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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lizefan <lizefan@huawei.com>,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@parisplace.org,
	james.l.morris@oracle.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: isolate selinux_enforcing
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 08:39:10 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <347f63b5-c274-c7bc-55f7-f6304d31418a@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <58C11A6C.7000408@huawei.com>

On 3/9/2017 1:03 AM, yangshukui wrote:
> I want to use SELinux in system container and only concern the function in the container.
> this system container run in vm and every vm has only one system container.
>
> How do I use now?
> docker run ... system-contaier /sbin/init
> after init is running ,the following service is also running:
>
> #this is the part of service file which will run in container after starting the container.
> ..
> semodule -R     #use the policy in container.
> restorecon /     #if needed
> ..
>
> this method seem to work if host os and the docker images use the same content for rootfs, but if host use
> redhat7 and docker images use centos7, it will deny many normal operations , and this let some host service not work.
>
> If SELinux is permissive in host and enforcing in container ,it will resolve my problem. Unfortunately,
> there is no namespace for SELinux.

The LSM infrastructure is essentially a set of lists.
These lists are rooted globally, but there's no reason*
they couldn't be rooted in a namespace. That would give
each namespace the option of using whatever security
scheme was deemed appropriate. There are a number of
issues, such as namespacing policy, that would have to
be addressed, but the mechanism could work fine. I would
look at patches.

---
* Other than the sheer insanity of making security
  claims about such a system. I would not expect that
  minor issue to slow demand or deployment any more
  than it has in the past.

>
> Isolate SELinux is difficult and it has a lot of work to do, but is easier to isolate selinux_enforcing.
>
> What do you think ?
>
> Think you very much.
>
>
> -- 
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: casey@schaufler-ca.com (Casey Schaufler)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: isolate selinux_enforcing
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 08:39:10 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <347f63b5-c274-c7bc-55f7-f6304d31418a@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <58C11A6C.7000408@huawei.com>

On 3/9/2017 1:03 AM, yangshukui wrote:
> I want to use SELinux in system container and only concern the function in the container.
> this system container run in vm and every vm has only one system container.
>
> How do I use now?
> docker run ... system-contaier /sbin/init
> after init is running ,the following service is also running:
>
> #this is the part of service file which will run in container after starting the container.
> ..
> semodule -R     #use the policy in container.
> restorecon /     #if needed
> ..
>
> this method seem to work if host os and the docker images use the same content for rootfs, but if host use
> redhat7 and docker images use centos7, it will deny many normal operations , and this let some host service not work.
>
> If SELinux is permissive in host and enforcing in container ,it will resolve my problem. Unfortunately,
> there is no namespace for SELinux.

The LSM infrastructure is essentially a set of lists.
These lists are rooted globally, but there's no reason*
they couldn't be rooted in a namespace. That would give
each namespace the option of using whatever security
scheme was deemed appropriate. There are a number of
issues, such as namespacing policy, that would have to
be addressed, but the mechanism could work fine. I would
look at patches.

---
* Other than the sheer insanity of making security
  claims about such a system. I would not expect that
  minor issue to slow demand or deployment any more
  than it has in the past.

>
> Isolate SELinux is difficult and it has a lot of work to do, but is easier to isolate selinux_enforcing.
>
> What do you think ?
>
> Think you very much.
>
>
> -- 
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-03-09 16:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <58732BCF.4090908@huawei.com>
     [not found] ` <58734284.1060504@huawei.com>
     [not found]   ` <b7f75f65-592a-5102-0ac5-4d3aa43f0b55@huawei.com>
2017-01-09 10:51     ` SELinux lead to soft lockup when pid 1 proceess reap child yangshukui
2017-01-09 18:12       ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-01-09 18:29         ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-01-09 18:43           ` Stephen Smalley
2017-01-09 23:49             ` Paul Moore
2017-01-10  0:26             ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-09  9:03       ` isolate selinux_enforcing yangshukui
2017-03-09  9:03         ` yangshukui
2017-03-09 15:28         ` Stephen Smalley
2017-03-09 15:28           ` Stephen Smalley
2017-03-09 15:39           ` Stephen Smalley
2017-03-09 15:39             ` Stephen Smalley
2017-03-09 16:39         ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2017-03-09 16:39           ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-09 20:49           ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-03-09 20:49             ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-03-10  0:05             ` Paul Moore
2017-03-10  0:05               ` Paul Moore
2017-03-13  7:06             ` James Morris
2017-03-13  7:06               ` James Morris
2017-03-13 16:05               ` Casey Schaufler
2017-03-13 16:05                 ` Casey Schaufler

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