloc_pipe_info())
>
> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
> Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> ---
>  fs/pipe.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
>  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
> index f45a173..256fc5a 100644
> --- a/fs/pipe.c
> +++ b/fs/pipe.c
> @@ -625,33 +625,34 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
>  struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
>  {
>  	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
> +	unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
> +	struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
>
>  	pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> -	if (pipe) {
> -		unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
> -		struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
> -
> -		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
> -			if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
> -				pipe_bufs = 1;
> -			pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs,
> -					     sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
> -					     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> -		}
> +	if (pipe == NULL)
> +		goto out_free_uid;

if (!pipe) would probably be more canonical, but I don't know anybody
really cares.


Vegard

Re: [PATCH v2 5/8] pipe: simplify logic in alloc_pipe_info()

[Vegard Nossum]

On 08/29/2016 02:21 AM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) wrote:
> Replace an 'if' block that covers most of the code in this function
> with a 'goto'. This makes the code a little simpler to read, and also
> simplifies the next patch (fix limit checking in alloc_pipe_info())
>
> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> Cc: socketpair-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org
> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel-JPay3/Yim36HaxMnTkn67Xf5DAMn2ifp@public.gmane.org>
> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe-b10kYP2dOMg@public.gmane.org>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>
> Cc: linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
> Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
> Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  fs/pipe.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
>  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
> index f45a173..256fc5a 100644
> --- a/fs/pipe.c
> +++ b/fs/pipe.c
> @@ -625,33 +625,34 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
>  struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
>  {
>  	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
> +	unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
> +	struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
>
>  	pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> -	if (pipe) {
> -		unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
> -		struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
> -
> -		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
> -			if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
> -				pipe_bufs = 1;
> -			pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs,
> -					     sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
> -					     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> -		}
> +	if (pipe == NULL)
> +		goto out_free_uid;

if (!pipe) would probably be more canonical, but I don't know anybody
really cares.


Vegard

[PATCH v2 6/8] pipe: fix limit checking in alloc_pipe_info()

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

The limit checking in alloc_pipe_info() (used by pipe(2) and when
opening a FIFO) has the following problems:

(1) When checking capacity required for the new pipe, the checks against
    the limit in /proc/sys/fs/pipe-user-pages-{soft,hard} are made
    against existing consumption, and exclude the memory required for
    the new pipe capacity. As a consequence: (1) the memory allocation
    throttling provided by the soft limit does not kick in quite as
    early as it should, and (2) the user can overrun the hard limit.

(2) As currently implemented, accounting and checking against the limits
    is done as follows:

    (a) Test whether the user has exceeded the limit.
    (b) Make new pipe buffer allocation.
    (c) Account new allocation against the limits.

    This is racey. Multiple processes may pass point (a) simultaneously,
    and then allocate pipe buffers that are accounted for only in step
    (c).  The race means that the user's pipe buffer allocation could be
    pushed over the limit (by an arbitrary amount, depending on how
    unlucky we were in the race). [Thanks to Vegard Nossum for spotting
    this point, which I had missed.]

This patch addresses the above problems as follows:

* Alter the checks against limits to include the memory required for the
  new pipe.
* Re-order the accounting step so that it precedes the buffer allocation.
  If the accounting step determines that a limit has been reached, revert
  the accounting and cause the operation to fail.

Patch history:

v2
   * Rework accounting checks to ensure that user cant get past
     too_many_pipe_buffers_soft() before the accounting is done.
     [Thanks to Vegard Nossum]

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 256fc5a..41a580a 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -632,24 +632,30 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 	if (pipe == NULL)
 		goto out_free_uid;
 
-	if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
-		if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
-			pipe_bufs = 1;
-		pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs,
-				     sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
-				     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
+
+	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user)) {
+		account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1);
+		pipe_bufs = 1;
 	}
 
+	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user))
+		goto out_revert_acct;
+
+	pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
+			     GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+
 	if (pipe->bufs) {
 		init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
 		pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
 		pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
 		pipe->user = user;
-		account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
 		mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
 		return pipe;
 	}
 
+out_revert_acct:
+	account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 0);
 	kfree(pipe);
 out_free_uid:
 	free_uid(user);
-- 
2.5.5

[PATCH v2 7/8] pipe: make account_pipe_buffers() return a value, and use it

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

This is an optional patch, to provide a small performance
improvement.  Alter account_pipe_buffers() so that it returns the
new value in user->pipe_bufs. This means that we can refactor
too_many_pipe_buffers_soft() and too_many_pipe_buffers_hard() to
avoid the costs of repeated use of atomic_long_read() to get the
value user->pipe_bufs.

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 41a580a..741560b 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -604,22 +604,20 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 	return retval;
 }
 
-static void account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user,
+static unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user,
                                  unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
 {
-	atomic_long_add(new - old, &user->pipe_bufs);
+	return atomic_long_add_return(new - old, &user->pipe_bufs);
 }
 
-static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user)
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs)
 {
-	return pipe_user_pages_soft &&
-	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_soft;
+	return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_soft;
 }
 
-static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)
 {
-	return pipe_user_pages_hard &&
-	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
+	return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
 }
 
 struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
@@ -627,19 +625,20 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
 	unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
 	struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
+	unsigned long user_bufs;
 
 	pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (pipe == NULL)
 		goto out_free_uid;
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
+	user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
 
-	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user)) {
-		account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1);
+	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) {
+		user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1);
 		pipe_bufs = 1;
 	}
 
-	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user))
+	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs))
 		goto out_revert_acct;
 
 	pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
@@ -655,7 +654,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 	}
 
 out_revert_acct:
-	account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 0);
+	(void) account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 0);
 	kfree(pipe);
 out_free_uid:
 	free_uid(user);
@@ -666,7 +665,7 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, 0);
+	(void) account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, 0);
 	free_uid(pipe->user);
 	for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
 		struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
@@ -1037,6 +1036,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
 	unsigned int size, nr_pages;
+	unsigned long user_bufs;
 	long ret = 0;
 
 	size = round_pipe_size(arg);
@@ -1056,11 +1056,11 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 			size > pipe_max_size && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
+	user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
 
 	if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers &&
-			(too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
-			 too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+			(too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) ||
+			 too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) &&
 			!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		goto out_revert_acct;
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg)
 	return nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
 
 out_revert_acct:
-	account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, nr_pages, pipe->buffers);
+	(void) account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, nr_pages, pipe->buffers);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.5.5

[PATCH v2 8/8] pipe: cap initial pipe capacity according to pipe-max-size limit

[Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)]

This is a patch that provides behavior that is more consistent, and
probably less surprising to users. I consider the change optional, and
welcome opinions about whether it should be applied.

By default, pipes are created with a capacity of 64 kiB.  However,
/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size may be set smaller than this value.  In this
scenario, an unprivileged user could thus create a pipe whose initial
capacity exceeds the limit. Therefore, it seems logical to cap the
initial pipe capacity according to the value of pipe-max-size.

The test program shown earlier in this patch series can be used to
demonstrate the effect of the change brought about with this patch:

    # cat /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    1048576
    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536
    # echo 10000 > /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    # cat /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size
    16384
    # sudo -u mtk ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1
    Initial pipe capacity: 16384
    # ./test_F_SETPIPE_SZ 1
    Initial pipe capacity: 65536

The last two executions of 'test_F_SETPIPE_SZ' show that pipe-max-size
caps the initial allocation for a new pipe for unprivileged users, but
not for privileged users.

Patch history:

v2
   * Switch order of tests in an 'if' statement to avoid a function
     call (to capability()) in normal path. [Thanks to Willy Tarreau]

Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: socketpair@gmail.com
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
 fs/pipe.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 741560b..10c5ad5 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -631,6 +631,9 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 	if (pipe == NULL)
 		goto out_free_uid;
 
+	if (pipe_bufs * PAGE_SIZE > pipe_max_size && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+		pipe_bufs = pipe_max_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
 	user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs);
 
 	if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) {
-- 
2.5.5